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STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, 1960

COMPANION VOLUME

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FOREWORD

The present volume, covering the year 1960, is the fourteenth in the series relating to the foreign policy of Israel. It is being issued before the volumes dealing with the years 1954 to 1959, which will be published in due course.

This volume differs from those published so far in that the documents do not appear chronologically but are arranged in chapters devoted each to a different subject — each chapter, however, being arranged in an inner chronological order. It is also different in that the editor is a retired diplomat, formerly with Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The priority given to the year 1960, the change in the order in which the documents appear and the co-opting of retired officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the editorial work, have all been carried out in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the object being to close the gap between the declassification of the documents after the lapse of thirty years and their being made available to the public.

Most of the documents appearing in this volume come from the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept in the Israel State Archives. A number of documents have been taken from the files of the Prime Minister's Office, which are also kept in the Archives, and from the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, the Ben-Gurion Archives and the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. In writing the footnotes and the Introduction, the editors have been aided by material found in other archival divisions of the State Archives, by documents from the British Public Record Office, and by those of the Department of State appearing in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Minutes of Cabinet meetings, though still classified, have been made available to the editors and have served as a source of information.

Arrangement of documents. The documents have been divided into 23 chapters, the initial ones dealing with Israel's existential problems, such as the situation on the borders, the water issue, freedom of navigation and the relations with the United Nations; then come the relations with other countries in geographical order, the opening chapter of this division illustrating Israel's relations with the United States, while the other chapters deal with the relations with other countries. Extensive treatment is devoted to the relations with Asian and African countries — a subject of importance to Israel in that period. The geographical division also includes chapters on the relations with European economic organizations and with the Vatican, because of the close connection of these matters with the relations with West European countries.

The final chapters are concerned with the Jewish Diaspora, a special chapter being devoted to the apprehension of Adolf Eichmann.

This system, *mutatis mutandis*, will apply also to the volumes to be published in future. Within each chapter the documents appear in chronological order. Reports on discussions or on meetings have been placed according to the date on which they were composed and not the date on which the event reported took place.

The text. The text printed in the Main Volume is that of the original document, exept for the following editorial changes and emendations:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees, as well as dates in their original form, have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes, the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in a standard format, in the heading supplied by the editor (see below), or in a note.

(b) A number of passages that are of a personal nature, or of no direct relevance to foreign policy, have been omitted. All such omissions are indicated in the text and as a rule are explained in the notes.

(c) Minor errors (slips of the pen, typographical errors, misspellings) have been corrected silently. No attempt has been made beyond that to correct style, syntax or grammar.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been expanded to full form in square brackets on their first appearance in the document. Subsequently, the abbreviations have been retained in the text. Abbreviations of proper names have always been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., UN, I.D.F., U.S. etc.) have not been altered.

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets) or on the basis of a parallel text of the same document (in square brackets and with an explanatory note).

(f) Original punctuation and capitalization, as well as British or American spellings, have been retained to the extent possible. Corrections have been made only in cases of obvious mistakes or to avoid misunderstandings. In telegrams, where the original punctuation is partial, the editors exercised much greater liberty in determining capitalization and punctuation.

(g) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia*, the file reference of the document and the place of destination, except where the addressee is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some other agency of the Government of Israel. The origin of the document and the date of its composition or transmission are given in standard format in the heading.

Editorial notes. These provide information on important events or developments and are numbered sequentially along with the documents. They

precede the earliest document that contains a reference to the subject or appear according to the date on which the event took place.

Footnotes. The annotations consist mainly of numbered footnotes, explanatory notes, and cross-references, intended to illuminate topics that might otherwise be unclear and to indicate other documents that contain additional information. The cross-references occasionally are to files and documents that remain classified, on the assumption that they will eventually be made available to scholars.

Biographical information has been provided when necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the text is provided in the index of persons.

Companion Volume. This companion volume consists of English summaries of the Hebrew documents, a translation of the editorial notes, footnotes, introduction and list of documents, and the indexes to the Main Volume.

Index and list of documents. A list of documents and editorial notes, indicating their main subject, appears at the beginning of the volume; two indexes — of persons and of topics and places — are at the end of this volume. References in the index are to document numbers.

We would like to thank all the individuals and institutions who helped in the preparation of this volume: Moshe Raviv, Israel's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who, while Assistant Director-General for Information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated the co-option of veteran diplomats to assist in the editing of these volumes; Ambassador Michael Elitzur of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who read the manuscript and made many useful comments; Ambassador Yaacov Shimoni, who read the chapter on the relations between Israel and Asia and made many comments and emendations; veteran diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, too numerous to be mentioned by name, whom the editor consulted while editing this volume; Mr. Uri Elgom, director of the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, and Mrs. Michal Zur, of the IMDEA staff, for their assistance in locating additional documentation; Dr. Tuvia Friling, of the Ben-Gurion Archives, for his assistance with Ben-Gurion material.

We would like to thank all those who provided biographical information about themselves or others mentioned in the documents.

Introduction

Nineteen-sixty can be counted as one of the ten years of peace enjoyed by Israel between the final withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip in 1957, and the Six Day War in 1967. Israel used this respite for both internal and external consolidation — strengthening its army, its international standing and its economy, and absorbing the continuous stream of immigrants.

The Arab states, headed by the United Arab Republic, reiterated their intention to destroy Israel, and attempted to weaken its international standing and security. In March, a war between the U.A.R. and Israel was avoided by a hairsbreadth; the Suez Canal was closed to Israeli shipping and to Israeli trade in foreign vessels; attempts were made to foil Israel's plans to divert the waters of the Jordan to the arid Negev; threats of boycott were directed at companies planning to establish economic ties with Israel; the problem of the Palestinian refugees was exploited for vilifying Israel.

In view of the Arab states' threats and their accelerated rate of rearmament, with the active help of the Soviet Union, Israel aimed at adding the United States to the list of its main suppliers of armaments — France, Britain and West Germany. However, efforts to obtain ground-to-air missiles, so vital for Israel's defence, from the U.S. were unsuccessful.

The Arab states acted to foil Israel's political initiatives in various spheres, such as attempts to come to an association agreement with the European Economic Community; attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Israel's activity among the new Asian and African states.

A historic meeting between Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer took place in New York in March. This was the year's central event in Israel's international relations, and important economic and military aid was promised to Israel by the Chancellor. Ben-Gurion also met U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and French President Charles de Gaulle, raising in his talks not only subjects relating to bilateral relations but also issues of world importance — such as relations between East and West, and the approach that should be taken to the new Asian and African states — a manifestation of his standing as an "elder statesman" on the world scene. However, his attempts to meet the leaders of the Soviet Union proved fruitless, and the Soviets and their satellites in eastern Europe remained hostile to, and estranged from, Israel.

Israel's relations with the countries of Oceania and Latin America were normal and eventless, and there are accordingly no documents relating to these countries in this volume; the exception was Argentina, where a crisis

arose in connection with the Eichmann affair which, however, blew over very rapidly.

The situation on the borders

The ongoing dispute over the cultivation of land between the settlers of Tel Qatsir (or Beit Qatsir) in the southern demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria[1] and the inhabitants of the evacuated village of Khirbet Tawafiq (or Lower Tawafiq) who resided in Syria but kept on working some of their lands, continued to cause problems in 1960. Lands under Jewish and Arab ownership were intertwined, which made it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The situation deteriorated at the beginning of the agricultural season of 1959/60, after the Arabs, covered by the Syrian army and with the support of U.N. personnel, began tilling land which had hitherto remained fallow. As attempts to drive them away proved unsuccessful, an Israeli policeman being killed in the process, the Israeli forces attacked Khirbet Tawafiq, which was in effect a Syrian position, on February 1st, and demolished its fortifications.[2] The Syrians complained to the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, but Israel refused to attend the meeting, claiming that the Syrians had no standing in what went on in the demilitarized zones. The Commission censured Israel for its action in Khirbet Tawafiq and called on it to refrain from any acts which might endanger the status of the demilitarized zone and the rights of its Arab inhabitants. The Chief of Staff of the U.N. Supervision Organisation, General Von Horn, composed a report summing up developments in this affair since 1954, and endeavoured, not always with success, to adopt a neutral position.[3] A. Biran, Director of the Armistice Affairs Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented on this report in his memorandum of April.[4]

In the aftermath of the I.D.F.'s action in Khirbet Tawafiq, the threat of war between Israel, and Egypt and Syria, then united under the name of "the United Arab Republic" (U.A.R.), was in the air. Increased military activity was observed in both parts of the U.A.R. during the second part of February. In Syria, the high state of alert instituted after the Khirbet Tawafiq action was not called off, while in Egypt troops were put on a similar high alert, reserves were called up, and infantry and armour poured into Sinai. Israel received

1 On the establishment of the demilitarized zones between Israel and Syria, see *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, Vol. 3, Companion Volume, pp. XXXIII–XL.

2 For a full account of the episode, see No. 31.

3 Published as U.N. Document S/4270 of February 23rd, 1960 — see No. 12.

4 *Ibid.*, note 6.

information that the U.A.R. was negotiating with the U.N. Emergency Force with the aim of having it evacuate the area should hostilities break out. Israel's assessment was that the U.A.R. had put its army on the alert for fear of Israel's attempting to retaliate for its "defeat" (as claimed by the Arabs) at Khirbet Tawafiq. The Soviet Union was also discovered to be adding fuel to the fire.

Israel hoped at first that the military tension would ease off when the U.A.R. became convinced that Israel had no aggressive intentions, but this did not occur. The President of the U.A.R., Gamal Abd-el-Nasser, even went to Syria and made inflammatory speeches, aggravating the atmosphere which was tense in any case because of additional issues: the dispute over the waters of the Jordan, and the closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. Israel therefore approached the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, and the Western powers,[5] requesting them to pass on to the U.A.R. the message that Israel had no aggressive intentions against it, and that its troop concentrations should be dispersed and bellicose preparations stopped, otherwise Israel would have to mobilize its own troops as an elementary precaution. Israel's interlocutors tried at first to controvert its information,[6] and the spokesman of the Department of State went as far as to issue (on February 27th, 1960) a statement voicing concern about the happenings in the Middle East, and calling on both the U.A.R. and Israel to exercise restraint. However, after they had become convinced of the authenticity of Israel's information, the U.N. Secretary-General and the United States consented to pass on Israel's message to Cairo. The Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, left for the U.S. and Britain on March 27th, and this also served to alleviate the tension. The U.A.R. began slowly to reduce its forces in the first half of March, and the tension was relieved accordingly.[7]

The borders with Lebanon and Jordan were generally tranquil. Israel's and Jordan's wish to keep their borders quiet was reflected in an exchange of messages through the good offices of the United States. This intention was again given expression in Ben-Gurion's letter to King Hussein after the assassination of Jordan's Prime Minister, Hazza' al-Majali, in August 1960.[8]

5 Only America was requested by Israel to intervene in Cairo, while Britain and France, whose relations with the U.A.R. were not at their best at that time, were requested to urge Hammarskjöld on. The Soviet Union was not approached owing to its role in increasing the tension.

6 See Nos 17 and 19.

7 See Nos 26 and 27.

8 See No. 29.

The dispute over the waters of the Jordan

The dispute over water was one of the main points at issue between Israel and the Arab countries. At President Eisenhower's initiative, the Americans had attempted, during the '50's, to bring Israel and the Arab countries to an agreement on this issue, by sending a special envoy, Eric Johnston, to the Middle East. For two years, from October 1953 to October 1955, Johnston negotiated with the parties, and proposed a plan for exploiting the water of the Jordan and of the Yarmuk. As Johnston's plan was not approved by the Arab League, the United States promised Israel and Jordan financial assistance for the implementation of their own water schemes within the framework of the Johnston plan.[9]

The year under review opened with rumours about Lebanon's intention to divert the water of the Hasbani, but this idea was never implemented. Nor did the Arab states succeed in embroiling the U.N. Secretary-General in their conflict with Israel over the water issue. Israel, on its part, in a letter from Ben-Gurion, informed Secretary-General Hammarskjöld that any interference by the Arabs with the Jordan water would constitute a *casus belli*.[10]

An agreement granting to Israel a loan of $15m for the installation of the "Central Israel Water Conduit" forming an important part of the overall Israel water scheme, was signed in Washington on June 30th.[11] The work on this plan continued unimpeded until its completion in 1964.

The passage through the Suez Canal

At the beginning of the year two ships were berthed in Port Said, at the entrance to the Suez Canal — the *Inge Toft* and the *Astypalea*. They both carried goods exported from Israel and both were prevented by the Egyptians from entering the Canal.

The *Inge Toft*, which had anchored in Port Said in May 1959, was in need of urgent repairs, and in February 1960 she was therefore instructed by her owners to discharge her cargo in the port and to sail north, after being forced to pay for the unloading of the cargo, which was confiscated by the Egyptians.

The *Astypalea* was dispatched following an agreement achieved in Cairo in June 1959 between Hammarskjöld and Nasser (the so-called "practical stand") according to which Israeli export goods carried under f.o.b. conditions

9 See A. Soffer, *Rivers of Fire* (Hebrew), pp. 145–146.

10 See No. 103.

11 See No. 115.

would be considered the property of the buyer from the moment of their shipment from Israel, and would be permitted to pass through the Canal in non-Israeli vessels. The same would apply to imports to Israel under c.i.f. conditions, these to be considered the property of the seller until their arrival in Israel. All this would be effective on condition that no publicity be given to the shipments and that these would constitute "honest trade", that is, passage of ships and cargoes dispatched for "political reasons" would not be permitted.[12]

Hammarskjöld was informed in advance of the *Astypalea*'s departure. He supported this move, and expressed his conviction that the ship would be allowed through the Canal. Israel imposed a news blackout on the ship's movements, but in spite of this the vessel was detained in Port Said on December 17th, 1959, on her way from Haifa to Djibouti with a cargo of cement destined for a buyer in Asmara.

Hammarskjöld, who left for Cairo in January to arrange for the ship's release, was informed that the ship's documents did not comply, on the face of it, with the stipulations of the "practical stand", and that it had been dispatched with the aim of preventing the World Bank from approving the U.A.R.'s application for a loan for the development of the Suez Canal.

Israel supplied Hammarskjöld with the ship's documents in its possession, though objecting in principle to having them examined as it was clear to Israel that the cargo had been shipped under f.o.b. conditions. However, the examination by U.N. experts was prolonged beyond the expiry date of the ship's charter, and the *Astypalea*'s captain was forced to discharge his cargo and return to Piraeus.

With the end of the *Astypalea* affair, Hammarskjöld issued a statement (on April 8th) saying that the U.N.'s position on the right of free passage through the Suez Canal remained unchanged, and that the obstacles he had met in his efforts to improve matters could be explained by various circumstances but not, he said, "by attitudes which could discourage me from continuing". However, at a press conference on May 6th, when asked whether the dispatch of the *Astypalea* had been preceded by an agreement or an understanding with Nasser, he replied: "The fact is certainly 100 percent known to me, and the fact is that there has never been any agreement. And that is well known to all Parties. There cannot be an agreement without two parties, and I have never agreed to anything on my side.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Golda Meir, reacted to Hammarskjöld's

12 See memorandum of a talk of July 4th, 1959, between Bunche and Cordier on behalf of the U.N. and Tekoah and Eilan, filed under 130.23/3112/9II, and telegram WNT787 of 4.7.1959 from the Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, filed under 130.09/2314/9.

statement in her speech in the Knesset of May 23rd, 1960,[13] quoting her own words in the Knesset of May 22nd, 1959,[14] and concluded by saying that she could neither add to, nor subtract from, what Hammarskjöld had told Israel at the time.

These developments forced Israel to abandon its efforts to change the U.A.R.'s position on passage through the Suez Canal, and to use the port of Eilat instead for its trade with East Africa and the Far East.

The *Astypalea* affair had after-effects in the United States — the boycott declared by the stevedores of the port of New York on the Egyptian ship *Cleopatra* in April 1960.

The Arab boycott of Israel

The Arab use of the boycott as an instrument of economic warfare against Israel had begun with the establishment of the state, in continuation of the boycott declared by the Arab League on the Jewish community in Palestine in 1945. The implementation of the boycott was entrusted to a central office in Damascus and regional offices in the Arab states, the entire organization answering to the Arab League.

World reaction to the boycott was wholly ineffective. Not only did the various states refrain from legislating against the boycott, but it turned out that even governmental bodies like the U.S. Navy[15] and the French state car manufacturer "Renault" were among those submitting to it.[16] Israel therefore could not expect help from abroad, except on the part of world Jewry. The Division for Politico-Economic Planning was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1960, and entrusted with the task of planning, guiding and leading preventive measures against the Arab boycott. However, the number of foreign companies which decided to liquidate their investments in Israel was not large, and the main damage caused by the boycott lay in its deterring potential investors from investing capital and know-how in Israel.[17]

The refugee problem

The problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine originating in the battles of

13 See *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 1292–1293.
14 *Ibid.*, December 22nd, 1959, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 176–177; also No. 50 and note 3 there.
15 See Nos 79–82.
16 See No. 83.
17 See No. 92.

the War of Independence, still remained unsolved in 1960. Israel adhered to its position that the refugees could not be repatriated and that their rehabilitation should be attempted in their present countries of residence, and rejected the Arab states' demand that they should be given the right of deciding between repatriation to Israel and compensation for their property.

The issue was taken up in the debate on the report by the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) which took place at the meeting of the Special Political Committee of the 15th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, from November 14th to December 19th, 1960. A report by another body set up by the General Assembly — the Palestine Conciliation Commission — was also insinuated into the debate.[18]

The Arab states raised the issue of the appearance before the Political Committee of a Palestinian Arab delegation, in contrast to previous years, when only a single Palestinian delegate had been admitted. Israel opposed the appearance of a Palestinian delegation, and ultimately the Palestinians were allowed to address the Political Committee as in the past, namely, as "individual Palestinian refugees", and to confine themselves to commenting on UNRWA's report.

Israel succeeded in preventing a debate on the report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, arguing that this body's reports were being submitted exclusively to the U.N. Secretary-General.

The representatives of 25 states took part in the debate. As no resolution could be arrived at, the issue was deferred to the second part of the 15th Session of the General Assembly, which took place in March–April 1961.

Israel and the United Nations

The United Nations continued to be involved in almost all the issues between Israel and the Arab states. The U.N. Observers continued their surveillance over Israel's borders, and, as in the past, Israel was not always happy with their actions.

The documents offered on this subject deal mainly with contacts between the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, and the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, which culminated in a meeting between the two in New York on March 14th, 1960. Unfortunately, there was no one else present at the meeting, therefore only a very few fragments of information in writing exist on what transpired there.[19]

18 See No. 99.
19 See No. 103.

Some time later relations between the two personalities took a turn for the worse, owing to a sarcastic remark interpolated by Ben-Gurion in his reply to Hammarskjöld's note, in which the latter expressed his concern about various events in Africa, in the Far East and in the Middle East and his opinion of the functioning of the U.N. in these areas.[20]

On top of Hammarskjöld's hurt feelings came the affair of Israel's medical aid to Congo (July–September 1960) which was organized as Hammarskjöld argued without prior coordination with the U.N. Ben-Gurion, on his part, attempted to conciliate Hammarskjöld, and sent him a long missive explaining the background to the medical aid affair, and another letter praising Hammarskjöld's intervention in the Congo crisis. However Hammarskjöld limited his replies to a non-committal acknowledgment of Ben-Gurion's letters.[21]

Israel and the United States

Israel's ties with the United States remained the cornerstone of its foreign relations. The scars of the Sinai Campaign were gradually disappearing, a process which had already begun in 1957 and intensified during 1958, a year of many upheavals in the Middle East.[22]

The American administration's attitude towards Israel's practical needs remained a function, to a large degree, of its relations with the Arab world in general and with the U.A.R. in particular. This said, there were other considerations which acted for a more positive attitude towards Israel, among them public opinion and the influence of the Jewish community in America. However, Israel's requests were assessed and judged, by and large, by the yardstick of the expected Arab reaction. As a result, the administration tended to respond coolly to Israel's requests, and, when these were approved, it was sometimes stipulated that the fact be kept a secret from the Arab states.[23] This was the background against which negotiations between the two countries

20 See Nos 106 and 107.

21 See Nos 113 and 114.

22 Egypt and Syria formed a union on February 1st, 1958, under the name of "the United Arab Republic". Iraq and Jordan reacted to that move on February 14th by forming the "Arab Union" (or the "Arab Federation"). The military coup of July 14th, 1958, in Baghdad put an end to the pro-Western Hashemite regime and to the "Arab Union", and resulted in Iraq's withdrawal in March 1959 from the "Baghdad pact". Lebanon and Jordan, in their fear of the U.A.R. and the new regime in Iraq, asked for the help (in July 1958) of the United States and Britain, respectively, and met with a positive response. Israel played its part in allowing passage in its airspace to British and American aircraft transporting troops and equipment from Cyprus to Jordan.

23 See No. 134.

took place on the principal issues of the year under review, arms procurement and financial aid for implementation of water projects.

Procurement of arms was the most sensitive issue in relations between Israel and the U.S., and here the American administration adopted the position that Israel's requests could not be fulfilled because this might adversely affect relations between the U.S. and the Arab states and restrict America's ability to act to relieve tensions in the Middle East. In addition, the U.S. feared that the supply of arms to Israel on its part would cause the Soviet Union to do the same for the Arab states, a process which would intensify the arms race in the area.[24] Israel therefore had to look for other sources of procurement, to France,[25] Britain,[26] and even the Federal Republic of Germany.[27] The U.S. approved of this step, and sometimes even helped Israel with financing of the procurement. The negative attitude of the United States was slightly and temporarily breached in 1958, when it agreed to sell to Israel 100 recoilless guns, a purely defensive weapon. However, this occurred only after America had supplied a number of Arab states with various types of arms, not always of a defensive nature.[28]

The intensified rearmament of the Arab states, and of the U.A.R. in particular, with the active assistance of the Soviet Union worried Israel greatly, mainly when it touched the problem of aerial defence. This was the reason behind the great efforts made to change America's attitude. The Israel Embassy in Washington delivered a note to the Department of State in February, in which it requested the provision of various items, mainly "Hawk" missiles and electronic equipment.[29] The Prime Minister participated in the effort during his unofficial visit to the U.S. in March 1960, ostensibly for the conferment of the degree of "Doctor honoris causa" by Brandeis University. He raised the subject of arms procurement in his talks with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and others.[30] The Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir again raised the subject with the Secretary of State in June,[31] but the results were disappointing: only the request for the electronic items, mainly radar systems, was approved. (A partial breakthrough in the matter occurred only in 1962, during the presidency of John F. Kennedy.)[32]

24 See No. 135.

25 See M. Gazit, "Sharett, Ben-Gurion and the big arms deal of 1956 with France", *Gesher* (Hebrew), Winter–Spring 1983/84, No. 1/108, pp. 86–100.

26 See Chapter 4.

27 See No. 214, note 1, and No. 215, note 5.

28 See M. Gazit, *Israel's Arms Procurement from the United States* (Hebrew), pp. 22–23.

29 See Nos 127 and 128.

30 See Nos 135–137.

31 See No. 166.

32 See M. Gazit, *ibid.*, p. 28.

Much better results were obtained in the matter of financial aid for the water projects. Here also America's concern for its relations with the Arab countries brought about a stalemate, but the breakthrough came when Israel announced in 1959 that it intended to earmark the requested loan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit", whose function would be to convey water from northern Israel to the centre and the south — in other words, "Israeli water" whose ownership was not under dispute, in contrast to the "National Water Conduit". However, Israel did not conceal its intention eventually to incorporate the two projects. The talks held in Washington in November 1959 between Israeli and American experts allayed America's fears that Israel intended to exceed the quota of water allotted to it in the negotiations which had given birth to the "Johnston plan". The way was thus paved for the note of January 1960 from the Department of State informing the Israel embassy that there were no longer any political reservations regarding the loan for the "Central Conduit"; however, Israel was requested to keep the matter confidential for fear of repercussions in the Arab world.[33] The agreement granting Israel a loan of $15m for this purpose from the "Development Loan Fund" was signed on June 30th.[34]

In 1960, as in previous years, the United States was called on to adopt a stance on various issues in the Israel–Arab conflict, in particular in the matter of the boycott and the restrictions on passage through the Suez Canal. The U.S. supported in principle free navigation through the Canal and opposed the Arab boycott of Israel ("These undesirable restrictions... are an outgrowth of the Palestine problem... It is our Government's firm conviction that an Arab–Israel settlement will one day come, not by coercion but by a spirit of accommodation on both sides. As progress is made in that direction, such problems as boycotts, restrictions and homeless refugees will disappear.")[35]

In January 1960 it was revealed that the American Navy, submitting to the Arab boycott, did not allow tankers which had anchored in Israeli ports to take part in tenders for the supply of fuel. This discrimination was abolished after Jewish organizations protested to President Eisenhower, and the Israel embassy lodged a note of protest with the Department of State.[36]

The United States declared its support for U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's efforts to ensure free navigation in the Suez Canal, but even when it proved he was helpless in the matter, especially in the *Astypalea* affair, the U.S. never went beyond declaratory steps. Moreover, when the

33 See No. 115.

34 See No. 168.

35 See No. 153, and Dillon's letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *FRUS* 1958–60, Vol. XIII, No. 145, pp. 315–318.

36 See Chapter 4.

seamen's and stevedores' unions in New York prevented, in April 1960, the unloading of the Egyptian ship *Cleopatra* in protest against the Arab boycott, the Department of State hastened to intervene and bring about the termination of the strike in its fear of possible harmful effects on America's relations with the Arab states in general and with the U.A.R. in particular.[37] The subject was also raised in the debates in the Senate in April–May 1960 on the Foreign Aid Law for the American financial year 1961.

In February–March 1960, tension mounted between Israel and the U.A.R. owing to troop concentrations in Sinai and on Israel's northern border in the aftermath of the incidents which culminated in the Khirbet Tawafiq action in the early hours of February 1st. The United States then acceded to Israel's request to inform the U.A.R. that there were no grounds for its fear of Israel and that it should therefore cease its warlike preparations and disperse troop concentrations. In the event, the American move was very helpful in relieving the tension.[38]

The United States did not consider the time ripe for a diplomatic effort to settle the Israeli–Arab conflict, except for the Palestine Arab refugee problem. Contrary to Israel's opinion, the U.S. thought that immediate action was possible to advance the solution of the problem, which should include the repatriation of a certain number of refugees to Israel. The administration even sometimes argued that there was a connection between the refugee problem and the Suez Canal issue.[39]

In November 1960 the United States announced that its technical assistance to Israel would come to a close in June 1962. In a joint statement the reasons were given as (1) the progress made in Israel's technological development, and (2) America's need to review the distribution of its resources and to allocate technical assistance to new countries.

Nineteen-sixty was a presidential election year in America. The elections took place on November 8th. Jewish or Israeli issues did not surface in the campaigns, but both parties included in their platforms planks favourable to Israel.

The affair of the nuclear reactor being built by Israel in the Negev overshadowed relations between the U.S. and Israel in the period between the elections and the swearing-in of the new administration. Ambassador Harman was summoned to give explanations on the matter, following information received by the U.S. government. The issue also appeared in the media, including the press outside the U.S.[40]

37 See No. 150.

38 See No. 15.

39 See Nos 134 and 190.

40 See Editorial Note, No. 198.

In order to clear the atmosphere, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion delivered a statement in the Knesset on December 21st to the effect that the reactor was designed solely for peaceful uses, and would serve the needs of industry, agriculture, medicine and science. A similar statement, with additional explanations, was delivered on the same day by Ambassador Harman to Secretary of State Harter, whose main concern was the guarantees to be given in respect of the utilization of plutonium, which could be used in the manufacture of atomic bombs.[41] With the change of administration the issue was temporarily shelved, but it was raised again in the meeting between Ben-Gurion and the new President John F. Kennedy, in May 1961.

Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany

Israel's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany continued after the Israeli representative, Ambassador F.E. Shinnar, head of the Reparations Mission in Cologne, obtained, in May 1959, an undertaking from Chancellor Adenauer to have diplomatic relations established by the end of that year.[42] These expectations did not eventuate when it became clear that Germany was not yet ready to take this step.

This situation reflected a reversal in the stands previously taken by the two sides. In 1952, following the signing of the reparations agreement, Chancellor Adenauer had proposed to Israel the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, at that time, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who had guided the development of relations between the two countries from the beginning and had coined the phrase "the other Germany", thought the time was not ripe because Israeli public opinion would reject such a step.[43]

At that time the Federal Republic saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state as a means of gaining sympathy and goodwill in the West in its efforts to obliterate the memory of the crimes of the Nazi regime, of gaining re-admission to the family of nations, and of acceptance as the sole representative of united Germany.

However, with the improvement in its international standing, the Federal Republic later decided that there was no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. There were in addition good reasons against such a step, since the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and financial and business

41 See Nos 199–201.

42 See Shinnar to the Foreign Ministry, telegram RM/685 of 22.5.1959, filed under 130.09/2354/8.

43 See A. Ben-Natan, "The Way to the Establishment of Relations: the Israeli Aspect", in *Normal Relations, the Relations between Israel and Germany* (Hebrew), p. 24.

circles preferred political and economic ties with the Arab states, exploiting the fact that Germany could not be accused of imperialist designs, in contrast to Britain and France, whose invasion of Egypt in November 1956 had not yet been forgotten. The West German Ministry of Foreign Afairs feared also that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would drive the Arab states to recognize the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and to establish diplomatic relations with it, which would have forced West Germany to break off relations with these countries in accordance with the "Hallstein Doctrine".

Owing to the improvement in West Germany's international standing, Israel began to attach greater importance to the establishment of diplomatic relations with that country. It would constitute a notable victory over the Arab states, and would serve as a precedent for other countries, such as Turkey, Ethiopia, Greece and Iran.[44] However, owing to the evasive tactics adopted by the Germans, Ben-Gurion decided that this matter should be left to Germany's initiative,[45] and that efforts should be aimed at cementing practical ties between the two countries — namely, full implementation by Germany of the reparations agreement, economic and trade relations, and also the valuable, though secret, aid extended by the Federal Republic to Israel in the matter of arms procurement.

That was the reason why the subject of diplomatic relations was not raised at the historic meeting between Ben-Gurion and Chancellor Adenauer which took place in New York on March 14th, 1960. In the course of that meeting, which demonstrated the formal reconciliation between the Jewish people and the new Germany under Adenauer, Ben-Gurion described the catastrophe visited on the Jewish people by the Nazi regime and, after outlining Israel's efforts to rehabilitate the survivors, requested Adenauer to authorize a line of credit of $40m to $50m annually for the coming ten years, which would be used mainly for the development of the Negev. He also asked for further aid in arms procurement, following the talks between representatives of the Israeli Ministry of Defence and the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic, Franz Josef Strauss.[46]

The Chancellor agreed in principle to Ben-Gurion's requests, but nothing was put on paper. They both decided that further action in the matter would be taken by Shinnar and by the appropriate authorities in Germany. It soon became clear that there were many formal obstacles to surmount. Adenauer's undertaking obligated Germany from the moral but not from the legal point of view. Shinnar therefore had to work very hard to implement what had been

44 See No. 230.
45 See No. 209.
46 See No. 215.

agreed on in New York, and Ben-Gurion, too, took part in the campaign. He exchanged messages with Adenauer, but it was only in December 1961 that the first payment was made on account of the promised credit.

Israel and France

The special relations between France and Israel which had developed in the course of close cooperation between the defence establishments of the two countries, which saw in Nasser their common enemy, continued to deteriorate. These relations had taken the form of some sort of informal alliance since the Sinai campaign, and contacts between the two countries were mostly confined to the military bodies even in matters which did not touch them directly.

This state of affairs underwent a change with the return to power of General de Gaulle, who did not approve of relations with foreign countries outside the accepted framework. His desire to find a solution to the problem of Algeria, and the plans of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Couve de Murville,[47] to bring about a revival of France's influence as a power in the Middle East — the Arab countries of which, except for Lebanon, had severed their relations with France following its invasion of Egypt — accelerated the change in France's attitude. This was intensified after the solution of the Algerian issue in 1962, and culminated on the eve of the Six-Day War, in May 1967, when France imposed an arms embargo on Israel.

However, during the year under review France was still Israel's main supplier of arms, and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was received very warmly on his visit to Paris in June 1960. De Gaulle promised him "an umbrella" against Arab aggression ("We shall not allow you to be destroyed, if you are attacked — we shall come to your defence").[48] Both leaders agreed that the Western powers should pay special attention to the new states in Asia and Africa in order not to abandon them to Soviet influence,[49] and they embarked on an exchange of correspondence, mainly on this subject.[50]

The Algerian issue confronted Israel with a dilemma as to the stance it should adopt at the United Nations, where the issue was raised year after year, starting with 1955, by the Arab states, with the support of various African and Asian countries. Israel had to decide whether to give its support to France, its old ally, or to its new friends in the "Third World". Fortunately, a group of

47 Couve de Murville was ambassador to Egypt in the years 1950–1954.
48 See No. 251.
49 See No. 250.
50 See Nos 256 and 257.

African Francophone countries, formerly French colonies, maintained close relations with their former mother country and represented its interests during the debates at the U.N. (France itself boycotted these debates, claiming that the issue was a domestic affair, as Algeria was formally a part of metropolitan France). These countries submitted several draft resolutions which were intended to avoid damage to French interests, and which enabled Israel to vote for them.[51]

Israel and Britain

Britain's Middle Eastern policy and its relations with the Arab states continued to affect its relations with Israel. The more Britain shed its possessions in the region, the better its relations with Israel grew.[52] The turning-point came in 1958, when Jordan was threatened by an Egyptian takeover following Qassem's coup in Iraq. Israel acceded to Britain's request to allow passage over its airspace to British planes bearing troops and equipment in support of the Hashemite king. This goodwill gesture by Israel paved the way to a meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs Meir and her British colleague, which resulted in a notable improvement in relations. In the same year Britain approved some requests by Israel for military equipment: tanks, submarines and cannons, but refused to supply it with missiles. From that point on, Britain saw Israel as a positive influence in the region, capable of containing the Nasserite threat of expansion. However, the fear remained that approval of all of Israel's requests in the field of military procurement would "encourage it to embark on dubious adventures".[53]

Another negative factor in the complex of relations with Israel was Britain's desire to safeguard its economic interests in the Arab states and to reconcile itself with the U.A.R.; Hence its tendency to avoid any outward expression of the improvement of its relations with Israel. This was demonstrated by the "low profile" accorded to Deputy Minister of Defence Peres's visit,[54] and by the cancellation of the planned visit of the Chief of Staff of the I.D.F., Rav-Aluf Ch. Laskov.[55]

Nevertheless, Britain agreed to host Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on his

51 See Nos 254 and 260.

52 British General John Bagot Glubb was dismissed from his post of commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion in March 1956. In July of the same year, Britain evacuated its bases in the Suez Canal area, and in May 1959 it evacuated its forces from Iraq.

53 See statement by A. Lourie at the conference of the heads of missions in September 1962, filed under 130.23/3420/18.

54 See No. 61.

55 See Nos 269 and 271.

way back from his visit to the United States in March 1960. At the meeting with British Prime Minister Macmillan, both statesmen agreed that the West should do its utmost to gain the friendship of the new states in Asia and Africa and to deliver them from Soviet influence.[56] At the same time, Ben-Gurion's requests for military procurement were only partly approved.

Israel and Italy

Italy remained wary of any rapprochement with Israel owing to its wish to cement relations with the Arab states, and with the U.A.R. in particular. This was based both on global considerations — Italy being part of the Western camp which wanted to keep the Arabs away from Soviet influence — and on its own wish to gain political and economic advantages in the Arab world.[57]

As a result, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked to prevent acts which could be construed as public expressions of an improvement in relations with Israel, such as the signing of bi-lateral treaties, visits by prominent people, and expansion of economic and trade relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also obstructed Israel's requests for military procurement, and opposed Israel's admittance to European economic bodies, both for the reasons enumerated above and because of its fears of competition on the part of Israeli products in general and citrus in particular.

Israel concluded that finding a way to economic cooperation with Italy was the key to resolving the political stalemate between the two countries. It was decided to examine the possibility of cooperation with the south of Italy, the least developed region of that country,[58] and the subject was even raised during the visit to Italy of Minister of Agriculture Dayan, who came to participate in a conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization.[59]

Israel and the countries of Eastern Europe

There was no significant change in the pattern of cool relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, and there was no substantial content to these relations. Economic ties with the Soviet Union had been severed by the latter in November 1956, in reaction to the Sinai Campaign,

56 See No. 264.

57 See E. Sasson's report of August 19th, 1960 to G. Meir: "On the relations between Israel and Italy", filed under 130.23/3296/1.

58 See No. 280.

59 See No. 282.

and were never restored. However, there were still commercial ties with the other countries of east Europe, apart from Czechoslovakia. Cultural ties existed only with Poland and Yugoslavia.[60] Immigration from eastern Europe stopped almost completely, apart from an intermittent trickle from Romania and Poland.[61]

Israel made great efforts to change that situation, but to no avail. As early as July 1958 Ben-Gurion proposed to the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Bodrov, that his country mediate between Israel and Egypt, improve its relations with Israel, and supply it with defensive arms, but there was no response at all on the part of the Soviets to this proposal.[62] Another suggestion by Ben-Gurion, that he come to the Soviet Union to meet Premier Khrushchev, was not replied to immediately and, after a reminder by Israel, there came a refusal on the grounds that such a visit was untimely.[63]

The reasons for the Soviet Union's negative attitude to Israel, namely, its relations with the Arab states and with its Jewish minority, were augmented in 1960 by yet another factor — Israel's rapprochement with the Federal Republic of Germany. What irked the Soviets most was Ben-Gurion's meeting with Adenauer of March 14th, 1960, because it "gave a moral stamp of approval" to the object of their hate — West Germany.

Israel and Spain, Portugal and Greece

Relations with three countries in the south of Europe — Greece, Spain and Portugal, retained their anomalous character. Greece, which had voted against the establishment of a Jewish state in the U.N. General Assembly of November 29th, 1947, recognized Israel de facto in 1949, and three years later established diplomatic relations with it at the lowest possible level — a diplomatic representation. Nevertheless, cultural, economic and scientific ties developed satisfactorily between the two countries, and Greece even agreed to allow transit to emigrants from Romania on their way to Israel.[64]

Relations with Portugal were at an unreciprocated consular level — there was a Consulate General of Israel in Lisbon, and no Portuguese representation at all in Israel. The main obstacle to regular relations was Portugal's fear of hostile voting on the part of the Arabs when the status of its colonies in Africa and Asia came up for debate at the United Nations.[65]

60 See *Government Yearbook* (Hebrew), 1960–61, p. 218.

61 See Chapter 23.

62 See Ben-Gurion's Diary, entry of 17 July 1958, the Ben-Gurion Archive.

63 See No. 289.

64 See Chapter 23.

65 See No. 294.

There were no relations of any sort between Spain and Israel, owing both to Spain's extensive interests in the Arab countries and its anger at Israel's negative stand in the the United Nations in matters related to Spain.[66] This resentment did not fade even after Israel had changed its position and voted for Spain's admittance to the U.N. in December 1955. Israel's efforts in 1960 to establish some sort of ties with Spain were unsuccessful, and the conclusion was that the matter should be shelved for the time being.[67]

Israel and the European economic organizations

Israel continued its efforts to come to understandings with the European economic organizations, as, in view of the character of Israel's economy and the constraints of the Arab boycott, most of its foreign trade flowed to the countries of Western Europe and the United States.

There were at the time two economic blocs in Europe,[68] and Israel's concern was that, like other countries exporting to that region, it would be discriminated against owing to the system of mutual preferences in customs and quotas between these blocs, and it would not be able to compete with the members of these organizations.

As the constitution of the "European Free Trade Area" did not allow for the admittance of non-European members, while that of the "European Economic Community" (the "Common Market") provided for the signing of association agreements with countries outside Europe, Israel's efforts at acceptance were directed at this second organization. Not only the Israeli ambassadors in the capitals of the member countries of the Community (in 1959 the ambassador to Belgium was also accredited to the Community) but also the Prime Minister and senior members of the government took part in

66 See No. 297.

67 See No. 302.

68 (a) The European Economic Community, established in 1957, has been known also as "The Six", "the Community", "the Common Market", or "the Market" — all these appellations have been used in this volume. Its member countries in 1960 were: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. The principal aims of the organization were: the establishment of a customs union, that is, a gradual repeal of customs duties between the member countries, and a gradual introduction of uniform tariffs towards other countries; a gradual adoption of a uniform foreign trade policy; and the introduction of joint production and marketing of agricultural products.

(b) The European Free Trade Area, established in 1959, has also been known as "the Seven". Its member countries in 1960 were: Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. The member countries abrogated all the trade restrictions between themselves, but they were allowed to retain their various tariffs on imports from other countries.

this campaign. Ben-Gurion raised the subject in the talks which took place in France, Belgium and Holland in 1960,[69] and the response was favourable in principle. On his visit to Washington in March, he also asked for the support of the American Department of State for Israel's acceptance as an associate in the European Economic Community.[70]

The first result appeared in June 1960, when members of the Commission of the European Economic Community[71] handed to Israel's representatives in Brussels a detailed questionnaire on its economy,[72] in order to define its future ties with the Community. Israel returned the questionnaire in September,[73] but an obstacle was encountered in October; the Council of Ministers of the Community[74] requested Israel to abstain from submitting its application for the time being, arguing that negotiations with Greece and Turkey, which had also submitted applications for association with the Community, should be finalized first. This was a purely formal reason, and it was in effect bolstered by fear of the reaction on the part of the Arab countries, which made efforts to foil Israel's plans. Another negative factor was Italy's fear of competition on Israel's part in the export of agricultural produce, and in particular of citrus.

However, Israel did not abandon its efforts and continued looking for other arrangements which would open up markets in Western Europe.

Attempts continued to be made to enter on a multilateral trade and clearance agreement with the thirteen countries of the OEEC — the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.[75] The first steps in that direction had been taken in 1958, in the hope that this would be the first stage towards signing

69 See Nos 325, 327 and 328.

70 See No. 315.

71 A body of the European Economic Community, "the Commission" for short. Its nine members are not considered representatives of their countries, and their decisions should be "for the good of the Community". They are appointed for 4-year terms, with the possibility of prolonging the appointment with the agreement of all the member countries. The Commission's function is to supervise the implementation of the Treaty of Rome — the Community's charter.

72 See No. 326.

73 See No. 340.

74 Comprises the ministers of the member countries of the European Economic Community, one to each country. Its function is to coordinate the economic activities of the separate countries with that of the Community as a whole; all its decisions must be unanimous.

75 The Organization for European Economic Cooperation — O.E.E.C. for short — was established in 1948 in order to coordinate the implementation of the Marshall Plan, which was intended to rehabilitate Europe's economy following the Second World War. The founding members were: Austria, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Britain. Spain joined the organization some time later.

closer and more binding agreements with the European economic unions, and with the European Economic Community in particular.

However, Israel's efforts were unsuccessful, because the members of the OEEC were not particularly enthusiastic about admitting Israel to their organization, and also because this body was about to make changes in its charter.[76] Israel re-applied to the reconstituted organization and submitted a memorandum to the "Committee of Four" which had been set up to deal with the application.[77] The memorandum, in which Israel's case was set down in detail, was also circulated among the member countries. The new body began functioning in 1961, outside the scope of this volume.

Israel and the Vatican

A number of Israel's friends in Italy and the Vatican informed the Israel embassy in Rome at the beginning of 1960 that information in their possession pointed to the possibility that a visit to the Vatican by an Israeli personality could favourably affect the issue of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.[78] The task was entrusted to M. Fischer, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had had meetings in the Vatican in 1957 and 1959,[79] and who knew Pope John XXIII from the time of their service in Paris at the end of the 'forties and the beginning of the 'fifties.

Fischer's visit did not meet with success,[80] nor did the attempt to arrange for an audience with the Pope for Israel's ambassador to Italy.[81] Israel therefore decided that it would not seek recognition unless a favourable answer on the Vatican's part were assured in advance.[82] Efforts to improve

76 After the O.E.E.C. had considered its task completed, the plan was to set up in its place the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development — the O.E.C.D. — with the 18 original members of the former body and with the addition of the United States and Canada. The charter of the new organization was signed in Paris on 14th December, 1960, and the new body started functioning in 1961.

77 See No. 316.

78 See No. 362.

79 Fischer concluded from his meetings that there were two conflicting attitudes towards Israel among the top echelons of the Vatican, one, adopted also by the Pope, positive and influenced by ethical and emotional considerations, and the other, represented by Secretary of State Cardinal Tardini, critical and influenced by political considerations dictating caution in developing the relations with Israel for fear of possible repercussions on Catholic institutions in the Arab states. See Fischer's memorandum to G. Meir and J. Tsur of November 5th, 1959, filed under 130.23/3102/20.

80 See No. 368.

81 See No. 371.

82 See No 375.

relations and, later, for the establishment of diplomatic relations were again made from 1961 on, when Fischer was appointed ambassador to Italy.

Israel and the countries of the Periphery

During 1960, Israel's realations with Iran and Turkey (and also with Ethiopia)[83] had a unique character, quite different from its relationship with any other country. In spite of the anomaly in the formal relations with those three states, Israel succeeded establishing with them fruitful co-operation in various fields, viz. political, economic and security, most of it, however, remained under the veil of secercy.

This pattern was established mainly after the Iraqi military coup of July 14th, 1958, which put an end to one of the West's bastions in the Arab world, and which was considered at the time a great victory for Nasserism and a defeat for the United States, for Israel, and for "moderate" Arab elements. However, this "victory" brought about the unification of anti-Nasserist forces in the Middle East, and it strengthened the initiative taken by Israel, with the blessing of the United States,[84] even before the coup to improve its relations with Iran and Turkey, which likewise feared the U.A.R.'s subversive activities and the Soviet attempts to penetrate the region.

The framework of relations instituted by Israel was called in Ministry of Foreign Affairs' parlance "the peripheral entente". This was a misleading term, because, after all, no formal treaties were signed between the four countries concerned and contacts were as a rule maintained bilaterally, between Israel and each of its partners.

Ben-Gurion defined relations between Israel and Iran as "informal but also unconcealed friendly relations... and this friendship is lasting because it is built on common advantages derived by both countries from their cooperation".[85]

All this notwithstanding, Israel wished to accord to its relations with Iran a formal framework, and the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, gave his approval to that in principle in May 1960.[86] However, Iran wished to test possible reactions to its step in advance. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accordingly leaked to the press that it was planning to open a mission in Israel, while the Shah himself declared at a press conference that his country had recognized Israel in the past and that this recognition was firm

83 On the relations between Israel and Ethiopia, see Chapter 20.

84 See Haggai Eshed, *One Man "Mossad"* (Hebrew), pp. 261–265, 270–271 and 274–282.

85 See his speech in the Knesset of 24.10.1960, *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), Second Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXX, p. 12.

86 See Nos. 384–385.

and valid, but that the mission in Israel had been closed because of budgetary difficulties.[87] The U.A.R. reacted by initiating a campaign of vilification against both Iran and the Shah himself, and broke off diplomatic relations with Teheran. The West did not come to the Shah's defence,[88] but the other Arab countries did not follow Nasser's steps. Fearing to impair its relations with the Arabs and the other Muslim countries, and especially with Pakistan, Iran was thus deterred from establishing full and overt diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel accordingly decided not to exert pressure on Iran in that direction,[89] but effective relations between the two countries continued.

Following a military coup in Turkey on May 27th, 1960, and the fall of the government, Israel decided to dispatch a special envoy to Ankara to express its feelings of goodwill towards the new regime, and to discuss matters of common interest.[90] The envoy, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Fischer, who had been Minister to Turkey in 1953–56, came to Turkey twice, in June and in August 1960, met Turkish personalities and obtained an undertaking that the special relations between the two countries would not be affected.[91] However, his efforts to persuade the Turks to rectify the defect in the formal relations were unsuccessful. As a sop to Israel, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper proposed that the personal rank of minister be conferred on the Chargés d'Affaires of the respective missions.[92] This proposal was not to Israel's liking, but was agreed to ultimately as the lesser evil.[93] (The special relationship between Israel and Turkey came to an end at the beginning of the 'sixties, when Turkey began cooling off towards Israel in order to gain the support of the Arab countries in the Cyprus issue.)

A new state, Cyprus, joined the group of non-Arab countries in the Middle East during 1960. On the eve of its independence Israel made great efforts to pave the way for full diplomatic relations. On August 17th, 1960, that is, on the morrow of the declaration of independence, Cyprus agreed to the appointment of Israel's consul general in Nicosia, Z'ev Levin, as Israel's first ambassador; however, there ensued a protracted delay in the submission of his credentials, which prevented him — according to protocol — from discharging his duties as necessary. This delay was the result of pressure on the part of the Arab states, headed by the U.A.R., who threatened to sever their relations with Cyprus should it establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

87 See No. 388, note 9.
88 See No. 391, paragraph (c).
89 See No. 394.
90 See No. 401.
91 See No. 402, paragraph 4.
92 See Nos 404 and 410.
93 See No. 413.

The Cypriot diaspora in Egypt and business circles in Cyprus, who hoped to find in the Arab states fertile ground for their activities, joined in pressuring the Cypriot Government.

The anomaly in relations with Cyprus's "mother countries", Greece and Turkey, did not encourage the new state to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel accordingly acted to convince the two countries to persuade Cyprus not to follow their example. Greece's position was ambiguous, while Turkey and the Turkish community in Cyprus supported Israel's case, as did also the United States, Britain, and certain Cypriot-Greek circles who hoped for Israel's help in developing their country.

The tangle was unravelled by the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, who decided to appease the U.A.R. by opening an embassy in Cairo and by enabling the U.A.R. ambassador to Cyprus to submit his credentials before the Israeli ambassador, in spite of the latter's having arrived in Cyprus first. (Both ambassadors submitted their credentials in 1961: the U.A.R. ambassador on January 14th, and the Israeli ambassador on January 20th.)

Israel and Asia

Israel continued its efforts to strengthen ties with the Asian countries in the context of its desire to break the political siege erected around it by the Arab countries, headed by Egypt. These last acted vigorously to foil Israel's efforts, and they achieved the upper hand in the three "giants" of Asia — Japan, China and India.

Japan established diplomatic relations with Israel, at the level of legations, in 1952, but these were in effect sterile because of Japan's extensive economic and business interests in the Arab world and its fear of the Arab boycott. Exploiting Japan's submission, the Arab states even demanded of it that it break off ordinary trade relations with Israel — a demand which they had not made of any other country. Japan was an advanced country technologically, so it did not need Israel's technical assistance — an important element in Israel's relations with several other Asian countries. Japan even abstained from any gesture of goodwill, such as raising the level of missions, or issuing a formal invitation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Meir to pay a visit to Japan.

Israel had no relations of any sort with the People's Republic of China. Israel had recognized China as early as January 1950, and five years later dispatched there a delegation officially described as economic but one which in effect also dealt with the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, on Israel's side there was no hurry, owing to considerations connected with its relations with the United States, which was at that time the patron of

the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Israel ambassador in the United States reported towards the end of 1954 that the latter state had withdrawn its objections, and thus Israel proposed to Communist China, in April 1955, the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. However, the Bandung Conference took place in the same month, following which China established diplomatic relations with the Arab countries, and the opportunity, if it ever existed, was lost.

India recognized Israel, de jure, in September 1950, but abstained from establishing diplomatic relations with it. Israel was allowed to open a consulate in Bombay in 1953, but India did not open a consulate in Israel. The official explanation referred to budgetary difficulties and to priorities, but the real reasons were political. The more India embraced anti-Western neutralism, the more it considered Israel a satellite of Western imperialism. To this were added Israel's abandoning its non-aligned stance with the outbreak of the Korean War (in 1950), and its cooperation with Britain and France in the Suez War (October–November 1956). The large Muslim minority in India was also a factor detrimental to Israel. The Indians also feared that the establishment of diplomatic and other relations with Israel would supply their adversary, Pakistan, with ammunition for a hostile propaganda campaign, mainly in the Arab and Muslim countries.[94]

The Arab states saw India as a key position, and the pressure they exerted there against Israel was more intensive than in any other Asian country.

Burma, whose leaders met Israel's leaders during the Asian Socialist Conference, was the only Asian country where Israel did succeed in gaining a firm foothold. The main contributor to the cementing of ties with Israel was the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, who was the first officiating prime minister to visit Israel (in 1955). Burma saw Israel as a perfect model of the development of a democratic-socialist economy and society, with modern Western technology, but with no aggressive or imperialist ambitions, and wished to profit from its experience in the fields of social development, economy and science. Many Israeli experts were sent to Burma, and students from Burma came to Israel. A number of joint economic enterprises were set up, "but it turned out during ten years of intensive cooperation that even projects which were successful in themselves did not have the expected deep and long-term influence. A gradual process of disappointment and disillusionment set in. Starting with the beginning and middle of the 'sixties, many projects were terminated or gradually abandoned, and the special

94 See Sh. Avimor (Editor), *Relations Between Israel and Asian and African States*, No. 6 (India), pp. 10–11.

relationship between Burma and Israel gradually waned; the relations between the two countries acquired an ordinary and normal character."[95]

Israel's participation in the Asian Socialist Conference also aided it in cementing ties with Nepal, with which diplomatic relations were established in April 1960. These relations rapidly became filled with content, on the Burmese model but to a much more limited extent. The Nepalese Prime Minister, B.P. Koirala, paid a visit to Israel in August 1960, when he headed his country's delegation to a conference at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot. (Koirala's dismissal and arrest by the king of Nepal in December 1960 did not adversely affect relations with Israel.)

Israel had no foothold in the Muslim countries of Asia — Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia, and even in a much less militant country like Malaya, Israel's efforts met with no success.

Ceylon cancelled the accreditation of its non-resident minister to Israel in 1960, following pressure exerted on it by the Arab states. However, the Israeli Legation in Colombo continued functioning unhindered.

Israel acted to establish diplomatic relations with two "divided" states — South Korea and South Vietnam (North Korea and North Vietnam, both under communist regimes, were closed to it), but with no success. Israel did not wish to recognize the Seoul government as the legitimate government of the whole of Korea, while South Vietnam feared that the establishment of relations with Israel would bring the Arab states to recognize its adversary, North Vietnam.

A resident minister was sent to the Philippines by Israel in the year under review, but the Philippine Government did not reciprocate, presumably because of local Muslim pressure. The same reason caused the delay in ratification of the treaty of friendship between the two countries, which was signed on February 26th, 1958, but was ratified only on December 19th, 1963.

In the context of relations with Thailand, the presentation must be noted, in March 1960, of the credentials of the first Thai non-resident ambassador to Israel. (Diplomatic relations between the two countries had been raised to the level of embassies towards the end of 1958.)

Israel accorded great importance to its relations with Singapore, which also served as a "window" to Malaya, but for budgetary and other reasons did not send to it a resident representative. The Singapore Minister of Education came to Israel in August 1960 to participate in the conference at the Weizmann Institute.

The first Laotian non-resident minister to Israel, former Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma, submitted his credentials in January 1960, while

95 *Ibid.*, No. 5 (Burma), pp. b–h.

the first Israeli non-resident minister to Laos, M.R. Kidron, did so in August the same year.

Israel and Africa

Seventeen African states achieved independence in 1960, a process which caused Israel to extend and consolidate its footholds in Africa, the first of which was established with the opening of consulates in Addis Ababa (in 1956) and in Accra (in 1957). The consulate in Accra was turned into an embassy after the independence of Ghana, and Israel's relations with Accra served as a model for relations with other African states.

Israel saw its ties with Africa not only as a means of breaking the Arab siege, but also as an asset in enhancing its standing with the Powers. There was also the economic aspect — the desire to find markets for its products, and a source of revenue from the export of know-how and the activity of joint enterprises.

The importance accorded to Israel's ties with Africa brought about the personal involvement of the top echelons of its establishment in furthering these relations. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stressed in his talks with Western leaders the vital importance of extending aid to the new states in Africa (and in Asia) to prevent them from coming under Communist influence. Senior ministers, Golda Meir, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,[96] Levi Eshkol, the Minister of Finance,[97] and Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture[98] all went to Africa in the year under review and played their part in consolidating the various countries' ties with Israel.

Israel hastened to open embassies in almost every newly independent African state (and sometimes accredited to a state a non-resident ambassador officiating in a neighbouring country), African personalities were invited to visit Israel and most of them did so. Students from various African states came to Israel to participate in courses in various subjects, and Israeli experts were dispatched to the African states to advise them in the fields of their expertise. A special division for that purpose was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — the Division for International Cooperation. Joint enterprises were set up with African states in the fields of shipping, construction, and other activities. Israel being a small and distant country, its aid was accepted with no reservations as no imperialist aims were ascribed to it.

Israel's success in Africa was a thorn in the flesh of the Arab states and

96 See No. 475.
97 See No. 484, note 7.
98 See Nos 485, 486 and 488.

they made great efforts to sabotage its activities. They were aided by the existence of five Arab countries in Africa and by the prevalence of Islam in many of the African states. In most cases, Israel was able to overcome the obstacles, and only two predominantly Muslim countries — Somalia and Mauritania — refused to establish diplomatic relations with it.

Another stumbling block was Israel's relations with South Africa, whose importance lay mainly in the existence of a large Jewish community there,[99] this factor overcoming Israel's dislike of the apartheid policy of the Pretoria Government.

On the dilemma confronting Israel when the Algerian issue came up for debate in the United Nations, caused by Israel's close ties with France in that period — see the chapter on Israel's relations with France.

In spite of the good relations prevailing with African countries on the bilateral plane, Israel was often disappointed at these states' attitudes at regional conferences. The Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, which took place in Conakry in April 1960, censured Israel as an "imperialist stronghold", and demanded the repatriation of the Arab refugees. At the Second Conference of Independent African States, which met in Addis Ababa in June, concern was expressed at the non-implementation of resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and of a number of Afro-Asian conferences in connection with the Palestine issue, which was seen as a disturbing element in the pursuit of world peace. The Arab states employed various tactics at these forums to impose their policy on the African states, while the latter did not wish to be out of step with the Arabs and considered their joining the anti-Israel resolutions as lip service only, without this affecting in any way their fruitful relations with Israel.

The Eichmann affair

Ever since its inception, the State of Israel considered itself obligated to bring to trial and to punish those responsible for the murder by the Nazis of six million Jews during the Second World War, and provided the legal instrument for such action — "The Law for the Trial of Nazis and their Collaborators, 5710–1950". Efforts were made to trace Nazi war criminals, and these bore fruit in the year under review: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset on May 23rd, 1960, of the capture of Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible for carrying out Hitler's orders for the implementation of the "final solution" of the Jewish problem, and of the intention to bring

99 See No. 482.

him to trial in Israel.[100] It quickly became clear that the Federal Republic of Germany had no intention of demanding Eichmann's extradition; on the contrary, the German government expressed its willingness to hand over to Israel all the relevant material and testimonies in its possession.[101] On the other hand, a heated controversy developed between Israel and the country from which Eichmann was abducted — Argentina, which considered Israel's action a serious infringement of its sovereignty.

Israel tendered its apologies for the infringement of Argentina's sovereignty in a note to the Argentine government[102] and in a personal letter from Ben-Gurion to the Argentine president, Arturo Frondizi,[103] explaining that the crime of which Eichmann stood accused was unique in history. Argentina, however, was not satisfied with this apology, and demanded "appropriate reparation", that is, Eichmann's return and the punishment of his abductors.[104] Israel of course could not agree to this, and Argentina then recalled its ambassador from Israel and submitted the issue to the U.N. Security Council.[105] The debate at the Council was held on June 22nd and 23rd, and Argentina's demand for "suitable reparation" was upheld on the basis of the U.N. Charter and of international law. However, the proposal of the American delegate was also approved to condemn the oppression of the Jews by the Nazis, while giving expression to the wish of "people from nations the world over" to see Eichmann brought to justice for his grievous crimes. The resolution also expressed the hope that the "traditional friendly relations between Argentina and Israel would not suffer". There were no supporters in that forum for the demand for Eichmann's return to Argentina, nor was Israel's right to judge him disputed. The representatives of the United States, Britain and France stated that they saw in Israel's apology the "appropriate reparation" to which Argentina was entitled.[106]

Argentina, however, was still not satisfied, and on 23rd July, 1960, following a fruitless exchange of notes with Israel, pronounced the Israel ambassador A. Levavi *persona non grata*.[107] This step paved the way for the settlement of the dispute between the two countries, which came finally to an end with the visit to Buenos Aires of Sh. Rosenne, the Legal Adviser

100 See No. 497.
101 See W. Eytan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram SP/19 of 28.5.1960, 130.09/2350/1.
102 See No. 500.
103 See No. 502.
104 See No. 503.
105 See No. 510.
106 See Nos 514 and 518.
107 See No. 519.

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[108] The two new ambassadors submitted their credentials in the respective capitals in December 1960.

Antisemitic incidents

A wave of antisemitic incidents occurred starting in December 1959 through February 1960; it began with the painting of swastikas on the walls of a synagogue in Cologne on December 25th, 1959, and quickly spread to 32 countries around the world. Swastikas were painted on other synagogues, and also on Jewish institutions and private business premises, Jewish cemeteries were desecrated, and antisemitic slogans appeared on the walls in many cities.[109]

Israel, which saw itself as responsible for the welfare of Jews wherever they might be, circulated a note among the countries where these incidents occurred and expressed its horror at these happenings.[110] The various governments replied by stressing their understanding of Israel's concern and their identification with its stand, and promised to do everything possible to extirpate the evil of antisemitism.[111]

Israel also submitted a note to the Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.,[112] which deliberated on the subject. The Commission on Human Rights accepted the Sub-Commission's recommendations, and adopted a resolution condemning antisemitic manifestations as being contrary to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and called on state members and U.N. bodies to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such manifestations, and to punish their perpetrators.

No clear conclusions could be drawn as to the origin of the occurrences — whether or not they had been organized by some sort of world centre — but Israel eliminated the possibility that the Arabs or the Communists had been the instigators, though they had exploited the happenings for their own purposes. This wave of antisemitism, in spite of its relatively limited dimensions, was considered by Israel the proof of a possible future threat, its rapid spread testifying as it did to the fact that antisemitism was present and alive and ready to burst out at the first opportunity.[113]

108 See No. 521.
109 See summary (undated) on File No. 130.23/3356/2.
110 See No. 527.
111 See Nos 531 and 532.
112 See No. 529.
113 See No. 530.

Immigration of Jews to Israel from countries of their persecution

Ever since its inception, the State of Israel attached great importance to immigration, both for ideological and for practical reasons: rescuing Jews from countries where their existence was threatened, and increasing Israel's population. Jewish immigration to Israel was therefore vigorously opposed by the Arab states which made efforts to have it stopped, by exerting pressure on the countries of origin of the immigrants or on the countries affording them transit facilities.

Israel undertook to bring Jews from the countries of their persecution in Eastern Europe and North Africa by whatever routes were available. In the nature of things, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its missions abroad had many partners operating in this field, such as Governmental bodies, the Jewish Agency, and various Jewish organizations. The documentation in this volume therefore only partially covers the subject.

The emigration policy of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe underwent many changes and was influenced by three main factors: (a) acknowledgment of the Jews' right of repatriation to their historic homeland; (b) considerations of internal policy (getting rid of unreliable or undesirable ethnic elements); (c) reaction to pressure by Israel or to counter-pressure by the Arab states.[114]

Starting with 1958, Romania was the main source of immigration from Eastern Europe. Its Government's decision to permit emigration to Israel was probably motivated by the intention to give the Jews' apartments and their jobs to Romanian citizens. Emigration was then stopped and renewed intermittently a number of times.[115] The possibility of "indirect emigration" was added in December 1959; the Romanian authorities permitted the departure of Jews to other countries, knowing that they would then go to Israel.[116] In the year under review, Israel made efforts to increase the rate of emigration from Romania and mobilized a number of factors to pressure the Romanian government. (These efforts were crowned with success in 1961, during which 20,778 people immigrated from Romania, against only 9,247 during 1960.)

Poland took second place after Romania as a source of Jewish emigration, following a repatriation agreement between that country and the Soviet Union

114 See Yosef Govrin, *Israel–Soviet Relations 1953–1967* (Hebrew), pp. 128–137.

115 *Ibid.*, pp. 137–143.

116 See Bendor's letter of January 24th, 1959 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Relations with the Rumanian Popular Republic", on File 130.23/3345/39.

signed in 1957.[117] Emigration from Poland continued during 1960 without any particular vicissitudes, 5,357 people leaving for Israel that year.

Emigration from the Soviet Union and from its other satellites in Eastern Europe was virtually non-existent during 1960.

The main source of Jewish emigration from North Africa was Morocco, which attained its independence in 1956 and immediately banned Jews from leaving the country. King Mohammed V became Nasser's ally, and took his country into the Arab League in 1958. As a result, the condition of the Jewish community there deteriorated and Israel then extended a helping hand. During the five years between 1956 and 1961 its emissaries organized illegal emigration, and by this means more than 4,000 Jews came to Israel during the year under review.[118]

Under President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's treatment of its Jews was equitable even after it joined the Arab League in 1958. Emigration was practically unhindered (as long as no publicity was given), and about half of the emigrants, mainly young people, came to Israel.[119] The number of immigrants to Israel in 1960 was 464.

The Jews of Algeria, which was formally part of metropolitan France, enjoyed French citizenship from as early as 1870 (Cremieux's Decree) and did not feel the need to emigrate. Following a pogrom by the Muslims in December 1960, Israel's emissaries announced that Israel was willing to accept any Jew wiling to immigrate, but the response was lukewarm.[120] Only 228 Jews immigrated to Israel from Algeria during the year under review. When Algeria attained its independence in 1962, almost all of its Jews, 140,000 in number, emigrated to France, and only a few thousand came to Israel.

Baruch Gilead

117 See Govrin, *ibid.*, pp. 144–146.

118 This situation changed in 1961, in the wake of two events: the sinking in January of the ship *Egoz* (*Pisces*) with 43 immigrants and the Israeli wireless operator — a tragedy which brought about bitter attacks on Morocco in the international media; and the death in February of King Mohammed V and the accession of his son, Hassan II, who, in contrast to his father, was not friendly with Nasser. Wishing to improve his image in the Western world, the king agreed to Jewish emigration, with several stipulations, the main ones being that the Jews would not be officially bound for Israel and that the shipments would not be organized by Israeli or Zionist organizations. See Isser Harel, *Security and Democracy* (Hebrew), pp. 316–318.

119 See statement on September 16th, 1962 by Y. Meroz at the Zurich Conference of Israeli Heads of Missions in Western Europe, in File No. 130.23/3425/2.

120 See Eytan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram SP/601, 15.12.1960, 130.09/2350/3.

List of Documents, Editorial Notes and Main Subjects

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14 24 February **Ch. Yahil to the Israel Permanent Mission to the U.N.**
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19 25 February **J. Herzog to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
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93	19 July	**Sh. Gilat to the Division of Politico-Economic Planning** British Board of Trade and the Arab boycott.
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108	31 August	**M. Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** Asks for instructions before his meeting with the Secretary-General following Israel's reaction to his message.

109	1 September	**M. Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** Meeting with Hammarskjöld: Hammarskjöld's indignation at Ben-Gurion's reaction to his message.
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249	14 June	**W. Eytan to Ch. Yahil** Ben-Gurion's meeting with Couve de Murville: situation in the Middle East, Israel's activities in Africa.
250	14 June	**Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — C. de Gaulle** International situation, ambitions and policy of the Soviet Union, Africa and Asia as a key to global peace, Israel's requests for arms.
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391	15 December	**Sh. Divon to the Israel Mission in Teheran** Composition and responsibilities of the Israel representation in Teheran; instructions not to raise officially the question of Iranian recognition.

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406	14 September	**M. Alon to M. Fischer** Meeting with Colonel Türkes: community of interests between Turkey and Israel.
407	14 September	**M. Alon to M. Fischer** Leave-taking visit to Gürsel.
408	3 December	**Israel Legation in Ankara to the West European Division** Raising the rank of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Tel Aviv.
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448	15 August	**M. Yegar to the Asia Division** Meeting with the Prime Minister of Malaya: relations between Israel and Malaya.
449	19 August	**Y. Shimoni to the Israel Ambassador in Washington** Israel's recognition of South Korea and South Vietnam.
450		**Editorial Note** Relations between Israel and Ceylon.
451	19 August	**Y. Barnea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** Revocation of the accreditation of the Ceylonese Minister to Israel.
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453	21 August	**Y. Shimoni to the Minister of Foreign Affairs** Review of the relations between Israel and Ceylon.
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455	26 August	**Y. Shimoni to the Minister of Foreign Affairs** The establishment of an Israeli consulate in Singapore.
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457	30 August	**Y. Shimoni to the Israel Legation in Colombo** Instructions for further meetings in Ceylon.
458	12 September	**D. Lewin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** Meeting with the Ceylonese Prime Minister: relations between Israel and Ceylon.
459	13 September	**Yong Nyuk Lin to G. Meir** Thanks for his visit to Israel; invites the Minister of Education and Culture to visit Singapore.
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LIST OF ARCHIVES AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCES

Israel State Archives

43. *Record Group: Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister's Bureau*

93. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*
    - 93.02 Paris
    - 93.03 New York
    - 93.04 London
    - 93.08 Washington
    - 93.13 Rangoon
    - 93.18 Ankara
    - 93.26 Brussels
    - 93.32 Buenos Aires
    - 93.39 Moscow
    - 93.42 Bombay
    - 93.75 Addis Ababa

130. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head Office*
    - 130.02 Office of the Minister and the Director-General
    - 130.03 Division of International Organizations
    - 130.06 Economics Division
    - 130.09 Coded Telegrams
    - 130.15 Middle East Division
    - 130.16 Armistice Division
    - 130.18 Division for Politico-Economic Planning
    - 130.23 General Political Archive

Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives (Abbreviated reference: IMDEA)

Public Record Office (Abbreviated reference: PRO)
Prem11 Prime Minister Office

Abbreviations used in Editorial Headings and References

Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Tel.	Telegram

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotations, Editorial Notes and introduction.

A. Sources

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Sofer, Arnon, *Rivers of Fire* (Hebrew), Haifa 1992

NOTES
AND SUMMARIES OF
HEBREW DOCUMENTS

All summaries of Hebrew documents and all notes are arranged according to the numbers of the documents in the Main Volume. The notes are translated in full, even those pertaining to passages that are omitted in the summaries.

Editorial headings of Hebrew documents are reproduced in full, while headings to translations of notes to documents in English or French are given in shortened version. Where no notes are appended, the English and French documents are represented by headings only. Editorial Notes appear in the same order as in the Main Volume, preceding the relevant document.

1. Major-General C. Von Horn (Jerusalem) to A. Biran. 20 January 1960

Notes

1. Settlement in the southern demilitarized zone, founded in 1949; also known as Bet Katsir.
2. An Arab village in the southern demilitarized zone. After the signing of the armistice agreements, its inhabitants fled to "Upper Tawafiq" or "Khan Tawafiq" in Syrian territory, but continued to cultivate their land in the demilitarized zone and came into constant conflict with the settlers of Tel Katsir.
3. A drainage ditch dug in 1958 by the Tel Katsir settlers in a north-easterly direction in the area between their settlement and Khirbet Tawafiq, in order to prevent the flooding of their fields in the rainy season; known also as "the explosion ditch". The Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization ruled at the time that the settlers had the right to dig the ditch, but that it would not constitute a demarcation line between the land they had the right to cultivate and the land worked by the people of Lower Tawafiq. (See U.N. Document S/4270 of 23 February 1960, p. 8.)
4. Lieut.-Colonel R.A.G. Pirlot, Chairman of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.
5. Rav-Seren Shmuel Gat, the senior Israeli representative on the Israel–Syria Armistice Commission.
6. See Pirlot to Gat, 8.1.1960, 130.16/2965/12.
7. See Gat to Pirlot, 14.1.1960, *ibid.* (U.N. Document S/6335.)
8. Colonel R. W. Rickert, Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.
9. For Von Horn's findings, see No. 30. See also Israel's reply in No. 3.

2. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 27 January 1960

Coded Tel. TNW851; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

Von Horn has issued his "findings" on the disputed area in Tel Katsir,[1] stating that the "yellow field"[2] west of the drainage canal had been allotted to the Arabs. The Arabs ploughed the field on 26 January under cover of armed Syrians. Our armoured car drove them off. Today they started ploughing again and there was an exchange of fire.

In today's meeting von Horn claimed that:

(1) Israel had violated the status quo by encroaching on the yellow area. — We explained that the chairman had made an error in identifying the area and that the field had been cultivated in the past by Israel.

(2) He regarded this case as a local problem.

(3) He is authorized to issue findings. — Israel referred him to Bunche's letter[3] and stressed the need to have life return to normal.

(4) He rejected Israel's claims to cultivation rights in the parcels known as the "X's" and "Giv'at Hahityashvut"[4] and intended to bring up these locations for discussion.

Biran summarizes Israel's stand as wishing to keep the status quo, while it is the Syrians who want to change it.

Notes

1. See Nos 1 and 30.
2. The appellation for the field between Tel Katsir and Khirbet Tawafiq.
3. Reference is to the letter sent by the Acting Mediator to Foreign Minister Sharett on 26 June, 1949, in which he wished to persuade Sharett to agree to the establishment of demilitarized zones within the framework of the armistice agreement with Syria. The letter said, *inter alia*, that the demilitarized zones would not constitute a vacuum nor would the land therein remain fallow, but that ordinary civilian life would continue there under the supervision of a local civilian administration. (See Vol. 3, No. 342.)
4. The appellation for fields south-east of Tel Katsir.

3. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 29 January 1960

Coded Tel. TNW854; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

Biran cables Tekoah on developments in the disputed area.[1] There have been additional incursions and exchanges of fire. Concentrations of Syrian forces can also be seen in this sector. The U.N. support Arab cultivation of the land west of the drainage ditch, basing themselves on Von Horn's findings. Israel sees the reason for the present tension in the Syrians' wish to change the status quo by their attempts to cultivate land which had till now lain fallow — at least for the last few years, — they, too, basing themselves on Von Horn's findings. Israel's position is stated clearly in Biran's letter to Von Horn (see Main Volume, pp. 6–7).

Notes

1. No. 2.
2. No. 1.
3. The border between Palestine and Syria, as demarcated in the time of the British mandate.
4. This had been said in Bunche's letter of 21st June, 1949 — see Vol. 3, No. 343.

4. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 January 1960

Coded Tel. NWT35; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah has received Biran's telegram No. 854.[1] He met Cordier and drew his attention to the Syrian attempts to violate the status quo in the area of Tel Katsir. Cordier argued that it was difficult to define the status quo and the moment of its inception. Tekoah replied that, in that case, the status quo was the state of affairs which caused no incidents. He added that it was not profitable to enter on legalistic arguments in respect of the complicated area between Tel Katsir and Tawafiq, reminding Cordier of the time when Israel had dug a drainage ditch in this area and this action resulted in incidents; the U.N. had then demanded that Israel stop the work, even though Israel's right to dig the ditch was undisputed.[2]

Cordier replied that he would draw Von Horn's attention to what Tekoah

had said, and added that he agreed that the main thing was to avoid incidents. He was keeping the Secretary-General[3] briefed on this matter.

Notes

1. No. 3.
2. In November 1957. On this see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israel Missions Abroad, telegram 132, 1.2.1960, 130.16/2965/12, and also U.N. Document S/4270 of 23.2.1960, p. 7.
3. U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

5. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 January 1960

Coded Tel. NWT38; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah contacted Cordier immediately following the minister's call, stating that the situation in the area was deteriorating and that the U.N. Staff had a hand in this. Von Horn was stubborn and biased. Previously, when the ditch had been dug through a plot which belonged wholly to Israel, Von Horn had demanded that the work be stopped,[1] while now his position encourages Syria's interference. In this situation Israel cannot be responsible for possible future developments. Tekoah demanded that Cordier cable Von Horn immediately, ask for his explanations, and convey to him Tekoah's words; he should accompany this with an explicit order to prevent the Syrians from encroaching on the "yellow field".

Cordier agreed that the main thing was to avoid incidents and he would act immediately. Tekoah requests to be informed by telegram of the instructions given to Von Horn by Cordier.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 4.
2. No further response to Tekoah's request has been found; presumably the entire situation changed radically following the I.D.F.'s operation of 1st February — see Editorial Note, No. 6.

6. Editorial Note

The I.D.F.'s Operation at Khirbet Tawafiq on February 1st, 1960

Towards the end of January 1960 the situation in the Tel Katsir area swiftly deteriorated. General Von Horn, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers, rejected Israel's request to order the Syrians to stop their cultivation of land to which, in Israel's opinion, they had no right. This work was being carried out by Syrian soldiers in civilian clothes, who were given cover by a unit of the Syrian army which had seized a position in the abandoned village of Khirbet Tawafiq, in contravention of the armistice agreement which disallowed the presence of armed forces in the demilitarized zones. On 31st January the Syrians opened fire on a force of the Border Police which had arrived to drive off the Syrian ploughmen, and a policeman was killed. As a result, the government resolved to have the army liquidate the Syrian post in Khirbet Tawafiq.

In the action which took place in the early hours of February 1st, the Syrian post was destroyed and a large quantity of arms was seized, some of it of Soviet origin. For details of this action see telegrams 131–133 of 1 February 1960 to the Israel Missions Abroad (in File 130.16/2965/12) and the report by the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers, General Von Horn, of 23 February 1960, U.N. Document S/4270.

7. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 1 February 1960

Coded Tel. E201; Outg.: 130.09/2333/19

Biran relays the Prime Minister's speech in the Knesset following the Tawafiq action:

As Israel has informed the U.N., it recognizes the Arabs' right to cultivate their land in the demilitarized zone, but does not recognize the Syrians' right to interfere in this matter. The Arabs have accordingly been working their land, but lately Syrian soldiers in civilian clothes have encroached on the area west of the drainage ditch. In an attempt to drive out these soldiers a policeman was killed. When Israel's appeal to the U.N. proved fruitless, the Syrian post, in which bunkers and uniforms were found, was destroyed. Those who have ownership rights in this area will be allowed to work their fields as before, but the Government will deny entry to Syrian army or police

personnel, and if the U.N. does not remove the trespassers — Israel itself will do it.[1]

Notes

1. For full text of the Prime Minister's speech, see *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 499–502.

8. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 2 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW865; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

Biran cables to Tekoah on his meeting with Von Horn, from whom he demanded the expulsion of the Ṣyrian forces from Lower Tawafiq which was proved to be a Syrian army post. He reminded Von Horn of Israel's complaint of the previous day about the incursion by the Syrian army[3] and on the announcement by the Syrian army spokesman that the army had seized positions in Tawafiq and its surroundings.

Von Horn replied that he had sent a letter to Israel on 31st January, asking for a meeting with the observers in the demilitarized zone.[4] Biran answered that he had considered the letter to be a routine communication which did not require a reply, seeing that a U.N. observer had inspected Tel Katsir on 1 February, and also that an enquiry had been held by the observers into Israel's complaint.

Von Horn then claimed that Israel had not answered his letters on: (1) the findings,[5] (2) a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission,[6] (3) the inspection by the observers.[7] Biran refuted von Horn's claims and repeated his question, asking whether the observers' inspection was a precondition to any action to be taken by him. Von Horn answered in the negative, but requested a reply to his letter on this subject. He claimed that this was not the first time that his letters remained unanswered, for example, in the matter of Mt Scopus.[8] He again tried to draw out of Biran a statement that Israel had rejected his findings, but Biran referred him again to the answer which had been given in writing.[10]

Later, Biran demanded that the Arabs be prevented from crossing the ditch and that they stop their work there. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is convinced that both Israel and the U.N. are interested in keeping the region peaceful. To summarize:

Biran requests Tekoah to demand of Hammarskjöld the expulsion of the Syrian army from Tawafiq and from the demilitarized zone in general.

Notes

1. See No. 7.
2. See Editorial Note, No. 6.
3. See Biran to the Israel Missions Abroad, telegram 133, 1.2.1960, 130.16/2965/12.
4. The letter is filed in 130.16/2965/4.
5. No. 1.
6. See Von Horn's letter to Biran, 30.1.1960, 130.16/2965/12.
7. See n. 4 above.
8. Israel agreed to attend the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on condition that the issues of the demilitarized zone did not appear on the agenda (see Biran to Von Horn, 31.1.1960, 130.16/2965/12). On the findings — see Israel's reply in No. 3.
9. Mount Scopus was also a demilitarized zone. At the beginning of February 1960, the inhabitants of the Arab village of Issawiya, which was included in the demilitarized zone, diverted to a new route, closer to the fence of the Hadassah Hospital, the dirt road passing through the Israeli territory of Mount Scopus and connecting their village to the Ramallah road; their aim was probably to encroach on the territory under Israel's control. This affair caused friction between Israel and the U.N. Observers. (See review by Biran, "Developments along Israel's Borders", 21.3.1960, 130.16/2965/4.)
10. See n. 8 above.
11. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israel Permanent Mission to the U.N., telegram 212, 1.2.1960, 130.16/2965/12.
12. See No. 5.

9. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT45; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports to Biran on his meeting with Cordier and his forthcoming meeting with Hammarskjöld,[2] to whom he had conveyed through Cordier Israel's demand for the expulsion of the Syrian army from the demilitarized zone. He repeated this demand in his talk with Cordier. Cordier, who had not yet received Von Horn's report on his meeting with Biran, asked whether Israel would also be prepared to withdraw its own forces from the area. Tekoah replied that he knew nothing of such forces and that the U.N. observers had already inspected Tel Katsir.

The reliability of Von Horn's reports was taken up, touching Cordier's

answer in the matter of Syrian incursions into the "yellow field" which was supposed to have been received by Tekoah. Cordier said that Von Horn had taken various steps in respect of the situation in general and the armistice in particular, but had not yet replied on the specific matter of the incursion into the "yellow field". Tekoah said that it was pointless to try to demonstrate Von Horn's mendacity and that it was more useful to keep pressing him to stop the incursions.

Notes

1. See No. 8.
2. In the course of a meeting devoted mainly to the *Astypalea* affair (see Chapter 3), Tekoah noted his satisfaction at the U.N.'s having demanded of the U.A.R. to withdraw its forces from the demilitarized zone, and expressed the hope that the planned meeting between the two parties would have positive results. He added that he had read Von Horn's findings of January 20th, 1960 and the accompanying letter (see No. 1), and noticed that Von Horn had advised the Arabs at the time not to cross the "explosion ditch" and had thus helped to restore the status quo. Hammarskjöld remarked that Von Horn's attitude towards the Arabs could be expressed as: "You have rights, but it would be preferable if you did not exercise them". (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT49, 2.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
3. At the meeting Tekoah said he had heard that Von Horn had proposed talks between the two parties, and that Israel had agreed to that. He added that he hoped that Von Horn would see to the cessation of Syrian encroachments on Israeli territory. Cordier said he hoped this was not a precondition to the proposed talks. (See telegram NWT40, 31.1.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
4. See No. 5.

10. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 3 February 1960

Notes

1. The original of the letter is found in File 130.16/2965/12.
2. In his letter (in File 130.16/2965/12) Biran states Israel's willingness to attend the meeting of the Syria–Israel Armistice Commission, on condition that matters connected with the administration of the demilitarized zone not be discussed.
3. In paragraph 2 of his letter to Von Horn, Biran stated his readiness to meet the Syrians in order to discuss ways of preventing the shooting incidents or the encroachments on the demilitarized zone beyond the international border. (The letter is in File 130.16/2965/12.)
4. See n. 2 above.

11. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 20 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW911; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

Biran replies to Tekoah's two telegrams on the incidents in the demilitarized zone.[1] Israel is about to protest in writing to Von Horn[2] on his having called for a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission — in the midst of negotiations between Israel and the U.N.[3] — the agenda to include an item which he knew would prevent Israel's participation.[5] The Chairman[4] has thus shown his bias in this matter. The Note will stress the fact that the Chairman's statement ignores the enquiries carried out by the U.N. and will reiterate Israel's position that the Commission has no mandate to discuss the demilitarized zone or to demand explanations on happenings there.

The Ministry is also of the opinion that a reply should be drafted to the Note circulated by the U.A.R.;[7] the reply should be widely distributed, in view of the publicity achieved by the U.A.R. Note. The matter is left to Tekoah's decision. The Note should set forth in detail what Tekoah had said in his telegram No. 95 and should make reference to Syria's rejection of the Secretary-General's proposal to mark out the international boundary, and to Israel's readiness to meet the Syrians notwithstanding their rejection of the invitation in the past.[9]

Notes

1. In these telegrams (of February 17th and 19th, in File 130.09/2339/21) Tekoah voiced his concern about the possible consequences of a meeting of the Israel–Syria Armistice Commission, in that it could destabilize a long-standing situation in the demilitarized zone, and asked for suggestions for a suitable response to the Note submitted on February 19th by the U.A.R. to the President of the Security Council complaining about Israel's "aggressive activity" along its border with Syria.
2. See Biran's letter of 22.2.1960 to Von Horn, in File 130.16/2965/4.
3. See No. 10.
4. Lieut.-Col. Pirlot, Chairman of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, had called for a meeting to discuss the situation in the demilitarized zone, but Israel boycotted the meeting. At a meeting held on February 16th, the chairman expressed his regret at Israel's absence, but ruled that the Commission had the authority to deal with issues connected with the demilitarized zone. In conclusion, Israel was censured for the I.D.F.'s action at Khirbet Tawafiq and was called upon to refrain from acts which could threaten the status of the demilitarized zone and the rights of its Arab inhabitants. (See U.N. Observers Document of 17.2.1960; U.N. Document S/4270 of 23.2.1960; both in File 130.16/2965/13.)

5. Israel claimed sovereignty over the demilitarized zones and argued that the Syrians had no standing there.
6. Harman suggested that Von Horn be informed that the Syrian position at Khirbet Tawafiq was located outside Syria's borders and was included in the demilitarized zone, and that Israel had submitted some 700 complaints about it in the past and demanded its evacuation. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT95, 19.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
7. The Note of February 19th, 1960 (published as U.N. Document S/4268) cited Israel's condemnation at the meeting of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission of February 16th (see n. 4 above).
8. Of February 3rd, 1960, in File 130.16/2965/12. Published as U.N. Document S/4264.
9. Israel's Note of February 25th, 1960, in File 130.126/2965/13. Published as U.N. Document S/4271. The proposal to demarcate the international boundary was raised during Hammarskjöld's visit to the Middle East in January 1959.

12. A. Biran (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 23 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW919; Inc.: 130.09/2340/4

Biran brings to Tekoah's personal attention first details of Von Horn's report on the Tel Katsir–Tawafiq incidents.[1] Starting with a detailed review of the Tel Katsir–Tawafiq affair since 1949, the report describes the digging of the drainage ditches (in 1957 and 1958) and the Arabs' fears that the 1958 ditch will separate their plots. It points out that the Israeli settlements in the demilitarized zones are fortified. In 1959 a U.N. observer saw a very small number of Arabs living in Tawafiq and owning a few cattle. After December 24th the Arabs agreed not to enter the area west of the ditch, on condition that their rights be not thereby prejudiced, but on January 16th an Israeli tractor entered the "yellow field" and then the Syrians started entering the same area. There was a meeting in Tiberias on January 19th, when Israel demanded that the Syrian infiltration be stopped in order to enable the issue to be discussed. That was when Von Horn published his findings, which Israel did not explicitly reject but which it completely ignored. The report quotes the correspondence and the proposals and the resolution in the Mixed Armistice Commission.[2] There has been a relaxation of tension, at least for the time being.[3] Von Horn adds that there are few prospects of the parties' keeping the peace if the issue of the lands is not settled. If a settlement is reached, then it would be possible to withdraw the forces and to implement Article 5.[4]

Israel has no information on what the report says on the fortifications in Tawafiq, on the I.D.F. operation and on the results of the inspection in

the demilitarized zones and in the defensive area.[5] The report is generally balanced and its tone is moderate.[6]

Notes

1. The complete report was published as U.N. Document S/4270 of February 23rd, 1960.
2. For particulars of the debate and the Mixed Armistice Commission's resolution, see No. 11 and n. 4 there.
3. The lull on the Syrian border lasted in effect a short time only, and the incidents, though of lesser severity, continued till the end of 1960 — both in the southern and in the other demilitarized zones. See, for instance, Israel's note to the Security Council of July 1st, 1960, U.N. Document S/4365.
4. Article 5 of the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement deals with the pattern of civilian life in the demilitarized zones and the prohibition to station in these zones armed or paramilitary forces.
5. In addition to the military zones, security zones or 'defence zones' on both sides of the border were defined in the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement, in which the presence of limited defensive forces was permitted. For details, see Volume 3, Appendix IX, pp. 733–734.
6. See also Biran's detailed comments on Von Horn's report, April 1960, 130.23/3351/7.

13. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 24 February 1960

Coded Tel. 192; Outg.: 130.09/2395/1

The heads of the missions abroad are informed that a state of military alert has existed for several days in both parts of the U.A.R. The entire Syrian army, including the reserve brigades, is on full alert and is concentrated along the Israeli border or in its vicinity. The Egyptian army is also in a state of alert and the reserves have been mobilized and are moving into Sinai. The U.A.R. is spreading rumours that Israel is preparing for military action against them and that it has mobilized its reserves. Yahil stresses that no unusual mobilization has taken place apart from the routine call-up of reserves. It is possible that the U.A.R. government is in a genuine panic nourished by the Soviets. This last item should be used with the utmost circumspection. Whatever the reason, the danger exists that a small incident could cause a conflagration. The head of the mission is requested to approach the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his country and to draw their attention to the state of military alert in the U.A.R., and to the dangers involved in this situation,

and to contrast it with the tranquillity in Israel. The Secretary-General of the U.N. has been approached in this matter.[1]

Notes

1. See Nos 14 and 17.

14. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 24 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW922; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

Yahil instructs Tekoah to meet immediately with the Secretary-General of the U.N. and to inform him of the military movements in both parts of the U.A.R.[1] For Tekoah's information: (1) Since the middle of February the leaders of the U.A.R. have been convinced that Israel is about to attack them. Their estimate is based on (a) their belief that Israel had suffered a defeat at Tawafiq,[2] owing to false reporting by their own men; (2) the Secretary-General's remark that the situation in the region has been deteriorating;[3] (c) a flood of information from various sources, especially from U.N. personnel in Israel, that the I.D.F. has been mobilizing and deploying for attack; (d) it is also known that the Soviets have been feeding the Egyptians' fears by stressing the rumours that Israel is on the alert. The U.A.R. leaders also believe that the West is plotting against them.

There is no basis for the rumour that the I.D.F. has been mobilizing the reserves. The danger is that in such a tense situation any small incident could develop into a conflagration. A reliable secret source also reports that the U.A.R. has been negotiating for the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force[4] within 24 hours should hostilities break out and should the Secretary-General issue the appropriate order. The very fact of the negotiations proves that the situation is at a danger point.

The U.A.R. forces: the entire Syrian army is still on the alert which was declared during the Tawafiq crisis. Two to three reserve brigades have been mobilized, in addition to the regular forces. There is a red alert in all the units of the Egyptian army. Reserve units have been pouring into Sinai for several days now. War is in the air. The forces in Sinai amount to over two divisions.

In his talk with the Secretary-General Tekoah should not go into details on what has been said above, but he should emphasize that Israel's information leaves no doubt as to the military deployment in both parts of the U.A.R.

and as to the objectives of this deployment. He should stress that Israel has not carried out any extraordinary mobiliztion. He should also describe compellingly the tension and the electrified atmosphere. Although the entire crisis is based on false rumours, he should point out that the U.A.R. with its propaganda is preparing western public opinion for the commencement of hostilities.

Tekoah is moreover requested to find out what the U.N. Emergency Force has been reporting and what action will the Secretary-General take to allay fears in Cairo following his conversation with him.

Notes

1. See No. 13.
2. See Editorial Note, No. 6.
3. This was said at a press conference held by U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in New York on February 18th, 1960.
4. The emergency force stationed in the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip following their evacuation by the I.D.F. in 1957.

15. United States Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 24 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW923; 130.09/2340/4

The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked Reid over and informed him of the military deployment in the U.A.R.. She emphasized that there was no mobilization whatsoever in Israel and no extraordinary activity. Israel has no intention of attacking Syria or any other country. She suggested several possible reasons for the present developments: the Egyptians may be afraid of Israel and the Soviets may have been feeding these fears, or maybe Nasser intended to shift public attention to Israel or even initiate hostilities because of his failures in Tawafiq and at the meeting of the Arab League,[1] or the cause may be the internal situation in Syria. Whatever the reasons, if these preparations continue and increase, Israel will have to take elementary precautionary steps and to concentrate its forces on the borders. It is possible that Nasser has no aggressive intentions and that the entire crisis is caused by either side's fears that the other will attack it. In any case, Israel has found it necessary to inform the United States, the Secretary-General of the U.N.[3] and the members of the Security Council of the situation.[2]

Yesterday the Soviet ambassador[4] came to request Israel's support for the

Czech representative's[5] candidacy for the presidency of the forthcoming U.N. Assembly. This was a strange step, as the Soviets know that Israel would not support the Czechs in this matter. However, when Israel learned that on the same day or on the previous day, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo[6] had been to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the presumption arose that he had told the Egyptians that the Soviet Union had warned Israel against attacking the U.A.R. The Soviets had taken similar steps at least twice during the last two years in warning the U.A.R. against a putative Israeli attack.

Reid replied that the U.S. Embassy in Israel had informed the Department of State that there was no basis to the rumours of Israeli mobilization. He asked whether it would be possible to use the services of Von Horn to allay the fears of the other party. Mrs. Meir replied that Von Horn was immersed in the problem of the demilitarized zones and that he was apparently not worried by the present situation. Israel has been remonstrating for a long time now about Nasser's inflammatory speeches,[7] and has rejected the argument that they were intended for internal consumption. The Egyptian people and the army, at any rate, do not view the situation in this way. The Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that the powers and the Secretary-General should inform the Egyptians that they have no reason to fear Israel and that they should stop their military deployment, otherwise Israel would have to mobilize its forces as an elementary precautionary measure. In conclusion she drew Reid's attention to Nasser's statement on the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.[8] Reid said that the United States was standing by that declaration; he praised Israel's self-restraint and requested to be notified should Israel decide to mobilize its forces.

Notes

1. The second part of the 32nd Session of the council of the Arab League was held in Cairo between February 8th and 29th. The U.A.R.'s efforts to create a "Palestinian entity" failed owing to opposition by Jordan.
2. See, for instance, No. 20, Yahil to Tekoah (TNW927 of February 25th) and the Ministry to Tekoah (TNW934 of February 26th), both in File 130.09/2340/4.
3. See No. 14.
4. Mikhail F. Bodrov, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel.
5. Jiri Nosek, Czechoslovakia Vice-Minister for Foreign Affiars.
6. V.Y. Yerofeev, the Soviet ambassador to the U.A.R.
7. Nasser came to Syria in the second half of February and made a number of anti-Israeli speeches; he spoke, *inter alia*, of the U.A.R.'s "holy obligation" to "liberate Palestine". (For a transcription of these speeches, see File 130.02/4316/1.) See also n. 8 below.
8. The declaration made in May 1950 by the United States, Britain and France on their "deep interest...and desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace

and stability in the area", on their awareness of the "need of the Arab states and Israel to maintain a certain level of armed forces" and on their intention to supply arms to the region once guarantees had been given that they would not be used for aggression against other countries. In his speech in Damascus of February 22nd, Nasser announced that this declaration was null and void following the British and French aggression against Egypt.

16. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT110; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah addresses his telegram to Yahil and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Bunche telephoned him, saying that Gyani[1] had cabled him denying that Egyptian forces had entered the Gaza Strip. Gyani had also received an official denial to that effect from Hilmi.[2] Gyani also says that following the rumours on the deployment of forces, the commanders of the U.N. Emergency Force had replied to cables from their governments, saying thay had seen no movements of Egyptian forces.

Bunche said he was concerned about other information he had received from Gyani, namely that he was due to meet the Israeli Chief of Staff[3] the following day. In his opinion, this meeting could embarrass Gyani because he could not serve as a source of information on the movements of forces in the country in which he is stationed. True, there is a difference between Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Egyptians not having ever claimed sovereignty over the latter, but they would presumably regard the meeting as being held to relay information.

Tekoah replied that he knew nothing about such a meeting, but in the present situation it could only be of mutual benefit. It was not only our concern about the movements of the Egyptian forces which justified our approaching the U.N. Emergency Force, in particular in view of the Chief of Staff's regular contacts with the Commander-in-Chief of the Emergency Force; furthermore, as Bunche certainly remembers, Israel's withdrawal in 1957 was conditional on the clear understanding that Egyptian forces would not return to Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and the U.N. was a party to this understanding.

Shortly after the conversation with Bunche, the U.N. spokesman informed the press that there was no basis to the rumours that Egyptian forces had entered the Gaza Strip.

Notes

1. Lieut.-General Prem Singh Gyani, Commander of the U.N. Emergency Force.
2. Amin Hilmi, the Egyptian liaison officer with the U.N. Emergency Force.
3. Rav-Aluf Chaim Laskov, the I.D.F.'s Chief of Staff.

17. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT103; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah met Hammarskjöld, with Bunche and Cordier present, to discuss the concentrations of the U.A.R. forces in Sinai and Syria. He stated that the military concentration in Sinai was larger than in 1956.

Hammarskjöld said they were following the situation in the region closely and that information from the U.N., the U.S. and Great Britain did not support Israel's impression of the situation.[3] Bunche added that it was impossible to hide military concentrations in Sinai and there had been no attempt lately on the part of the Egyptians to conceal the movements of their forces. The concentrations in both parts of the U.A.R. did not exceed what could be expected in the tense situation created on the northern border. They knew that the Syrian army was not much good, and considering Cairo's difficulties in Syria it was natural that Nasser would want to create the impression of activity on the southern border. As proof that the Egyptians had no aggressive intentions Hammarskjöld recalled Egypt's Note on the overflight of four Israeli jets which had been driven off by the Egyptians. He said that if the Egyptians had wished they could have blown up the incident out of all proportion for propaganda purposes and it could even have served them as a pretext to open hostilities. In the event, they did not even lodge a formal complaint. Nor did the Soviet Union wish for tension in the region, and its main efforts were now directed to focusing the debate at the forthcoming summit on the Berlin issue.[4] Hammarskjöld again said that, in view of the information at hand, he could not envisage the possibility of any action in Cairo. However, it was self-evident that he considered himself "seized with the matter" and would follow the developments very closely.

Tekoah did not accept Hammarskjöld's explanations. He repeated that numerical estimates of the forces were not the decisive point under the present circumstances. It was a fact that a bellicose atmosphere prevailed in the U.A.R. and it had reached a peak. The Egyptians' reasons for the steps they have been taking were not important, what was important was the fact that these steps were increasing in their intensity and the explosion

could occur any minute. The U.N. knew that there had been no mobilization in Israel and it was doubtful whether keeping track of developments was enough.

At this point Hammarskjöld began to backtrack and said he understood the danger of the situation's deteriorating still further and of an eventual explosion, and that he would raise the matter with Egypt. He will consult Cordier and Bunche and will let Tekoah know of the steps he will be taking.

Notes

1. See No. 15 and nn. 7 and 8 there.
2. No. 14.
3. The United States and Britain.
4. The summit conference took place in Paris in May 1960, with the participation of the leaders of the Western powers and the premier of the Soviet Union. The conference broke up with no results owing to the downing by the Soviets of the American reconnaissance plane U-2 on May 1st, 1960.
5. At a press conference held in New York on February 18th, Hammarskjöld said that the Security Council should act to support the U.N. resolutions and to prevent the situation in the Middle East from deteriorating, and added that his personal efforts were arousing too much expectations.
6. See No. 12 and n. 1 there.
7. Armand Berard, the French permanent representative at the United Nations. See also No. 21.
8. The meeting was mainly devoted to the *Astypalea* affair, but Von Horn's report on the I.D.F.'s action at Khirbet Tawafiq was also discussed — see No. 12. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT101, 23.2.1960, 130.09/2329/21.)
9. See No. 11, n. 7.
10. See No. 12, n. 6.

18. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW926; Outg.: 130.09/2340/4

The Minister of Foreign Affairs addresses Tekoah and Harman. She expresses her astonishment at the U.N. Secretary-General's reaction, and requests Tekoah to point out to him again the seriousness of the situation. Israel is there on the spot and its information is correct while Hammarskjöld's information is inaccurate. Israel knows for certain that an Egyptian force has entered Gaza. Hammarskjöld's unwillingness to approach Egypt officially is unacceptable. She requests Tekoah to inform the Secretary-General that she

has approached many delegates and given them the information at hand and also advised them that Israel had approached Hammarskjöld separately.

Harman is instructed to contact the Department of State immediately and to demand that they urge the Secretary-General to act in the matter.[6]

Notes

1. No. 17.
2. The location of the U.N. Secretary-General's bureau.
3. See No. 15 and n. 5 there.
4. See *ibid.*, nn. 7 and 8.
5. See Chapter 3.
6. See No. 19.

19. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. WNT30; Inc.: 130.09/2314/9

Herzog had a talk with Hart on the military concentrations in Sinai and expressed to him Israel's concern in this matter. Hart replied that they also knew about these concentrations but their information was that only three brigades had been transferred to Sinai and that their deployment was defensive. Further on Hart admitted that the Department of State's information was not up to date and it might change. The Department of State's estimate was that Nasser had no aggressive intentions towards Israel, but both the Department and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo were "mystified" as to the reasons behind the military concentrations and Nasser's inflammatory speeches. As to the military concentrations in Syria, again they did not know the reason for that, but it was a fact that a considerable part of the Syrian army was permanently stationed in the vicinity of the border. Hart surmises that Nasser's inflammatory speeches are connected with his quarrel with Qassem[2] and perhaps also with the situation in Syria.

Herzog replied that if the present crisis continued Israel would have to take precautionary steps to secure its borders, and in such a situation anything could happen. He demanded immediate action in Cairo to point out to the Egyptians the dangers of the situation and the necessity of stopping the warlike preparations. He also requested that the Department of State approach the U.N. in this matter.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 15.
2. Tension existed between the U.A.R. and Iraq at the beginning of 1960. The trial of the conspirators in the attempted assassination of Qassem of October 1959 took place in Baghdad in January 1960, and the U.A.R. was accused of having a hand in the conspiracy. Iraq also started a campaign calling for Syria's liberation from the union with Egypt, and opposed the convocation of the Arab League in Cairo in February 1960. When its protests were ignored, it boycotted the meeting.
3. In two telephone conversations made after that meeting, Hart stated that the United States had contacted its Embassy in Cairo and that the Embassy had in fact "approached a most important figure close to Nasser", whose reply was that "things were much easier". (See Herzog to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams WNT31 of 25.2.1960, 130.09/2314/9; WNT37 of 27.2.1960, 130.09/2313/2.)

20. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. TNW928; Inc.: 130.09/2340/4

The Minister of Foreign Affairs informs Tekoah of her meeting with the British Ambassador.[1] His information is of an even more serious nature than Israel's. He mentioned that three divisions had been transferred to the Sinai, the hospitals in Cairo put on the alert, and civilian patients evacuated from them. He also mentioned a telegram from the British Consul-General in Jerusalem telling of a cable he had seen from Von Horn to the U.N. Secretary-General with information on military concentrations in Sinai and in Syria. Von Horn also says that there are no signs of a mobilization in Israel. The Ambassador says the Americans are also in possession of this information.

Mrs. Meir asked the ambassador to convey to London her request that his government approach Hammarskjöld through their Permanent Representative at the U.N.[2] Tekoah is requested to meet the British representative and keep in touch with him in this matter. Harman is requested to approach the Americans and ask them to intervene immediately at the U.N.[4]

Notes

1. Patrick Francis Hancock, the British Ambassador to Israel.
2. See No. 22.

3. See No. 17.
4. Harman raised the matter again with Merchant, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, on February 26th. Harman repeated Herzog's words of the previous day to Hart (see No. 19), and stressed that Nasser's extremism will intensify with further undermining of the balance of power in the Middle East. He also protested against the balanced statement by the United States, calling on both parties to exercise restraint. Merchant gave Harman details of America's intervention in Cairo (see No. 19) and praised Israel's self-restraint. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram WNT32, 26.2.1960, 130.09/2314/9.)

21. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT111; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports on his meeting with Berard, France's Permanent Representative at the U.N., at which the latter asked him how he could help Israel in this situation. Tekoah replied that Hammarskjöld should be made aware of the powers' concern and he should be urged to act with all dispatch. Berard promised to talk with Cordier (Hammarskjöld is to return to New York on Monday). The rest of the meeting with Berard was taken up by the issue of free passage through the Suez Canal.[3]

Notes

1. Armand Berard, the French permanent representative at the United Nations.
2. See No. 11.
3. See Chapter 3.

22. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT115; 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports on the talk he had on February 26th and also on two prior conversations with Dickson and Beeley of the British Mission.[1] They compared their data on the U.A.R. army concentrations. The British claimed that the information on three divisions in Sinai originated only with the British military attaché in Israel, who had it from the General Staff in Tel

Aviv. On the other hand, the reports on the evacuation of civilians from the hospitals in Cairo came from Egypt. The British representatives said they hoped to get more detailed information from London and they were also expecting their government's instructions and reactions to the talks they had had with the Israelis so they could know what their next steps should be. They were in favour of the suggestion that Hammarskjöld fly to Cairo; he could not leave for the Middle East before Monday, but his intention to do so should be given publicity beforehand. Dickson said he would cable to London and ask for their reaction to this proposal. He also said that London, Paris and Washington were in continuous consultation on the situation.

Tekoah requests an answer by telegram whether he could tell Dickson officially that Israel was in favour of Hammarskjöld's going to Cairo.[6]

Notes

1. The talk took place on February 25th; information and estimates were exchanged about the strength of the U.A.R.'s mobilized forces. Dixon said that the information possessed by the U.S. showed the situation to be less serious than that reported by Israel, but agreed with Israel's assessment that it was serious enough and that it could blow up any minute. He thought Hammarskjöld was concerned about the situation, but his wish was to relieve the growing tension by allaying the fears of both parties; he was absolutely certain that neither party was interested in the situation's escalating into hostilities. Dixon promised to maintain the contact with Hammarskjöld should the situation demand this. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT109, 25.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
2. At that meeting, Tekoah suggested that Hammarskjöld go to the Middle East. Dixon said the idea was certainly worth considering, and perhaps they would suggest it to the Secretary-General. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT112, 25.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
3. See No. 20.
4. See n. 1 above.
5. Colonel James N. Cowley, the British military attaché in Israel.
6. Yahil replied that he did not think Israel should pressure the Secretary-General to go to Cairo (see his telegram TNW935, 17.2.1960, 130.09/2340/4).

23. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT122; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports on a message from the Secretary-General of February 27th, saying that he was prepared to leave for the Middle East in order to allay the

tension there (for full text of the message, see Main Volume, p. 30). Bunche, who had brought over the message, remarked that it did not constitute a "proposal" but only a "tentative suggestion". In answer to a question he said that the second sentence in the message meant that the Secretary-General would leave for the Middle East only if the replies of the parties justified this journey. According to Bunche, a certain relaxation of the tension has been felt for the last two days. Gyani has confirmed that there were no military concentrations in Gaza, and a more moderate vein has been noticed in the Cairo radio broadcasts. There had also been an encouraging meeting between Gyani and Hilmi, but he did not want to enlarge on that.

In a later conversation with Bunche, the latter again said that the idea of Hammarskjöld's journey was not a proposal but an attempt on his side to find out what the reactions of the parties were. He repeated his information that no Egyptian forces had entered Gaza and that the Palestinian brigade which had come to Gaza for the "liberation" celebrations had also been almost entirely withdrawn. As to Sinai, they had no reports changing their estimates — which had already been given to Israel — of the size of the concentrations of the U.A.R. forces there. He thinks there has even been a "slight change for the better" and that "a very good first step" had been taken. He would not elaborate on this subject.

In a talk with Beeley, the latter said that Hammarskjöld's proposal differed from the idea they had talked over previously with Tekoah. They thought Hammarskjöld should go to the Middle East from Europe. Hammarskjöld's proposal meant that he did not intend to take immediate steps to deal with the present tension but that he was planning for an improved future situation. They had not yet received a reply from London, and their impression was that their government did not think an emergency action was necessary. Beeley added that he thought London would view favourably the Secretary-General's proposal.

Notes

1. The evacuation of the I.D.F. from the Gaza Strip in March 1957, after the Sinai Campaign.

24. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 February 1960

Coded Tel.: NWT128; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah met Hammarskjöld on February 29th. They discussed Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's forthcoming visit to the United States and the planned meeting between him and the Secretary-General, because of which the latter's visit to the Middle East would have to be put off. Hammarskjöld had not yet received the Egyptians' answer in this matter but he presumed that it would be in the affirmative. The visit will most probably take place in the spring, particularly if the meeting with the Prime Minister provided a good basis for it.

Further on the talk turned to the situation in the Middle East. Tekoah said that there had been no change in the situation though there were signs of the beginning of a certain relaxation in the tension, and Israel assumed that this was the result of the Secretary-General's and the powers' actions. At the same time, the presence of forces where they had not been stationed before was a grave development and efforts should continue to have these forces withdrawn.

Hammarskjöld replied that he was acting to this end and it seemed to him that the attenuation of the forces would be carried out gradually, in contrast to the concentration which had taken place with great fanfare. The process had already begun. He would have been happy to see an immediate withdrawal, but one had to be realistic. He connected the military concentrations with the quarrel with Qassem and the convocation of the Arab League.[4] If the League's session closed with no substantive results it would aid in the relaxation of the tension.[5]

Tekoah answered that the time element was of the utmost importance, and one should prevent the present deployment from becoming an established fact for any period of time.

The issue of free passage through the Suez Canal and the affair of the *Astypalea* were then discussed.[6] Hammarskjöld said that he was still awaiting additional documents from both parties. The enquiry so far has supported his conclusion that political issues were of a relative nature. He had intended to write to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this subject but now he preferred to postpone the discussion until after his meeting with the Prime Minister. He saw the "practical stand" as a starting point from which to advance to the state of affairs existing in 1958. The present atmosphere obviously did not make progress easier.

Notes

1. On the exchange of telegrams between Hammarskjöld and Ben-Gurion which preceded their meeting in March 1960, and on the meeting itself, see Chapter 6, Nos. 101 and 103.
2. See No. 23.
3. The Brandeis University, situated near Boston, which was to confer on Ben-Gurion the degree of *Doctor honoris causa*.
4. See No. 19 and n. 2 there.
5. See No. 15 and n. 1 there.
6. Chapter 3.

25. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 1 March 1960

Coded Tel. 203; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Yahil reports on the situation on the borders with the U.A.R. Though there has been a relaxation in the tension, the deployment of the U.A.R. forces has not changed substantially so one cannot see in the lessening tension a guarantee for continued peace. The actions of the U.N. and the powers had a moderating effect and they should be encouraged to continue with this line until a substantial relaxation is achieved.

26. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 March 1960

Coded Tel. 661; Inc.: 130.23/3344/51

The U.S. Embassy in Cairo reports that a "heavy withdrawal" of Egyptian forces from Sinai into Egypt proper has begun.

27. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 13 March 1960

Coded Tel.: 232; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

The advance units of the U.A.R. army in Sinai have commenced a partial

withdrawal, but there is still a heavy concentration of forces there. It appears that the armoured units have not yet been withdrawn. Israel's diplomatic action has indubitably contributed to the relaxation in tension, but one should not assume that the danger has entirely passed.

28. United States Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 26 April 1960

Coded Tel.: TNW71; Outg.: 130.09/2313/1

The U.S. Ambassador saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs at his request and relayed a *Note Verbale* from the Jordanian Prime Minister,[1] as follows:

> The Government of Jordan is interested in keeping the border calm and will do its utmost in that respect. It hopes that should there be unforeseen incidents, the Government of Israel would take into account the Government of Jordan's interest in keeping the peace and its actions with this aim in view.

Reid does not know what is meant by "unforeseen incidents" and what brought the Jordanian Prime Minister to send this message.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed her satisfaction with the first part of the Note, but was concerned about the second part, from which it could be concluded that the Jordanian Prime Minister knew of somebody interested in heating the border and embroiling the two countries in a quarrel.

With no obvious connection with the former subject, Reid told of an incident in which several shots were fired from the Israeli side at a group of labourers in Jordan employed in building a dam near Adassiyeh.[5] No one was hurt, but Reid claimed that this constituted harassment by Israel and attempts to obstruct development plans in the Jordan Valley which were supported by the U.S. and aimed at promoting peace in the region. Reid stressed that he was quoting the facts "as reported", that is, that they had no confirmation of their own as to their authenticity.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave immediate instructions to verify the report, and it turned out that nobody had heard of such an incident nor had a complaint been submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Minister of Foreign Affairs connected this story with a similar one concocted in Jordan, alleging that an Israeli patrol had penetrated into Jordan near Tul Karm and two of its members were killed. Enquiries made by the U.N. observers, by Jordan and by Israel had found no basis whatever to this report. Both the U.N. people and the Jordanians expressed their displeasure at the

falsified report. The Minister concluded from these two stories and from the Jordanian Note that there were agents interested in fomenting a quarrel between the two countries. She again requested the Ambassador to find out from the Jordanian Prime Minister what exactly had been the object of his Note, and reiterated Israel's policy of keeping the borders quiet. The Israel Embassy in Washington is also requested to elucidate this matter.

The Chief of the Army Intelligence Branch[6] adds in clarification that Jordan was very sensitive as regards Egyptian activity and that they were afraid Egypt could recruit terrorists from the Gaza Strip to penetrate into Israel from Jordan, and that could be the reason behind Jordan's Note.

An additional enquiry elucidated that the Jordanians had indeed submitted a complaint on the incident near Adassiyeh but had not demanded an investigation, which proved that they did not attach much importance to the incident. The opinion in Israel is that if shots had indeed been fired they had come from the Syrian side.[7]

Notes

1. Hazza' al-Majali, the Jordanian Prime Minister, was assassinated on August 29th — see No. 29.
2. Sheldon J. Mills, the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan.
3. An irrigation channel dug by the Jordanians to divert the water of the Yarmuk to land in the Jordan Valley (the Ghor) — see Chapter 2.
4. United States Operations Mission — the American mission which supervised the economic aid to Jordan.
5. A township in Jordan neighbouring on the dam and on the diversion channel of the Yarmuk.
6. Aluf-Mishne Chaim Herzog, head of the Intelligence Branch of the I.D.F.
7. As the result of an approach by the Department of State, the Jordanian Prime Minister thanked Minister of Foreign Affairs Mrs. Meir for her message; investigation showed that the rumours had no basis, and its disseminators were arrested. (See J. Herzog to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram WNT93, 3.6.1960, 130.09/2313/2.)
8. An official announcement published in Cairo on April 20th stated that an Israeli espionage network had been uncovered.

29. D. Ben-Gurion to King Hussein (Amman). 30 August 1960

Note

1. Hazza' al-Majali, the Jordanian premier, was assassinated in his office in Amman on August 29th, 1960. Eleven other people, including several ministers in his

government, were killed at the same time, and 34 were wounded. King Hussein accused the U.A.R. of having plotted the murder, but Cairo denied the accusation and put the responsibility on Jordanian elements opposing the Hashemite regime. Eleven people (including seven tried *in absentia*) were sentenced to death for their complicity in the assassination.

32. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 January 1960

Coded Tel. WNT12; 130.09/2314/9

Erell reports on his talk with Armin Meyer on the U.N. Secretary-General's planned trip to Cairo to deal with the crisis of freedom of passage in the Suez Canal and with the reports that Lebanon was planning to divert the Hasbani river.[2] Meyer said that the Department of State was chary of instructing the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to investigate this plan so as not to create the impression that the projected diversion was taken seriously. He requested Erell to transmit to him unofficially Israel's estimates of the possibility of the Arab states diverting the tributaries of the Jordan.

Notes

1. One paragraph, dealing with Hammarskjöld's visit to Cairo in connection with the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, has been omitted here.
2. Refers to the announcement by the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hussein Oueini, that his government was about to request Parliament to allocate 12m Lebanese liras (some $4m) to divert the Hasbani from the channel of the Jordan to Lebanese territory. This report was published in the Lebanese paper *Al-Hayat* on January 16th, but such an allocation was not requested in 1960.
3. On Israel's water projects and its request for a loan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit", see Chapter 7, Nos. 115 and 118.

33. M. Comay (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the U. N. and the Israel Embassy in London. 21 January 1960

Coded Tel. 130/3; Outg.: 130.09/2323/1

Comay reports on his talk with P. Hancock, the British Ambassador to Israel, who said that the impression of the British was that the Lebanese statements

on the diversion of the Hasbani[1] were pure propaganda in anticipation of the forthcoming Arab League session.[3] Hancock is keeping in touch with his colleagues in Jordan and Lebanon and briefs them on Israel's water schemes. He thinks that his colleague in Amman has managed to pacify the Jordanians.

Notes

1. See No. 32.
2. P.M. Crossthwaite, the British Ambassador to Lebanon.
3. The second part of the 32nd regular Session of the Council of the Arab League took place in Cairo between February 8th and 29th, 1960. Among the resolutions, there were several dealing with the water of the Jordan: "Israel's attempts to divert the water of the Jordan are aggressive actions justifying defensive steps on the part of all the Arab states acting in solidarity... The water of the Jordan should be utilized for the good of the Arab states and the Arabs of Palestine. The Arab states should implement this resolution with all haste, both unilaterally and collectively... A special technical committee will be set up to coordinate these actions and follow their implementation." (See *Al-Hayat*, 1.3.1960.)

34. M. Ofer (London) to the British Commonwealth Division. 22 January 1960

Coded Tel. 812; Inc.: 130.09/2323/2

Ofer reports on talks at the Foreign Office on regional water planning. Lebanon's plan to divert the Hasbani seems to them "utterly wild", and Lebanon does not have the resources to carry this plan out. The British ambassador in Beirut expressed his doubts about the judiciousness of this plan to the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and recommended regional cooperation. The British are considering instructing their representatives in the Arab states to adopt a favourable attitude towards Israel's water plans.

Note

1. See No. 35.

35. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT61; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah addresses his telegram to Yahil and reports on his talk with Hammarskjöld, who told him that Arab delegates had approached him on Israel's plans to divert the water of the Jordan.[2] The main spokesman was the Jordanian representative, A. al-Rifa'i, who claimed that implementation of the Israeli plan would result in salination of the southern channel of the Jordan. When Tekoah remarked that these problems had been discussed with Johnston, the American envoy, Hammarskjöld said that al-Rifa'i claimed that no agreement had been reached and that governments could not be considered bound by "the talk of some technicians". (The Johnston plan had indeed not been endorsed by the Arab states but only by Arab water experts.) Al-Rifa'i also claimed that the quantities Israel was planning to divert were greater than those allotted to it in the Johnston plan. The Arabs also rejected Israel's argument that Jordan's Yarmuk plan was analogous to Israel's Jordan plan, because Israel was planning to pump the water from the Lake of Tiberias basin while the Arabs will be using water from the Yarmuk basin. Hammarskjöld said he had not been asked by the Arabs to take steps in this matter, but as he had no information on Israel's plans he requested to be briefed on them.

Notes

1. On the affair of the Danish ship *Inge Toft* which was detained in Port Said in May 1959 with an Israeli cargo on board, see No. 52.
2. See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT54–55, 5.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21. The first telegram stated that representatives of the Arab states had expressed their concern to Hammarskjöld regarding Israel's water projects, and the second said that the Arabs had submitted a memorandum on this subject which described Israel's plans as "a potential threat to peace".
3. See No. 33, n. 3.
4. See Introduction, p. XIV.
5. See No. 32, n. 1.

36. D. Hammarskjöld (New York) to Y. Tekoah. 15 March 1960

Notes

1. In the course of the meeting, which took place on March 14th, Ben-Gurion said that there were two things an attack on which would constitute for Israel a *casus belli* — the water of the Jordan and freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits; see No. 103.
2. See No. 35.
3. The Israel National Water Conduit project.
4. Regional waterworks connected with the Israel National Water Conduit — see S. Blass, *Water in Strife and Action* (Hebrew), pp. 224–225.
5. Tekoah recommended (his telegram NWT162 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17.6.1960, 130.09/2339/23) that the reply to Hammarskjöld not be given in writing in order to avoid a lengthy exchange of correspondence on the water of the Jordan, but Ben-Gurion did write to him in the end — see No. 45, n. 5, and No. 47.

37. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT190; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay addresses his telegram to Yahil, and reports that, after the meeting with Hammarskjöld on Suez, the latter mentioned his letter to Tekoah on Israel's water plans[1] and requested that the dispatch of the informative material he had requested be hastened because the Arabs, and the Jordanians in particular, were pressing him and the issue may have to be brought before the Security Council.

Comay replied that he had not yet received the informative material but that he could represent Israel's position unofficially. Israel was prepared during Johnston's visit and is prepared now to come to an agreement with its neighbours on regional water schemes, but as they refuse to do so, it does not recognize their right to interfere or to demand that an account be rendered to them on Israel's intentions. Israel does not wish the U.N. or the Secretary-General to act as mediators in this matter.

Hammarskjöld replied that the Jordan was an international river and that the Jordanians feared, whether justifiably or not, that Israel would divert larger quantities of water than had been allotted to it under the Johnston plan; if he could not allay their fears, they would go to the Security Council and then a debate would take place whose consequences could not be predicted.

Comay asked whether the Arab stance was caused by their concern about

the water or by their non-recognition of Israel's right to exist and their wish to sabotage its development. If Jordan wants an equitable sharing out of the water, Israel will welcome any constructive approach on its part and not necessarily within the U.N. framework. Comay reminds Yahil that he has not yet received the draft of the Prime Minister's letter,[3] and asks whether he should raise the subject in the Prime Minister's name or wait until Hammarskjöld himself raises the issue again.[4]

Notes

1. No. 36.
2. See Chapter 7.
3. See No. 47.
4. Yahil instructed Tekoah to meet Hammarskjöld and to inform him of Israel's position in the spirit of Ben-Gurion's letter — No. 47 (see telegram TNW19, 7.4.1960, 130.09/2340/5).

38. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT203; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay addresses his telegram to Ambassador Harman in Washington and to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He fears that Israel's opposition to Hammarskjöld's mediation in the water issue could lead to a conflict with the Secretary-General, therefore the position of the U.S. is here of particular importance. Comay assumes that the Americans will have to consider the problem from two different points of view: on the one hand, it would be convenient for them to have the Secretary-General deal with subjects at issue between Israel and the Arab states; on the other hand, the Americans had attempted in the past to solve the water problem outside the U.N. framework and they have a common interest with Israel to prevent it from becoming an international issue and the subject of debates at the U.N. The U.S. is the most appropriate agent to convince the Jordanians that they have nothing to fear from Israel's plans, just as they have been trying to allay Israel's apprehensions of the Jordanians' Yarmuk plan. From the Americans' point of view, action by the Secretary-General will only complicate the situation. Comay thinks that there is no alternative but to approach the Americans as the Secretary-General will contact them in

any event. He suggests that Harman request instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later consult with him on the action to be taken.[2]

Notes

1. No. 37.
2. Harman replied that he had been told by the Department of State that they did not wish the Secretary-General to handle the matter of the Jordan's water, while the Embassy itself was interested in gaining time until the Americans approved the plan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit". (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to M. Comay, telegram WNT53, 11.4.1960, 130.09/2313/2.)

39. D. Hammarskjöld (New York) to M. Comay (New York). 13 April 1960

Notes

1. The report in the *Jerusalem Post* said that the diversion of the water in the conduit under construction came to compensate the settlements of the Bet Shean Valley and the Jordan Valley for the water of the Yarmuk which had been diverted to the Jordanian side of the Ghor.
2. No. 36.

40. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 April 1960

Coded. Tel NWT217; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay informs Yahil that he has received a letter from the U.N. Secretary-General regarding an item in the *Jerusalem Post* reporting that Israel has begun constructing a pumping station south of Lake Tiberias and a water pipe leading to the Beth She'an Valley;[1] Hammarskjöld requests details on Israel's water plans.[2] As the Embassy wishes to gain time,[3] he will give Hammarskjöld an interim answer to the effect that he was consulting his Ministry and that he hoped to see him again after Passover. As to the matter itself, he will be cabling his comments on the instructions he has received.

Notes

1. See No. 39.
2. See Nos 36 and 37.
3. See No. 38 and n. 3 there.
4. See No. 37, n. 4.
5. See n. 3 above.

41. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT232; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay reports on consultations and coordination of steps to be taken between the Embassy in Washington and the permanent mission to the U.N. He requests Wiener, the Director-General of TAHAL, to comment on the two letters he has received from Hammarskjöld. He explains that he intends to brief Hammarskjöld on Israel's basic stand and to convince him that the Arabs' fears are groundless. In this context he could supply him with general data and avoid a discussion of the principles involved.[3]

Notes

1. No. 36.
2. No. 39.
3. For the Ministry's response, see No. 42.

42. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Israel Embassy in Washington. 22 April 1960

Coded Tel. TNW62; Inc.: 130.09/2340/5

Yahil instructs Comay and Harman on the coordinated action they should take on the water issue.

(1) The Ministry agrees with Harman that time should be gained until the conclusion of the negotiations on the American loan for the implementation of Israel's water plans.[1] (2) There is no option but to make clear to the Secretary-General that Israel is not prepared to recognize the United Nations'

right to interfere in the implementation of a plan which is compatible with the Johnston water plan. (3) The Secretary-General can be given details on Israel's plans, for example, that Israel is not pumping water from Lake Tiberias now and will not do so for another four years. It should be pointed out that Jordan is implementing a plan which also involves Israel, but Israel does not raise problems because it believes that what Jordan is doing will be within the framework of a regional plan.

(4) The Prime Minister's opinion should be relayed to Hammarskjöld in his name.[2]

(5) If this information does not satisfy Hammarskjöld, he should be told that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is coming to New York and will be prepared to discuss the issue with him.[3]

Comay and Harman are requested to cable their conclusions.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 38 and n. 3 there.
2. See No. 47.
3. In the event, the Minister of Foreign Affairs did meet Hammarskjöld in New York on June 7th, but the talk dealt with general matters and the subject of the water was not raised at all (see Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT320a, 7.6.1960, 130.09/2339/23).
4. See No. 46.

43. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 22 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT251; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay consulted with Harman who thinks that the meeting with Hammarskjöld can be held without it prejudicing the negotiations with the U.S. on the loan for the implementation of Israel's water plans. As there are inconsistencies in Johnston's agreements with Israel and the Arab states regarding the amounts of water allotted to the parties, Johnston's plan should be referred to only in a general way and Hammarskjöld should be advised to ask for more details from the Department of State or from Johnston himself.[3]

Notes

1. No. 42.
2. See No. 47.
3. The understanding between Israel and Johnston was signed on July 5th, 1955, and between Johnston and the three Arab states concerned on October 10th, 1955. It turned out that the allotted quantities of water in the agreements were not identical, the main differences being as follows: (1) The agreement between Jordan and Israel on the water from Lake Tiberias gave Jordan 70m m^3 fresh water and 15m m^3 brackish water, while according to the agreement with the Arab states Jordan was allotted 85m m^3 fresh water and 15m m^3 brackish water. (2) The agreement with Jordan gave Israel 40m m^3 water from the Yarmuk, while that with the Arab states allotted to Israel only 25m m^3. (See brief of March 24th, 1963, prepared by Sh. Cahane for Prime Minister Eshkol prior to his visit to the United States, in File 93.03/3080/2.)

44. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 April 1960

Coded Tel. WNT62; Inc.: 130.09/2313/2

Erell reports on a talk with Armin Meyer of the Department of State on Israel's proposed answer to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding the water plans. Meyer said he thought Israel's position acceptable, and he even suggested that Hammarskjöld could be told there was no opposition to his approaching the Department of State in this matter. The Department will see to it that the inconsistencies in the water allocations to Israel and the Arab states[2] are glossed over, as in his opinion they are of no practical significance.

Notes

1. See Nos 42 and 43.
2. See No. 43, n. 3.

45. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 May 1960

Coded Tel. NWT291; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Further to a previous telegram,[1] Comay transmits to Yahil his correspondence

with the U.N. Secretary-General: a letter to the secretary of May 6th, the Secretary's reply of May 10th, and the draft of a letter he intends to send to the Secretary (for the text, see Main Volume, pp. 58–59).

Notes

1. Comay reported that Hammarskjöld had told him that any exchange of views between them would not be of much use unless he received beforehand the details on Israel's water projects. (See telegram of 12.5.1960, 130.09/2339/23.)
2. Nos. 36 and 39.
3. See No. 36, n. 1.
4. Thus in the original, but should presumably be "to us" — see No. 42.
5. Yahil instructed Tekoah not to write to the Secretary-General nor to request a meeting with him: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished the answer to come from Ben-Gurion — see No. 47.

46. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] 16 May 1960

Coded Tel. NWT294; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Comay comments on Harman's draft for the reply to the Secretary-General.[2] In his opinion, this would only lead to more argumentation in writing with Hammarskjöld. Comay analyses Hammarskjöld's position thus:

(1) He wants to examine Israel's water plans himself, and therefore demands details at firsthand.

(2) In the light of the details he gets, he will decide whether Israel was indeed staying within the framework of Johnston's plan.

(3) He wishes to be the mediator between Israel and the Arabs.

In Comay's opinion, the reply to Hammarskjöld should state that we were ready to meet him, and then clarify Israel's stand in accordance with the instructions Comay has received. A member of the U.S. Permanent Mission to the U.N. should also be kept in the picture. The Secretary-General is about to return to New York from London, and it is advisable to reply to his last letter[7] before he renews the pressure.

Notes

1. This was also sent to Harman in Washington.
2. In Harman's telegram to Comay and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (WNT81,

15.5.1960, 130.09/2313/2) he suggested that the reply to Hammarskjöld should say that Israel's water projects were based on the Johnston plan, on the assumption that the other parties would do nothing against its guidelines.

3. No. 36.
4. See *ibid.*, n. 1.
5. The first meeting on this subject was held on February 8th — see No. 35. Comay's report did not touch on the American viewpoint.
6. No. 39.
7. See No. 45.

47. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to D. Hammarskjöld (New York). 27 May 1960

Notes

1. See Chapter 1.
2. See No. 17, n. 4.

48. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 June 1960

Coded Tel. NWT320; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Comay reports that he had received the instructions[1] concerning the handing over of Ben-Gurion's letter[2] after he had already given the letter to Hammarskjöld.

At his meeting with Comay, the Secretary-General expressed his satisfaction and said that the clarification of Israel's position was important to him because he wanted to speak on this subject with the representatives of the Arab states, and with the Jordanian representative in particular, before the session of the Arab League due to open the following week — where the issue could appear on the agenda. Comay said that Ben-Gurion's message was for the Secretary-General's personal information and was not intended to be utilized in another context. Israel would not agree to be a party to three-sided negotiations with the Arabs with Hammarskjöld's mediation. What was said in the Prime Minister's letter was based on a bilateral understanding between Israel and the U.S., and Israel could not permit the involvement in this matter of the Secretary-General or any other third party.

Hammarskjöld replied that he accepted what Comay had said, but he

wanted to silence the Arabs' protests. In his opinion, Johnston did not arrive at a definite settlement with the Jordanians as he did with Israel, because the Arabs reject Israel's claims regarding the allocation of Jordan's waters, and also deny that Johnston's plan was operative. Comay replied that Israel was not interested in the Arabs' claims because it was bound by the agreement with the United States, and what had been agreed on with the U.S. is their affair. Hammarskjöld said that he now understood Israel's position and if there was any detail he was not certain about he would contact Comay.

Comay thinks this is not the last word, but it is good that the Secretary-General has noted Israel's position. He thinks that Johnston and his assistants left the Arab states vague about his plan and that the inconsistencies between the Israeli and Arab versions are also their doing. He recommends that Ben-Gurion's letter be sent on to the Department of State, because the information will reach them anyway. Hammarskjöld has also received much material on the Johnston plan from the Department of State.

Notes

1. Conflicting instructions were sent in these telegrams. In the first telegram, Yahil's instructions were that Ben-Gurion's letter be delivered to Hammarskjöld as written. The second telegram said that Ben-Gurion preferred that the letter not be delivered, but that Hammarskjöld be given the explanations orally, in the spirit of the letter. (These telegrams, dated June 7th, are in File 130.09/2340/5.)
2. No. 47.
3. Reference is to the salty springs around Lake Tiberias whose average yearly flow is some 500m m^3, with an average salt content of some 280 mg chlorine/litre.
4. Several words are missing in the original.

49. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 January 1960

Coded Tel. WNT4; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Harman reports to Bartur and Tekoah on a conversation he had with Parker Hart of the Department of State on the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. He told him about Comay's talk with Bunche and Cordier of 30th December 1959[1] and stressed that the U.N. people had accepted Comay's arguments about the "practical stand" and had stated that the Secretary-General intended to demand the release of the *Astypalea*. He added that he had heard from the U.S., as early as July 4th 1959, very

clear statements in favour of the "practical stand".[2] Similar statements were made at the meeting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development[3] when Egypt's application for a loan was discussed. In the light of the above, Harman requested that the U.S. give its support in Cairo to the Secretary-General, whose standing is also now in the balance — in addition to the Canal issue.[4]

Hart then asked Harman for details on the *Astypalea*'s sailing date and on the f.o.b. conditions. Harman explained that the ship's date of sailing was a natural consequence of the entire series of contacts and that Israel had kept its commitment to secrecy. His explanation of the f.o.b. conditions left Hart satisfied.

As regards Harman's suggestion, Hart replied that the U.S. had approached Cairo and had made its stand clear. He did not think that there was room for another move on their part unless they were requested to do so by the U.N., especially as Bunche was due in Cairo on the 5th. In Hart's opinion, the Secretary-General preferred to act by himself. Harman responded to this by saying that he had not meant that the U.S. should go into technical details of the negotiations, but that they should make clear to the Egyptians that three things were now being put to the test: freedom of navigation, the Secretary-General's standing in the Middle East, and whether Nasser's word had any value. If these three points are made clear, a favourable atmosphere will have been created for the Secretary-General's intervention. Israel had been told that after the Egyptian loan had been authorized the American influence in Cairo would be strengthened — and now was the time to find out whether this had indeed happened.

Hart promised that they would take Harman's request into consideration.

In the meantime the Embassy was organizing local factors, including members of Congress, to exert pressure on the Department of State. They spoke with Blaustein, who will also approach the Department of State.[6]

Notes

1. The meeting took place in consequence of the detention of the ship *Astypalea* in the Suez Canal on December 17th, 1959. Comay said that Israel had been reluctant from the beginning to dispatch the vessel, and that the U.A.R.'s "practical stand" could not form a basis for steady trading. Hammarskjöld's view that it would be possible to return in two stages to the state of affairs prevailing in 1958 only complicated the matter further. It was no use repeating the experiment, and the minimum starting-point should be "directly to 1958". The U.N. officials replied that they thought the stipulations made now by the Egyptians were a retreat from the "practical stand". The *Astypalea* was dispatched in good faith, in accordance with that stand, and a change in the stand could not be retroactive. Hammarskjöld will persist

in demanding that the ship and its cargo be allowed passage through the Canal. (See Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT995, 30.12.1959, 130.09/2339/20.) On the "practical stand" and other stipulations in force in the Suez Canal, see Introduction, pp. XIV–XVI.

2. For declarations and statements of opinion by leaders of the United States on the freedom of passage, see in the publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Freedom of the Seas — the Views of the Nations", issued by the Information Department of the Ministry in 1957. The latest statement on that subject was that of Secretary of State Herter at the U.N. General Assembly — see *GAOR, 14th Session*, 797th Plenary Meeting, September 17th, 1959, p. 10.
3. This was said on December 21st, 1959, when the World Bank approved a loan to Egypt for widening the Suez Canal. For the full text of the American representative's statement, see in Harman's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WNT986, 22.12.1959, 130.09/2314/9.
4. The Secretary-General was to leave for Cairo on January 21st in order to discuss that subject — see No. 50.
5. During Hammarskjöld's visit to Cairo in June 1959 — see Introduction, p. XIV.
6. Following the meeting, Meyer said that in consultations in the Department of State the conclusion was that "an additional appeal at that time would be useless and perhaps even harmful". (See Erell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram WNT6, 6.1.1960, 130.09/2314/9.)

50. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT49; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah cables to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bartur and Harman on his meeting with Hammarskjöld, Bunche and Cordier also being present.[1]

Hammarskjöld referred to publications in the press on his last talk in Cairo.[2] He stressed that his first duty was to report to the U.N., though the Israelis knew that he had always informed them fully on the steps he was taking. The fact that he had not done so this time did not mean that he was trying to influence Israel not to give publicity to its actions in the issue. Though his opinion had been that it would have been better to act through diplomatic channels, it now seemed to him that the possibilities of diplomacy had been exhausted, and if the issue is brought before the Security Council he will be prepared to render a full report.

Hammarskjöld then turned the talk to discussion of facts which in his opinion had arisen following his visit to Cairo. He had been told by Israel that the *Astypalea* had been under an Israeli charter. Later the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated in the Knesset that the ship had been chartered

by a non-Israeli company.[3] If he had known that the charter was not an Israeli one the question of the "practical stand" would not have arisen at all.

The second question arose out of the Egyptians' claim that the ship's bill of lading did not show that the cargo was f.o.b.[5] and that the buyer "was not entirely a non-Israeli". Hammarskjöld has no intention of impugning the facts he had been given, but he would like to have photostatic copies of the relevant documents. He knows that Israel wishes him to censure Nasser publicly, but in order to be able to do that he has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the documents; only then, when he has weighed everything and decided to make a public statement, will he do so, taking into consideration his duty to be entirely objective. He ended by saying that the U.A.R. had not changed its policy on the "practical stand", which thus remained effective.

Tekoah replied that what he had just heard supported his first impression that Nasser had not been sincere in his attitude and that the Egyptian proposal which Hammarskjöld had brought with him from his first visit to Cairo[6] had not been in effect a basis for renewing free passage in the Canal. The Egyptians' claims in respect of the *Astypalea*'s documents were nothing but pretexts to obstruct freedom of navigation. If the Egyptians had been sincerely interested in freedom of navigation they would have found a way to verify the documents.

Tekoah then put to Hammarskjöld a number of questions: (1) After he had examined the documents and notified the Egyptians of their authenticity, would the ship be allowed to pass through the Canal? Hammarskjöld replied that in such a case he would again open negotiations. (2) What exactly had he heard in Cairo about the "practical stand"? Hammarskjöld replied that Nasser had told him: "A neutral flag and a neutral cargo." Tekoah argued here that the *Astypalea* had fulfilled these conditions. Hammarskjöld replied that the Egyptians had doubts about the cargo's being f.o.b. Tekoah then asked whether this should be understood to mean that the Egyptians would not oppose the passage of merchandise f.o.b. Hammarskjöld said that the politico-psychological element had also to be taken into account: in this case the Egyptians claimed that the dispatch of this ship had not been made *bona fide*, its aim being to obstruct Egypt's loan from the International Bank.[7] He said that throughout the negotiations on this loan Israel had conducted intense diplomatic activity to obstruct the Egyptian application. This activity was uncalled-for because the Bank was an international institution and should be free of political pressure. Tekoah rejected these arguments and stressed that exactly because the Bank was an international institution within the U.N. framework one should expect it to take into account a member's violation of the organization's resolutions.

Bunche again raised the question of the "practical stand" and claimed that

Israel had in effect rejected it and had done nothing to promote its implementation. Tekoah rejected this argument and said that since the "practical stand" had been adopted there had been a number of developments, including some things said at the General Assembly and negotiations with the maritime powers. In practice the situation was more like what it had been in 1958. He asked Hammarskjöld whether the Egyptians had agreed to move slowly in the direction of the 1958 situation. Hammarskjöld replied that he had not raised the matter with Nasser, but Fawzi told him unofficially that there was no objection to arriving at this state of affairs. He emphasized that this had been said privately at an unofficial meeting.

Tekoah summarized what had been said so far, pointing out that what remained after the Cairo visit was some abstract definition of a "practical stand", but also lack of certainty whether even this stand would be implemented as it depended on politico-psychological considerations.

Hammarskjöld said he did not object to a return to the 1958 situation, though that would be very difficult to attain. Moreover, political sensitivity and developments in the Arab world would have to be considered in the future, for example the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League[9] made for a specially delicate situation at present.

Later there was an argument on whether Hammarskjöld should make a public statement on freedom of navigation. Tekoah urged the Secretary-General to do so, even if he should refer to the issue only as a matter of principle. Hammarskjöld replied with feeling that if it came to enunciations of principle then he had something to say about the observance of human rights in Israel, for example the Azzazmeh affair.[10] Tekoah retorted mentioning the freedom of access to the Western Wall and the resumption of activity of the institutions on Mt Scopus.[11]

The meeting concluded with a discussion of postal links with Morocco and the tension on the northern border.

Notes

1. Complete minutes of the meeting are enclosed with Tekoah's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 12th, 1960, filed under 130.02/4316/20.
2. On his visit to Cairo, Hammarskjöld talked on January 21st with Nasser and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Fawzi. The *Jerusalem Post* wrote on January 25th that the fact that Hammarskjöld did not inform Israel of the content of these talks proved, in the opinion of political circles in Israel, that his efforts had been unsuccessful.
3. The *Astypalea* affair was debated in the Knesset on December 22nd, 1959. The Minister of Foreign Affairs reviewed the obstacles put before Israeli cargoes planning to pass the Suez Canal, beginning from March 1959. She said Hammarskjöld had told Israel that if it agreed to ship the cargoes as owned by the buyer (f.o.b. condition)

and to accept cargoes as owned by the seller (c.i.f. condition), the Egyptians would not make any difficulties for them. This method, said Mrs. Meir, was not to Israel's liking, but it eventually agreed to it as it was recommended by "friendly circles". "In our campaign for freedom of navigation we decided to try even this rocky road" — she said, and added that Israel had informed beforehand the U.N. Secretary-General and the "friendly circles" of the ship's dispatch, and received their blessing. Moreover, a complete news blackout was imposed on the movements of the vessel, which was on a voyage charter in the name of the cargo's buyer and the conditions of the shipment were f.o.b. Now it should be obvious to all those who had been so patient with the U.A.R.'s ruler that he had led them by the nose. The grant of the loan by the World Bank for the Canal's development will be construed by Nasser only as an incentive for further acts of that sort. The U.N. Secretary-General had told Israel time and again that he thought the arrangement would work, and now he is standing like a beggar at Nasser's door. (See *Divrey Haknesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, meeting, December 22nd, 1959, pp. 176–178.)

4. The bill of lading of December 15th, 1959, and the manifest of cargo of the same date. These documents are found in File 130.02/4316/1, marked "Appendix 3" and "Appendix 4", respectively.
5. "Free on board", that is, under the buyer's ownership from the moment the cargo had been loaded on board the ship.
6. In June 1959, see Introduction, p. XIV.
7. See No. 49 and n. 3 there. And, indeed, from G. Meir's telegram to Harman and Comay of December 11th, 1959 (TNW750, 130.09/2340/3), it appears that in dispatching the *Astypalea* Israel wanted not only to test the arrangements for the freedom of passage in the Canal, but also to cause a delay in the approval of the World Bank's loan to Egypt.
8. During the debate at the 14th session of the General Assembly (September–December 1959), the representatives of 26 states voiced their support of the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal — see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, "Guidelines for Information", No. 40.
9. The second part of the 32nd regular Session of the Council of the Arab League took place in Cairo from February 8th to 29th, 1960.
10. A bedouin tribe in the Negev; the repatriation of some of its members to Israel was an issue between Israel and the U.N. at the beginning of the 1950's.
11. In accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement, a special committee to be made up of representatives of both sides should have been entrusted with finding a solution to these issues. However, such a committee was never set up and there was no progress in these matters.
12. A Danish ship which was detained in Port Said on May 21st, 1959, having on board Israeli goods bound for ports in the Far East — see No. 51.
13. The consultations ended with the conclusion that no great hopes should be attached to Hammarskjöld's talks in Cairo on the *Astypalea* or on the passage of other cargoes through the Canal. However, one should not abandon the political campaign, though a decisive debate at the Security Council should be avoided because it might close the door to any further political activity in this matter. The opening made by Hammarskjöld when he asked for the documents should be exploited, and the

documents should be delivered to him as soon as possible. His statement that Cairo was still adhering to the "practical stand" should serve as a basis for sending more ships through the Canal, in coordination with the United States, and for starting an information campaign in America at the same time. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WNT26, 4.2.1960, 130.09/2314/9.)

14. Morocco broke off postal and telegraph links to Israel in 1959, and the efforts supported by the U.N. to have them restored, proved in vain. The postal items were finally being sent from Israel to Morocco through an Israeli state agency. (See A. Harel, *Security and Democracy* (Hebrew), p. 312.)
15. Reference was to incidents in the southern demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, which culminated in the I.D.F.'s operation at Khirbet Tawafiq on February 1st — see Chapter 1.
16. See *ibid.*, No. 1.

51. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 4 February 1960

Coded Tel. 144; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

The owners of the *Inge Toft*[1] have instructed her captain to unload the cargo under protest and to sail south. The ship needs urgent repairs, and the contract entitles the owners to make this decision. The owners have been insisting on this move for a long time, and in view of Hammarskjöld's failure in the matter of the *Astypalea* one cannot put them off any longer. The publicity accompanying the unloading will serve to point to Nasser's aggressive policy which is being encouraged by the West. P. Lieftinck's[2] argument that Nasser's attitude will moderate on receipt of the loan from the International Bank has been very quickly refuted.

Notes

1. See No. 50, n. 11.
2. Pieter Lieftinck, a member of the board of directors of the World Bank, who also represented Israel on that board.

52. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT60; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah cables Bartur on his meeting with Hammarskjöld, to whom he had relayed the facts in the affair of the *Inge Toft* as they had been cabled to him by Bartur.[1] Hammarskjöld said that he had in the meantime spoken with Jensen[2] who did not cast any further light on events. The ship's owners had informed the Egyptians they were sailing north, therefore there was no basis for him to intervene with the Egyptians so that they should allow the ship to sail south. Tekoah replied that the basis should be the negotiations Hammarskjöld had held in Egypt and the understanding which had been reached according to his letter of October 7th,[3] based on which the ship could sail in any direction once her cargo had been unloaded. In any case, the new facts should allow him to approach the U.A.R. again.

The Secretary-General replied that he would ask for further details from the Danish government and would then decide whether he could intervene in the matter. Bunche, who was present at the meeting, said that if an understanding had been reached between the owners and the Egyptian government which put an end to the affair, the Secretary-General could not reopen the whole issue.

Notes

1. In his telegram, Bartur said that the U.A.R. authorities had finally decided not to permit the *Inge Toft* to sail south from Port Said, but only in a northerly direction. (See his telegram to the Israel Missions abroad, 9.2.1960, 130.09/2378/3.)
2. A. Hessellund Jensen, Danish permanent representative at the United Nations.
3. In a letter to Golda Meir, in File 93.03/498/11.
4. During Hammarskjöld's visit — see No. 50.

53. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions abroad. 10 February 1960

Coded Tel. 161; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

The *Inge Toft* is about to finish unloading her cargo and to sail, it is not clear whether north or south.[1] With this affair the struggle for free passage in the Canal has reached a climax. This opportunity should be exploited to denounce the U.A.R.'s obstruction of free navigation and Nasser's duplicity, after he had just obtained a loan from the International Bank, and was encouraged by Hammarskjöld's condonation of these acts. The Division of Information will try to arrange for continuous press coverage of the ship's sailing from Port

Said and perhaps also of her arrival at the port of destination. The Missions must see to it that maximum publicity is given to this affair.

Note

1. The *Inge Toft* discharged her cargo in Port Said and sailed to Haifa on February 15th.

54. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT65; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah cables to Bartur, informing him that he had given Bunche the *Astypalea*'s documents,[1] as requested by Hammarskjöld. Bunche perused the documents and said that was exactly what Hammarskjöld had wanted.

Tekoah informed Bunche of the new Arab boycott regulations as relayed in Bartur's telegram,[2] but Bunche said that the U.N. knew nothing about any new regulations.[3] Bunche was pessimistic about Cairo's response to Hammarskjöld's last two messages;[4] he was expecting a caustic answer, which would lead to the Secretary-General's breaking off contacts with Nasser.

Notes

1. See No. 50.
2. In his telegram to Tekoah of February 10th, 1960, Bartur reported that the ship's owners had informed the ZIM company that the U.A.R. authorities had refused their request to have the ship sail south because the new boycott regulations (see n. 3 below) forbade ships on an Israeli time charter to pass through the Canal. (The telegram is in File 130.09/2340/4.)
3. In this telegram of January 5th, 1960, Tekoah reported that he had heard from the Norwegian Ambassador that new regulations had come into force on October 5th, 1959, dealing with the passage of Israeli cargos through the Canal, and adding new restrictions to those which had been in force so far. (The telegram is in File 130.09/2339/21.)
4. Bunche informed Tekoah that, following the talk of February 8th (see No. 52), Hammarskjöld sent off a message to Fawzi repeating his opinion that the U.A.R. should let the *Astypalea* pass through the Canal. He also reminded Tekoah that the U.A.R.'s opposition to the ship's passage was based on arguments touching the fidelity of the documents which he, Bunche, had asked for but had not yet received, and then stressed that he could not wait for them indefinitely. He added that he had

also approached Israel in the matter of the documents. When the U.N. had received the documents and examined them, Hammarskjöld would send off a forceful message to Cairo and demand that the ship be released. If this were not done, he would consider Cairo responsible for the crisis and would publicize his findings. (See Tekoah to the Ministry of Foreign Ministry, telegram NWT62, 9.2.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)

5. See *ibid.*

6. See No. 52 and n. 3 there.

55. Y. Tekoah (February) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT66; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports to Bartur on his telephone conversation with Bunche, who told him that Hammarskjöld had handed the *Astypalea* documents over to the legal department of the U.N. Secretariat. While perusing the documents, Hammarskjöld had queried two points: (a) The identity of the cargo's buyer was not apparent from the ship's documents but was to be found only in the documents of the Antonatos company[1] — and these last had not been on board the ship; Tekoah replied that the Antonatos documents led to a definite conclusion as to the buyer's identity. (b) The meaning of the initials F.I.O. Tekoah explained these according to the lawyers' letter.[2] Bunche said that a voyage charter would have solved the buyer's problem, because — as the Minister had said in the Knesset[3] — the charterer was also the buyer of the cargo. Tekoah replied that raising questions in respect of the chartering would go beyond the definition of the "practical stand" and would open new loopholes for Egyptian evasions. Bunche replied that Hammarskjöld wished to clear up all the queries so that his next message to Cairo would refute all three of Nasser's arguments — that the cargo had not been sent f.o.b., that the buyer was not a non-Israeli, and that the chartering had been done by Israel.

Tekoah replied that those were invalid arguments and that they were not within the framework of the "practical stand". Taking them up would nullify the results of the examination of the documents in advance. A request to supply the U.N. Secretariat with a voyage charter would provoke a negative reaction in Jerusalem, and anyway he was not sure whether such a document existed; perhaps the charter had been made by cable or even on the telephone. Bunche yielded on this point.

During the telephone conversation with Bunche a message arrived from Hammarskjöld to Tekoah.

(For the text of the message, see Main Volume, p. 77).

Notes

1. In the first letter, dated December 10th, 1959, Antonatos Bros. submit an order for 400 tons cement from the "Nesher" works, under f.o.b. conditions. In the second letter, dated December 26th, 1959, the buyers enquire what steps they should take in order to obtain possession of the cement they had ordered, in view of the *Astypalea*'s detention in Port Said. (The letters are filed under 130.02/4316/1, marked "Appendix 5" and "Appendix 6", respectively.)
2. Reference is to a letter from the law firm of Nelson, Nealy, Baillie & Burke. The letter has not been found, but see their letter of February 17th, 1960 — *ibid.*, "Appendix 7". In this letter the lawyers explain that the initials F.I.O. (Free In & Out) have no relevance to the ownership of the cargo: they appear on voyage charters, and signify that the shipper and the buyer — and not the shipowners — will bear the expenses of the loading and unloading, respectively. See also No. 60.
3. See No. 50, n. 3.
4. In this interview Antonatos, the owner of the *Astypalea*'s cargo, said that he had bought the cargo in Haifa under f.o.b. conditions only after he had been told that Hammarskjöld had been promised by Nasser that a cargo bought in Israel by a foreign national under these conditions was not in danger of being impounded. (See Prato to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 33, 22.1.1960, 130.09/2293/7.)

56. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT71; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports on Blaustein's meeting with Hammarskjöld, as related to him by the former.

Hammarskjöld told Blaustein how things had developed in Cairo. On his arrival he had been prepared to accuse Nasser of a breach of faith, but he began to have doubts after he had spoken with him. Here Hammarskjöld again referred to the connection between the loan and the dispatch of the ship, and mentioned a number of details connected with the documents which raised doubts about the affair's being a *bona fide* commercial deal.[1]

Blaustein replied that the Secretary-General should not become involved in secondary matters but should deal with the fundamental issue. The Suez problem could have grave consequences. The affair constituted another stage in Nasser's appeasement by Hammarskjöld, by the U.N. and by its members. As a result Nasser will conclude that anything goes and will act precipitately, or a feeling of frustration might drive Israel to who knows what actions. He has met Israel's leaders and knows that there is frustration there and a conviction that diplomacy has failed. A step might be taken by them which would be

regretted both by him and by the Secretary-General. Blaustein thinks that Hammarskjöld should address Nasser on the basis of the Antonatos letters and demand that he allow the ship to proceed southwards. Nasser should also be told explicitly that his policy will have grave consequences, and this just when the authorization of the loan opens new possibilities of constructive development. Blaustein in addition proposed that the Secretary-General issue a public statement on the entire affair.

Hammarskjöld replied that the documents in hand will not allow him to decide in all faith that Nasser had broken his promise. Neither can he come out with public declarations, and the only way open to him is to report to the Security Council; this, however, he can do only if one of the member states requests a meeting of the Council. He claimed that he was puzzled by Israel's position: a public statement on his part would result in a breach of contacts with Cairo and would render him unable to extend any further help. He is cooperating with Israel more than with other states and yet Israel has so many complaints against him.

Notes

1. See No. 55 and n. 2 there.
2. See *ibid.*, n. 1.

57. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 11 February 1960

Coded Tel. 30; Outg.: 130.09/2333/19

Mrs. Meir cables Tekoah, instructing him to convey to Hammarskjöld Israel's astonishment at being asked to supply various documents according to Nasser's demands and caprices. She does not think that Israel should be put in the position of a defendant who has to prove his innocence. Hammarskjöld should be reminded that the "practical stand", as represented to Israel, involved two conditions: f.o.b. and no publicity. No other conditions were mentioned, and it was agreed that an Israeli charter was valid. Nevertheless, they are now trying to find out whether a charter was made out and whether it was possible to obtain it.

Note

1. No. 55.

58. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 February 1960

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah replies by cable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' telegram.[1] He relayed Mrs. Meir's message to Hammarskjöld verbally. The Secretary-General tried to mollify Tekoah, saying that he had been asked to demonstrate Nasser's breach of faith, and for that he had to have possession of all the relevant documents; these are still being studied.

Tekoah said he hoped that the examination was being carried out with the object of drawing conclusions according to the usual procedures employed with such documents, and not with the aim of finding pretexts for the ship's detention.

Hammarskjöld answered that he would instruct his legal adviser to examine the documents in this spirit. He understood that Israel was not in possession of the voyage charter and that perhaps it did not exist in the form of a document, but his duty was to try to obtain it. His decision whether to reopen the *Astypalea* case will not depend solely on the examination of the documents.

Tekoah thinks Hammarskjöld wished to hint in this way that he was afraid Nasser would react to renewed approaches in this matter by querying the timing of the ship's sailing so closely to the date of the authorization of the loan.

Notes

1. See No. 57.
2. See No. 55 and n. 1 there.
3. Several words are missing in the original.

59. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT83; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah addresses Bartur and Harman. He has relayed to Bunche the information given by Bartur.[1] Bunche doubts very much whether Cairo will respond to Hammarskjöld's two demands.[2] So far the receipt of his messages has not even been confirmed. Hammarskjöld, Bunche and Cordier agreed that it would be useless to dispatch additional notes to Cairo, and that if no reply in the matter of the *Inge Toft* was received the Secretary-General would have to "draw conclusions". In Hammarskjöld's opinion, the Egyptians' refusal to let the *Inge Toft* sail south is even graver than the *Astypalea* case. While lawyers could find many interpretations to the documents, Fawzi made an explicit promise to Hammarskjöld that the *Inge Toft* would be allowed to sail in any direction she wished once her cargo had been unloaded. This morning Hammarskjöld met Reinhardt, the new American ambassador to Cairo, and briefed him on the Suez issue. Bunche hinted that both he and Black[3] were requested to take some action in the matter. Herewith Tekoah's assessment of the situation: Black and the Department of State should pressure the Egyptians to allow the ship to sail south, but this case should not be turned into a test of the U.A.R.'s position on the passage of empty ships through the Canal. It would be preferable to regard Egypt's intransigence in the *Inge Toft* affair in the light of the special circumstances surrounding this case and not to interpret their attitude as a refusal from now on even to allow the passage of empty ships. The pressure on Cairo should be increased during the next few days, and if there is no change in Cairo's position then the ship should leave Port Said without any publicity in the matter of her planned departure southwards.

Notes

1. Bartur reported that the authorities in Port Said would not permit the *Inge Toft* to sail south, but only in a northerly direction. (See his telegram of 15.2.1960, 130.09/2378/3.)
2. See No. 54, n. 4.
3. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank.

60. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT93; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah cables Bartur that he had delivered to Stavropoulos the professional opinions of the firm of lawyers Nelson, Healy, Baillie and Burke. These advisers, experts in matters relating to shipping, determined that the cargo was sent f.o.b. and that ownership was vested in Antonatos.[1] Stavropoulos read the opinion and said it would be of help; but at the same time he argued that even though every fair interpretation substantiated Israel's position, there were still weak points in the bill of lading and in the manifest which could be seized on by the Egyptians. Tekoah replied that the U.N. must not give any other but a fair interpretation, and referred Stavropoulos to the definition of the "practical stand" and to the minutes of Tekoah's last meeting with Hammarskjöld.[2]

Tekoah asks what developments have taken place in the matter of the voyage charter.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 55 and n. 2 there.
2. See No. 58.

61. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 23 February 1960

Coded Tel. NWT101; Inc.: 130.09/2339/21

Tekoah reports to Yahil and Bartur that he spoke with Bunche on February 23rd to find out about the developments in the *Astypalea* case. More than a month has passed since the Secretary-General's visit to Cairo, Israel has submitted the relevant documents, and expert lawyers have reached conclusions based on these documents.[1] It has been understood that Hammarskjöld has been personally convinced that the cargo is f.o.b. What then prevents him from drawing the necessary conclusions and approaching Cairo again?

Bunche replied that no documents, such as the bill of lading, the manifest and the charter, had yet arrived from Cairo, and that the Egyptians had been requested to supply them through their representative at the U.N. Tekoah

replied that it was clear the Egyptians were in no hurry, but why did Bunche need these documents when they were not related to the "practical stand" or to the cargo's being f.o.b.? Bunche's reply was that the Secretary-General had to have all the documents in his possession so that Nasser would not have any grounds for counter-arguments.

The conversation then turned to the rumours on Hammarskjöld's intention to convene the Security Council on the issue of freedom of navigation. Bunche denied these rumours and said that if a meeting of the Council were planned then the subject would be the tension on the northern border. Tekoah remarked that the Security Council had long since turned into a punitive instrument against Israel and that its convocation would only increase the tension. He also suggested that the Secretariat consider carefully whether to publish Von Horn's report.[6]

Notes

1. See No. 60.
2. Rafiq Asha, the U.A.R.'s Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
3. See No. 60.
4. See No. 55 and n. 1 there.
5. At a press conference in New York Hammarskjöld said that some people expected of the Secretary-General action which was in effect within the competence of the Security Council only. (See the *New York Times*, 20.2.1960.)
6. On the incidents in the southern demilitarized zone — see Chapter 1.

62. D. Hammarskjöld (New York) to G. Meir. 2 March 1960

Notes

1. See No. 50 and n. 3 there.
2. G. Meir annotated this paragraph in the margin: "Where had this been ?"
3. G. Meir annotated this paragraph in the margin: "Are we to be placed in a position where we have to prove with documents that any fantastic accusation is not true ?"
4. G. Meir annotated this paragraph in the margin: "This was not part of effective (practical) stand".
5. See No. 55 and n. 2 there, also No. 60.
6. G. Meir annotated this paragraph in the margin: "Even you needed written proof".
7. For G. Meir's reply — see No. 68. See also Nos. 63 and 64.

63. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT138; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

After having received the draft of Hammarskjöld's letter to Mrs. Meir,[1] Tekoah told Cordier that he was disappointed with the conclusions drawn by the U.N. personnel who had examined the pertinent documents. He drew Cordier's attention to three points which could be interpreted as expressing Hammarskjöld's doubts as to the *bona fides* of the *Astypalea*'s cargo: the first was the sentence in parentheses in paragraph 3, the second was the last sentence in paragraph 11, and the third was the remark in the same paragraph referring to the dates of the Antonatos letters. Tekoah said he protested against these three sentences which he thought constituted an insult to Israel, and he requested that they be deleted. Cordier said he would raise the matter with the Secretary-General and would let Tekoah know. Tekoah replied that if the present draft were insisted on, it would be better if the letter were not delivered at all.

During the conversation Cordier drew Tekoah's attention to paragraph 12 of the letter which he said constituted the core of the message, being an attempt at arriving at an agreed procedure which would obviate difficulties in the future. Tekoah asked whether an agreed formulation of documents was meant,[3] Cordier replying that this was also the intention.

Tekoah requests an immediate reaction from the Ministry[4] and a decision whether the letter should be accepted, with or without the corrections. He notes that the letter contains also points favourable to Israel, such as an admission that the cargo was purchased f.o.b., the Secretary-General's readiness to inform Cairo accordingly, and also his readiness to carry on with his efforts.

Notes

1. For the text of the letter — see No. 62.
2. See No. 52 and n. 3 there.
3. In this telegram Tekoah reported on his talk with James Barco, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., who suggested that standard forms be prepared testifying to the f.o.b. character of the cargo and to the buyer's being a non-Israeli national; Cairo should bind itself in advance to honour these documents. (See telegram NWT132, 1.3.1960, 130.09/2339/21.)
4. A reply has not been found, but see No. 64.
5. See *ibid.*

64. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT143; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Tekoah reports having received from Hammarskjöld two corrections to his letter to Mrs. Meir (for the corrections see Main Volume). He has suggestions as to the formulation of the answer, should one be decided on. It would also be desirable to consider the possibility of a verbal reply, because Israel should try and persuade Hammarskjöld to approach Cairo without supplying it with the Antonatos letters; Hammarskjöld may oppose this, and then he might weaken the positive points appearing in the first draft of his letter.[3]

Notes

1. No. 63.
2. Cf. No. 62.
3. No. 62. For G. Meir's reply — see No. 68.

65. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT146; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Tekoah reports on his meeting with Hammarskjöld. He opened by saying he wished to progress on the *Astypalea* case so that the problem did not affect the scheduled meeting between Ben-Gurion and Hammarskjöld.[1] He then referred to some reservations he had had about Hammarskjöld's letter to Mrs Meir.[2] He said that Israel had been glad to note Hammarskjöld's readiness to carry on with his efforts in Cairo and also his admission that Israel had acted in accordance with the "practical stand", as confirmed by the ship's papers.

Here Hammarskjöld interrupted, saying that this was true according to the accepted interpretation, but that in his letter he distinguished between the accepted interpretation and legal proofs.

An argument then took place about Hammarskjöld's intention to hand over the Antonatos letters to the Egyptians. Tekoah said there was no objection to the Egyptians' being informed of the gist of these letters, but as they were private documents and were not included in the ship's papers, they should not be delivered to the Egyptians who might start another argument. Hammarskjöld, supported by Bunche who was present, insisted that fairness

demanded that the letters be given to the Egyptians. Here he referred to a number of facts which seemed to him strange, such as the fact that the expenses of the shipment were paid twice, that Antonatos was an agent of "Nesher", and that the stamp "To File" appeared on the letters. During the talk Hammarskjöld remarked that if he had known all the details in advance, he would have advised against the dispatch of this ship. In conclusion he said he would have to reconsider the action he would take in Cairo, in view of Israel's refusal to hand over the Antonatos letters to the Egyptians.

Notes

1. Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion was about to pay a visit to the United States, and he took that opportunity to meet Hammarskjöld. On the meeting of March 14th, see No. 103.
2. See Nos 62 and 63.
3. See No. 23.

66. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT153; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Tekoah reports on the letter he has received from Hammarskjöld (for text of letter see Main Volume, p. 95). He asked Cordier and Bunche for clarification of certain items in the letter. The U.N. people explained that Hammarskjöld wanted Israel to agree to hand over to the Egyptians copies of the Antonatos letters should they ask for them. In his talks with the Egyptians Hammarskjöld will not analyse the letters nor refer to their weak points. Bunche stressed that if Israel still refused to hand over the letters, Hammarskjöld would be able to deal wih the *Astypalea* affair only on the basis of the general principle of freedom of navigation.

Herewith Tekoah's opinion about the new situation:

(1) The main point is that Hammarskjöld will notify Cairo that following an examination of the documents he is satisfied that the *Astypalea*'s cargo was dispatched in accordance with the U.A.R.'s promise not to obstruct the passage of merchandise f.o.b.

(2) If the Secretary-General indeed bases himself on the Antonatos letters without relating to their weak points, as he has promised, this will strengthen Israel's position that these weak points do not affect the main conclusion

— which is that the documents examined confirm Israel's statement on the nature of the cargo.

Notes

1. See No. 65.
2. See No. 62.
3. See No. 65.
4. Thus in the original, but should presumably be "to me".

67. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT177; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay reports on his talk with Hammarskjöld which took place after he had received Bartur's message.[1]

Hammarskjöld said that the Egyptian leaders were not in Cairo at the moment and he did not know what to do. Comay said the affair would be remembered as a failure of the Secretary-General's efforts. Hammarskjöld attempted to justify himself and recounted to Comay the full history of the conflict, finishing by saying one should not despair because of the failure in this case and that he was prepared to continue to study the situation in connection with the passage through the Canal.

Comay replied that Israel could only conclude from this affair that Nasser was playing a game, he had no intention of allowing passage to Israeli cargoes, and he would easily find some pretext in every case. If the Secretary-General had different information, then he, Comay, would be glad to hear what it was based on.

Hammarskjöld replied that he had no knowledge of Nasser's intentions. On the one hand, the dispute is very inconvenient to Nasser and to his relations with the West, and he would prefer to solve it quietly. On the other hand, he is sensitive to criticism on the part of the Arab states. In these circumstances, Hammarskjöld does not think the conflict can be solved quietly.

Comay asked to see Hammarskjöld's latest message to Egypt.[6] After some hesitation, Hammarskjöld showed Comay the letter, but said it was for Comay's personal information and not to be published. The message said that though the ship's papers did not prove that the cargo was sent f.o.b., this became evident from the captain's declaration and the two Antonatos letters, which he was prepared to show the Egyptians on demand. Comay reacted to

this, saying that the entire procedure was unjustified and was incompatible with the "practical stand". Hammarskjöld agreed, but said there were special circumstances in this case.

Notes

1. In his telegram of 30.3.1960 (130.09/2333/20) to the Permanent Mission in New York, Bartur says that the charter of the *Astypalea* has run out and the owners are about to take charge of her again, "therefore this is our last and most urgent request to allow her to proceed with her cargo on her way south".
2. At the meeting in New York on March 14th — see No. 103.
3. The United Nations Emergency Force, raised in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of November 5th, 1956, to supervise the cease-fire in the aftermath of the Sinai Campaign.
4. After the Sinai Campaign, Egypt desisted from hindering the passage of vessels to the port of Eilat.
5. See Chapter 2.
6. See No. 66.
7. Bartur's telegram of 30.6.1960 (130.09/2333/20) to the Mission in New York approved the draft of G. Meir's reply to Hammarskjöld's letter — see No. 68.
8. One paragraph, dealing with the Security Council's debate on African issues, has been omitted here.

68. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to D. Hammarskjöld (New York). 31 March 1960

Notes

1. No. 62 (the date of the letter was changed to 4.3.1960 — see the end of No. 64).
2. See No. 66.
3. This was said at Comay's meeting with Bunche and Cordier at the end of December 1959. It was also said at the meeting, *inter alia*, that "the *Astypalea* had been dispatched in good faith under the conditions of the 'practical stand', and a change in these conditions cannot affect the ship retroactively. The Secretary-General will insist on the ship's passage with its cargo as an immediate objective". (See Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT995, 30.12.1959, 130.09/2339/20.)

69. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 1 April 1960

Coded Tel. 271; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Yahil informs all the missions that the *Astypalea*'s attempt to pass through the Suez Canal has failed, and that she will unload her cargo and sail for Piraeus. This affair should be given wide publicity, and the following steps will be taken: (a) a question to the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be submitted in the Knesset; (b) at the U.N. Secretary-General's press conference scheduled for April 7th, he will be asked a question by a well known journalist; Hammarskjöld's reply will be commented on by the Minister;[2] (c) efforts will be made to persuade the Swedish transport union to publish its decision of February 4th not to assist in the loading and unloading of cargoes of U.A.R. ships and to boycott the transport of cargoes to these ships; (d) the Presidents' Conference[3] or a similar body will be asked to publish a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* censuring the Arab boycott;[4] (e) all the Israel Missions will see that leaders and commentaries on the affair are published in the press.

Notes

1. See No. 50 and n. 3 there.
2. See Nos. 70–72.
3. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations — the parent organization of Jewish organizations in the United States, established in 1955 to coordinate the efforts for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East.
4. Harman objected to this decision — see his telegram IR688 of 4.4.1960 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 130.09/2313/11.

70. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT182; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay reports to Bartur on his meeting with Hammarskjöld and Cordier. The Secretary-General showed Comay the text of the statement he intends to publish (for the text see the Main Volume, pp. 101–102). He repeated his analysis of Nasser's having to manoeuvre between Western pressure and Arab pressure, gave his assessment that the *Astypalea* affair was not the end

of the road, and pointed out that ships bound for Israel were allowed through the Canal in ballast.[1]

Comay replied that he would cable his government and ask for explicit instructions; but for now he had to say that the affair painted a gloomy picture when the United Nations acquiesced in the violation of its own resolutions and moreover brought the affair to public knowledge in a manner distorting the truth and refraining from putting the blame squarely on Nasser. Hammarskjöld and Cordier replied to this that it was not the accepted procedure to censure governments, that the statement was phrased in a manner permitting further action, and that it twice repeated the principle of freedom of navigation.

Having consulted together, Hammarskjöld and Cordier changed the phrasing of the announcement; they deleted the sentence "does not bring into question the principle upheld by the nations" and inserted instead, after the words "latest development", the sentence "which goes against the principle upheld by the United Nations".

In Comay's opinion, nothing more can be extracted from Hammarskjöld, and if Israel wants him to continue acting in the matter it must accept the statement as the lesser evil. He requests instructions[2] as early as possible, as it would be desirable for the Secretary-General to say a few more words after the statement is published.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 62.
2. The Ministry's response said that Hammarskjöld should be told that the main thing was missing in his statement, namely, the *Astypalea* affair, and that the fact should be stressed that Nasser had acted in bad faith towards him and that all his efforts had resulted in failure. The Minister of Foreign Affairs would also like an explanation as to what Hammarskjöld had meant by the expression "attitude on the side of the parties", in the plural — did he mean that Israel was also a party to the violation of the principle of free navigation ? (See Yahil to Comay, TNW16, 5.4.1960, 130.09/2340/5.)
3. Comay filled in the background in a further telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

   (a) During the talk, Hammarskjöld and Cordier hinted that the report on the ship's detention originated in Jerusalem, and in any case they were convinced that it did not come from Cairo. Comay rejected this, saying there was no doubt whatever that the report had come from Egypt; however, this question was of no significance because by detaining the ship the Egyptians themselves had created a newsworthy incident, otherwise no particular attention would have been paid to the affair.

   (b) The Secretary-General stressed that the Egyptians were also very sensitive and he had to take that into account in planning his future steps. He read out a message

from Fawzi to the effect that Israel was falsifying the facts in order to win over public opinion, and that it should desist from hitting below the belt.
(c) The Secretary-General mentioned "the Arab mentality which enabled them to put up with things on condition that they were allowed to turn a blind eye to them (un)officially", and cited Fawzi as saying it was a pity that the Secretary-General had informed him officially beforehand of Israel's intention to dispatch the ship.
(See Comay to Bartur, NWT186, 5.4.1960, 130.09/2339/22.)

71. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT189; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Comay had another talk with Hammarskjöld and Cordier and they discussed the phrasing of the statement.[2] Comay proposed a number of changes, including inserting a reference to the armistice agreement, and the Secretary-General agreed to that. He said he would issue the statement as soon as he had definite information that the cargo had been unloaded and that the *Astypalea* had sailed. (For the final text of the statement, see No. 72.)

Notes

1. As Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations.
2. See No. 70.
3. See *ibid.*, n. 2.
4. That is, in the connection between the armistice agreement and the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.
5. Which he used to do once a fortnight.
6. For the final text of the statement — see No. 72.

72. Statement by the U.N. Secretary-General (New York). 8 April 1960

Notes

1. See Nos 70 and 71.

73. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 10 April 1960

Tel. 290; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Herewith the text of the statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on receipt of the information that the *Astypalea*'s cargo had been unloaded and that the ship had been ordered to sail home.

(1) As stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Knesset on December 22nd 1959,[1] the ship was dispatched after the U:N. Secretary-General had informed Israel's representatives that he had reasons to believe that the Egyptians would not obstruct the passage of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal if Israel agreed to send them f.o.b. The ship's arrest, prevention of her passage through the Canal, and the unloading of her cargo constitute not only a grave violation of the principle of free navigation, but first and foremost a breach of faith by Nasser.

(2) The Government of Israel will not accept the Egyptians' right to dictate to it discriminatory methods of trading. We agreed to dispatch the ship under unusual conditions not because we believed in their practicality but out of consideration for the Secretary-General's opinion and his many efforts in the cause of freedom of navigation, and at the recommendation of various friendly parties. The dispatch of the *Astypalea* was a test not of freedom of navigation but of the trust one could place in Nasser. He has demonstrated to the world that he is worthy of no trust.

(3) Israel on its part will not abandon the struggle for freedom of navigation. This freedom of navigation means Israeli shipping, under an Israeli flag, bearing cargoes as demanded by the conditions of commerce and not as dictated by Nasser. We demand and expect that in this struggle we are accorded the help of all freedom-loving nations which stand for a regime of law and justice in international relations. As the Secretary-General stated in his announcement of Friday, April 8th,[2] obstruction of the freedom of navigation constitutes a violation of the stand of the U.N. and of its principles. Israel expects the U.N. bodies to use all the means in their power to ensure the implementation of its resolutions and principles.

Notes

1. See No. 50 and n. 3 there.
2. No. 72.

74. Press Conference of the U.N. Secretary-General. (6 May 1960)

Notes

1. Refers to the picketing of the *Cleopatra* in the port of New York — see No. 150.
2. No. 72.

75. M. Comay (New York) to M. Slim (New York). 10 November 1960

Notes

1. Mongi Slim, the Tunisian permanent representative at the United Nations, the President of the Security Council for the month of November 1960.
2. See No. 77.
3. See No. 78.
4. A convention signed in Constantinople in 1888 by the then maritime powers, containing the undertaking that the Suez Canal will be permanently open to both commercial and naval shipping of all countries, in times of war as in times of peace. A number of articles in the convention accord priority to Egypt's security needs, but the freedom of navigation is stated there to be an absolute and unconditional principle.
5. See Vol. 6, pp. 593–594.
6. See No. 76.

79. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 22 January 1960

Coded Tel. TNW846; Outg.: 130.09/2313/1

The *New York Times* having published an item on naval circulars adapting to the Arab boycott,[1] the Embassy is requested to report on the matter, and on the source of the information, and to suggest a course of action.[2]

Notes

1. A report appeared in the *New York Times* of January 22nd, to the effect that the American Navy was preventing tankers which had visited Israeli ports from

participating in tenders for the transport of fuel oil. The maritime circles called the relevant article — "The Haifa Clause".

2. See No. 80.

80. Sh. Ya'ari (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 22 January 1960

Coded Tel. WNT16; Inc.: 130.09/2314/9

In reply to the question about the news item on the Arab boycott,[1] the Embassy reports that the source of information is the press itself.[2] This practice by the Navy has existed for a long time now, and it has been known to the Jewish organizations for some two years. A statement of February 1958 by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations[3] mentioned this practice, but it aroused no particular interest at the time. Klutznick and other Jewish leaders raised the matter with Secretary Herter at the beginning of November 1959. The Department of State people were shocked, but Klutznick and his colleagues did not report to the Embassy on the meeting. Right now the matter is creating a furore, and a number of senators, besides Javits, intend to raise it in the Senate. Emanuel Celler submitted a draft bill on January 21st forbidding government bodies to discriminate against ships visiting Israeli ports. A report instigated by Navy circles appeared in the *New York Times* alleging that the matter was not of interest to Israel. Israel had approached the Department of State twice in the past over similar incidents. The Ambassador[4] is out of town and additional information will be cabled when he returns.[5]

Notes

1. No. 79.
2. Yeshayahu (Si) L. Kenen, head of the Jewish lobby for Israel in the United States.
3. The Conference of Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations — see No. 69 and n. 3 there.
4. Abraham Harman, Israel's Ambassador to the United States.
5. The Embassy's reply has not been found, but see telegram from the United States Division to the Embassy, instructing it to consider the submission of a note to the government of the United States and to request a meeting between the Ambassador and L. Jones of the Department of State (TNW847, 24.1.1960, 130.09/2313/1). See also No. 81.

81. Israel Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 January 1960

Coded Tel. WNT19; Inc.: 130.09/2314/9

Ambassador Harman spoke with Jones on the American Navy's submission to the Arab boycott. He delivered the Israeli note[1] and added more information verbally. Jones said that the entire matter became known to the Department of State only when mentioned by Klutznick and his colleagues at their meeting with Herter.[2] The Department had commenced its investigations when the news appeared in the press. It now appears that the practice began when in December 1957, an American tanker was turned away by the Saudis because it had anchored in Haifa at some time in the past. The Americans were not able to change the Saudis' stand, and that was when the Navy adopted the said practice in order to assure a regular supply of oil for its ships. The Department of State and the Navy are now in close contact discussing a solution. Harman and Ya'ari (who was also present) remarked that the Americans were more scrupulous about observing the boycott than other countries, and this of course served to encourage the Arabs. The United States is a steady customer for Saudi oil and it must solve the problem.

Harman took the opportunity to ask what the Department of State thought about Lebanon's threats to divert the Hasbani.[3] Jones replied that the whole affair was a "private initiative" of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another question is what will be the reaction of the Jordanians who are downstream along the Jordan.

Notes

1. See No. 82.
2. See No. 80, paragraph (c).
3. On this see Chapter 2, Nos. 32–34.

82. Note from the Israel Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State. 26 January 1960

Notes

1. Military Sea Transportation Service — the division in the Department of the Navy which dealt with tenders for tankers.

2. In File 130.18/2056/1.

83. D. Ben-Dror (Paris) to D. Shaltiel. 29 January 1960

Copy: 130.18/2059/9

Ben-Dror reports on the state of the Arab boycott in France. Things are steadily deteriorating. While there had also been difficulties in the past, today there is a general panic. People do not know exactly what the limits of the boycott are, what may and what may not be done, and as a result they are overly careful. As proof he brings the case of the special supplement of *Le Figaro* for Israel, in which many companies refused to advertise for fear of the boycott. In his opinion the answer lies in discreet action by responsible bodies, for example the Manufacturers' Association, or the Chamber of Commerce, or even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to explain to the people concerned, first, that the boycott is illegal, next that efforts are being made to fight it; in the meantime, they should know that the limits of the boycott are such and such, for example, it does not operate against companies trading with Israel but only against those which set up or help to set up industries in Israel. He requests comments on his idea.[3]

Notes

1. A French state-owned publicity firm.
2. Ephraim Illin, director of the Israeli company "Kaiser Frazer", which had a contract with "Renault" for the assembly of its cars in Israel. This contract was cancelled owing to the Arab boycott — see No. 87.
3. See No. 87.

84. Sh. Ya'ari (Washington) to the United States Division. 4 February 1960

Copy: 130.18/2056/2

The Embassy is informed that the American Jewish Congress has in its possession a copy of a contract between the U.A.R. and an American shipping company carrying wheat to Egypt, one of whose clauses obligated the company not to dispatch to Egypt any ship which had traded with Israel in the past. The Congress has had the document published in the *New York*

Times, where it appeared with editorial comments. The embassy will hold consultations on appropriate action as soon as a copy of the document is at hand.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 80.
2. The copy is found on file, but has not been printed here.
3. No proposals for action have been found, but see Harman's letter to G. Avner (17.2.1960, 130.18/2056/1) reporting on a meeting with Klutznick, who said that the cases of the naval and wheat tenders were an internal American affair and Israel should not get involved in them, as those affected were mainly American citizens. Harman agreed with this approach.

85. Sh. Ya'ari (Washington) to P. Eliav. 5 February 1960

Copy: 130.18/2056/2

Ya'ari refers to Eliav's letter of February 1st,[1] and first of all to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' surprise that the Embassy in Washington had taken no steps on the American Navy's submission to the Arab boycott, as appeared from the question asked in the Knesset by Bar-Yehuda.[2] Ya'ari's answer to this is, that the Embassy had insufficient information to take diplomatic steps, the relevant documents being in the hands of various Jewish organizations. Moreover, for the last three years the Embassy has not received adequate clear and consistent instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this subject. Eliav's proposal that the Embassy follow systematically all items of news and publications in the United States showing submission to the Arab boycott, is unacceptable. The Embassy has not sufficient manpower for this, and whatever information it obtains in the future will always be from a third party. Action against the boycott also demands some expertise in technical questions, and for action in the United States in this field help from the ministries concerned is essential.

Notes

1. The letter (in File 130.18/2056/2) refers to the Israel Embassy's activity in Washington on the governmental and public levels, against the official and semi-official submission to the Arab boycott.
2. Refers to a question submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 25th

by Israel Bar-Yehuda, MK, on the practice in force in the American Navy to abide by the "black list" of the Arab boycott. Bar-Yehuda asked whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of this practice, and if so – what steps have been taken in the matter; if not — why was it not aware of this situation and what were the steps it intended to take against this aspect of the Arab boycott.

3. See No. 80.
4. See No. 81.
5. These documents untraced.
6. No. 80.
7. The memorandum in File 130.18/2056/1, dealing with the economic warfare against Israel, was submitted to the governments of the United States, Britain and France.

86. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner. 10 February 1960

Copy: 130.18/2056/2

Harman refers to Avner's letter to Ya'ari on the Embassy's reaction to manifestations of submission to the Arab boycott,[1] and requests not to take any steps in the matter until the issue is cleared up among ourselves.

Harman's feeling is that we should not overly pressure the Americans on this issue. It is preferable to concentrate efforts on military aid,[2] on aid for the water plans,[3] and on freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. This last also touches the Arab boycott. The basic American stand is that Israel should be helped as much as possible, but that this should be done discreetly in order not to irritate the Arabs. The difficulty in the boycott issue is that this is exactly where overt action is demanded of the United States, which would bring them into immediate confrontation with the Arabs. During a talk he had with Lewis Jones of the Department of State,[4] Harman discerned a note of impatience bordering on irritation in his reactions, not because Israel was not in the right but because they were requested to do something which would involve them with the Arabs. Harman wished to raise these considerations also when he was required to submit the Note on the naval contracts affair, but he refrained from doing so because this was a matter of an official document originating with the administration and basing itself on the boycott. The case of the wheat ships is quite different, being an agreement between the U.A.R. and Americans shipowners. But even in this case the American are unlikely to raise the issue with the Arabs.

In view of all this, his recommendations are as follows:

(1) We should be satisfied with having submitted the Note and we should not importune the Americans but should let others do so, and that also within certain limits.

(2) All efforts should be concentrated on the central problem of military aid.

(3) The case of the wheat ships should not be raised at all but should be left to the action of others.

(4) Pressure should continue to be exerted on the Americans in the matter of the Canal.

Harman requests further instructions.[6]

Notes

1. In his letter (in File 130.18/2056/2) Avner submitted to the Department of State additional instances of America's acquiescence in the Arab boycott, and asked what had been done about Israel's Note on the naval contracts — No. 82.
2. For the arms procurement — see Chapter 7.
3. The American loan to Israel for the implementation of the "Central Israel Water Conduit" plan — see *ibid.*
4. See No. 81.
5. See Chapter 3.
6. Avner replied that the Foreign Ministry "has in effect approved" Harman's suggestions as detailed in the last four paragraphs of his letter (see his letter of February 15th, 130.18/2056/2).

87. D. Shaltiel (Jerusalem) to D. Ben-Dror (Paris). 10 February 1960

Copy: 130.18/2056/9

Shaltiel thanks Ben-Dror for his letter of January 29th.[1] He is worried about the situation in France. After Renault's submission, and after the publicity given by Israel to the Air France affair,[2] in his opinion quite unnecessarily, more and more bodies began distancing themselves from Israel and the boycott has become almost a psychosis.

The division set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with the boycott is now being organized and within a week or two will issue instructions on ways to fight the boycott.[3]

Shaltiel has no doubts about our being able to fight the boycott, but first of all one has to overcome the panic. Israel must not interpret the laws of the boycott to the public either directly or by implication. This would only strengthen the fears of the commercial bodies. One sometimes has to know when to retreat, as in the case of *Le Figaro*'s special supplement,[4] and it is better not to pressure the companies to advertise.

In the Renault affair there are first signs of success. The sale of these cars in the United States has gone down from 9800 to 7000 monthly. There is no reason why sales should not suffer in France itself also, because there is a large Jewish market there. In any case, these steps should be taken very cautiously and they must not appear to be connected with Israel. Sentiment must not be the only note to be struck, rumours should also be disseminated about the inferior quality of the Renault car.

Notes

1. No. 83.
2. Refers to the agreement on cooperation between El Al and Air France on the Tel Aviv–Paris–New York line. It had already been initialled, but Air France backed out before the final signature, claiming that the agreement contravened its obligations towards Air Union (the Federation of European Airlines) — see No. 238.
3. See Nos. 91 and 93.
4. See No. 83.

88. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 February 1960

Coded Tel. RI577; 130.09/2313/11

Harman has been informed that the Department of the Navy is about to announce the annulment of the offensive clause in the circular.[1]

Note

1. The relevant article was indeed deleted, and the U.S. Navy stated that there had been no intention of abetting the Arab boycott: as soon as the article had been construed as such, it was decided to eliminate it.

89. Circular of the Division for Politico-Economic Planning (Jerusalem).[1] 4 March 1960

Copy: 130.18/2055/5

The director of the division, David Shaltiel, issues instructions on the basic lines of policy in combating the Arab boycott.

The Arab boycott is gaining in strength and is turning into the main weapon of Arab warfare against Israel. For this reason, the Division for Politico-Economic Planning has been set up, which will plan, direct and conduct preventive action against the boycott. The policy is that of total war to be conducted using all possible ways and means, with absolute flexibility and absence of principles and dogmatic restraints. The only criteria will be efficiency, usefulness and the prospects of success.

The war will be conducted on three fronts: prevention, reaction and aggressive action.

The Israel missions abroad will be the main bases of the action. They should be constantly on the alert and report every case of submission to the boycott. They will have to follow Arab activity closely in order to find out the actions and intentions of the boycott apparatus. The reports should be dispatched to the Ministry, but in urgent cases the missions will act on their own initiative. The missions will employ the information they possess to disrupt systematically Arab trade and to sabotage Arab economic plans. For that purpose each mission will set up a special body consisting of the leaders of the Jewish organizations and of selected personalities with connections and of proven ability. This body will constitute a sort of general staff which will act in coordination with the mission and according to local circumstances. The Division will supply the missions with information and plans for the implementation of this project.

Note

1. This circular was sent to the heads of the Israeli missions abroad and to senior officials in the Foreign Ministry.

90. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 4 March 1960

Copy: 130.18/2055/5

The heads of missions are requested to give their most serious attention to the circular of the Division for Politico-Economic Planning.[1] The Arab states consider their economic warfare against Israel a most potent weapon and therefore we should fight back with all the means at our disposal.

Note

1. See No. 89.

91. Circular of the Division for Politico-Economic Planning (Jerusalem).[1] 21 April 1960

Copy: 130.18/2055/3

The circular deals with psychological warfare against the Arab boycott. The main danger of the boycott is that it deters companies and other bodies from initiating economic ties with Israel or from contributing their know-how to its development. We must therefore avoid any action which might reinforce the psychological impact of the boycott and to battle against the psychosis of fear of getting on the wrong side of the Arabs which has lately spread in the world. The Arabs succeeded in spreading these fears with a lot of help from us. The Arabs frequently feed the media with stories about their successes in the field of the boycott, stories which are mostly barefaced lies or utterly unfounded. Israel and the Jewish press around the world play into their hands by reprinting these statements, analysing them and adding verisimilitude even to false allegations. The notion that the noose of the boycott is steadily tightening around Israel contradicts the real state of affairs, is a harmful exaggeration and testifies to a defeatist attitude. Nor is it of any help in the fight against the boycott. The campaign will be long and Israel's fate will not be decided by this or that company succumbing to the boycott. One should not panic if some company turns away nor should one blow the trumpets when another decides to trade with us. The Division will attempt to instil into the public awareness that we are fighting a psychological war and to work for restraining the publicity about the boycott.

Note

1. See No. 89

92. Circular of the Division for Politico-Economic Planning (Jerusalem). 2 June 1960

Copy: 130.18/2055/3

This circular is intended for the Investments Authority in the Ministry of Finance for distribution among its representatives abroad, and it clarifies a number of points about the Arab boycott.

(1) The damage to Israel's economy
This consists in persuading companies already active in Israel to sever their relations, and in deterring others from investing in Israel. So far few companies have left Israel, though they are among the bigger ones (oil companies, Philips, Renault), and substitutes were found for them in every case. There were some who submitted to the boycott but later decided to come back for business reasons (B.O.A.C., American Express).

Most of the damage is from reluctance to invest in Israel. In some cases there were the beginnings of negotiations, but it may be assumed that in many other cases there had been the intention of investing but the stage of negotiations was never reached. Severe damage resulted also from the atmosphere of panic which deterred companies from trading with Israel — which is not forbidden by the boycott.

(2) When is a company blacklisted?
A company is blacklisted in the following cases: (1) if it has an industrial branch in Israel, for manufacture or assembly; (2) if it had sold to Israel the rights to manufacture or to assemble its products; (3) if the general agency or the head office for its activity in the Middle East is in Israeli hands; (4) if it supplies technical aid to an Israeli company; (5) if it owns shares in an Israeli company; (6) if it has authorized an Israeli company to manufacture its products under its trademark; (7) if it promotes the sales of Israeli products; (8) if its trademark is the Star of David.

(3) How are the boycott regulations implemented? They are implemented as expediency allows, in accordance with the needs of the Arab economy and the measure of resistance to pressure of the company concerned. For instance, the international aviation companies have resisted the pressure and are serving both Israel and the Arab countries.

(4) What should be told a prospective investor who has misgivings about the boycott?
(a) The boycott is immoral and it obstructs international trade and international relations. (b) The Israeli market has a bigger potential than the Arab market, and Arab promises regarding the development of the company's business in the Arab states should be ignored, because the Arabs promise much but deliver little. (c) Israel has a stable economy and there is no danger of confiscation or

nationalization, as there is in the Arab countries. (d) Considerable economic potential resides in the Jewish diaspora.

93. Sh. Gilat (London) to the Division for Politico-Economic Planning.[1] 19 July 1960

Copy: 130.18/2057/1

Gilat reports on his meeting with Mr Mackenzie, head of the Middle East division of the Board of Trade. Gilat said that it was known in Israel that the Board of Trade supplied the regulations of the Arab boycott to companies trading with Israel. This was not done systematically but only in cases when the company approached the Board of Trade or when it was known that the boycott officials were acting against the company. This action by the Board of Trade creates the wrong impression on the companies: first, it appears as if the Board of Trade supported the boycott, and second, the boycott regulations appear more impressive than they are in reality. Gilat requests that the Board of Trade discontinue this practice, or that it inform the companies asking for details that the boycott is not so terrible as it looks at first sight.

Mackenzie replied that the Board of Trade does not support or recognize the boycott, but it is its duty to supply the information to those requesting it. When verbal explanations are given, it is stressed that the boycott allows trading with Israel but forbids investment, transfer of know-how or appointment of agents in Israel. In conclusion, Mackenzie admitted that perhaps it would be necessary to re-examine their attitude to the Arab boycott, and he would be contacting Gilat.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 97.

94. D. Shaltiel (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassies in Rangoon and Bangkok and the Legation in Manila. 14 September 1960

Copy: 93.13/232/9

The official in charge of the Boycott office in Kuwait sent identical letters to companies in various countries with the following announcement: (for text

see Main Volume, p. 138).[1] An exchange of correspondence took place in the United States on this subject between Senator Javits and the Department of State, which latter protested to the Kuwaitis verbally. The question arises how to persuade other governments to adopt a similar stance. Should the missions become aware of the existence of similar letters in their countries, they are requested to intervene with the respective governments not by direct approach but through companies, public figures or members of parliament. Their attention is also drawn to the statement included in the Department of State's letter to Senator Javits (see Main Volume, p. 139).

Notes

1. This letter was delivered to Israel's Consulate-General in New York by the New York firm of Schulsinger Bros., printers and booksellers. A copy was also sent to the Department of State, whose reply stated that the United States did not recognize the Arab boycott and its regulations, the more so as it caused discrimination against American nationals and firms. The Department of State had already issued a declaration to that effect on May 6th, 1960, and the American diplomats had been instructed to bring this attitude to the knowledge of the Arab states. The hope was then expressed that both the issues originating in the boycott and those of the restrictions on free movement and of the homeless refugees would find their solutions in a final settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict. (See the exchange of correspondence in File 130.18/2054/19.)
2. The Embassy in Burma replied that, as far as it could ascertain, no such letters had reached Burmese firms. The Embassy in Paris, which had also received a letter on the same subject from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replied in a similar vein. (See letter from the Embassy in Burma to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14.11.1960, 93.13/232/9; Eytan to the Ministry, 29.9.1960, 130.18/2059/9.) No replies from the other missions have been found.

95. Meeting: A. Lourie — R. Stevens (London, 15 September 1960)

Notes

1. The first two paragraphs, dealing with Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol's visit to Britain, have been omitted here.
2. See No. 93.
3. A number of paragraphs, dealing with the relations between Israel and Ceylon and the debates during the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly, have been omitted here.

96. Sh. Arad (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17 September 1960

Coded Tel. NWT421; Inc.: 130.09/2339/24

Arad reports on the conversation between Katz[1] and Dreyfuss[3] on the boycott against Renault. Dreyfuss said that he was about to reach an arrangement with Illin that very day. Katz said that the arrangement with Illin does not put an end to the affair, and that Dreyfuss has to do something to demonstrate that Renault is not submitting to the Arab boycott. Dreyfuss replied that Illin had fooled him, that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had encouraged him to move into the Arab countries, and that his business in Israel was shaky. Katz answered that the affair is on the agenda of the Presidents' Conference[8] and that if the arrangement is unsatisfactory the information campaign in the United States will continue. He demanded that Dreyfuss address a letter to him saying that there had been a misunderstanding and that Renault was prepared to carry on its business in Israel — only in this way will the affair be settled. Dreyfuss replied he would have to consult with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Arad will transmit the draft of Dreyfuss's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comments as soon as it is received.[5]

Notes

1. Label A. Katz, president of the "B'nai B'rith" organization in the United States.
2. Baron Guy de Rothschild, chairman of the Jewish communities in France.
3. Pierre Dreyfuss, President of "Renault".
4. The Conference of Presidents — see No. 80 and n. 2 there.
5. See No. 98.

97. Sh. Gilat (London) to the Division for Politico-Economic Planning. 6 November 1960

Copy: 130.18/2057/1

Gilat refers to the exchange of correspondence between the British Board of Trade and the Elite Company representatives in Britain.[1] The letters were shown by the ambassador to Sir Roger Stevens whose reply has already been reported.[2] In a talk with Mackenzie, head of the Middle East division in the Board of Trade, the latter argued as follows:

(1) The letters of the Board of Trade to British companies concern the addressees only and Israel has no right to intervene in this matter.

(2) A failure to inform the British companies of the facts of the Arab boycott would amount to dereliction of duty.

(3) He again denied supporting the Arab boycott and he does not see in their letters any contradiction with their position nor does he think that the addressees will get a wrong impression.

(4) He hopes Israel will not submit a formal complaint to the Foreign Office, and in spite of all he has said above he will take Israel's criticism into consideration.

(5) He does not think it necessary to express their attitude to the boycott in every single case.

After consultation with the ambassador it was decided not to take any further action — perhaps they will discontinue sending those letters.[4]

Notes

1. These documents have not been traced.
2. See No. 95.
3. This paragraph was annotated in the margin by an unknown person: "Do they handle other forms of boycott in the same way?"
4. A. Lapid, Deputy Director of the Politico-Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented in the margin of this document: "I spoke with Mr. Livran (Director of the British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). He thinks pressure on this subject should continue, and that MP's and others should be recruited for this purpose. I would like to discuss the entire problem with you (addressing D. Shaltiel, Director of the Division) on your return. A(rye) L(apid) 15.11.60."

98. Sh. Arad (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 November 1960

Coded Tel. X821; Inc.: 130.09/2334/15

Leibl Katz received a letter today from the president of Renault, as follows: (full text in Main Volume, p. 143).

Katz wishes to give this letter wide publicity. He regards it as a real achievement. It is suggested that the letter be published and the affair regarded as closed.[1]

Notes

1. In his telegram to the Israeli Consulate-General in New York (No. 207 of 20.11.1960, 130.09/2313/1), Ch. Yahil says: "We authorize publication, and consider this as closing the affair".

99. Memorandum by Sh. Ya'ari (Jerusalem). 22 December 1960

Copy: 130.23/3350/11

Ya'ari reviews the debate held at the United Nations First Committee from November 14th to December 19th, 1960, on the report by the director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees.[1]

The report, by John Davies, contains several elements which are negative from Israel's point of view, such as the conclusion that there are no prospects of progress in rehabilitation of the refugees without the implementation of Article 11 of U.N. Resolution 194(III) of 1948,[4] which speaks of repatriation and compensation; the conclusion that there are no prospects of the host countries[5] or their neighbours (for instance, Iraq) being able at any time in the future to absorb large numbers of refugees — not necessarily for political reasons but because of their poverty, their lack of resources and the fact that their populations are already large enough; the conclusion that if a solution to the problem of the refugees is ever found it will involve the crossing of an international border by most of the refugees, perhaps two thirds of them or more; and that in the meantime the welfare, education and vocational training activities will have to continue as hitherto.

The debate began with a dispute about the appearance of the Palestinian delegation. While at previous meetings the sole Palestinian representative had been Izzat Tannous, this time the Arab delegations demanded that a larger Palestinian delegation be admitted and that the Mufti's people also be included. The Israel delegation had instructions to oppose the appearance of a new factor called the Palestinian delegation which would imply recognition of the Palestinian entity. With American intervention, the chairman decided that the Mufti's representative, Emile Ghouri, would also be permitted to address the assembly, being accorded the same status as Izzat Tannous in the past, namely, an individual Palestinian refugee.

There was also an attempt to submit for discussion the report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission,[10] but Israel's demand not to include the Commission's report within the framework of the debate on the refugees was accepted. The chairman decided that the Commission would submit its report but would not take part in the debate on the refugees; however, it would

be permitted to reply to questions submitted to it directly. In the event, the Commission's report contained nothing that was new.

Twenty-five states took part in the debate on the refugees, in addition to the two representatives of the refugees and the director of UNRWA. The hostile note was struck as usual by the Saudi representative, Ahmed Shuqairi. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria praised Shuqairi and gave unqualified support to the Arab position. So did Greece, while inordinately hostile speeches were given by Guinea, Cyprus and Yugoslavia. The addresses by the Dutch, Liberian and Honduras representatives could be defined as friendly to Israel. The other speakers, including the representatives of the U.S. and other Western countries, attempted to avoid political polemics and concentrated mainly on the technical aspects of UNRWA's activity. The representatives of the Latin American countries gave speeches full of generalities, calling for peace and for stopping the sabre-rattling. Comay, Israel's representative, avoided direct argumentation with the Arabs, and concentrated mainly on criticism of the exaggerated estimates given of the numbers of the refugees, and of an analysis of the U.N.'s handling of the problem which proved that the United Nations considered the rehabilitation of the refugees in the Arab countries the main solution to the problem. The African states did not show much interest in the issue and most of them were absent from the debate.

The wording of the resolution was fought over. The first draft was submitted by the chief donors to UNRWA, and the main article in it was an appeal to the Conciliation Commission to continue searching for a solution to the refugee problem. In contrast to the previous year's resolution, the present draft did not mention Article 11 of the 1948 resolution which dealt with repatriation and compensation. It was clear that, at least as regarded the Americans, this draft was only a bargaining card and they would be prepared to revert to last year's draft which explicitly mentioned the said paragraph. However, this time the Arabs dug their heels in and insisted on their two demands: the appointment of an international custodian for refugee property in Israel, or at least a formulation of the "existing rights" of the refugees to their property in Israel, and a strengthening of the instructions to the Conciliation Commission on the implementation of Article 11. The Arabs' stubbornness prevented the adoption of a resolution, the director of UNRWA announced that he saw in the speeches of the parties concerned authorization for his Agency's activities in the coming year, while the chairman announced that he was adjourning the debate "*sine die*". This will enable the Arab states or their allies to raise the subject again at the second session of the Assembly scheduled for March 1961.

Notes

1. The report was submitted to the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly on October 3rd, 1960, and was published as U.N. Document A/4478, Appendix 14. It embraced the period from July 1959 until June 1960. For an analysis of the report, see in Sh. Ya'ari's memorandum to G. Rafael, 24.10.1960, 130.23/3350/11.
2. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East — UNRWA — was established in accordance with the resolution of December 8th, 1949, taken at the 4th session of the U.N. General Assembly, with the object of aiding and rehabilitating the Palestinian Arab refugees; it commenced functioning in May 1950.
3. The debate resumed in April 1961 — see U.N. Document A/ PV/993 of April 21st, 1961, and also the summary of the proceedings prepared by M. Elizur and enclosed with G. Rafael's letter to Ch. Yahil of April 27th, 1961 (filed under 130.23/3350/10).
4. See Vol. 2, Appendix G, pp. 639–641.
5. Egypt and Syria — at that time forming a single state as the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Lebanon.
6. UNRWA conducted a census of the refugees in 1950, the definition of a refugee being "a person eligible for aid, whose permanent residence had been in Palestine for a period of at least two years prior to the 1948 conflict, and who as a result of this conflict lost his home and his means of subsistence". UNRWA could not bring its lists up to date in the years 1950 to 1960, as the refugees reported births but almost always concealed deaths in order to keep using the ration cards of the deceased persons. The United Nations' demand of UNRWA to carry out a new census was rejected by the Arab states in whose territories the refugees had settled, and also by the refugees themselves. (See also M. Comay to G. Rafael and A. Harman, 31.12.1959, p. 6, 130.23/3350/11.)
7. The letter was published as U.N. Document A/SPC/48.
8. Armin Meyer, director of the Israel–Lebanon desk in the Department of State (see A. Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT200, 16.11.1960, 130.23/3350/11).
9. Carlet R. Auguste from Haiti, Chairman of the Political Committee.
10. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, was established in accordance with the resolution of December 11, 1948, at the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in order to assist Israel and the Arab states to terminate the state of war between them. Representatives of the United States, France and Turkey sat on the Commission. Its annual report, embracing the period from August 1959 until November 1960, was submitted to the General Assembly on November 14th, 1960. (See U.N. Document A/4574 of 14.11.1960.)
11. See No. 100 (Appendix A).
12. See Vol. 7, Editorial Note, pp. 52–53.
13. This report, dated June 15th, 1959, and published as U.N. Document A/4121, stated, *inter alia*, that the economic integration of the Palestine refugees in the productive communities in the Middle East is possible, but it will be a long process depending on recruiting sufficient capital for the development of the region.
14. A French colony in north-western Africa, which was granted independence in 1960 in spite of Morocco's claim that it was an integral part of its territory. Morocco approached the U.N. on August 20th, 1960, requesting that the matter be put on the

agenda of the General Assembly, but the latter could not arrive at a resolution on the issue.

15. See No. 100 (Appendix A), paragraph 6.
16. See *ibid.*, paragraph 4.

101. I. Navon (Jerusalem) to A. Harman (Washington). 1 March 1960

Notes

1. Ben-Gurion's journey to the United States to meet President Eisenhower was ostensibly made at the invitation of the Brandeis University to have conferred on him the degree of Doctor *honoris causa*. See No. 121.
2. On the meeting, see No. 103.

102. Y. Tekoah (Jerusalem) to the Prime Minister. 11 March 1960

Copy: 130.02/4316/1

In anticipation of his scheduled meeting with Hammarskjöld,[1] Tekoah briefs the Prime Minister on the present relations between Israel and the United Nations. It may be said in general that the differences in positions and attitudes between Israel and the U.N. originate in the fact that the U.N. has not succeeded in implementing the basic principles of its Charter, while the Secretariat applies to international conflicts methods of technical bookkeeping and legalistic hair-splitting. This attitude is of course the result of the internal organization of the U.N. and of its composition, but the Secretary-General's personality has also contributed to the problem. Israel thus faces difficulties from time to time in safeguarding its basic rights.

Tekoah lists here the problems under discussion and at issue between Israel and the U.N.:

(1) Freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.[2]

(2) The Egyptian claim to a state of belligerency.

(3) The demilitarized zones, in particular those between Israel and Syria.[6]

(4) The implementation of Article 12 in the Israel–Jordan armistice agreement.

(5) The implementation of Article 8 in the above agreement.

(6) The demarcation of the international boundary between Israel and Syria.

(7) The postal communications between Israel and Morocco.[12]

Notes

1. See No. 101.
2. See Chapter 3.
3. See *ibid.*, No. 62.
4. See *ibid.*, No. 66.
5. These appendices, as well as those mentioned below, are in the File but have not been included here.
6. See Chapter 1.
7. See *ibid.*, No. 24.
8. See Chapter 1.
9. Article 5 in the Israel–Syria Armistice Agreement deals with the pattern of civilian life and the security in the demilitarized zones — see Vol. 3, pp. 725–726.
10. For the letter *in extenso* — see *ibid.*, pp. 617–619.
11. An Arab village within the Israeli demilitarized zone on Mt Scopus.
12. See No. 50, n. 14.
13. A strong earthquake devastated the town of Agadir in Morocco in March 1960. The town was completely destroyed, and only 800 Jewish survivors were found out of the original 2300 members of the Jewish community there.

103. Y. Tekoah (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT15; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Tekoah reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Ben-Gurion's talk with Hammarskjöld which lasted two hours, no one else being present. On coming out, the Prime Minister mentioned several points which had been discussed at the meeting:

The main subject was relations between Israel and the U.A.R., especially as touching the demilitarized zones and the Suez Canal.[1] The Prime Minister declared that the demilitarized zones were not different from any other Israeli territory. Hammarskjöld said that for the U.A.R. the demilitarized zones in effect meant the waters of the Jordan, and they saw the plan for diverting this water to the Negev as serving increased immigration — which they viewed with great misgivings. Ben-Gurion stressed that for Israel there were two vital concerns, infringement of which could lead to war — the waters of the Jordan and freedom of passage through the Tiran straits. The Prime Minister did not enter into the details of the Secretary-General's actions in

the matter of the Suez Canal, but he insisted on Israel's unconditional right of navigation through the Canal, Israeli ships included. Hammarskjöld said the Egyptians had also obstructed Israeli navigation before Nasser's time, and the latter could not seem to be less determined *vis-à-vis* Israel than his predecessors.

Note

1. See Chapters 1, 3.

104. Editorial Note

The Affair of the Israeli Medical Aid to Congo

Congo was granted its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, and was immediately thrown into political turmoil. Its national militia — la Force Publique — rebelled and a state of chaos ensued, made worse by the panic-driven evacuation of the Belgian civil service. As against that, Belgium sent over a number of army units to protect those of its subjects who had elected to remain. The ore-rich district of Katanga proclaimed its independence of the new state. Extreme differences of opinion continued between the President, Joseph Kasavubu, who thought Congo should be a loose federation of districts, and the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who was for a strong centralized regime.

The government of Congo appealed for help to the United States, and, when that proved fruitless, it approached the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who convened the Security Council which empowered him to send an armed force to Congo. This arrived in the country in July–August 1960, and included units from the U.A.R., Tunisia and Morocco.

Hammarskjöld rejected Lumumba's demand that the U.N. forces be used to compel Katanga to retract its declaration of independence, arguing that their function was solely to impose law and order. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, supported Lumumba and harshly criticized the Secretary-General.

This was the background to Hammarskjöld's heated quarrel with Israel — he was angry because Israel had dispatched medical aid to Congo, at that country's request, without going through the Secretary-General.

105. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. 21 August 1960

Coded Tel. 717; Outg.: 130.09/2334/10

Mrs. Meir refers to Comay's telegram No. 393[1] and criticizes his reply to Cordier on the medical personnel dispatched to Congo as being too mild. The reply should be more forceful and should express astonishment that in all the tangle around Congo, what troubles the U.N. most is the matter of the Israeli physicians.

Note

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested Comay to approach the U.N. Secretariat and to express Israel's deep concern at the U.A.R.'s having been invited to participate in the U.N. force in Congo (see Editorial Note above). Comay met Cordier, Hammarskjöld's assistant, who told him at the end of the meeting that the U.N. had certain reservations concerning Israel's activity in Congo. When Comay asked whether he was referring to the affair of the medical mission, Cordier replied in the affirmative. Comay refuted his arguments, and added: "If the existing cooperation is satisfactory, it is pointless to waste time on a past misunderstanding". (See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Israel's Permanent Mission to the U.N., telegram Y696, 21.8.1960, 130.09/2334/10; Comay to the Ministry, NWT393, 17.8.1960, 130/09/2339/24.)

106. D. Hammarskjöld (New York) to D. Ben-Gurion. 29 August 1960

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, No. 104.
2. North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. The United states and other countries hastened to South Korea's aid, in accordance with the U.N. resolution.
3. Refers to the shelling by the artillery of Communist China of the Quemoy islands, which were under the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
4. The murder of the Jordanian premier al-Majali in Amman in August 1960 — see No. 29.
5. The U.N. General Assembly met in August 1958 for an emergency session against the background of the July 1958 coup in Iraq and the concern for the regimes in Lebanon and Jordan, which caused the dispatch of American forces to Lebanon and British forces to Jordan. The resolution adopted called on the member states

to honour the principles of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Jordan and Lebanon and of non-aggression and non-intervention in other countries' domestic affairs.

6. See No. 107.

107. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Delegation to the United Nations. 31 August 1960

Coded Tel. 750; Outg.: 130.09/2334/10

Mrs. Meir relays the Prime Minister's reaction to the Secretary-General's message in the matter of Majali's murder[1] (for text see Main Volume, p. 163). Mrs. Meir points out that the message sent by Hammarskjöld to Nasser was identical to that sent by him to the Prime Minister. This detail is not for publication.

Notes

1. See No. 106.
2. This sentence brought about an exchange of telegrams between Comay and G. Meir. Comay asked for the meaning of the sentence, and Meir replied that "it was an expression of contempt towards the United Nations which does not dare to offend dictators". (See Comay's telegram X452, 31.8.1960, 130.09/2334/14; Meir's telegram 761, 1.9.1960, 130.09/2334/10.)

108. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 August 1960

Coded Tel. 454; Inc.: 130.09/2334/8

Comay cables the Minister of Foreign Affairs: Having received the Prime Minister's reply to his message,[1] the Secretary-General has asked Comay over for a talk. Comay thinks that Hammarskjöld will express his disappointment at and criticism of the Prime Minister's response, and he requests instructions on how to react. He also thinks the Secretary-General will raise the matter of Israel's medical aid to Congo and on this he is prepared to counterattack.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 107.
2. Yahil replied that Comay should listen to Hammarskjöld's comments without reacting (see his telegram to Comay, 751, 1.9.1960, 130.09/2334/10).

109. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 September 1960

Coded Tel. X455; 130.09/2334/14

Comay reports on his meeting with the Secretary-General, who was very agitated.[1] Hammarskjöld claimed he had requested the Prime Minister's support in the matter of the dangerous situation brewing in China, and had received a slap in the face in return.[2] Israel lacks the correct perspective and is immersed in its obsession with Nasser. In view of the situation in Asia and Africa, a crisis in the Middle East could lead to catastrophe. He added that he had not yet exhausted all his resources, and if the situation in the region deteriorated he would be prepared to employ all the means at his disposal. Comay replied that he had nothing to add to his Prime Minister's message, except for one remark: Israel is part of the Middle East reality and has a very clear idea of what is the disturbing element in the region. The Secretary-General replied with sarcasm that apparently Israel had a better idea of what was happening in Jordan than the Jordanians themselves.

Comay will report later on the rest of the conversation, including the matter of the medical aid to Congo.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 108.
2. No. 107.
3. No. 110.

110. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 September 1960

Coded Tel. X457; Inc.: 130.09/2334/14

Comay continues his report on his meeting with the Secretary-General (see

No. 109 above). Hammarskjöld turned to the affair of Congo[1] and complained that Israel was conducting an independent operation there and would not accept the authority of the World Health Organization, which aggravated the already complicated situation. He also claimed he had information that Israel had offered direct military aid to the Congolese, who had however refused the offer. Had Israel's offer been accepted, the situation would have irreparably deteriorated. Comay replied that he knew nothing about any offer of military aid and the entire story seemed to him very unlikely. As to the medical personnel, he did not understand what the whole hullabaloo was about. Israel was the first to come to Congo's aid, and everybody says its mission was doing a wonderful job. There is full cooperation between the Israeli team and the W.H.O. Israel has not yet heard a single word of commendation from the Secretary-General or from the U.N. staff on its work in the field. The impression is that the whole dispute is artificial. Hammarskjöld replied that he had a heavy fight on his hands for the vital principle of action solely through U.N. channels. He pointed to the U.S. as an example of a country which usually preferred direct aid but which conceded on this in the Congo case.

Comay then complained about the inclusion of U.A.R. units in the U.N. force in Congo. Under the U.N. flag an element was introduced into Congo the avowed aim of which was to sabotage the relations between Israel and the African countries. He reminded Hammarskjöld that he himself had originally refused to include the Egyptians in the relief force. Hammarskjöld replied that the composition of the force was his exclusive prerogative. The main argument for including the Egyptians was political, and its object was to win the trust of the African countries in the face of Soviet propaganda.

The conversation ended on a less tense and more friendly note. Comay repeated Israel's wish to contribute to Africa's welfare and stressed Israel's feeling of responsibility towards this continent and towards the U.N. The Secretary-General replied that he understood Israel's position, but that he wished Israel would understand his anxiety about global affairs. He said he was sure he could come to an understanding with Israel's Prime Minister on global problems if they could sit together and talk for several hours. He praised the Prime Minister's political wisdom.

Notes

1. See Nos 105 and 109.
2. G. Kamanga, the Congolese Minister of health.

111. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 September 1960

Coded Tel. X462; Inc.: 130.09/2334/14

Following his meeting with the U.N. Secretary-General,[1] Comay wishes to set down on paper an analysis of Hammarskjöld's attitude and to put to the Ministry a number of questions the answers to which would help in setting a line of policy.

(1) The Secretary-General's sensitiveness to Israel's activity in Congo has its roots in his experience with Israel. Israel's opposition to the stationing of U.N. forces in its territory and its non-recognition of the U.N.'s authority in the demilitarized zones can serve as illustrations of the background to Hammarskjöld's attitude. Moreover, the U.N. staff, and the Secretary-General at its head, see in the Congo case a test of the U.N.'s authority, hence his fervid insistence that nothing should be done there except through U.N. channels.

(2) What has been said above is only part of the explanation, and there is an additional important element. Hammarskjöld sees in the Congo crisis a historic opportunity. The colonial regimes have departed, the U.S. is demonstrating its weakness, while the Soviet Union is attempting to infiltrate the former colonies and is operating against the U.N.. The Secretary-General thinks that it is the U.N.'s duty to fill the vacuum, otherwise Africa will slide into chaos and will turn into another arena of the cold war. He has so far succeeded in arousing African solidarity around his actions, and that includes the U.A.R. Any activity outside the U.N. framework is seen by him as an infringement of its authority.

(3) Whether this attitude meets with Israel's approval or not, a re-examination of Israel's position appears to be necessary. Is the Secretary-General's assessment of the American stand correct? In any case it is clear that the other two Western powers, France and Britain, support exclusive action by the U.N. The gains to Israel from its independent action in Congo should be weighed against the harm it is doing to its relations with the U.N. The possibility should be examined of integrating Israel's medical aid with that of the U.N.

Comay suggests that Avriel's stay in Israel should be utilized for a discussion of the points Comay has raised. It should also be noted that the Secretary-General's prestige is now at its peak.

Note

1. See Nos 109 and 110.

112. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 11 September 1960

Coded Tel. TNW246; Outg.: 130.09/2340/6

Yahil confutes Hammarskjöld's claims regarding Israel's independent action in Congo. Israel has never proposed military aid to Congo, and it is unfitting for the Secretary-General to repeat this nonsense. As regards the medical aid, Israel responded rapidly to the U.N.'s request for help and proposed its aid simultaneously to Ralph Bunche, the U.N. representative in Congo, to the U.N. Secretariat, to the World Health Organization, and to the Congolese government. All, except for the Secretariat, responded in the affirmative and the medical team left on its mission, arriving in Congo two days before the W.H.O. team. Israel should not be censured for having acted more swiftly than others. Its actions were commended, *inter alia* by Bunche. The latter apparently received later certain instructions from Hammarskjöld who instituted a line of ignoring Israel's activity. As a matter of principle, Israel does not share the Secretary-General's philosophy of the sole authority for extending aid being vested in the U.N.; it favours bilateral aid, side by side with international action within the framework of the U.N. and its agencies. In the case of Congo, in view of the dangers and complexities of the situation Israel will be prepared to yield priority to any action within the U.N. framework or coordinated with it, as long as its right to participate is not denied by the U.N. At the same time, it cannot be disputed that Israel's faith in the U.N. and in the Secretary-General's objectivity has been shaken.

Notes

1. No. 110.
2. No. 111.

113. Ch. Yahil to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 11 September 1960

Coded Tel. 813; Outg.: 130.09/2334/10

Yahil requests Comay to deliver a message to Hammarskjöld (for text see Main Volume). The message deals with general policy on Congo, and the matter of medical aid will be the subject of another missive.[1] In any case, the present message in no way contradicts what Yahil had cabled previously on the subject of medical aid.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 114.
2. See No. 112. For Hammarskjöld's reply, see No. 114, n. 10.

114. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to D. Hammarskjöld (New York)

Notes

1. See No. 109.
2. S.C. Linner, who was appointed permanent representative to the U.N.'s technical aid operation in Congo in July 1960, and also put in charge of the civilian activities of the U.N. in that country.
3. See No. 109.
4. See No. 29, n. 1.
5. At the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.A.R. was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the years 1961–1962.
6. See No. 113.
7. See No. 110.
8. Major-General Carl C. Von Horn, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers in Palestine, was appointed in July 1960 Commander of the U.N. Force in Congo, a post which he filled until December 31st of that year.
9. The facts detailed in this message are based on the memorandum by E. Avriel to G. Meir, dated September 12th, 1960 (in File 130.23/3341/20).
10. Hammarskjöld replied to this message, saying that he had taken careful note of Ben-Gurion's comments (see Comay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, X660, 14.9.1960, 130.03/2612/12).

115. A. Harman (Washington) to L. Eshkol. 8 January 1960

Coded Tel. 482; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Harman reports on his meeting with Under Secretary of State D.C. Dillon, G.L. Jones, assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs and others who were also present. Dillon said that following the talks conducted by the hydrological experts in November 1959,[1] and after Israel had again declared that its water projects were coordinated with the Johnston plan and had undertaken not to do anything incompatible with that plan — the Department of State had no more reservations about the loan for the financing of the Central Israel Water Conduit.[3] The appropriate financial bodies of the U.S. will now be able to deal with Israel's request. He added that they were not interested in publicity being given to this matter, explaining later that this referred to American support of the Water Conduit and not to the fact of Israel's getting a loan. Jones explained they did not want to create the impression that Israel had prevailed over the Arabs, remarking that the Arab League was due to meet at the end of the month to discuss the water issue.[4] The U.S. has taken steps to assuage the Arabs' fears and to convince them that the Johnston plan was to their advantage too, and they did not want any discordant notes to be struck in the meantime. Harman remarked that Israel was not interested in publicity either, but one had to take into account the fact that Israel was a "parliamentarian country". Dillon said that perhaps it would be best to divide the $15m. loan into two loans of $5m. and $10m., in order to lessen the impression of such massive aid. He then handed to Harman a Note (for text see Main Volume).

A discussion ensued between Dillon and Harman on the Johnston plan, and the view was expressed that perhaps Israel's moves would persuade the Arabs to relate more positively to the plan. Jones said that he had told one of the Arab states' representatives that the Arabs were making a mistake by not adopting the plan while Israel was moving forward with it. To Harman's question on the Arabs' schemes to divert the Banias and Hasbani rivers,[7] Jones replied that his impression was that this was not serious at all, and that water engineers he had consulted pronounced the scheme unworkable. Jones's impression is that what bothers the Arabs is the plan's name — "the Johnston plan". Harman replied that what mattered to Israel was the content and not the name.

It was agreed that the subject of the loan would be advanced if Israel submitted a renewed application — and the embassy people thought this should come from the Israel Bank for Industrial Development. It was also agreed that the loan would come from the Development Loan Fund.

Harman thought of the possibility that the Department of State might

suggest the deletion in the new application of any mention of the ultimate object of the loan — the transfer of the Jordan's water to the Negev. Harman recommends that this possibility be considered.

Harman also raises the question whether it is desirable to reply to the Note he had been given, and, if so, whether to stress that Israel's future attitude to the Johnston plan depended on the Arabs' position. He thinks it would be best to postpone discussing this problem until the loan has been finalized.

Harman concludes by emphasizing the utmost importance of secrecy in this matter. The situation is very delicate in view of the approaching session of the Arab League, and any leak to the press might defeat the entire plan.[8]

Notes

1. On the beginning of America's involvement in the dispute between Israel and the Arab states on the utilization of the water of the Jordan and on its contacts with Israel on this subject until the beginning of the year under review, see Introduction, p. XIV.
2. In its Note of November 19th, 1959, the United States proposed the holding of informal talks between the parties — see Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram RI379, 19.11.1959, 130.09/2313/10.
3. A conduit planned to carry water not under disputed ownership and not included in the Johnston plan, from the north of the country to its south — see Introduction, p. XIV.
4. The debate at the session of the Arab League took place in February 1960 — see No. 33 and n. 3 there.
5. The Development Loan Fund was intended to aid foreign countries in the development of their economic resources. The function of the Export–Import Bank was to extend financial aid to these countries and to facilitate the movement of goods between them and the United States.
6. For the full and official text of the note, see File 93.23/2713/17.
7. See Introduction, p. XIV, and also Chapter 2.
8. No reply to the American note has been found, and presumably no such reply was given. See also No. 118. The reply to this telegram was given by Manor, who was then staying in Israel, in Levi Eshkol's name, as follows: "Efforts should be made in all contacts to increase the sum to be given this year". (See his telegram IR884 to the Embassy in Washington, 12.1.1960, 130.02/6451/4.) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied in the name of G. Meir, who was then on a visit to Africa, "It seems strange to me that we should enter on clandestine relationships with the United States on matters such as development and water". (See telegram to the Embassy in Washington, IR888, 15.1.1960, *ibid.*)

116. G. Avner (Jerusalem) to A. Harman (Washington). 11 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Ya'acov Herzog, the Minister in Washington, is now on home leave and Avner uses his services to transmit to Harman the gist of discussions on relations with the United States held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and officials of the Finance and Foreign Ministries.[1]

There is serious concern about the possibility of a leak in the matter of the water projects. Harman is requested to do his utmost to prevent Israeli journalists in the States from knowing that a reply has been received from the Administration on this subject. Newspaper editors in Israel will be told that any news item appearing on this subject will mean playing into the hands of the Arabs. As to ultimate publication, the Minister of Foreign Affairs opposes in principle keeping secret the fact that Israel has received American aid for the Central Israel Water Conduit; Harman is therefore requested not to make far-reaching promises to the Americans.

In the matter of disarmament, it is recommended that the Minister of Foreign Affairs propose to the Prime Minister the appointment of a study group comprising officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army to work out a plan for gradual disarmament and supervision of the cessation of arms supply to the region.[5]

With regard to military acquisitions from the U.S., Avner thinks that submission of the Note[6] with an inflated list, for instance 500 tanks and 300 missiles, is doomed to failure and immediately frustrates any sort of negotiations. One has to ask for things within the bounds of possibility. In his opinion, the subject to be discussed should be mainly financial aid. It should also be pointed out that what is said in the submitted Note asserting that the balance of armament in the Middle East was upset in 1955[8] and has not been rectified since, is simply not true: the balance was corrected in 1956 before the Sinai campaign, and the present problem has existed for no more than two years. The Note stresses Israel's present relative weakness *vis-à-vis* putative immediate aggression by the Arabs — the Pentagon and the Department of State will not accept such a description of the present situation. Avner remarks that Chaim Herzog, Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch, thinks it necessary to dispatch two Army officers to the States to explain Israel's position to the Pentagon.

Notes

1. See No. 117.
2. On the loan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit", see No. 115.
3. On the session of the Arab League and the resolutions adopted there, see No. 33 and n. 3 *ibid.*
4. See No. 115 and n. 7 there.
5. On November 20th, 1959, the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly decided unanimously to adopt a draft resolution submitted by all the member states, calling on all the governments to make every possible effort in finding a constructive solution to the problem of disarmament. The resolution called on the committee of ten states on disarmament (five from the Western and five from the Eastern bloc) to examine in depth, at their planned meeting in Geneva in March–June 1960, the proposals made by Britain and by the Soviet Union on that subject. Harman's proposals to that committee have not been found.
6. On the arms procurement, see No. 128.
7. This telegram has not been found.
8. The date on which the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia was signed.
9. On the water projects, see No. 115.
10. Aluf-Mishne Aharon Yariv, Military Attaché in the Embassy in Washington until April 1960.

117. Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem, 10 January 1960, document dated 11 January)

Report: 130.23/3294/3

The following subjects were discussed and decisions on them taken: the obstructions by the U.A.R. to Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal; the American loan for the Central Water Conduit; the Arab refugees; preparations for the summit meeting; Israel's relations with Europe; non-aggression treaties.

Notes

1. Reference is to President Eisenhower's speech to the American people of February 20th, 1957. He said, *inter alia*, "We should not assume that, if Israel withdraws (from Sinai and the Gaza Strip), Egypt will not prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Akaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the armistice agreement or other international obligations, this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations."
2. A Danish ship detained in Port Said in May 1959, on her way to pass through the Suez Canal with an Israeli cargo — see Chapter 3.

3. A Greek ship detained in Port Said in December 1959, on her way to pass through the Suez Canal with a cargo of Israeli cement — see Chapter 3.
4. That is, the ownership of which was already invested in the non-Israeli buyer.
5. See No. 99, note 13.
6. See No. 116 and n. 5 there.
7. A "Western" summit conference took place in Paris in December 1959, with the participation of President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. The conference concluded with the statement that it had been decided to invite the premier of the Soviet Union to an inter-bloc summit conference to take place in May 1960.
8. Paragraph 44 in the chapter on foreign policy in the program of the government sworn in in December 1959, states as follows: "Israel will not take part in any aggressive scheme or alliance aimed against any country whatsoever, and will always be faithful to the principle of international cooperation with all nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". (See *Government Yearbook* (Hebrew), 1961, p. 4.)

118. M. Erell (Washington) to the United States Division. 12 January 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Erell transmits two copies of the American Note on the Central Israel Water Conduit[1] and brings arguments for and against a reply to the Note. On the one hand, a reply will go to show that the U.S. has entered into negotiations with Israel on the Water Conduit; it will also make possible the expression of reservations about certain formulations in the Note, such as the conspicuous one-sidedness whereby only Israel has obligations while nothing is said about the other parties to the Johnston plan and the connection between their obligations and Israel's. Especially serious is the sentence which says that the government of Israel undertakes not to take any steps incompatible with the Johnston plan or detrimental to the possibility of achieving an international agreement. The last phrase in particular can be taken to mean that Israel will not be able to develop its own water resources. On the other hand, it would not be desirable to enter into correspondence on this subject as long as the loan has not been finalized; there will be other opportunities to react when further stages of the plan have been reached and more aid is needed from America.

Notes

1. The enclosure to Erell's missive has not been included here. For the gist of the American Note, see No. 115.
2. See *ibid.*
3. In the implementation of their water projects — the eastern Ghor waterworks.

119. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 January 1960

Coded Tel. 489; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Erell quotes Randall S. Williams, the officer in charge of economic affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, as saying that it was agreed at a meeting of the Department of State officials and the Development Loan Fund people that the loan[1] will be given to the Government of Israel and not to any other body; the Americans are almost certain that they can prevent publication and they assume that the same is the case with Israel.

As to the phrasing of the application, they will not attempt to avoid expressly referring to the Central Conduit as they recognize this to be impractical, but will try to create the impression that this loan is a further stage in development aid for the Government of Israel, which includes water and agriculture, and a continuation of the aid which had already been given for these aims. The Department of State is working on the phrasing and will meet the embassy people again[2] when it is completed and the application can be submitted to the Development Loan Fund.

Notes

1. On the "Central Conduit" plan, see No. 115.
2. See No. 120.

120. Sh. Ya'ari (Washington) to the United States Division. 22 January 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Ya'ari reports on A. Manor's meeting with the Department of State officials, at which Ya'ari was also present, on the subject of the application for the loan

for the Central Israel Water Conduit.[1] The Department of State is not opposed to it being stated in the application that the Water Conduit will ultimately be integrated in the Jordan scheme and will receive water from the Jordan. The officials also requested that a number of modifications be made on several technical points. It was agreed that the modified draft will be submitted on January 25th.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 119.
2. See No. 126.

121. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 January 1960

Coded Tel. 517; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Herzog reports on preparations for Ben-Gurion's visit to the States. The embassy will approach Brandeis University suggesting that the Prime Minister be invited for the award of the degree of Doctor *honoris causa*. The Secretary of State will then be informed of this invitation, and it will be explained that Ben-Gurion wishes to take this opportunity to meet President Eisenhower.

Notes

1. Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion's visit to the United States.
2. The sobriquet of James (Jim) Engleton, one of the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency.
3. A degree of Doctor *honoris causa* from a university.
4. Christian Herter, the U.S. Secretary of State.
5. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
6. The Middle East and Near East Bureau in the Department of State.

122. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 January 1960

Coded Tel. 518; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Herzog reports that Brandeis University is willing to invite Ben-Gurion over, and that Harman has requested a meeting with the Secretary of State to inform him of this development. Herzog suggests that a similar step be taken in respect of the U.S. Ambassador in Israel. Secretary of the Treasury Anderson has also been informed of Ben-Gurion's plans, and he said he would be glad to meet the Prime Minister.

Notes

1. No. 121.
2. The month of February.
3. The month of March.
4. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.
5. Ogden Reid, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel.
6. Robert A. Anderson, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
7. Herzog left for Israel for consultations in January 1960.
8. G. Meir's visit to the United States, which took place in September 1959.
9. Eisenhower and Ben-Gurion met in Frankfurt in 1945, when the former was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Europe, and Ben-Gurion was Chairman of the Jewish Agency executive. They discussed Ben-Gurion's request to allow educational aid to be given to Jews in the refugee camps prior to their immigration to Israel. Eisenhower acceded to the request.
10. One sentence has been omitted here.

123. A. Harman and J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 January 1960

Coded Tel. 523; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

A meeting with the Secretary of State has been scheduled. Harman and Herzog request that the U.S. ambassador to Israel also be informed of Ben-Gurion's impending vist to the United States, so that he can cable his recommendations to the Secretary of State.

At the meeting the Secretary of State will be told that Ben-Gurion has accepted Brandeis University's invitation to be awarded the degree of Doctor *honoris causa*; and that the Prime Minister would like to take this opportunity to meet President Eisenhower, with whom he wishes to discuss certain aspects of the relations between East and West, the newly independent African countries, and Middle East issues. The subject of relations between Israel and the U.S. will not be referred to explicitly.

Notes

1. Reference is to Ogden Reid, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel.
2. President Charles de Gaulle.
3. Chancellor Adenauer.
4. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.
5. No. 122.

124. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 February 1960

Coded Tel. 528; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Harman reports on his meeting with the Secretary of State on the subject of Ben-Gurion's visit. He came away with the impression that the Secretary of State was not taken by surprise by this information.[1] Harman stressed the unofficial character of the visit. The Secretary of State said that he would be meeting the President the next day, and that he would contact Harman after that. Harman thinks that in principle there are no difficulties about the visit, and the only problem is the date, because the President is loaded down with work. Harman said the Prime Minister would also like to meet the Secretary of State, who said that he would be very glad to meet Ben-Gurion. The talk then turned to the Tawafiq incident and the situation on the Syrian border.[3] Harman described the events on the lines of the Prime Minister's statement in the Knesset;[4] it was obvious that the Secretary of State was very worried about the hostilities on the Syrian border.

Notes

1. On the American version of the meeting, see Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 1.2.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 260–1 (No. 119).
2. See No. 126.
3. The I.D.F.'s operation at Khirbet Tawafiq of February 1st, 1960 — see Chapter 1.
4. Following the I.D.F.'s operation at Khirbet Tawafiq, Ben-Gurion said in the Knesset that Israel would make every effort to keep peace on the borders, but that it would not allow entry to Syrian forces where they had no right to be. If the United Nations could not expel them — "we shall take the necessary steps to do so ourselves". (See *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, Meeting 41, pp. 499–500.)

125. M. Erell (Washington) to the United States Division. 1 February 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Erell reports Williams of the Department of State as saying that the Department had no further comments on the draft of Israel's application for the loan for the Central Israel Water Conduit, and that the embassy could now submit the application to the Development Loan Fund.

The application was accordingly submitted on February 1st, and Erell encloses a copy of the first three pages which contain the main points.[2] (For text see Main Volume, pp. 193–194.)

Notes

1. See No. 120.
2. The full text of the application was enclosed with Manor's letter to L. Eshkol, February 1st, 1960, 130.02/6451/4.

126. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 February 1960

Coded Tel. 529; Inc.: 130.02/6723/1

Harman was asked over to see Assistant Secretary of State L. Jones, who told him that the Secretary of State had spoken with the President and that the answer was in the affirmative. The date set for the meeting was March 10th. Jones requested that the publicity to be given to the visit be delayed as much as possible, and that when the information on the visit is released it contain only the invitation from Brandeis University; if asked by the press, the spokesman can reply that the Prime Minister would most probably also go to Washington to pay courtesy visits to the President and the Secretary of State.

127. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 February 1960

Coded Tel. 545; Inc.: IMDEA 230/72/781

Harman reports that Israel's application for arms from the U.S. will be submitted by Erell to Armin H. Meyer, the Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs. This will be followed up by Harman's meeting higher-level officials and also the Pentagon people.[2]

Notes

1. On Israel's arms procurement, see No. 128.
2. See No. 131.
3. The final text of the note has not been found, but see several drafts filed under 130.23/3089/12 and No. 129 for the list of the requested equipment.
4. These documents have not been found.

128. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 February 1960

Coded Tel. 548; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Erell reports that he has submitted Israel's application for arms to Meyer of the Department of State.[1] He stressed the following points, which he had discussed previously with Ambassador Harman:

(1) Israel will not publicize the submission of the application nor its contents. Meyer replied that a news item from Jerusalem of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency touching the cabinet meeting mentioned the U.S. and France in connection with security matters. Erell replied that it was difficult to conceal the government's existing apprehensions from a public like Israel's.[2]

(2) Several months ago the United States recognized the crucial importance for Israel of maintaining its power of deterrence, and the subject was raised in September[3] and November 1959[4] at the Minister of Foreign Affairs' and the Ambassador's meetings with the Secretary of State. The government of Israel discussed the issue and the subject was summarized at its last meeting of February 7th. The result of an agonizing reappraisal of the situation was the clear conclusion that urgent action was necessary for Israel to retain its power of deterrence.

(3) For obvious reasons, Israel does not request that a new formal framework be established for its relations with the United States, and it does not aim at new political gains in this context. The main thing is a firm promise of the supply of military materiel, thus ensuring the continuance of the present

stability which is in danger of deteriorating. This matter is of concern not only to the security of Israel but to the stability of the entire region.

(4) The list has been made up with the utmost rigour, the Prime Minister having dealt with this matter in person. It enumerates equipment which is essential for maintaining the present minimal balance of power.

(5) The ambassador wishes to discuss this matter with Jones, Hare and Merchant of the Department of State, with the participation of Military Attaché Yariv who will clarify the military aspects.[5]

(6) The embassy additionally wishes Yariv to give full explanations to the Pentagon people, and Ambassador Harman would also like to brief civilian officials in the Pentagon on the wider implications of Israel's request. Meyer did not react to Harman's request regarding the Pentagon, but said he would like to think over the suggestion about Yariv's participation.

Erell remarks that Meyer did not react regarding the substance of the matter, but it was obvious that he had not expected such a weighty list. A general observation he made was that he felt sad to be discussing an increase in armament in the region when everybody would like to see a relaxation of tension there, and perhaps also some sort of *modus vivendi*. He made an oblique reference to the American intervention in the Lebanon in July 1958[7] and to the Eisenhower doctrine, as if to emphasize that Israel should not feel isolated and forced to increase its military power.

Erell responded to that, saying that neither was Israel happy with the arms race and that it certainly wished for better relations with its neighbours, but this could not be attained in the absence of stability achieved through Israel's power of deterrence; the entire world knows what Nasser's aims are, and there is no doubt he would not hesitate to act if he felt strong enough to prevail. Erell mentioned what Murphy of the Department of State had said, that it was dangerous to create situations of "irresistible temptation".

Meyer referred to what Secretary of State Herter had said to Harman, namely, that the U.S. was not the traditional supplier of arms to the region.

Erell concludes by saying that Meyer's words were comments and not criticism of Israel's attitude. He did not dwell at all on the question whether the arms requested were necessary for restoring the balance of power in the region.

Notes

1. The note has not been found, but see No. 129 for the detailed list of the requested equipment.
2. The Cabinet held a debate on Israel's security situation on February 7th. The conclusion was, that the flow of Soviet arms and instructors to the Arab states and the

intensified preparations of the U.A.R. to attack and destroy Israel, necessitate raising the quality of the I.D.F.'s equipment. Efforts should intensify to procure arms of a deterrent nature, especially from France, Germany and Britain. At the same time, political efforts should continue to obtain arms gratis from the United States or with America's help. (See stenographic report of the Cabinet's meeting, 7.2.1960.)

3. At her meeting with Herter of September 19th, 1959, G. Meir stressed that Israel's deterrent power "has weakened dangerously". Israel based its renewed demand for arms on Dulles's note to Ben-Gurion of August 1st, 1958, which said that the United States believed that Israel should be strong enough to deter any aggressive intentions on the part of its neighbours, and it would be prepared to discuss without any predisposition the military significance of this problem. G. Meir told Herter that the Embassy in Washington would soon submit to the Department of State a detailed note on the subject, and asked for a sympathetic treatment of the requests to be enumerated in it.

   Herter mentioned the possibility of arms procurement from other countries, as Britain and France, and asked whether the requested items were unobtainable from these countries. He said that Israel's request would be dealt with as soon as it was received. (See the Israel Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT870, 30.9.1959, 130.09/2314/9.)

4. At the meeting between Harman and Herter of September 20th, 1959, the former stressed Israel's concern at the present trend towards imbalance of power in the Middle East due to the U.A.R.'s rearmament, and mentioned the burden imposed on Israel owing to its security needs. He pointed out that America's aiding Israel would convince the U.A.R. that its policy of rearmament was pointless. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 383, 20.11.1959, 130.09/2313/10.)

5. See No. 131.

6. See No. 130.

7. The dispatch of American forces to Lebanon in July 1958.

129. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10 February 1960

Coded Tel. RI552; Inc.: IMDEA 230/72/781

Erell transmits to the Ministry the list of armaments requested by Israel from the United States (for full list, see Main Volume, p. 198).

Notes

1. Has not been found.
2. See No. 128.

130. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 February 1960

Coded Tel. 562; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Erell reports on his and Yariv's meeting with Meyer and Wahl of the Department of State, to discuss Israel's list of requirements.[1] Yariv explained the importance and the urgency of strengthening Israel's air power, and stressed that the object was not to increase the I.D.F. numerically but to bring its equipment up to date. When Meyer asked whether Israel was approaching others with similar requests, Yariv replied that there were no similar applications as far as he knew, but there were continuous contacts with France and Britain on the supply of spare parts for equipment which had been acquired from these countries. Meyer asked what were Israel's plans for developing its own arms industry, and referred to rumours that the Haifa Technical Institute was experimenting with rockets. Yariv replied that Israel was concentrating its efforts in the field of basic equipment.

In the course of the conversation Meyer remarked that Israel's application would assuredly be the subject of prolonged discussions between the two governments. He made no objections to Yariv's visiting the Pentagon, and remarked that the Department of State would be advised by the military on the professional aspects of the matter. Towards the end of the meeting Meyer asked what was behind Deputy Defence Minister Peres's statement of February 9th, according to which Israel's requests for heavy armaments from certain countries had been refused, which would force it turn to European suppliers, and Yariv gave a suitable reply. Wahl said he was impressed by the extent of the list in contrast to what they had been used to seeing till then.

Notes

1. See No. 128.
2. See No. 121.

131. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 February 1960

Coded Tel. 567; Inc.: 130.09/2313/10

Harman reports on a meeting with Jones, Meyer and Hamilton of the

Department of State, Yariv and Erell being also present. Harman gave the background to Israel's request for arms,[1] and Jones said the application was now being processed by the Department of Defense, who were examining the data on the increase in military strength of the Arab states and the resulting situation. They were also discussing the effect of Israel's request on America's traditional policy of not becoming a major supplier of arms to the Middle East. The cost of the equipment was also being estimated, and Jones here said that the list was very long and the costs would amount to a considerable sum. Harman said that in the matter of supply the Note said that Israel was willing to be flexible, and as to the length of the list — it expressed precisely the gap in the balance of arms and the seriousness of Israel's concern. Jones said he understood this concern.

Harman thinks that Jones was particularly impressed by the argument about the Arabs now being able to exploit to the utmost the arms they have, thus strengthening their military power. Yariv dwelt on this point, and it could be felt that it was new to the Americans. Jones pointed to the presence of U.N. forces on Israel's borders, calling them a "trip wire" against aggression. Harman said that was not the situation. Harman said that Israel was the only country in the world whose security was endangered by Soviet weapons, and it had to finance its defence from its own resources. Jones asked what part of the budget was allocated to defence, and Harman replied that it was some 30% of the public budget and more in several hidden items.

Yariv gave details of the increase in strength of the Arab military forces, particularly those of the U.A.R. and Iraq. When Jones asked whether Iraq was also included in the Arab forces confronting Israel, Yariv replied that this possibility had also to be considered from the military point of view, though the U.A.R. forces constituted the foremost danger.

It was agreed to return to this subject later, while it was being studied in the meantime by the Department of Defense. The next step, Harman thinks, is to persuade the Department of Defense of the validity of Israel's assumptions and assessments. Further details on the rearmament of the Arab states will in the meantime be submitted to the Department of State.

Towards the end of the meeting Jones said he had received a report on a meeting of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission in which Israel had not participated.[3] Harman explained Israel's position, and Jones said he did not wish to criticize but he thought it best that the parties cooperate with the U.N.

Harman summarizes the arguments put forward regarding Israel's application for arms and concludes that the list submitted by Israel expressed precisely the security gap and aimed at restoring the disturbed balance of power. Israel's dilemma was how to manoeuvre between its security needs, which are of paramount existential importance, and its capacity of

economic development. The problem should not be shouldered by Israel alone, because it was its power of deterrence which had brought about the present three-year-old stability in the Middle East.

Notes

1. See No. 128.
2. See Nos 144 and 145.
3. The Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The Chairman of the Commission summoned the parties to a meeting in February 1960, the agenda to include a debate on the situation in the demilitarized zone. Israel boycotted the meeting, claimimg that the Syrians had no standing in what concerned the demilitarized zones — see No. 11.
4. See No. 128 and n. 3 there.

132. M. Erell (Washington) to G. Avner.[1] 18 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/17

Erell sums up developments in the matter of Israel's application for arms from the U.S., and thinks that they are taking a desirable course. The Department of State is taking the matter seriously, has transferred the material to the Pentagon, and has encouraged Israel to maintain contacts with that body. Yariv is already active there.

Erell estimates that there will be no further progress in the Department of State in the matter, until the Pentagon submits its assessments on the relative strength of the Israeli and Arab forces.

Yariv has been informed that the professional analysis, which is to take some three or four weeks, would be carried out by the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the moment he cannot say to what extent details would be required of the present strength of the I.D.F., but he thinks one should be prepared to deal with such a question.

Notes

1. The letter was sent also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Prime Minister.
2. See No. 133.

133. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner. 25 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/17

Harman supplements his cabled report on his meeting with Irwin,[1] the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) on the subject of Israel's application for arms.

It appears that Irwin and his colleagues did not question the factual data on which Israel's request was based. They said that the list was "very reasonable", but the main thing they were worried about was its magnitude and cost. Against this Harman argued that the list was not based on a plan for enlarging the I.D.F.'s military capacity but on a quantitative estimate of what was necessary to attain the minimum balance between Israel and the Arabs. Three categories of equipment were included: (1) equipment designed to achieve a qualitative balance, which will replace the present obsolete materiel; (2) equipment which will re-establish a healthy quantitative balance; (3) equipment designed for increasing Israel's defensive capacity against aerial attack.

Harman said he had asked for cost pricing from Israel, but the information had not yet arrived. These data were important because they will serve as a basis for practical proposals on ways and means for the U.S. to finance Israel's requests. It would, by the way, be useful to find out the differences in prices for similar items between the U.S. and other suppliers.

Harman adds that when the Department of Defense has completed its analysis, there will remain the problem of policy, as the U.S. has traditionally refrained from supplying arms of its own manufacture to the Middle East. He therefore suggests that a detailed list be compiled — for the time being for internal use — of American equipment already in Israel's possession, any addition to which would not be so conspicuous. The electronic equipment requested by Israel could also be processed separately, and it was therefore possible that it would be easier to obtain this category from American sources than other items, the cost pricing for this equipment being somewhat lower as a result. Harman does not know whether there are other items of this sort apart from electronic equipment, perhaps only the recoilless guns.

The financial problem is also very serious, and it is in effect a political problem, how to extend to Israel the requested financial aid in an inconspicuous way. It is therefore necessary to start thinking right now — for internal consideration — about the various possible options.

In conclusion Harman proposes — again for internal use only — a list of priorities of the items on the list, on the assumption that any aid received will start only from the coming American new financial year — June 1960.[3]

Notes

1. Has not been found.
2. Recoilless guns, sold to Israel by the United States in 1958.
3. Avner said he supported Harman's stand as expressed in paragraph (b) of his letter, while the arguments and suggestions in paragraphs (c) and (d) should be studied by the head of Intelligence. (His letter, of February 29th, is filed under 130.23/3294/17.)

134. Memorandum by G. Avner (Jerusalem). 3 March 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Avner reviews and analyses various aspects of the American attitude towards Israel during the last few years. The attitude of the U.S. Administration to Israel's practical needs continues to be, to no small degree, a function of its relations with the Arab world in general and with Egypt in particular. However, certain considerations of internal politics, such as public opinion and the Jewish vote, make for more affirmative action. Nevertheless, Israel's requests for aid were for the most part measured by the expected Arab reaction. This policy made for a positive attitude to Israel's requests but at the same time for suspicions about its motives, and sometimes for stipulating that the granting of aid be conditional on its being concealed from the Arab states.

Notes

1. The declaration was made in May 1950 — see Vol. 5, No. 248.
2. See No. 15.
3. James P. Richards, Special Assistant to the President of the United States, was sent by the President to several countries in the Middle East to explain to them the Eisenhower doctrine (see n. 4 below). No joint communiqué was issued at the end of his visit to Israel, but Israel published a declaration, approved by the United States, welcoming America's support in the safeguarding of the independence of the various countries in the Middle East and its aid in developing the economic strength necessary in securing this independence. (See Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 499, 520, 10.5.1957, 15.5.1957, 130.09/2313/2.)
4. The declaration on American policy in the Middle East, submitted to Congress on January 5th, 1957, by President Eisenhower, when he requested the authority to extend military and economic aid to Middle Eastern countries asking for it, and to use the United States' armed forces to defend the independence and territorial integrity of any country in the Middle East against overt armed aggression by a country under the rule of international communism.

5. In his speech of November 1955 at the Guildhall in London, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden said that he thought Israel's boundaries should be a compromise between its present boundaries and those of the partition resolution of November 29th, 1947.
6. This was said at the press conference of February 17th, 1960.
7. Reference is to the financing of the acquisition of Centurion tanks from Britain — see No. 146.
8. Itzhak Navon, Head of the Prime Minister's bureau.
9. See No. 132.

135. A. Harman (Washington) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 11 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWTA4; Inc.: 130.02/6723/1

Harman reports on the meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion which took place on March 10th.

The Prime Minister opened by commenting on relations between East and West and the situation in Africa, analysed the situation in the Middle East, and dwelt on Israel's defence problems and needs. He suggested that the President propose to Khrushchev, at their summit meeting, that the United States and the Soviet Union come out with a joint appeal to the Middle Eastern states to reach a mutually acceptable agreement between Israel and the Arabs, preserving the independence and integrity of all the countries in the region.[1]

The President said that the U.S. did not want to become the main supplier of arms to Israel for two reasons: (1) it would weaken its ability to alleviate tensions in the region and to bring about conciliation; (2) it might aggravate the arms race as the result of competition between the two Powers. He therefore thinks that the main arms suppliers to Israel should be Britain and France, and perhaps also Germany. He mentioned that Israel's request for arms was now being examined[4] and that certain categories, such as electronic equipment, had been supplied by the U.S. to Israel in the past.

The Prime Minister explained that Israel did not intend the U.S. to become the supplier of arms to the Middle East.

The President showed interest in Ben-Gurion's proposal for a joint appeal to the Middle East by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and said this would be studied at the Department of State. As to Israel's defence needs, these are not questioned, but he would not like the impression to be created right now that the U.S. was the main supplier of arms. The U.S. recognizes Israel's right to existence and greatly admires its achievements during the last twelve years

and its sturdiness. He mentioned the economic aid being extended by the U.S. to Israel. In conclusion he said they would "go over the whole thing", but with the basic assumption that the U.S. does not wish to become the main supplier.

The Prime Minister was guest of honour at dinners at Blair House and at the Department of State, with the attendance of the top ranks of the Administration.

Notes

1. The Department of State informed Herzog on April 28th, 1960, that it had been decided not to adopt Ben-Gurion's proposal. (See Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI946, 28.4.1960, 130.09/2313/12.) See also No. 141.
2. This declaration was published on April 26th, 1956, at the conclusion of Khrushchev's visit to Britain. It said, *inter alia*, that both countries would do their utmost to preserve peace and security in the Middle East. The parties concerned are called upon to take steps to prevent the rise of tension in the areas adjoining the armistice lines between Israel and its neighbours. Britain and the Soviet Union will support the United Nations' initiative aimed at ensuring a peaceful solution acceptable to all parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
3. In a letter of July 25th, 1958, it was stated, *inter alia*, that Israel could be assured of America's interest in its integrity and independence (for the full text of the letter, see File 130.23/3294/3).
4. See No. 128.
5. One sentence has been omitted here.
6. This telegram is the only report in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the meeting between Ben-Gurion and President Eisenhower. The Americans recorded the conversation in its entirety — see Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, 10.3.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 280–88 (No. 131).
7. See No. 136.

136. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT9; Inc.: 130.09/2339/22

Harman sums up the Prime Minister's visit to the United States.

(1) The meeting with Dillon did not bring forth a conclusive reply to Israel's request for arms, but Dillon said they were studying it with "sympathetic consideration", as was being given the request for financial aid to subsidize arms acquisition from other sources. Nasser and the Middle East in general were the subject of a discussion.[1]

(2) A successful meeting was held with labor leaders.

(3) A successful meeting took place with Humphrey.

(4) Successful meetings were held with Gruenther and with the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee.

Gruenther and Dillon both said that the President was very much impressed by Ben-Gurion and by their talk. What Ben-Gurion had said on the Soviet Union increased his appreciation, while his words on Africa also made a great impression.

(6) The Prime Minister also met many public figures, whether on social occasions or at separate meetings. He visited Secretary of State Herter, who was sick, at his home. The press coverage was good, and a great impression was made in particular by the unusual honours extended to the Prime Minister.

Notes

1. No further report has been found on this conversation, but see the minutes taken by the Department of State, *FRUS,* 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 289–92 (Nos. 132, 133). The subject of Israel's planned association with the European Economic Community was also raised at the meeting — see No. 315.
2. Secretary of the Treasury R.B. Anderson, who carried out in January 1956, on Eisenhower's behalf, an unsuccessful mediating mission between Israel and Egypt.
3. Styles Bridges, Republican senator from New Hampshire.
4. Richard M. Nixon, the Vice President of the United States.
5. Allen W. Dulles, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. See No. 137.

137. A. Harman (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 March 1960

Coded Tel. X986; Inc.: 130.09/2334/12

Harman reports on the successful talks the Prime Minister had with Senator Johnson and with Vice President Nixon. Nixon knew of the meeting with the President and suggested that, if the Prime Minister's idea of a joint declaration on the Middle East is not raised at the summit, it may be possible to raise it during the President's visit to the Soviet Union. In the matter of arms, both the Vice President and Dillon showed understanding of Israel's situation. The Prime Minister also visited the sick Secretary of State at his home. On this last meeting the Prime Minister will brief the Minister of

Foreign Affairs in person; Harman wishes to say that the Prime Minister had left Washington in good spirits.

Note

1. Allen Dulles. No report on this meeting has been found.
2. There is no report on this conversation in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor has the letter sent by the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State in the aftermath of the meeting been found. From the American documentation it appears that Herter said during the conversation that the United States would study Israel's request "sympathetically and urgently". When Ben-Gurion then asked whether he could consider the answer as favourable, Herter said: "That is a fair assumption". (See Memorandum of a Conversation, 13.3.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 296–300 (No. 137).)

138. D. Ben-Gurion (Washington) to President Eisenhower (Washington). 16 March 1960

Note

1. Letter untraced.

139. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 March 1960

Coded Tel. 671; Inc.: 130.09/2313/11

Harman reports on his meeting with Assistant Secretary of State L. Jones, with the participation of Minister Herzog and Department of State officials Meyer and Hamilton.

Harman thanked those present for the arrangements made for the Prime Minister's visit and handed over letters from Ben-Gurion to the President[1] and to Secretary Herter.[2] Jones said that the visit had had good coverage. Several Arab ambassadors, whom he described as "moderates", remarked that Israel had shown restraint during the visit.

As to the implementation of what had been promised by Herter,[3] Jones said that this was in Dillon's hands. They are studying the subject and hope that Dillon will be ready to meet Harman next week.[4] Harman emphasized

Israel's readiness to keep the matter secret. Harman and Herzog decided to refrain from any more pressure on the Department of State and the Pentagon and to await the outcome of the meeting with Dillon.

Meyer mentioned a report published in the *New York Times* based on the Prime Minister's words at the press conference in London, to the effect that the issue of the Jordan water had not been discussed with the President but only with the U.N. Secretary-General, and that Israel would insist on its rights of implementation of the Jordan plan.[6] Meyer said that the Arabs were much taken up with the subject and their view was that this was one of the matters Ben-Gurion had wished to discuss in the United States. He added that if the U.S. implemented the Water Conduit plan now, the Arabs would accuse it of having decided on it during Ben-Gurion's visit.

Harman remarks that what has been said demonstrates the sensitivity of the U.S. regarding the water schemes. He therefore repeats his request to have the press create the impression, on the Prime Minister's return, that his talks in the U.S. dealt with the summit and the call for peace, and that the press does not refer to the subjects of the arms and water.

Notes

1. No. 138.
2. Untraced.
3. See No. 137 and n. 2 there.
4. See No. 144.
5. The documents have not been found and the matter remains obscure.
6. On Hammarskjöld's meeting with Ben-Gurion, see No. 103.

140. Editorial Note

The Prime Minister's Statement on his Return from his Visit to the United States and Great Britain, 24 March 1960

The Prime Minister stated that subjects "of international importance" were raised in his talks with the President of the United States and with the Secretary of State and his assistants, as well as matters touching Asia and Africa, and the situation in the Middle East. There were practically no differences of opinion between him and his interlocutors. He also mentioned his meetings with Chancellor Adenauer, with U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, and with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan. He has returned with the impression that his journey "had not been useless".

141. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 March 1960

Coded Tel. 677; Inc.: 130.09/3294/4

Harman quotes two passages from Secretary of State Herter's reply to Ben-Gurion's letter[1] (for text see Main Volume, pp. 217–218).

Harman remarks that the embassy had not made public the fact of letters having been dispatched to the President and to Herter, nor that Herter had given a reply. He adds that it is very important that the text of the letters not be leaked out to the press, and that is what has been agreed on with the Department of State.

Notes

1. See No. 137 and n. 2 there.
2. See No. 129.
3. See No. 135.
4. See No. 144.
5. The Note, dated March 25th, is filed under 130.02/4316/7.

142. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner. 4 April 1960

Copy: 130.23/3329/5

Harman offers his opinion on how Israel's reaction to the *Astypalea*[1] affair should be handled in the United States. After reviewing relations between the U.S. and Israel, he comes to the conclusion that the importance of the Suez Canal issue is not such as to endanger these relations and thus cause harm to more important matters. The reaction to the *Astypalea* affair should be of a general character, not specifically Jewish or anti-Nasserist, anti-American or anti-Hammarskjöld. The U.N.'s and the American support of freedom of navigation should be exploited, demonstrating that Nasser was acting against the U.S. and the U.N. Harman warns of Jewish elements in the United States who are looking for excuses for attacking the present Administration in the election year, and perhaps finding them in the Israeli issue; it is not in Israel's interest to co-operate with these elements.

Herewith Harman's analysis of the relations between Israel and the U.S.:

Israel has succeeded in turning the problem of free passage through the Suez Canal into a recognized international issue. Every serious agent in the

U.S. dealing with foreign policy knows of this problem, and knows that Nasser is not in the right in this case. In 1959, at the 14th Session of the General Assembly, the Administration was in two minds about expressing its opinion on this subject and Secretary Herter thought it enough to say a few general words about the freedom of navigation.[2] The Administration now takes every opportunity of reverting to Herter's words as expressing America's policy, while stressing that it supported any practical steps taken and efforts made by the U.N. Secretary-General.

Harman lists six occasions on which Israel had appealed for help from the U.S. in matters connected with the Arab states. On three occasions the response was positive, and on three others — negative.

The positive response was on the following matters: (1) intervention in favour of the Damascus prisoners;[3] (2) allaying the fears of the Arab states about Israel's implementing the Jordan water plan; (3) an appeal to the U.A.R. to halt the military concentrations on Israel's border following the Khirbet Tawafiq incident.[4]

In the following cases the U.S. did not offer its support to Israel: (1) when at the 14th Session of the General Assembly Israel proposed to delete Article 4 in the resolution on the Arab refugees, which instructs the Conciliation Commission to make further efforts to implement Article 11 of the General Assembly's resolution of 1948;[5] (2) when Israel attempted to obstruct the U.A.R.'s request for a loan from the World Bank for widening the Suez Canal;[6] (3) when Israel requested America's intervention with the U.A.R. to enable the *Astypalea* to pass through the Canal.

Two additional important factors have to be considered to round out the picture of relations between the U.S. and Israel:

(1) The increase in American economic aid to Israel (ordinary economic aid, aid for the Central Water Conduit, the Administration's promise of help in Israel's rearmament).

(2) There are many signs of the substantive change in America's assessment of Nasser since November–December 1959. This was a result of several factors, including the *Astypalea* affair, Soviet aid for the second stage of the Aswan dam, the concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and the U.A.R.'s activity in the Arab League with regard to the Palestine issue. In talks with U.S. officials Israeli diplomats can discern a quite different note than that heard before, and in unofficial conversations one can even hear very strong utterances about Nasser.

To this can be added the fact that not a single official note was addressed to Israel by the U.S. during the Khirbet Tawafiq incident. In Harman's opinion, when the U.S. estimates that a certain situation in the Middle East can deteriorate into hostilities, it uses its influence to prevent such a development. Its non-intervention in the Khirbet Tawafiq affair resulted

from its assessment of the inherent justice of Israel's case and of Israel's non-belligerent intentions.

The aid in respect of the Central Water Conduit was influenced both by Israel's hints that it could disrupt Jordan's water projects and by its assurances that it would keep to the Johnston plan.

Harman is convinced that the matter of military aid can be advanced if two important conditions are fulfilled: (1) that the Americans are persuaded that Israel's assessment of the disturbed military balance in the Middle East is based on actual facts, and (2) if Israel can suggest forms of aid which would not be overly conspicuous.

The basic American attitude is that at best they could assist in preserving the present state of affairs between Israel and the Arabs. The exception in this regard is the Arab refugee problem.

As an element in preserving the present situation, the Americans would have wished to return the state of affairs in the Suez Canal to what it had been in the past, but a number of events since the summer of 1959 affected this attitude adversely. The fact that the Suez Canal was not an issue in Israel's elections, and that it was not raised during the Prime Minister's visit to the States, persuaded the Americans that the issue was of no special concern to Israel and did not constitute a *casus belli*. Therefore the Department of State was caught unawares by the reactions in Congress and in the press on freedom of navigation aimed not only at Nasser but also at the Administration, which was accused of condoning Nasser's actions.

Harman thinks that the Americans consider the Suez issue as a long-term problem, to be dealt with by continuous quiet efforts and not by immediate action.

The Americans' wariness of Nasser waxes and wanes with his actions. The general line is that relations with him should be as normal as possible, but not at the expense of relations with other countries in the region. The main point of the relations should be Egypt's need of help to solve its economic problems which prevent Nasser from ever becoming a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. For reasons of global strategy, competition should not be allowed to develop here with the Soviet Union in the field of economic help, but Nasser should not be thrown into their arms and something must also be offered to him by America.

The results of Israel's elections of November 1959 have been interpreted by the Americans as signifying that the Arab problem is not at the focus of political interest of the Israeli public, this being taken up by internal issues and economic development. Following Israel's appeal for arms, and especially after Ben-Gurion's visit, the U.S. should have become convinced that Israel wished for peace and that defence was its main concern, therefore its anxieties should be assuaged.

Notes

1. On the *Astypalea* affair, see Chapter 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent instructions for action in this case to several missions, including the Embassy in Washington. Harman replied that preparations had been made to brief the press and to have them print editorials and commentaries, and that action would also be taken with respect to foreign affairs associations and the American Association for the United Nations. However, Harman opposed the Ministry's proposal to insert an advertisement in the *New York Times*, arguing that a leader in the same paper would make a much stronger impression. (See Yahil's telegram to the Israel Missions Abroad, telegram 271, 1.4.1960, 130.09/2378/3; Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 688, 4.4.1960, 130.09/2313/11.)
2. Herter's speech of September 24th, 1959, at the 14th Session of the General Assembly, included a paragraph to the effect that the United States adhered to its support of the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal as endorsed by the United Nations. (See *GAOR, 14th Session*, 797th Plenary Meeting, September 17th, 1959, p. 10.)
3. During October–November 1959, at Israel's request, the United States interceded with the U.A.R. authorities for six Syrian Jews on trial in Damascus for attempting to cross the border into Israel. (See Herzog to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 284, 341, 8.10.1959, 2.11.1959, both in File 130.09/2313/10; see also *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 210–12 (No. 96).)
4. See Nos 15 and 19.
5. See No. 99 and n. 16 there.
6. See No. 49 and n. 3 there.
7. See No. 70.
8. See No. 141.
9. Starting with 1958, the Soviet Union granted to Egypt credit for the construction of the second stage of the Aswan Dam, and Soviet engineers and technicians took part in the planning and used Soviet equipment in the construction. The work on the second stage started in 1960 and ended some ten years later.
10. See Chapter 1.
11. At his meeting with G. Meir of February 2nd, immediately following the I.D.F.'s operation at Khirbet Tawafiq, Ambassador Reid commented that Israel should exercise restraint and refrain from moving armed forces into the sensitive area. (See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in Washington, TNW959, 2.2.1960, 130.09/2313/1.)
12. See n. 3 above.
13. At his meeting with Herter of November 20th, 1959, Harman said that while the United States was aiding Jordan in its eastern Ghor project, it was exchanging notes with Israel on its water projects. Harman argued that in these circumstances Israel would have to take the necessary steps to protect its rights, and unilateral action would only damage the chances of a joint plan with Jordan. Herter said it seemed to him that the United States did not expect its aid to Jordan could hinder the Johnston plan instead of advancing it. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI383, 20.11.1959, 130.09/2313/10.)
14. See No. 141.
15. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

16. See No. 85.
17. See n. 1 above.
18. Reference is to action among foreign affairs associations and the American Association for the United Nations — see *ibid.*

143. A. Manor (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 April 1960

Coded Tel. WNT51; Inc.: 130.09/2313/2

Manor reports on his meeting at the Department of State, at their invitation, on the subject of the loan for the Central Water Conduit.[1] He was told that the matter was now under consideration at the Development Loan Fund. Dillon wished to finalize the loan, but the Department of Agriculture objected for the following reasons: (1) the water would serve to increase the areas under cultivation for oranges and cotton, where Israel was competing with the U.S.; (2) these crops are subsidized by the Government of Israel and thus they compete unfairly in the European market.

Israel was accordingly requested by the Department of State to reply to the arguments of the Department of Agriculture so that Dillon could get the green light from the Development Loan Fund. Obviously Dillon would wish for an undertaking by Israel that the water would not be used in planting new orange groves or adding to the existing cotton plantations, and that Israel would not subsidize the export of oranges.[2]

Manor suggests a reply on the following lines: the water of the conduit will not serve for developing new agriculture but for maintaining the present areas under cultivation, and also for industry and the needs of a large and expanding urban population. There is not enough water now for the existing orange groves. The cotton is not intended for export, while the exported oranges are not being subsidized.

Notes

1. The loan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit" — see No. 115.
2. Some time later Herzog cabled that he had been informed by the Department of State that they had succeeded in overcoming the opposition of the Department of Agriculture and that the loan would be approved soon (see his telegram RI749, 28.4.1960, 130.09/2313/12).

144. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 April 1960

Coded Tel. 704; Inc.: 130.09/2313/11

Harman reports on his meeting with Dillon on the subject of arms for Israel. Herzog and Manor were also present, as well as Jones and Hamilton from the Department of State.

Dillon said that the reply on the electronic items would be given within a week. Almost everything Israel had requested would be approved, and this would serve to strengthen Israel's defence in the air.

As to the missiles, they would have liked to help but they are meeting with difficulties of supply for their own forces and also cannot cope with the shortage of instructors in this field. He knows this is a disappointment to the Israelis, but he cannot give them any hopes for the near future.

As regards the financial side, he is willing to assume that the increased acquisition of arms will not harm Israel's economic development.

More details will be cabled later.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 145.
2. See *ibid.*, and also Nos. 146 and 147.

145. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 April 1960

Coded Tel. 705; Inc.: 130.09/2313/11

Harman submits a detailed report on his meeting with Dillon, the gist of which has already been dispatched.[1]

Dillon said that they had practically finished with the electronics and were now working on a list showing when, and at what price, Israel could get what had been approved. This list would be ready within a week, and then the experts from both sides could start discussing the details. As far as they knew, most of what Israel had asked for was approved, including items which were still on the classified list and in respect of which special authorization would be necessary. He stressed that "we are prepared to go a substantial way to meet your requirements". Jones pointed out that Israel's

list included the most advanced items of equipment; these could not all be supplied immediately — some could be supplied right away, others within some six months, and the rest would have to wait for some eighteen months. Dillon said that their estimate was that the new equipment would greatly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Israel's defence in the air and its capability of interception.

As to the missiles, Dillon said that they did want to help in the matter, but when Herter spoke with Ben-Gurion he was not aware of many technical details. Now they are wiser and they have learnt of two difficulties with the Hawk missiles. First, production does not cover their own needs, at least not up to 1962. Second, this missile is very complex and requires at least two years' training. He added that the missile was not effective against planes flying at a height of more than 35,000 feet.

Harman said that the Prime Minister would be greatly disappointed, as he had accorded first priority to the missiles and had thought the matter had been settled. Dillon replied that he knew it and that they "felt very badly about it". They had processed the application with the utmost urgency, as they had promised, wishing to satisfy Israel's requests, but they had been faced by the difficulties described above. He did not mean to say that this missile or any other item was "totally out of the question", but from the point of view of urgency, it should be made clear that they could not commit themselves to any immediate time period; in the longer term, the technology of missiles was in any case in constant development. He again wished to stress that he had approached the subject with the very best will, but it turned out that at the time of his talk with the Prime Minister he simply did not have all the technical information.

Harman remarked that the Prime Minister had mentioned the danger facing us from the MIG-19. Israel is now informed that the U.A.R. will acquire this plane in September and that a school for jet pilots is to open there. With this in view, would it not be possible to reconsider the matter? Dillon replied that they would certainly follow developments, and find out what the Egyptians were getting and the dates of delivery. The U.S. was assuredly anxious to help in Israel's defence. Intelligence has so far reported only on the intention to supply Egypt with the MIG-19, but no information has been received that the delivery has actually begun. If the situation changes and it is known for certain that Egypt is getting the planes, then the whole matter would have to be reconsidered. The Department of State does not think that Israel is facing an immediate danger, and in any case some electronic items can be supplied well before the end of the year. When asked again about reconsidering the situation, Dillon replied that they would hold the matter "under review", but he did not wish to arouse hopes of immediate action. To the question whether the Israelis would be able to start training now for the Hawk, he replied that

the missile would be available for training only at the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963.

Harman asked whether they had not considered an alternative to the Hawk; Dillon replied that they had thought of the Nike, but this missile was very expensive and not as effective as the Hawk. Moreover, it could be converted to use as artillery, and this might be how the Arabs would interpret its supply to Israel.

Harman said that Israel was nevertheless interested in studying the subject with the Americans, because here its power of deterrence was involved. Dillon asked whether the Prime Minister had managed to find out anything in Britain regarding the Bloodhound missile,[2] and Harman said he had no information on this. He pointed out that, when preparing the list, Israel had considered it as forming a single package: if the missiles were not available, then more planes would be wanted for defence. Dillon asked about the Mirage which the Prime Minister had mentioned, and Harman replied that this was a matter of waiting for another three years. Dillon asked what danger lay in the MIG-19, which could not be used as a bomber; Harman replied that it could be used to gain air superiority and afford access to the bombers. Dillon said that this most probably would not happen in the near future; Harman replied that one had to take into consideration the U.A.R.'s present strength even without the MIG-19, while with these planes the danger to Israel would greatly increase. Dillon said he was prepared to do some "keen thinking" on the subject of the missiles, but he was not expecting a result "in the immediate future". Harman said he would be approaching him again on this matter.

Turning to the financial side, Dillon said they were thinking of a three-year credit arrangement; Harman replied that Israel's Note spoke of financing in addition to supply, stressing that Israel could not shoulder the burden of the necessary rearmament without harming its economic development. Dillon replied that they did not want to harm Israel's economy and that they would take this point into consideration; they could make it easier for Israel in several ways. When Harman mentioned the possibility of using the Contingency Fund, Dillon replied that there was no money in that fund at the moment, but he specifically referred to an increase in the food surpluses and an increase in the Development Loan Fund, and he also mentioned special assistance — something which had till now been of mainly psychological importance but which could now be approached from the practical point of view. The U.S. was interested in Israel's economic development and it was aware of the difficulties Israel would be facing with reparations coming to an end in 1963. As Israel's arms acquisitions are expanded, and if it turns out that there is a danger of a slow-down, attitudes towards the grant assistance will change accordingly. He again mentioned that more use could be made of

food surpluses, and in future perhaps also of grant funds from the contingency funds.

Priority would be given to Israel's requests for missiles and electronic equipment, but other items are also under discussion and there will be more meetings on that subject.

Notes

1. No. 144.
2. A ground-to-air missile of British make; it turned out to be unsuitable for Israel's needs — see No. 147.
3. Recoilless guns sold to Israel by the United States in 1958.
4. This was said at the Prime Minister's meeting with Dillon on March 10th — see Memorandum of a Conversation, 10.3.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 289-90 (No. 132).
5. See No. 168.
6. See No. 146.

146. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 April 1960

Coded Tel. 706; Inc.: 130.09/2313/11

Herzog comments on Harman's cable reporting on the meeting with Dillon.[1] In spite of disappointment in the matter of the missiles, it appears that there is progress from the viewpoint of America's involvement in Israel's problems of rearmament, from both the political and the financial aspects. He suggests the following line of action:

(1) We should press for receipt of the approved list of electronics within a week, and then request a meeting of experts from both sides and attempt to turn this into a routine forum for discussions on arms acquisition in general.

(2) When the list has been received, talks should begin with the Department of State on ways and means of financing the electronic items; the market price of Israel's list is more than $20m.

(3) In view of what Dillon had said, draft proposals should be submitted for the approval of the Department of the Treasury on which they should base their claims for payment for the electronics and other items of equipment.

(4) The Administration should be requested to hasten the processing of the remaining items on Israel's list.

(5) Israel's friends should be recruited to help in the matter of the missiles,

but not before receipt of the approved electronics list and progress in the matter of financing.

Herzog remarks that Y. Prihar, the military attaché, received the impression during his talks in the Pentagon that Dillon was telling the truth about the availability of the Hawk missiles, namely, that all production would be reserved for the U.S. forces until 1962. Our pressure should aim at persuading the Americans to divert some of the production to Israel. In the meantime the question of alternatives to the Hawk and Nike should be enquired into; later on, perhaps, it would be advisable for the Prime Minister to approach Herter on the basis of his promises, in particular if further intelligence is received on the supply of the MIG-19 to Egypt. Herzog also proposes to take advantage of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's stay in the U.S. and find out through Herter if Britain would be prepared to sell Bloodhound missiles to Israel; if the answer is in the negative, or if Herter refuses to approach the British on this matter, there will be more force behind Israel's demand that the Administration approve Israel's list of requirements *in toto.*

Notes

1. See No. 145.
2. See Introduction, p. XIX.
3. The reply to this telegram has not been found.

147. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 April 1960

Coded Tel. 718; Inc.: 130.09/2313/11

Herzog reports on his meeting with Assistant Secretary of State L. Jones, Erell of the embassy and Hart and Hamilton of the Department of State being also present.

Herzog expressed his appreciation of the positive reply received regarding the electronic items, and asked when the approved list would be ready. He also requested that the Pentagon quote rock-bottom prices so that the problem of financing be easier to solve. Jones replied that he had been reproached by the Pentagon people for having promised that the list would be ready within a week, they claiming that Israel's list included the latest and most complex equipment which would require more time for study and for a detailed reply. Jones told them that he had mentioned a week or ten days, which should suffice for preparing at least the list of items capable of immediate delivery.

Jones promised to talk with the Pentagon about the prices. Herzog emphasized the financial aspect and said that Israel was appreciative of Dillon's promise of massive financial aid for the purchase of arms in general and for the electronic items in particular; Israel viewed this undertaking as an integral part of the Americans' approval of the arms deal. Israel could not possibly shoulder the financial burden of rearmament. Jones then said that as far as the electronic equipment was concerned, the financial aspect was "built in".

Herzog told the Americans that the Bloodhound missile was found unsuitable for Israel's needs. Israel considered Herter's promise to Ben-Gurion as binding, but appreciated that supply of the whole quantity was a matter of availability; the request therefore was for immediate delivery of a limited number of Hawk missiles from current production, the balance to be supplied later. Jones said he would bring this request up for discussion but he personally could not go beyond what Dillon had said. He added that producing the Hawk "was the devil" and that current scientific developments had to be incorporated in the product which complicated the process. In what concerned training there were also difficulties from the availability and the complexity aspects. Herzog replied that he understood that no training facilities could be found at the moment for an Israeli crew, therefore his request was that a number of Israeli experts be attached to the American crews so that they could start by getting their bearings. Jones replied that so far only some of their NATO allies had been included in the training courses, but he would bring Israel's request up for discussion.

Herzog remarks that in his opinion Israel's representatives should in future address the Hawk issue as a solemn promise made by Herter to Ben-Gurion and continue pressuring the Americans even if the answer takes a long time to arrive. He reverts to what Dillon had said about their reviewing the situation if the Egyptians are supplied with the MIG-19.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 145.
3. Untraced.

148. M. Erell (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador to the United States. 27 April 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/17

Erell reports on his meetings of April 25th wih Hamilton and Meyer of the Department of State, on the subject of Israel's purchase of arms.

Hamilton said that the matter of the missiles was not on the agenda, and Dillon's statement on this subject should be taken as a rejection of Israel's request.[1]

As to the electronic equipment, the Department had approached the Pentagon asking them to expedite the preparation of the list and were answered, with some annoyance, that they should not be pressured because they were already working at full speed and the list would be ready as soon as possible; the processing was very complicated and had to take into account many factors. Hamilton thinks that Israel will obtain most of the items asked for, and that the Pentagon was devoting its best efforts to the subject.

In his talk with Meyer, Erell proposed that the latter also meet the Israeli military attaché who wished to explain a certain proposal in the matter of the missiles, namely, that Israel be supplied immediately with a minimum number of missiles so that crews could be trained in their operation; in an emergency, more missiles could be supplied as necessary and they could then be put into immediate use. Meyer replied that in principle he had no objection to hearing the attaché's proposal, but he could not go beyond what Dillon had decided and he could see no prospect of the decision's being changed. He then explained again the difficulties in acceding to Israel's request on the missiles. Ultimately, Meyer agreed to the military attaché's maintaining contact with the Pentagon on this subject, on condition that he did not raise subjects outside the framework of the present discussion.

Meyer repeated what Hamilton had said on the electronic equipment and added that this must come out of current production at the expense of less urgent needs of the Pentagon's. This was an additional reason for the delay in supply. When asked by Erell whether the Pentagon had any estimate as to the time needed for the preparation of the list of approved items, Meyer answered in the negative. Meyer had no objection to Erell's suggestion that the military attaché receive more professional explanations from the Pentagon, so that he in turn could explain the background to the delays.

Erell raised the financial question and said he assumed that the prices quoted would be those applicable to war surplus material. Meyer replied that most of the equipment was new and up-to-date and could not be considered war surplus, but the Army would quote the price paid to the manufacturers and this would result in considerable saving. Erell then said that the financing of the transaction would have to be discussed with Dillon.

Note

1. See No. 144.

149. United States Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 1 May 1960

Coded Tel. TNW84; Inc.: 130.09/2313/1

The Division reminds the Embassy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' stand on publicizing the approval of the loan for the Central Water Conduit, namely, that there should not be clandestine relations with the U.S. on matters touching Israel's development. The Administration's agreement should be obtained to publication by Israel of an official statement on the DLF loan for the Conduit, to the effect that "it constituted a part of the national water project". However, Israel could not deny, if asked at the press conference, that this segment would in due course be integrated in the scheme of utilizing the Jordan waters for irrigation in the south of the country.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 143 and n. 2 there.
3. See No. 115 and n. 8 there.

150. Editorial Note

Picketing of the Cleopatra; the Senate Debate on the Foreign Aid bill.

During April and May 1960, Israel's name was linked with two American internal issues: picketing of the Egyptian ship *Cleopatra* in the port of New York, and the debate in the Senate on the ratification of the Foreign Aid Bill for the financial year 1961. Both these issues eventuated against the background of the struggle for free passage through the Suez Canal (see Chapter 3).

On April 13th 1960, several days after the ship *Astypalea* had been compelled to discharge her cargo after being denied passage through the Suez Canal (*ibid.*), the seamen's and stevedores' unions prevented the unloading

of the Egyptian ship *Cleopatra* which had berthed in the port of New York. Pickets stationed by the unions distributed leaflets saying that the boycott policy of the Egyptian government threatened the livelihood of American seamen; the Department of State was enjoined to act for the restoration of the freedom of navigation; the American navy was enjoined to refrain from refuelling in ports where a "black list" was in operation. A further demand was the halting of American aid in the shape of food surpluses to countries using the boycott weapon for political reasons.

P. Hall, president of the Seamen's Union, announced that the members of his union were involved in a "genuine labour dispute" because many of them had lost their jobs as a result of the Arab boycott; the aim of the strike was to demonstrate that the Administration was only paying lip service to the principle of freedom of navigation. The matter was brought to court, but the judge accepted the strikers' claim that this was a genuine labour dispute and refused to issue an injunction against them.

The U.A.R. appealed for help to the federation of Arab labour organizations, which on April 22nd decided to declare a counter-boycott of American ships berthing in Arab ports. The effectiveness of this counter-boycott was never tested, because the American ships were diverted to other ports.

The situation embarrassed the Administration, which feared for its good relations with the Arab countries, and with the U.A.R. in particular. Following an approach by the U.A.R. ambassador in Washington, the Department of State published a statement expressing understanding of the seamen's stand but stressing that "an effort by a private group to apply pressure publicly with a view of bringing about shifts in the policies of foreign governments is, of course, embarrassing to the conduct of our government's foreign relations and may have unfortunate consequences". President Eisenhower also stated on April 27th at a press conference that the U.S. had done everything to demonstrate that it would honour its obligations, in particular in what concerned free use of the Suez Canal, but it had no intention of solving international problems by the use of force.

The Department of State and the Department of Labor pressured the leadership of the American Federation of Labor AFL–CIO, to which the seamen's union belonged, to call off the boycott; an agreement was reached on May 6th involving an exchange of Notes between the parties (for full text of the Notes see Israel Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram WNT74, 7.5.1960, 130.09/2313/2). The Note addressed to Chairman George Meany of the AFL–CIO stresses American support of the principles of free navigation and its opposition to discrimination in international commerce against American companies, ships and citizens. The U.S. does not recognize the Arab boycott of Israel and will make every effort both within and without the framework of the U.N. to advance the

solution of the Arab–Israeli conflict — which is the background to the Arab boycott of Israel ... (the Administration) will consult with the leadership of the AFL–CIO on future developments and undertakes to study the seamen's union's complaints and to renew its efforts to assure freedom of navigation.

Though the strike was presented as action in defence of American interests, public opinion in the States saw it as part and parcel of Israel's campaign for freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal.

A debate was held in the Senate on April 28th 1960 before the second reading of the Foreign Aid Bill for the financial year 1961. A group of 18 senators, who wished to teach the U.A.R. a lesson because of the restraints it had put on free passage through the Suez Canal, proposed an amendment to the bill recommending the withholding of aid from a country conducting economic warfare against another country enjoying American aid. The President would be empowered to act on this amendment. The amendment, known by the names of its proponents — Senators Douglas and Keating — met with vehement opposition on the part of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, who wanted to save the Administration another embarrassment on the lines of the *Cleopatra* affair. He therefore proposed an amendment to the amendment, to the effect that the Douglas–Keating amendment would not operate in the case of conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations and in which the adoption of a stance by the United States could be interpreted as a contravention of its neutrality. In arguing for his proposition, he violently attacked the Jewish community in the United States, as well as colleagues in the Senate who had supported the Douglas–Keating amendment, and the seamen who had picketed the *Cleopatra*. He claimed, *inter alia*, that amendment would not achieve anything except conciliation of minority groups, would not assist in terminating the Arab boycott, would support the communist contention that the U.S. stipulated its aid on political commitments, and would incense the Arabs and motivate them to retaliate against American shipping.

Before the final reading which took place on May 2nd, Fulbright asked the Department of State's opinion on the Douglas–Keating amendment. In reply (*FRUS*, 1958–1960, pp. 315–318), Acting Secretary Dillon said that the amendment would not achieve its aim and would have a deleterious effect on American interests in the Middle East. It would be interpreted as favouring Israel, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to relieve the tension between Israel and the Arab states; it would also obstruct the attempts to achieve political commitments in return for economic aid, which in turn will make it still harder to terminate the Arab boycott — thus playing into the hands of the Soviets who are interested in keeping the Middle East on the boil.

The Douglas–Keating amendment was ultimately ratified by 45 votes to

39. As a result, Fulbright did not table his amendment or another amendment he had planned: a call for the speedy implementation of Article 11 of the U.N. resolution of December 1948 concerning the Palestinian refugees.

The Douglas–Keating amendment was of purely declarative importance, as no President ever exercised his power to make it operative.

151. A. Harman (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 May 1960

Coded Tel. NWT275; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Harman thinks that Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in his speech during the debate on the Foreign Aid Bill,[1] was moved by his anger at the submission of the Douglas–Keating amendment and at the *Cleopatra* affair, both of which he laid at the door of Israel's friends in the United States. Being aware of Israel's vulnerability in the matter of the refugees, he proposed an amendment supporting the refugees' right of return to Israel, and another amendment emasculating the Douglas–Keating amendment.

Douglas, when consulted, agreed that it would be difficult to act directly against Fulbright's amendment as it enjoyed the support of many in the Senate; the best way would be to weaken it by adding an opening sentence: "As part of an overall peace settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict and of an agreed resettlement, a reasonable number of refugees who wish to return etc.". There is no assurance that a majority would support such an addition, but efforts must be made in that direction. In any case, at least the words "As part of an overall peace settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict," must be fought for.[2]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. In the event, Fulbright did not put his amendment on the refugees to the vote — see *ibid.*

152. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 May 1960

Coded Tel. 753; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Harman refers to the stand taken by the Ministry on the publicity to be given the American loan for the Central Water Conduit.[1] He stresses that Israel's main interest is to obtain the loan and with it, in effect, American involvement in the Jordan–Negev Water Carrier scheme. The embassy is therefore of the opinion that the application to the Development Loan Fund should expressly state that the Central Conduit is part of the Jordan–Negev scheme. Added to the Note received by Israel in January,[2] confirming that Israel's plans are compatible with the Johnston plan, this would constitute diplomatic recognition of the legitimacy of Israel's plans and the beginning of practical aid for their implementation — and this, after all, is the main point. Israel does not yet have the money, and even when the loan agreement is finally signed it will not be immediately publicized. The problem of publication in the press is first and foremost an American one: if they decide to refrain from publication, then so should Israel; if they do publish, they will most probably try to play down the connection between the Central Conduit and the Jordan-Negev Carrier, and Israel should follow suit.

Notes

1. No. 149.
2. See No. 115.
3. No. 115.
4. Untraced.

153. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 May 1960

Coded Tel. 759; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Harman analyses Dillon's letter to Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, giving the Department of State's opinion on the implications of the Douglas–Keating amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill.[1] He thinks special attention should be paid to a number of statements in the letter, which he divides into three categories: (1) Favourable to Israel:

(a) The statement that the U.S. supports freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, prevention of trade restrictions, and termination of the Arab boycott.

(b) The paragraph on Israel's economic development, stating that the Foreign Aid programme helped but was only "partly responsible" for it, and that the whole credit should be given to the Israeli people.

(c) The emphasis on continued American aid to Israel.

(d) The statement that the U.S. was also acting in the Middle East in Israel's interests.

(2) Points which could be considered as an objective expression of the Department's assessments:

(a) Economic aid should not be made conditional on political commitments.

(b) There is no way of influencing the Arabs through economic coercion.

(c) A situation has arisen which forces Asian and African states to choose between Israel and the Arabs.

(3) Points unfavourable to Israel:

(a) Fears of the U.S. appearing as discriminating in Israel's favour to the detriment of the Arab states.

(b) Ascribing the *Cleopatra* affair to Israeli interests.

(c) Belittling the influence of the Arab boycott on American interests.

(d) Putting the Suez issue in the context of the whole complex of problems arising from the Palestine conflict, and emphasizing that the refugee problem is also part of this complex.

(e) A sarcastic remark on the extent of financial aid so far received by Israel.

Harman considers the letter to be an expression of intense personal exasperation deriving from several causes:

(a) Dillon is convinced that he had lately made a number of decisions in Israel's favour on issues of a vital nature.

(b) Dillon was present at all of Ben-Gurion's meetings in the United States, at which the Suez issue was never raised; and now suddenly it is the cause of the *Cleopatra* affair and of the trouble in the Senate. Dillon sees Israel as responsible for these affairs — and this has blown up right in the middle of negotiation with him on two subjects declared by Israel to be of vital importance: purchase of arms and the loan for the Central Conduit.

(c) Dillon may be apprehensive of Israel's wishing to exploit the fact that 1960 is an election year.

Harman points to Dillon's personal importance and the importance of matters in his care, and recommends that the Israeli press be advised to refrain from criticizing him. Annoyance and anger should be directed at Fulbright. Israel should create an atmosphere conducive to placating both Fulbright and Dillon. It is enough that Israel's friends in the Senate have managed to dissuade Fulbright from submitting his amendment on the refugees —

this is a clear asset for Israel. If we want to conciliate Fulbright and Dillon, we must also prevent Malter from submitting his amendment, which could arouse against us not only the hostility of Dillon but that of Secretary of the Treasury Anderson.

Harman remarks that one lesson for Israel from the whole affair is that public opinion in the States is not like a faucet, which you can turn on and off. If Israel creates the impression that the Suez issue is of vital importance, then action may be initiated at the wrong time from the point of view of issues which are still more important. A good example is the Malter amendment which was submitted without prior consultation with Israel.

Harman repeats his conviction that the atmosphere should be cleared to enable progress in the two issues vital to Israel. The *Cleopatra* affair may have opposite effects. There is apparently some sort of agreement between the Department of State and the U.A.R. to refrain from acts which could aggravate the situation and turn it into a conflict between the two states. Though the picketing of the ship was represented by the seamen as being in defence of American interests, public opinion regards it as a chapter in Israel's battle for freedom of navigation. As long as the affair remains in the public eye, Israel will be facing the following dangers:

(a) Nasser is the winner on both fronts: he has declared a boycott of American shipping, and the U.S. keeps sending him the food surpluses.

(b) The Department of State is incensed at Israel in spite of its protestations of innocence in the *Cleopatra* affair.

Harman concludes by saying that the embassy is nevertheless maintaining its contacts with the Department of State and the Pentagon on both the vital issues as if nothing had happened.

Notes

1. On the debate in the Senate on the Douglas–Keating amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill — see Editorial Note, No. 150.
2. See *ibid.*
3. Which was election year in the United States.
4. Reference is to Representative A. Malter's draft amendment, proposing that countries conducting economic warfare against other countries should be ineligible for loans from the International Development Association. This was opposed by the Administration, and Secretary of the Treasury Anderson wrote to the House of Representatives to the effect that aid forthcoming from the United States should be free of any stipulations.
5. Senator Albert Gore's draft amendment was intended to restrict the number of refugees eligible for aid from UNRWA. It also called on the President of the United States to include in his recommendations to Congress touching the Foreign Aid Bill,

specific recommendations on the plans for the gradual rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees; it also called for a reduction in America's allocation to UNRWA. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI744, 28.4.1960, 130.09/2313/12.)

6. The joint draft of the Foreign Aid Bill was ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 12th, 1960. The final version said that the lists of the Palestinian refugees should be brought up to date as soon as possible, so as to ensure that only *bona fide* refugees whose needs and eligibility have been certified would receive aid from UNRWA. Also, when the President has to decide on whether to allocate American money to UNRWA, he will take into consideration the intensity of its endeavours and of those of the host countries and the measure of their success in bringing the lists of the refugees up to date. The President will have to report to Congress next year on the progress made in the revision of the lists of the refugees, their repatriation and resettlement. (See *Congressional Record*, Senate, May 12, 1960, p. 9424.)
7. See n. 5 above.
8. American ships transporting surplus food to the U.A.R. discharged their cargoes in Italian ports where the food was loaded on non-American ships for the final stage of its journey; the purpose of this arrangement was not to put to the test the resolution of the Arab labour unions to boycott American shipping (see Editorial Note, No. 150).
9. A leader in the *New York Times* of May 2nd argued that the picketing of the *Cleopatra* was a mistake. At the same time, the paper opposed the amendment to the Douglas–Keating amendment proposed by Senator Fulbright.
10. The matter remains obscure.

154. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 May 1960

Coded Tel. 763; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Herzog reports on his talk with Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration L.W. Henderson, who raised the *Cleopatra* issue,[1] accusing the seamen's union of attempting to conduct the country's foreign policy against the Administration's line. He pointed to the public's lack of support for the union's action, and expressed the opinion that Israel's public image had suffered. To Herzog's question, whether he was satisfied that Israel had no hand in the boycott, he replied in the affirmative. He criticized Nasser and his counter-boycott against American shipping. In his opinion, Nasser was attempting to demonstrate to the public in the United States and elsewhere to what extent friendship with Israel could lead to complications with the Arab world.

Henderson concluded by asking Herzog what in his opinion the Department of State should do in the matter of the seamen's boycott. Herzog replied that

as a representative of Israel he was not empowered to give advice in matters unconnected with his country; however, as he had been asked, he would venture to remark that if the Department of State retreated without having Nasser give up his "blacklisting", Nasser's standing in the Middle East would greatly improve, with all that this implied for the security of the region's nations and the standing of the West, and the U.S. would appear helpless against a blackmailing dictator who in fact had no real power. Is it possible that the U.S. cannot use political and economic means to persuade Nasser to retreat from his blacklisting policy? Henderson mumbled that something indeed should be done but it was not clear what.

The subject was mentioned again in a talk with Senator Bridges, who promised Herzog, after hearing his explanations, to raise it with Dillon and persuade him of the necessity of pressuring for concessions on Nasser's side, and to convince him that Israel was not involved in the debate in the Senate nor in the *Cleopatra* affair.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, No. 150.
2. See No. 153 and n. 8 there.

155. Ch. Yahil and M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 6 May 1960

Coded Tel. TNW94; Outg.: 130.09/2313/1

In a discussion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the *Cleopatra* case, the conclusion was reached that the main achievement was in the labour movement's lining up behind the seamen's union. This reinforced the claim that a labour dispute was involved here, and not a "Zionist plot".

At the same time, the rope should not be stretched too tight. The Ministry therefore agrees with the line adopted in his talks by Herzog, namely, that the Department of State should also be interested in liquidating the dispute in a way which would not appear as giving in to Nasser's blackmail.

It was important to avoid giving the impression that Israel had been involved in the dispute. Instructions in this spirit have been sent to the missions abroad.[2] The Ministry agrees with Harman's analysis of Dillon's letter and is acting to restrain the local press. The embassy is also requested to moderate the tone of the reports sent in by Israeli journalists in the United States.

Notes

1. See Nos 153 and 154.
2. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegram to the missions abroad (telegram 353, 10.5.1960, 130.09/2378/3), instructing them to act through dependable agents only and to ensure that the mission is not identified as the initiator of the action.
3. The report said that Dillon's letter to Humphrey was an example of the methods of indirect pressure employed by the Department of State in its attempt to influence public opinion and to conciliate the Arabs.
4. See No. 153, the end of paragraph (c).
5. See No. 156, paragraph 6.

156. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 May 1960

Coded Tel. 771; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Harman does not share the Ministry's positive assessment of the results of the *Cleopatra* affair and the debate in the Senate.[1] He lists a number of adverse results:

(a) It has been most clearly demonstrated to Nasser that the U.S. did not intend to employ public means of pressure to advance the cause of peace with Israel.

(b) The importance the U.S. attached to formal relations with the U.A.R. has been brought out. This is an invitation to Nasser to raise the price of these relations, and it may be assumed that the extent of American aid to the U.A.R. will grow very soon.

(c) It has become apparent that the international labour movement cannot be brought to take active steps against the U.A.R.

(d) Most serious of all — until now the U.S. government was entitled to assume that Israel's policy versus the Arab world was that of "wait and see". In the course of the last two years, Israel had approached the U.S. on two Middle Eastern problems: the danger of Nasserism to the Arab peoples, and the danger of Soviet infiltration of the region. Israel did not evince any initiative in the sphere of its relations with the Arab states, and in the matter of the Suez blockade it only reacted to Nasser's actions. Israel never demanded of the Department of State to force a showdown and made it clear that it did not consider freedom of passage a *casus belli*. During the last year Israel was in contact with the Department of State on the subjects of economic and military aid; as to Israel–Arab relations, there was a certain proposal regarding a summit meeting.[4] All this should have led the Department of

State to conclude that Israel's position — which agreed with its own — was that the situation with regard to Arab–Israel relations should be left as it is, and that the main efforts should aim at Israel's economic development and the strengthening of its defence, on the one hand, and on the other hand at halting the spread of Nasserism in the Arab world and Soviet infiltration of the Middle East. Now the Senate and the *Cleopatra* affairs have changed the situation. The calm on the Israel–Arab front has been disrupted and the world is again in a tumult over this issue. Last year Nasser failed twice in his attempts to strengthen his position in the Arab world by using two issues connected with Israel – the Jordan waters and the Palestinian entity. Now he has been given another lever which will work for his success. He appears as a hero in the Arab world and also among the neutralists, because he has shown that he can flout both America and the Soviets and come out the winner.

On the remark by the Ministry that the rope should not be stretched too tight, Harman comments that the rope has already been stretched. The impression has been created that Israel played for a showdown on an issue connected with the Arab states, and now the danger exists that others will follow suit and force a showdown on the issue of the refugees.[7] The Arabs justified their actions on the Canal issue by the problem of the refugees, and they were successful, as appears from Dillon's letter to Fulbright. Harman draws the Ministry's attention to the fact that the Department of State was in fact of the opinion that the subject of Israel–Arab relations should be shelved, except for the problem of the refugees. Now this trend will intensify.

Harman stresses that Israel must clarify its objectives. If the prospect of an early Israel–Arab settlement is envisaged, action should be taken immediately, but only through negotiations and not through noisy publicity. Everything should be done to prevent the refugee issue from flaring up again, and he thinks this will be possible if Israel announces that it is prepared to negotiate on compensation for the refugees. Additionally: Israel's problems should be taken out of the context of the American electoral campaign.

Harman sums up by saying that Israel's policy since 1957 was to shelve the Israel–Arab issue. This policy proved advantageous. There has been a certain retreat in the matter of the Suez Canal, but at the same time there was considerable progress in aid to Israel. Further positive developments may be expected, and when the anger is forgotten the demonstrations of friendship for Israel in the Senate and the House of Representatives will be remembered, and this may be of importance in the future.

Notes

1. No. 155.

2. On April 7th, 1960, the Federation of Swedish Transport Workers decided to boycott U.A.R. shipping; this decision, however, was revoked on April 20th, the explanation being that no Scandinavian ships had been affected by the Arab boycott since the *Inge Toft* case.
3. On April 27th, 1960, the Canadian Seamen's Union picketed the Egyptian ship *Star of Aswan* in the port of Montreal, but the Canadian Stevedores' Union broke through the picketing lines and unloaded the ship's cargo, explaining that it sympathized with Israel but had to honour its obligations.
4. See No. 135.
5. See Chapter 5.
6. The Douglas–Keating amendment — see Editorial Note, No. 150.
7. In a televised interview on April 24th Nasser said that Israel would be allowed to transport cargoes through the Suez Canal only after it had implemented the United Nations' resolution on the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees to their homes. He added that he did not consider the impounding of Israeli cargoes to be illegal, because they constituted part of the property of which Israel had robbed the refugees. (*Ha'aretz*, 25.4.1960.)
8. Reference is presumably to No. 142.
9. See No. 153 nd n. 4 there.
10. See No. 155, paragraph 5.
11. The loan granted to the U.A.R. by the World Bank in December 1959 for the widening of the Suez Canal.

157. H. Perry (Washington) to A. Harman (Washington). 13 May 1960

Notes

1. See No. 115.
2. Manor's letter to Perry of May 17th, 1960 (in File 130.02/6451/4), confirming the letter in question, said that they were waiting for the draft of the loan agreement. No such draft has been found.
3. The signing took place on June 30th, 1960. In his telegram RI9599 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 30.6.1960, in File 130.02/6451/4, Harman said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was then on a visit to the United States, decided that Israel would not publish nor leak the matter of the loan.

158. M. Erell (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington.[1] 13 May 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/17

Erell reports to Harman on his meeting of 12th May with Meyer of the Department of State, which was a continuation of the meeting held on April 25th.[2]

Erell briefed Meyer on the problem of the defence of Israel's airfields against low-flying planes, and said that only the missiles requested by Israel could prevent a decisive blow against the Israeli air force; these missiles also had a deterrent effect on Arab aggression.

Erell added that inquiries at the Pentagon have elicited the fact that the problem of the defence of Israel's airfields and its need for missiles had not been properly understood in the first stage of the contacts on military aid. From what Israel's military attaché has been able to find out in the Pentagon, it would appear that the situation in respect of the missiles, regarding both supply and training, was not that of "all or nothing"; it may be possible to start with something, but this should be discussed with the Department of State. They were also told at the Pentagon that Germany will be producing these missiles in two years' time, and perhaps this source of supply could also be considered.

Erell requested the Department of State to authorize, as soon as possible, practical talks between Israel and the Pentagon on the start of training and supply, on the assumption that if modest beginnings are made immediately, the complement could come later.

Meyer replied that he had to find out what could be done. What Harman had been told by Dillon in the matter of the missiles had been based on information from the Pentagon, and therefore they had discontinued discussing the question. He did not oppose further talks with the Pentagon by the military attaché on this subject, but the Department of State had already adopted the position transmitted to Israel. No progress could be made without a new decision — he would find out and let Erell know.

Meyer inquired about the possibility of obtaining the missiles elsewhere, and Erell replied in the negative.

Erell concluded by asking how the matter of electronic equipment was progressing, and Meyer replied that it was moving on and that the Department's answer to Israel would be given within two or three weeks.

Erell stresses the undesirability of the Department of State's reviewing its stand on the missiles solely on the basis of his talk with Meyer, and suggests that further efforts at pressure and persuasion be made at a higher level.

Notes

1. Copies sent also to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister and the Military Attaché in Washington.
2. See No. 148.

159. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 May 1960

Coded Tel. 853; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Harman reports having received a reply from Jones[1] to Israel's Note of February 9th on the arms purchase.[2] The reply includes detailed proposals for the supply of the electronic items, embracing most of Israel's requests in this field, and also defines the attitude of the U.S. to the question of financing. Harman remarks that he had already dispatched to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a few of his thoughts on this subject,[3] but the matter requires consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on her expected arrival in the United States,[4] and also with the Minister of Finance, on financial matters.

Notes

1. Untraced, but see the cited document in *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XXIII, No. 148, n. 2. The document shows that electronic equipment for $10m was offered in the Note to Israel, but the missiles were not mentioned at all.
2. See Nos. 128 and 129.
3. See his letter to G. Meir of May 25th (130.23/3294/17), saying that the Note received by Israel was the beginning of a process, and not its end. The immediate question was whether to base oneself on the list of electronics in order to turn it into the beginning of the process. The decisive consideration should be not the list of electronics *per se*, but its tactical influence on the more fateful matters, that is, financial aid for Israel's arms procurement and the issue of the missiles.
4. G. Meir arrived in the United States in June, and met Secretary of State Herter on the 28th of that month — see No. 166.

160. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 May 1960

Coded Tel. RI868; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Erell reports on a talk with Meyer of the Department of State on the subject of the arms purchase. Meyer said that the package offered to Israel included sophisticated and effective equipment not possessed by all of America's allies. This equipment constitutes a tremendous advance in comparison with what Israel had received in the past. With this package Israel will be getting electronic know-how which will advance it greatly in this vital field.

Meyer also said that the last paragraph in the Department's letter[3] reflected a sincere desire to help Israel overcome economic difficulties arising out of its defence needs.

Notes

1. See M. Erell to the Ambassador in Washington, 27.5.1960, 130.23/3294/17.
2. Untraced.
3. See No. 159.

161. J. Herzog (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 May 1960

Coded Tel. 867; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Herzog reports on his meeting with Jones. The latter opened by asking what was Israel's impression of the American Note on the supply of arms.[3] Herzog replied that their response in the matter of the electronic equipment was appreciated, but that Israel was greatly disappointed by their attitude in general. He said that during Ben-Gurion's visit four subjects had been discussed: (1) the missiles, (2) the electronic equipment, (3) the list of armaments in Israel's Note, (4) the financing problem.

On (1) and (2) the Prime Minister had received an explicit commitment from Herter. On (3) a favourable approach was promised, while (4) was to have been studied together with Israel. Now, two-and-a-half months later, the U.S. has not retreated from its promise on (1) but does not appear to be willing to implement it at this stage, in spite of the urgency of the matter. As to (3), from the first reading of their Note the impression is created that everything is being denied to Israel except for the electronics, and even there the list is not complete. Their Note does indeed mention (4), but vaguely and without referring to ways and means of implementation.

Jones said that as the meeting was unofficial, he could speak frankly. How did Israel imagine the U.S. being able to retreat from its official policy and

become Israel's main supplier of arms? If it did so, it would disrupt its relations with the Arab world in one go and "put all its eggs in one basket". When Herzog pressed for an answer whether that meant a refusal on all the items except for the electronics, Jones said this was the wrong interpretation and they were still studying the list, but he wanted Israel to know that there were no prospects of the main items being authorized. As to the problem of financing, Israel must understand that many countries were purchasing arms from the U.S. and they all wanted financial help. There is also a delicate internal issue of the objectives marked out by Congress for the disbursal of the foreign aid. That was why they phrased their Note to imply that Israel's request for financial aid was connected with the general problem of its economic development and not with its request for aid for the purchase of arms. He then asked what course was Israel thinking of taking, and Herzog replied that a number of ideas were being considered, and what did Jones think of rescheduling? He suggested that Israel could submit a number of proposals to the Department of State and leave the final decision to them.

Herzog reverted to the subject of the electronics and raised the financial problem. Jones said that the financial year was about to close and the Department of State could not make any commitments as to the future, when the payment for the electronics became due. Herzog said that in order to convince Israel of their good will and to create a precedent for the coming years, it would be necessary for them to inform Israel immediately that they were prepared to give one million dollars from the Contingency Fund to cover part of the debt for the coming year. This sum would form a precedent in respect of aid from this fund and also a precedent for the payment of the cost of the electronics in the coming years. Jones said he would recommend this step to Dillon.

Herzog said he wished to summarize the talk as follows:

(1) The Hawk remains under review. Jones did not reply but nodded in the affirmative.

(2) Israel will have to consider the reply in the American Note as referring to the electronic equipment, while the remaining items are still being studied; there are prospects of receiving additional recoilless guns and other items. Jones confirmed that.

(3) On the indirect financial aid to enable Israel to pay for its purchases in other countries — the U.S. is prepared to help and Israel is to submit concrete proposals. Jones confirmed that.

(4) Concerning the electronics, Jones will try to have Dillon authorize an immediate nominal sum from the Contingency Fund, as a precedent for the future. Jones confirmed that.

Jones stressed again that what he had said should not be considered an official statement and it should not be referred to in the future. Herzog replied

that he also was only expressing attitudes and had not agreed to discuss the arms issue officially at this meeting. However, he hoped that Jones would not oppose his words being transmitted to Ambassador Harman in order to clarify future negotiations. Jones agreed. When he said he would talk with Dillon on the electronics, he remarked, as if incidentally, that in the wake of the *Cleopatra* issue and other affairs (he presumably meant the debate in the Senate)[6] he was concerned about Nasser's having discovered the weapon of a counter-boycott against the U.S. Herzog replied appropriately.

In the light of his talk with Jones and other meetings, Herzog summarizes the situation as follows:

(1) It is of no use to discuss the issue of the missiles with the people of the Near East Division in the Department of State. This matter should be taken up at the highest level.

(2) Proposals on the financing, should be submitted without delay to Dillon, as they will soon claim that they were powerless to act because of the approaching elections.

(3) An answer to Israel's list of requirements should be insisted upon.

(4) The electronic equipment should be acquired not only because of its importance for defence, but also because of the political aspect, that is, widening America's commitment to Israel's security.

Notes

1. No. 159.
2. Untraced.
3. See No. 159 and n. 1 there.
4. See Nos. 128 and 129.
5. These guns were shown in the Independence Day parade on May 2nd — see also No. 173.
6. See Editorial Note, No. 150.
7. See No. 160. Prihar's telegram untraced.

162. G. Meir (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 June 1960

Coded Tel. 893; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

The Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests that the Prime Minister send a message to Secretary of State Herter on Israel's application for arms. The message should arrive immediately in advance of her meeting with Herter.[1]

Harman and Manor have requested a meeting with Dillon to submit concrete proposals on the financing problem.[2] In her opinion, if no decision on this subject is taken this month, it will have to be delayed until after the presidential elections.

Concerning the electronics, the Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests that the American offer be accepted if it really includes up-to-date equipment which would add important know-how to Israel. The Department of State has already referred Israel's military attaché [3] to the Pentagon to receive the necessary details on the equipment. The following advantages will accrue from the deal:

(1) Important equipment will be obtained, including know-how and training.

(2) Israel's relations with the Pentagon will be strengthened.

(3) Israel's acceptance of the American proposal will commit the latter to continued involvement in Israel's problems of security.

(4) The fact that Israel has been able to obtain such equipment will strengthen its position in other arms supplying countries.

Mrs. Meir suggests that the Americans not be informed now of Israel's decision but that this be deferred until the Secretary of State has received the Prime Minister's message and has met with Mrs. Meir.

Notes

1. See No. 166.
2. See No. 165.
3. Aluf-Mishne Yehuda Prihar, the Military Attaché in the Embassy in Washington.
4. Ben-Gurion was planning to leave for France, Belgium and Holland in June 1960.
5. See No. 159 and n. 1 there.
6. See No. 137.
7. The letter to Herter has not been found. For Herter's reply, see No. 141.
8. See n. 5 above.
9. See Nos. 128 and 129.
10. The final text of the Note, dated June 9th, is filed under 130.23/3294/17.

163. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 10 June 1960

Coded Tel. TNW137; Outg.: 130.23/3294/17

On the Prime Minister's instructions, Yahil wishes to draw the attention of the

Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Ambassador Harman to the assessment by the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff that the Department of State's reply in the matter of the electronic equipment is much less satisfactory than it appeared to Israel's representatives in Washington.[3] A final opinion can be given only after the receipt of full particulars of the equipment, and of an explanation in what ways the U.S. can help Israel in financing the acquisition, such as economic aid, special funds, etc.

Notes

1. No. 162.
2. Untraced.
3. See No. 159 and n. 3 there.

164. M. Erell (Washington) to G. Avner. 15 June 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/17

Erell reports on a round of consultations, with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the form in which to submit the request for economic aid from the U.S. for the purchase of the military materiel required by Israel.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs decided that the request should be submitted orally, because a written appeal would have to include complicated calculations which could serve the Americans as a basis for lengthy discussions and investigations, and lead to all kinds of conclusions. This letter by Erell therefore replaces a written document, and can also serve for raising the matter with the American Ambassador to Israel.

Israel's argument is that if arms cannot be obtained from the U.S., they will have to be bought elsewhere. If the starting-point of the Department of State is that Israel should not be given arms nor the wherewithal to buy arms, but may be given economic aid which will solve its problems indirectly, then Israel will be facing a dollar deficit, a problem which will need an immediate remedy. In the years 1955–1960 Israel expended an average of $36m a year on arms from abroad, and this was only part of the general defence burden, in dollars and in local currency. These $36m were not enough, and the Ministry of Defence had, in April 1960, debts for acquisitions beyond its allocation of $65m. Israel cannot make up this deficit without causing great damage to its development and to investment, without which it cannot attain economic independence. Moreover, during the coming two or three years Israel's defence needs to be paid for in foreign currency will amount

to $300m to $310m, including the main items in the list submitted to the Americans — this is an enormous sum which cannot possibly be borne by Israel's economy. Israel is the only country whose security is threatened by arms of Soviet manufacture, and which is not receiving any direct aid.

Israel therefore proposes that it be allocated $20m from the Contingency Fund and another $40m–$50m from the Development Loan Fund. Most of this amount can be given as a loan to the Institute for Industry and Agricultural Development, while according to Israel the utmost possible freedom in its use — namely, that it be freed as far as possible from the proviso that it be spent in the United States.

Note

1. See No. 165.

165. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 June 1960

Coded Tel. WNT104; Inc.: 130.09/2313/2

Harman reports on his meeting with Dillon, to whom he submitted Israel's request for financial aid for the purchase of arms.[1] The information in his possession showed that Israel's deficit in foreign currency for the purchase of arms amounted to some $65m to $70m. In order to cover this deficit, Israel requested a grant and special assistance from the Contingency Fund, and also a loan of $40m to $50m from the Development Loan Fund; this last should be given to the Institute for Industry and Agricultural Development, and should be freed as far as possible for use outside the U.S.

In his reply, Dillon stressed the desire of the U.S. to come to Israel's aid, but pointed out that no monies were available in the Contingency Fund and in the Special Aid Fund until the end of the financial year. Israel has been allotted $5m as special aid for the next financial year. The Administration is now fighting an amendment which would deny aid from the Contingency Fund to countries in receipt of military or special aid. Dillon hopes they will be able to defeat this amendment, and then it will be possible to talk of a grant from the Contingency Fund. There will be ample money in the Development Loan Fund and Israel will be able to receive more than in the past, but he had no great hopes of free use of this money.

Harman raised the subject of credit and payment in Israeli currency for

acquisitions in the United States. Dillon replied that it was indeed possible to extend a ten-year credit against payment in local currency. However loans for a period of more than three years did not revert at payment to the defense budget but to the Treasury, while credit for payment in local currency raised a political difficulty as it was equivalent to military aid. Nevertheless, he did not entirely exclude such a possibility, and also remarked that the conditions for a three-year loan could be made flexible.

Harman concluded by mentioning the issue of the missiles, stressing how vital it was for Israel to have at least a commitment for a certain date in the future. Dillon promised to transmit this remark to Herter before his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 164.
2. See No. 166.

166. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 June 1960

Draft Tel.; Inc.: 130.23/3294/3

Harman reports on G. Meir's meeting with Secretary of State, Herter. Present were also Dillon, Jones, Meyer and Hamilton, and Harman and Manor.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs opened by stressing two points in Ben-Gurion's message to Herter: the supply of missiles, and the financial aspect.[2] She said that the problem of aerial defence was central to Israel's concern, therefore, even if the missile is not available immediately, she would like to have a date on which it could be supplied, and also that Israeli crews be enabled to train in its operation.

Herter replied that the subject remained under their constant consideration, but at this stage they could not say anything definite. What he could now say was that Israel's request had not been rejected. They could not tell when the missile would become available. As to training — there were no vacancies in the courses.

The Minister could not move Herter from his position; when she reminded him that Ben-Gurion had left him greatly encouraged, and that the main thing he wanted could be obtained only in the U.S., Herter replied that what he had said to the Prime Minister were generalities, and these were moreover conditional on objective factors, such as availability. He added that their

policy on offensive weapons was to have Israel make efforts to obtain them from other sources, while they would supply Israel with purely defensive weapons. The missile lay somewhere in between, and this made for another difficulty.

As to the financial aspect, Dillon repeated what he had said about the Development Loan Fund, and agreed with Israel that this source could not solve the entire problem. He said he intended to propose to the new Administration, after the elections, that it request Congress to allow the DLF more flexibility, on the model of the Export and Import Bank. If this idea is adopted, it would make it easier for them to help Israel in the coming financial year. In the meantime he promised help within the framework of the DLF, and the Israelis reminded him that they were about to submit applications.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 514.
2. See No. 162.
3. In his speech in Alexandria on June 25th, after his return from a visit to Yugoslavia and Greece, Nasser called Ben-Gurion "a war criminal pretending to be as gentle as a lamb, and plotting evil schemes with the imperialist powers against the Arab people". He also attacked "the treacherous Arab leaders who will never be able to face their nations, and their fate will be like Nuri Sa'id's and King Abdallah's". (*Davar*, 26.6.1960.)
4. A complete record of the conversation is found in File 130.23/3294/17. See also No. 171.

167. A. Harman (Washington) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 29 June 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Harman summarizes what had been said in the Prime Minister's message to the Secretary of State,[2] at Harman's meeting with Dillon, and at the Minister of Foreign Affairs' meeting with Herter.[3] He adds that, after the last meeting, he saw Secretary of the Treasury Anderson to inform him of the reply received on the missiles. Anderson said that the Department of State had indeed explained to him why it would be difficult to name the date for the supply of the missiles to Israel, but he was also told that the matter remained under constant and serious consideration. Harman raised the problem of training courses for the Israeli crews, and said he wanted to discuss it with

John N. Irwin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs. Anderson encouraged him to do so, and even said he would himself talk with Irwin.

The meeting with Irwin took place on June 29th, with the participation of Aluf-Mishne Y. Prihar, the Military Attaché, and Colonel Harding of the U.S. Army. In reply to Harman's arguments, Irwin said that Israel's requests had been considered from two aspects: first, the problem of availability, and the second — that they did not wish to initiate an arms race in the Middle East. The supply of missiles to Israel might be followed by the supply of ground-to-ground missiles to the U.A.R., and they had no defence against those. Therefore, their decision at this stage was not to supply the missiles to Israel.

Harman remarks that Irwin's words did not contradict what Herter, Dillon and Anderson had said. Irwin was right in talking about the two aspects for consideration, while the others limited themselves to mentioning availability only, so as not to confront Israel with a direct refusal. They greatly appreciated Israel's ability to defend itself, and they thought that in supplying Israel with electronic equipment they were arming it with sufficient power of deterrence. However, if new armaments were introduced into the region and the balance of arms were disturbed, they would reconsider their decision; in any case, they assumed that Israel would have enough time to make the missiles operational. As long as the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. did not introduce a new factor into the arms balance, they did not wish to be the first to do so.

Harman adds that he had said to Irwin that it was the Egyptians who had introduced new categories of weapons into the region, starting with submarines and ending with jet planes. Prihar added that they had lately introduced rockets with a range of 10,000 yards. Harman stressed that Israel's power of deterrence would disappear within two or three years unless something was done to preserve it. This is why Israel had decided to purchase arms, in spite of the economic burden involved. If Israel cannot rely on obtaining defensive missiles within a certain period of time, this will affect all its planning. Israel is also concerned about the general political atmosphere, following the failure of the summit meeting,[10] and in view of Nasser's aggressive stance.

Prihar clarified Israel's attitude in the matter of the training courses. An entirely new field was involved here, and this is why Israel wished to discuss the possibilities of training in stages so that at least the first steps could be taken now. Irwin said they would study the issue, and that Israel's request was reasonable and understandable under the circumstances described. However, their assessment of Israel's power of deterrence was different, and thought it would also serve Israel well in 1962 and 1963. At the moment he could add nothing to what had been said.

Harman replied that Ben-Gurion had returned from the United States encouraged by what he had been promised, and this had become the basis for Israel's planning for defence; and now he, Harman, is being told that this assumption is void, which would require those responsible for Israel's security to start their planning anew. As to Irwin's remark on Israel's power of deterrence, the problem facing Israel is entirely different from what Irwin imagines it to be. The danger to Israel is that it might overestimate its own defensive capacities. The main worry is the U.A.R.'s concentration on improving its military power. The problem of training for operation of the missiles is fundamental against this background, and it will affect the planning for defence for the near future.

Irwin said he understood the seriousness of the issue for Israel, but he could not offer hopes of a reconsideration of the problem, including the matter of the training courses.

In a later talk between Aluf-Mishne Prihar and Colonel Harding, the latter said that Israel had exhausted all the possibilities of discussing the issue in the Department of Defense.

Harman thinks the next step should be for the Prime Minister to summon the American ambassador to Israel for a talk.[11]

As to the financial aspect, Harman remarks that this is an election year in the United States and Congress could allot more money for foreign aid; in this case, Israel could demand its share from the Department of State.

In conclusion, there are prospects of the DLF getting more money in the new financial year, and then the aid to Israel could increase. Manor is about to leave for home, and it is important that he bring back with him realistic plans for the disbursement of $60m, which would be submitted to the DLF by the end of July.

Notes

1. Copies sent also to the Prime Minister, the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United States Division.
2. See No. 162.
3. See No. 166.
4. See No. 165.
5. No record of or report on this meeting has been found.
6. Secretary of the Treasury Anderson — no record of or report on this conversation has been found.
7. See No. 136, paragraph 9.
8. One sentence has been omitted here.
9. One paragraph has been omitted here.
10. On March 15th, 1960, following the debates at the 14th Session of the U.N. General

Assembly (September–December 1959), the conference opened of the ten states elected to discuss the subject of disarmament — five states from the Western and five from the Eastern bloc. The two sides could not come to an agreement, and the representatives of the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, walked out of the conference on June 27th. See also No. 116 and n. 5 there.

11. See No. 180.

168. United States Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 1 July 1960

Coded Tel. 180; Outg.: 130.02/6451/4

Ogden Reid, the American Ambassador to Israel, has informed the Division that the agreement on the American loan for the Central Water Conduit has been signed. He added that the Department of State wished to extend the policy of secrecy indefinitely because of the sensitivity of the subject in the present Middle Eastern context.[2] The Ambassador was told that this was impractical as far as Israel was concerned: the press has been aware for over a year now of the discussions with the U.S. on the subject of water, and they keep asking questions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry has been able to keep the matter secret so far, but there is no assurance that it could go on doing so or that it could prevent leakage to the press. It would be preferable therefore for a controlled communiqué to be released now. Reid promised to convey Israel's concern to the Department of State. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends that the Minister, who is now staying in the United States, be consulted on this matter, as, apart from the practical aspect of keeping the matter secret there is also the political aspect — should Israel keep a loan for development purposes secret?

Notes

1. In this telegram, the Embassy was requested to consider giving publicity to the loan for the "Central Israel Water Conduit", in view of the pressure being exerted by the press (30.6.1960, 130.02/6451/4).
2. The conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League, due to meet in August.

169. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 July 1960

Coded Tel. 962; Inc.: 130.02/6451/4

Harman replies to the Ministry's telegram on the subject of the loan for the Central Conduit,[1] arguing that Israel would gain nothing from the publication of the matter, and that the Embassy wished to gain time. If the news of the loan is released before the August session of the Arab League it could become the central subject at the conference.[2] Moreover, Israel has been boasting to the Americans that it could keep a secret (in connection with the arms acquisition deal).

Notes

1. No. 168.
2. The matter of the American loan was not put on the agenda of the conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League, which convened in August 1960.
3. The military aid.

170. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 July 1960

Coded Tel. WNT113; Inc.: 130.09/2313/2

Erell reports on his meeting with Meyer of the Department of State on the subject of the missiles, as a sequel to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' talk with Herter and Dillon.[2]

Meyer said they were having great difficulties coping with the issue of the missiles, and hinted that they had also been approached on the matter by the Secretary of the Treasury, whom Mrs. Meir had met. He said that they also had to reply to the Prime Minister's message,[4] and their difficulties arose from their wish to convince Israel that the door was not closed and there was no rejection or denial of the understanding reached by Ben-Gurion with Herter, or indifference to Israel's problems. They are discussing and looking for a way to find "some give" in their position. As proof of their sincerity, they have decided to advance Israel two stages in their security classification which determines which countries are eligible to receive what sort of electronic equipment.

Erell said he could not see how they could convince Israel that there was

no refusal and retreat from their promises in the matter of the missiles, as long as no concrete expression was given to what Meyer calls an "open mind" or "open door", — and indeed, if the door is open, why is Israel not allowed to study the equipment in a general way and to learn what preparations should and must be done to enable its future integration in Israel's deployment. Meyer then asked what would be Israel's response if such an approach were adopted by them, with the proviso that it must not be interpreted as an undertaking to supply the missiles in the future. Erell replied that if such a condition were laid down Israel's representatives would continue arguing with them. Meyer added that there were also problems of security in connection with the missiles and the training in their use. Erell proposed a further meeting, with the participation of the military attaché, to clarify in detail what can be done in stages. After some hesitation, Meyer agreed to that.[5]

Notes

1. See M. Erell to G. Avner, 11.7.1960, 130.23/3294/17.
2. See No. 166.
3. See No. 167.
4. See No. 162.
5. In a second telegram, Erell reported that Prihar had given Meyer "a technical conception of the preliminary practical steps in the matter of the missiles", but the latter "caught the intention and said that we were trying to get a foot in through the back door. He argued that the election year was in the way, and let slip the remark that after the elections it would be possible to do what we were proposing." (See Erell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI979, 12.7.1960, 130.23/2313/12.)

171. M. Gazit (Washington) to G. Avner. 11 July 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/3

Gazit reports on his talk with the American ambassador to Israel, Ogden Reid, at the latter's leave-taking visit before departing for Washington.[1]

Reid stressed that the reply given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Secretary of State[2] constituted a flat refusal, and he repeated this several times. Gazit comments that this brings him to suspect that the report on the Herter–Meir talk, as related to the U.S. Embassy in Israel,[3] was more negative than should have been expected from what had been actually said at the Washington meeting.

Notes

1. See Nos 172 and 180.
2. See No. 166.
3. See Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 27.6.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 341–2 (No. 155).

172. G. Meir (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 July 1960

Coded Tel. X329; Inc.: 130.09/2334/14

The Minister of Foreign Affairs addresses her telegram to Yahil, and suggests that the Prime Minister summon Reid and express to him Israel's disappointment at the rejection of Israel's request in the matter of the Hawk missiles. Israel understands that the missiles cannot be obtained now, but it is glad that at the meeting of Meir and Herter[1] the answer "no" had not been heard, even if the answer "yes" was not given. What Israel cannot understand is why Israeli crews could not be trained now in the operation of the missiles. Meir adds that it is of importance for Reid to be impressed by the Prime Minister's disappointment after he had been given to understand that the answer would be favourable. She stresses that the matter is urgent and requests Yahil to report on what is being done.[2]

Meir also informs Yahil that General Klein has returned and that he is about to intervene in the matter.

Notes

1. See No. 166.
2. See No. 180.

173. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner.[1] 12 July 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

In connection with the Administration's request that Israel prevent publicity being given to the loan about to be granted for the implementation of the water plans,[2] Harman raises the possibility of imposing censorship on the press in this and similar matters.[3]

In his opinion, the main consideration should be America's willingness to aid Israel in matters at issue between it and the Arab countries — but only if strict secrecy is preserved. These subjects include security, water and immigration.

There have been several cases of this character lately: (1) The loan for the Central Water Conduit, authorized only after Israel had proposed a new approach which enabled the plan to be represented — if it were disclosed — as the utilization of local water resources unconnected with the Jordan scheme. (2) The affair of the recoilless guns, when their appearance in the Independence Day parade[4] had led to a refusal for further acquisition from the U.S. (3) America's refusal to intervene in the case of the transit of immigrants from Romania through Greece.[5] (4) America's decision to give economic and financial aid to Israel which would relieve some of the burden of defence, in preference to direct military financial aid.

If it becomes known that the U.S. is aiding Israel in implementation of its Jordan scheme, the Arabs could react in various ways, such as by heating up the Israel–Syria border, and by protests being made by the U.A.R. — which in turn could force the U.S. to extend economic aid to the Arabs and to stress the fact that the Central Water Conduit plan has no connection whatever with the Jordan scheme.

Harman does not think that Israel would gain anything by giving publicity to the loan for the Conduit. He recognizes the Israelis' touchiness when it comes to censorship, but as a state of war exists between Israel and its neighbours, it is only natural that all means, including censorship, be utilized in the country's defence. He cannot see that the issue can be evaded in the case of the Conduit; but if imposing a blackout on this item of news is impossible, then it should be agreed with the Department of State that the loan be represented as entirely unconnected with the Jordan scheme, and that heavy pressure be applied on the press to present the matter likewise.

Notes

1. Copy sent also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Meir and A. Manor.
2. Manor cabled that *Ma'ariv* was in possession of the information about the loan for the Central Conduit, and that only their utmost efforts prevented publication of the news. Efforts were continuing to prevent publication at least till the session of the Arab League was over, but the Department of State should be informed that the matter could not be kept a secret much longer. (See telegram IR186, 8.7.1960, 130.02/6451/4.)
3. See No. 175.
4. See No. 145. These guns were shown in the Independence Day parade in Haifa on May 2nd, 1960. Harman complained that the media had given the guns too much

prominence, and that he had not been informed beforehand of the intention to exhibit them in the parade. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI760, 3.5.1960, 130.23/3294/3.)

5. See No. 542.

174. G. Avner (Jerusalem) to A. Harman. 15 July 1960

Copy: 130.02/6451/4

In answer to Harman's letter on the loan from the DLF,[1] Avner informs him that the subject will be raised with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on her return to Israel. The issue is complex. It would need special legislation by the Knesset or a supplementary clause in the agreement between the Prime Minister and the press, on the subjects liable to censorship. There is no problem in regard to arms purchase, because it is already included in the agreement with the journalists. The agreement allows the publication of items published previously abroad, unless they are very sensitive from the security aspect. Avner thinks it possible to explain to the Americans in the meantime the objective difficulties in preventing publication of the loan and Israel's efforts to overcome these difficulties.

Notes

1. No. 173.
2. See *ibid.*, n. 4.
3. A report in *Ha'aretz* of 15.7.1960 said that important progress had been made lately in the talks between the United States and Israel on the development projects, and in particular on the agricultural development plans, including irrigation projects and also the national irrigation plan.

175 M. Erell (Washington) to G. Avner. 20 July 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Erell reports on his meeting with Meyer about the publication of the Central Conduit loan.[1] Meyer understands that it is impossible to impose a permanent blackout on this subject, and he discussed with Erell how to minimize the harm if the deal were disclosed. He would wish publication to be postponed at least until after the meeting of the Arab League,[3] and he assumes Israel can promise that. Subsequently, Israel should present the loan to the press as a second or third loan for the development of irrigation works, without connecting it with the Jordan scheme.

Meyer asked whether it would be profitable to make a further attempt to come to an agreement with the Arabs, whether through Johnston or in any other way. He foresees a crisis when Israel starts to pump water from the Kinneret, and perhaps the time has come to make a serious attempt at an overall settlement. Erell replied that he had to consult on this and to think it over and he would let Meyer know. At first glance, however, he thinks that it would be better to defer new initiatives until there is greater progress in the implementation of the water schemes, both in Israel and in Jordan.

Notes

1. This talk took place further to the conversation between Erell and Meyer of July 15th, when they had agreed to meet again after Meyer had said that he was aware of the impossibility of ensuring a total news blackout forever. (See Erell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17.7.1960, 130.02/6451/4.)
2. See No. 174.
3. See No. 169 and n. 2 there.

176. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 20 July 1960

Coded Tel. RI999; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Harman informs the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the situation regarding the supply of the Hawk missiles to Israel:

(1) The Department of State feels bound to reply to the Prime Minister's message[1] and they are now discussing the draft of the reply.

(2) They feel a certain amount of guilt for having made the promise to the Prime Minister.

(3) Against this background one can see some indications of a shift from their previous position on training for the Israeli crews.

(4) Pressure has been exerted on the Department of State by Anderson and by Julius Klein.

(5) In view of the above Reid, and also Williams, should be made aware of the Prime Minister's deep disappointment and this impression should be clearly conveyed to the Department of State.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 162.
2. Secretary of the Treasury Anderson.
3. Major-General (retd.) Julius Klein, Chairman of the Association of Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America.
4. See No. 180.
5. Murat W. Williams, a Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Israel.

177. G. Avner (Jerusalem) to A. Harman. 22 July 1960

Copy: 130.02/6451/4

Avner has spoken with the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the publication blackout on the Central Conduit loan. The Minister thinks that censorship in Israel cannot be extended to additional subjects. The present regulations cover the subjects of immigration and purchase of arms. Harman should therefore explain to the Americans the limitations of censorship in Israel regarding civilian matters. She agrees that Israel has nothing to gain from the publication of the said item, but ultimately it must be disclosed; this should be explained to the Department of State, while stressing the efforts made so far to prevent publication.[2] There are two options here: either a jointly drafted communiqué is published by the two governments, in which the connection between the loan and the national water scheme may be mentioned or not, — or no initiative is taken and then there will ultimately be an uncontrolled disclosure.

Ambassador Reid has been importuning Finance Minister Sapir to prevent publication, and the latter has promised not to let anything leak from his office. However, Avner remarks, this does not solve anything because there are other sources of possible leakage. He therefore repeats his suggestion of a joint communiqué being published as soon as possible.

Notes

1. No. 173.
2. See No. 178.

178. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner. 26 July 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Harman proposes the following line on the publication of the Central Conduit loan: (1) Efforts should continue to prevent publication until after the session of the Arab League, that is till the beginning of September. (2) The problem has been brought to the attention of the Department of State and further action awaits instructions from Israel.[1]

Note

1. Avner replied that this proposal had been approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see his letter to Harman, 29.7.1960, 130.02/6451/4).

179. M. Gazit (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 July 1960

Coded Tel. RI27; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is informed that, as instructed by Ambassador Harman, Gazit raised the issue of the missiles with Hart, of the Department of State. The latter said their reply was in the negative on both the Hawk missiles themselves and the training in the interim period. In his opinion, they had fulfilled their promise to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give the matter their sympathetic consideration and they studied it thoroughly and in detail. Hart repeated the known arguments on America's desire not to be the first supplier of missiles to the Middle East. He mentioned the limitation of availability and stressed the revolutionary character of the equipment in general. At first he evaded the question about help in the interim period, that is until the equipment could be supplied, but later he answered in the negative.

Gazit adds that Hart said he thought that, generally speaking, there was an improvement in the atmosphere in the region, and he did not believe that

Nasser was planning to attack Israel. The U.A.R.'s last deployments were of a defensive nature, or were definitely motivated by defensive considerations.[1]

Note

1. For a full report of the conversation, see Gazit's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23.7.1960, 130.23/3294/3.

180. G. Avner (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 29 July 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Harman had requested details of the Prime Minister's talk with Ambassador Reid.[1] Avner now informs him that the conversation had taken place privately, thus very few details were available. The Prime Minister later informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the gist of the talk, and said he had spoken to Reid very firmly; the latter had shown good will, and had doubtless conveyed to his superiors the Prime Minister's explanations of Israel's need of the missiles.[2]

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. For a full report of the conversation, see message from the U.S. Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 350–3 (No. 158).

181. M. Erell (Washington) to G. Avner. 1 August 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Erell raises the question of the publication of the American loan for the Central Conduit, referring to Avner's letter to Harman[1] and to himself.[2] Meyer of the Department of State told him how much he appreciated Israel's success in so far preventing publication of the fact of the loan. He understands the difference between matters touching security and other matters, and he can practically promise that if there is a leak, Israel will not be held responsible for it. Meyer would wish to maintain the blackout as long as possible, but

also to agree on a joint formula for publication if it turns out that the blackout cannot be maintained.

Erell assumes that the newspaper editors have agreed to the Prime Minister's request to keep the matter secret until after the session of the Arab League. As to the proposed edited version of the press release which would not mention the connection between the Central Conduit and the National Scheme, Erell questions its practicality because, after all, the newspaper editors know the truth and they will wish to publish all the details once permission is given.

Erell proposes the following: (1) to leak the item to the press at the end of August, in coordination with the Department of State; or, (2) to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs meet the press editors after the session of the Arab League, give them the expurgated version, and request them not to go beyond it.

Whatever is decided, the Department of State should be told that Israel will make efforts to prevent publication but cannot guarantee success.

Erell concludes by saying that he is certain Meyer will not feel the end of the world has come if he is informed that the version drafted by Israel will contain an indication of some future connection between the Central Conduit and more extensive irrigation schemes.[4]

Notes

1. No. 177.
2. Untraced.
3. No. 175.
4. No direct reply to this letter has been found, but see No. 186.

182. Ch. Herter (Washington) to D. Ben-Gurion. 4 August 1960

Notes

1. See No. 162.
2. See No. 159.
3. See No. 128.

183. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 August 1960

Coded Tel. RI88; Inc.: 130.09/2314/1

Harman informs the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Department of State has so far received only a short report on the Prime Minister's meeting with Ambassador Reid, who brought with him a letter from the Secretary of State.[1] Reid remarks in his telegram that the Prime Minister's reaction was "characterized by placidity". Harman requests details about this meeting.[2]

Notes

1. No. 182.
2. See No. 185.

184. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 August 1960

Coded Tel. RI86; Inc.: 130.02/6451/4

Harman proposes to Avner the following lines of action in respect of the publication of the loan for the Central Conduit:

(1) It should be made clear to the Department of State that Israel cannot prevent the publication after the conclusion of the Arab League's conference.

(2) The Department of State should be told that Israel's reply to possible questions by the journalists when the fact of the loan is made public, will be that the loan is of $15m for 20 years, at an interest of 3 1/2%, and that it is intended for agricultural development and irrigation. If the question is put whether these plans will connect with the National Water Scheme, the answer will be that the Central Conduit will connect with the National Carrier.

(3) The Department of State's reaction to that should be tested, and the DLF should be asked what answers it would give if similar questions were put to it.

Harman explains that the object of approaching the Department of State is twofold: (1) to prevent its replying to questions in a way unwelcome to Israel; (2) to make it clear that, while Israel will not initiate publication, neither will it initiate its prevention.[1]

Harman suggests that journalists be discouraged from publishing the item, and requests Avner's opinion by cable.[2]

Notes

1. G. Meir annotated this telegram in the margin :"They will publish it anyway."
2. See No. 186.

185. G. Avner (Jerusalem) to M. Gazit. 18 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Avner acknowledges with thanks receipt of the copy of Herter's letter to the Prime Minister dispatched by the hand of Ambassador Reid.[1] The conclusion from the message is clear: the U.S. will not be the first to introduce missiles into the Middle East. No further action is possible until Egypt receives the MIG-19, and Israel can then raise the question again. Even in that case the U.S. will not be the first to introduce missiles into the region.

Avner comments that America's policy on military aid was clear all the time, and it is also clear now after the message. It is more favourable than the line taken during 1953–1958. There has been a shift following the Iraqi coup, but the principles have not changed. A change, if it comes, will happen only after the new Administration is sworn in in 1961.

Note

1. See Nos 182 and 183.

186. G. Avner (Washington) to A. Harman. 19 August 1960

Copy: 130.02/6451/4

In answer to the Embassy's letter[1] and telegram[2] in the matter of the publication of the Central Conduit loan, Harman is informed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has adopted his suggestions as put forward in the letter. She has also agreed to the proposal made in the telegram, but with the following additions:

(1) Not only should there be coordination with the Department of State, but

also no American body should give the press a more informative answer than the one to be given by Israel. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has misgivings about the President's weekly press conference. Israel might then be put in a ridiculous situation. Avner does not share the Minister's fears, nor does he see what can be done to prevent such a situation from arising.

(2) The Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed Avner to coordinate the matter with the ministries of Finance and Agriculture, to prevent discrepancies between the various ministries.

Avner concludes by saying that Harman may approach the Americans in the spirit of her suggestions.

Notes

1. No. 181.
2. No. 184.

187. A. Harman (Washington) to G. Avner. 23 August 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/17

Harman transmits to Avner a copy of Secretary Herter's letter to the Prime Minister.[1] There was a consultation at the Embassy on the subject of the electronic equipment to be supplied by the Americans, with the participation of the Ambassador, Minister Ya'aqov Herzog, Military Attaché Arbel, and senior Army officers who had come to the United States, headed by Chief of General Staff Branch Yitzhak Rabin. Aluf Rabin undertook to write home and request that the relevant material, which had been transmitted to Israel by the military attaché, be thoroughly studied and the decision taken whether Israel was interested in acquiring the equipment. If the decision is in the affirmative, the Department of State should be contacted and arrangements made for the dispatch of Israeli experts to Washington to finalize the transaction.

Harman comments that the Americans consider equipment and training as parts of the same package. When the decision is not to sell the missiles, then training is not allowed either. When they decide to sell the electronics — training will be included in the deal. Obviously, if Israel decides to buy the electronic equipment it will lead to everyday contacts being established in the field of aerial defence between the experts on both sides, thus creating opportunities for presenting Israel's problems in that field on a professional level — an important thing in itself.

Regarding the Secretary of State's letter, the conclusions were as follows:

(1) Israel and the U.S. differ in their estimates of Nasser's intentions. As long as no new factor is introduced into the region, America does not wish to be the first to introduce missiles of any type whatever.

(2) The letter contains several favourable points. There is the expression of satisfaction at Israel's having been able to obtain tanks and airplanes from other sources, and the emphasis put on the advanced character and high quality of the electronic equipment which the U.S. is prepared to sell to Israel — stressing at the same time that this will be the largest ever transaction of its kind.

(3) As this is presidential election year, it would be pointless to attempt to change their position on the missiles at this stage. The next few months should be devoted to quiet lobbying on the subject of Israel's problems of aerial defence, and to bringing to the attention of the U.S. any new military factor appearing on the Middle Eastern scene. The U.S. and Israel should both concentrate on finding out whether the U.A.R. will indeed be getting the MIG-19 planes. Israel should draw the attention of the Americans to changes in the U.A.R.'s military efficiency.

Harman suggests that a decision be taken as to whether to reply to Secretary Herter's letter only after it has been decided to purchase the electronic equipment. In the affirmative case, it would be desirable for the Prime Minister to raise the problems of Israel's aerial defence in face of the U.A.R.'s growing military strength, to express his grave concern about possible developments in the near future, and to thank the U.S. for its consideration for Israel's economic problems — and especially for their good will in addressing Israel's requests in this field. It may perhaps be useful to stress Israel's readiness to halt the arms race in the Middle East, while pointing out that it was not begun by Israel.[5]

Notes

1. No. 182.
2. G. Meir annotated this paragraph in the margin: "I don't know of any letter or any description. To be discussed soon with Laskov". To this Meroz added: "The talk (with Laskov) took place on the 9th of this month".
3. The presidential elections in the United States were to be held on November 8th.
4. This paragraph was annotated in the margin, perhaps by G. Meir, with a question mark.
5. No reply to Herter's letter has been found, and it is not certain that such an answer had been sent at all.

188. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 September 1960

Coded Tel. RI166; Inc.: 130.09/2314/1

Erell reports on his meeting with Thatcher of the Department of State on the subject of the publication of the loan for the Central Water Conduit.[1] Their reply will be given in about a week's time,[2] when Meyer, who had dealt with this subject, returns from his vacation.

Thatcher said at the meeting that it would be very unfortunate if the fact of the loan is publicized before the Jordan crisis[3] blows over, and he firmly requested that Israel make every effort to prevent publication at this time.

Note

1. See No. 184.
2. See No. 191.
3. The murder of Jordan's Prime Minister al-Majali — see No. 29.

189. A. Harman (Washington) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 6 September 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/7

Harman reports on his meeting with Senator Kennedy, which took place at Arthur Goldberg's home and with his participation.

Harman thanked Kennedy for his speech at the congress of the American Zionists.[1] Kennedy referred with anger to an article in the *New York Times* on the Jewish vote in New York, which claimed that many Jews were cool towards Kennedy because of his father.[2]

Harman reviewed the situation in the Middle East, and stressed that the main factor disturbing the peace there was Nasser's subversive activity. When asked what sanctions the U.S. could employ against Nasser, Harman replied that he thought Nasser had, during the iast two years, lost his ability to manoeuvre between East and West. He is more interested in receiving aid from the West than the West should be interested in giving it, because Western aid gives him the only chance of attaining a position of power in the Arab world. The minimum price for that should be that he abandon his subversive activity against his neighbours, including Israel.

Kennedy said he would remember this, and requested Harman to keep in contact with him after the elections.

Goldberg pointed to how the Department of State had bungled in the *Cleopatra* affair,[5] and said that Dillon was the only one to show practical ability and a realistic approach, but he had been called in at a late stage.

Harman found the opportunity during the conversation to mention Israel's security problems, stressing that these were the main challenge facing Israel at the moment.

Notes

1. In his speech at the American Zionists' conference in August 1960, John Kennedy, the Democratic presidential candidate, praised Israel warmly. He said, *inter alia*, that the friendship towards Israel was non-partisan and that it was a national American commitment.
2. Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. Ambassador to Britain in the years 1937–1940, was said to have been tarred with the brush of antisemitism.
3. See No. 29.
4. See No. 142 and n. 9 there.
5. See Editorial Note, No. 150.

190. M. Gazit (Washington) to G. Rafael. 16 September 1960

Copy: 130.23/3294/3

Gazit reports on his meeting with Eilts of the Department of State, who told him that there had been a reorganization at the Department as a result of which the issue of the Arab refugees had been transferred to the Near East Division. Gazit comments that this was caused by the Department's coming to the conclusion that the subject should not be dealt with solely from the point of view of the U.N. and UNRWA but that it constituted a political problem to be dealt with by the appropriate regional division.

Eilts told Gazit that Congress was inclined to dissolve UNRWA because it has not succeeded in solving the problem of the refugees. He said: "You have influential friends on the Hill. You would be well advised to persuade them to change their position on the allocation to UNRWA".

The Department of State will have to appear before Congress in February 1961 to request its approval of the UNRWA budget. Eilts says that the Congressmen do not understand, or do not wish to understand, that UNRWA must be maintained even if there is no progress on the refugee problem in

the near future. On the contrary, this is exactly why it should receive its allocation. The Department of State is between the hammer and the anvil: Congress is the hammer, and the anvil is the necessity not to do anything which could disrupt stability in the Middle East.

Eilts said he regretted that the Palestine Conciliation Commission[2] had done nothing since the December 1959 resolution of the General Assembly,[3] Paragraph 4 of which calls on the Conciliation Commission to make further efforts to implement Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(III) of the General Assembly of 1948. Gazit asked why, if the Americans regretted its passivity, was the Commission not activated during the current year — and received no clear answer. Eilts surmises that France opposed the activation of the Commission, while Turkey was unenthusiastic and was concerned with its own affairs. The American representative had in any case opposed the 1959 resolution.

Gazit said he was surprised and sorry to hear that a mistake had been made in not activating the Commission. Israel was a loyal friend of the United States and it expected to be privy to its ideas concerning the refugee problem. He advised Eilts that Israel be consulted before steps were taken on this issue, and stressed that if the U.S. sprang a surprise on Israel and confronted it with an imposed solution, such a move would be doomed to failure.

Eilts said there were no differences of opinion between the U.S. and Israel on the ultimate goal, and it was only the ways of achieving it that were being disputed. They did not suppose that Israel could absorb all the refugees or a large number of them, but they thought that Israel should recognize their right of choice between returning to their former domiciles or staying where they were. He developed the theory that a majority of the refugees would not want to return, and promised that if there were a flood of those wishing to return in the context of an agreement, then the U.S. would stand by Israel's side to contain this flood. Eilts reminded Gazit that Ben-Gurion, during his stay in the States, expressed his readiness to have refugees return within the context of reunification of families.[4] It would perhaps be worth while, thought Eilts, to submit a plan based on this idea and thus avoid the principle of the right of return.[5]

Gazit said he was surprised at this approach. The refugee problem is a barrel of dynamite. Israel must not start on an experiment of this sort which could blow the whole thing up in our faces. Surely the Israel government's position is well known to Eilts: it is prepared to pay compensation to the refugees even without a general peace settlement, with the proviso that when it came to determining the sums to be paid Israel's counter-claims would have to be taken into account; one must also remember that the Arabs were maintaining a boycott on Israel. Eilts asked what was the connection between the boycott and the compensation, and Gazit reminded him of Nasser's

declaration that he would not open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping until the refugee problem is solved.[6] The connection between the two problems is not artificial and Nasser is well aware of it.

Gazit repeated his warning about an imposed solution. The refugee problem demands negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. Israel opposes mediation and considers the role of the powers to be to make available their good offices and bring the parties to the negotiation table.

Eilts returned to the UNRWA issue and said that this year they were obliged to give them their allocation partly in cash and partly in food surpluses. If Congress cuts down their allocation for next year they will be facing a crisis, and an increase in the food surpluses would not solve the problem. He also mentioned the problem of the population lists,[7] and said that the birth rate was higher than the mortality. UNRWA was making efforts to extend the vocational training scheme but their financial means were limited. When Gazit asked why Jordan's development plans were not being implemented, the reply was that he thought the delay was caused by budgetary considerations.

Gazit sums up the conversation as follows: Eilts was astonishingly frank, and therefore what he said must be used but not attributed to him. Gazit thinks that his argument that Israel must not be faced with an unexpected and imposed solution made an impression on Eilts. He seems to have an open mind and to be ready to consider new ideas. From what Eilts had said Gazit expects a difficult debate at the U.N. this year too. From Eilts's remark that the Conciliation Commission had not been activated it may be inferred that the Americans will try to give it a booster shot this year.[9]

Notes

1. See No. 99, n. 10.
2. Gazit's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WNT141, 15.9.1960, 130.09/2313/2, summarizes the report in this document.
3. See No. 100 (Appendix A).
4. In a talk with Vice-President Nixon on March 15th, 1960, Ben-Gurion said that when peace was achieved Israel would be prepared to admit a reasonable number of the Arab refugees wishing to settle in Israel. (See Memorandum of a conversation, Vice-President Nixon's residence, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 295–6 (No. 136).)
5. The document has been annotated in the margin, apparently by G. Avner: "This proposal was mentioned also by Lewis Jones".
6. See No. 156 and n. 7 there.
7. Since the 1950 census of the refugees, UNRWA was not able to bring the lists up to date as the refugees reported births but virtually no deaths, wishing to keep using the food ration cards of the deceased. The demand by the United Nations that UNRWA

conduct a new census was rejected by the Arab states hosting the refugees and by the refugees themselves.
8. The enclosure has not been traced.
9. See No. 99.

191. M. Erell (Washington) to G. Avner.[1] 28 September 1960

Orig.: 130.02/6451/4

Erell reports on an agreement with the Department of State on the publicity to be given to the DLF loan, to the effect that the press in Israel would be allowed to publish, without special emphasis, a short item that Israel, in continuation of similar loans received in the past, has this year been granted a loan of $15m for agricultural development and for the implementation of local irrigation plans. The press can print cautious comments saying that, in the natural course of events, these plans will be integrated in the future with the National Water Scheme, but the Jordan plan should not be mentioned. Israel will decide on the appropriate date for the publication.

Erell points out that already a month ago Congress was given a report on the aid activities in the passing year, and the loan for the Central Conduit was also mentioned. The report is classified, but the page on which the loan is mentioned is not. This could be a stratagem which would later enable the Department of State to claim, if necessary, that the matter of the loan was not veiled in any particular secrecy, and that in any case they did not conceal the facts from Congress.[2]

Notes

1. Copies sent also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Israel Ambassador in Washington.
2. In the exchange of telegrams following this letter, Meroz stressed in the Minister's name that Israel could not accept responsibility that the reports in the press would be identical to the American version. Erell replied that he had spoken about this to the Department of State and made it clear that Israel would make efforts to keep to the American version but could not promise complete success. (See Y. Meroz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram NWT448, 2.10.1960, 130.02/6451/4; Erell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WNT162, 6.10.1960, 130.09/2313/14.)

192. L. Eshkol (Washington) to C.D. Dillon (Washington). 17 October 1960

Notes

1. No report on this conversation has been found in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The summary prepared by the Embassy in Washington (undated, probably from 1961, in File 130.23/3294/7) states that Eshkol had stressed to Dillon the need to increase the economic aid to Israel in view of its heavy defence burden. Dillon appeared sympathetic in principle, but estimated that the chances were rather poor of obtaining aid from sources like food surpluses, Special Aid and the Contingency Fund. However, he thought the Development Loan Fund could be of help. (See also Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 20.9.1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, pp. 372–5 (No. 169).)
2. The World Bank. No report on this conversation has been found.
3. See No. 197.

193. Editorial Note

The Presidential Elections in the United States

Elections for the Presidency were held in the United States on November 8, 1960. The Republican candidate was Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, and the Democratic candidate was Senator John F. Kennedy.

The Democratic platform stated, *inter alia*, that, if the party won, the Administration would encourage direct peace talks between the Arab states and Israel, would promote the resettlement of the Arab refugees in those countries where they could be absorbed, would put an end to the Arab boycott and the blockade, and would act for the unfettered use of the Suez Canal by all countries.

The Republican platform stated that they would promote, in every possible way, solution of the issues between the Arab states and Israel, an equitable settlement of the refugee problem, termination of the limitations on free trade and passage, abolition of discrimination against Americans on the basis of religion, and progress towards peaceful relations which would render the arms race redundant.

Senator Kennedy was the winner by a small majority, and was sworn in on January 20, 1961.

194. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 November 1960

Coded Tel. RI263; Inc.: 130.09/2314/1

Harman addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General, Yahil. He suggests that the press be briefed on the American elections, as follows:

(1) The United States has again given a wonderful example of democracy in action.

(2) Questions of foreign policy were not an issue in the electoral campaign, which concentrated mainly on internal affairs.

(3) The American people demonstrated their faith in Kennedy and in the Democratic party and its economic plans.

(4) Kennedy insisted that the choice was between a progressive party and one that was more conservative, and asked the people to vote for the party which would make the country move forward.

(5) The voters would not have decided for Kennedy if they had not been convinced that he was a capable and dynamic person. He also succeeded in overcoming the hurdle of his Catholic faith. One can see him as a symbol of the new generation which has appeared on the American scene.

(6) All those who uphold religious tolerance will be greatly encouraged by the spectacle of the American people choosing a president regardless of his religious beliefs.

(7) Neither Israel or the Jews were an issue in the electoral campaign. Both parties included in their platforms clauses favourable to Israel.

(8) The United States has emerged from the electoral campaign fortified in its determination to fulfil its obligations.

Note

1. Reference is presumably to a leader in *Yedi'ot Aharonot* of August 12th, 1960, expressing concern over the possibility that Kennedy's election as president could lead to a policy of appeasement towards the Arabs, therefore Nixon's victory would be "an important guarantee for Israel's security". Nixon's press secretary later stated that this article had been published without Nixon's prior knowledge (*New York Times*, 15.8.1960). Some time later Harman cabled that Nixon's campaign headquarters issued a press release citing the article in *Yedi'ot Aharonot* and calling on Israel's citizens to influence their relatives in the U.S. to vote for Nixon. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT164, 11.10.1960, 130.09/2313/2.)

195. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to J. F. Kennedy. 11 November 1960

196. Ministry of Finance (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 27 November 1960

Coded Tel. TNW672; Outg.: 130.09/2313/1

The American ambassador to Israel has informed the Ministry of Finance that his Government had decided to terminate the technical aid to Israel as from June 1962, for purely objective reasons.[1] The Minister of Finance said that Israel accepted this decision, and expressed Israel's gratitude for the important aid which had been thus far extended to it in this field by the U.S.

The meeting dealt mainly with economic plans submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the Development Loan Fund and to the Export and Import Bank.[2] Ambassador Reid promised to do all in his power to help in this matter.

Notes

1. A joint statement by the United States and Israel, issued on November 29th, stated that both governments had reached this conclusion owing to the notable progress lately achieved by Israel in the field of technology, and because the U.S. government had to redirect its sources of technical aid to the more urgent needs of the new developing countries. (See *Ha'aretz*, 30.11.1960.)
2. See No. 197.

197. A. Salmon (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 9 December 1960

198. Editorial Note

The Atomic Reactor in Dimona

Ambassador Harman was summoned to Secretary of State Herter on December 9th. The latter said he had been informed by the American Embassy

in Tel Aviv that Israel was building an atomic reactor in the Negev. Herter expressed his government's concern in regard to this matter and asked for clarifications. Harman replied he would report to his Ministry and would transmit to the Secretary the information received.

199. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 20 December 1960

Coded Tel. IR442; Outg.: 130.09/2313/14

Yahil instructs Harman to request a meeting with the Secretary of State and inform him as follows:

(1) Israel is building an experimental atomic reactor in the Negev with a capacity of 24 megawatts.[1] The reactor is not intended for commercial operation and its size is governed by the use to which it will be put: the acquisition of scientific knowledge for peaceful purposes. The site near Beer Sheva was chosen in accordance with the government's policy of developing the Negev.

(2) The reactor will serve industry, agriculture, medicine and science, and will enable Israel to build its own nuclear power station some time in the future.

(3) Construction began a year ago, and the reactor will be operative within three or four years from now.

(4) The equipment and the raw materials have been obtained both locally and abroad. Israel has agreed not to divulge its sources of supply because of the Arab boycott.

(5) Though Israeli scientists have studied and trained abroad, in France in particular, the reactor is being built under the supervision of Israeli experts as part of Israel's efforts to train a body of scientists.

(6) The spokesman of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on December 19th that "the help extended by the French government in this matter concerns a heavy water and natural uranium experimental reactor, similar to that constructed in India with Canadian help. We shall do everything to ensure that it will be used for peaceful purposes only".

(7) When the reactor is completed, it will also be available to students from friendly countries. Harman is requested to respond to Herter's remarks of December 9th as follows:

(a) The reactor at Nahal Soreq is intended mainly for training. Israel recognizes the need for training a body of scientists for the industrial nuclear age, and it has been helped by friends in various countries.

(b) Estimates given of the Dimona reactor's cost are exaggerated. Israel estimates its cost at some $5m a year, apart from the usual auxiliary structures paid for in local currency.

(c) Israel accepts Herter's suggestion to stress, in its informative material, the peaceful purposes of the research to be carried out at the reactor.

(d) The American experts are mistaken in their estimates of the reactor's dimensions. Its capacity is 24 megawatts and not 100/300 megawatts. What has been described as a chimney is a water tower. The reactor is water-cooled and not air-cooled.

If Harman is asked about the possibility of visiting the site of the reactor, he should reply that he would have to receive instructions from his government. Harman is also to tell Herter that some of the information given to him will form part of a statement by the Prime Minister in the Knesset.[2]

Notes

1. In addition to the reactor at Nahal Soreq (Wadi Rubin).
2. Ben-Gurion's speech in the Knesset on December 21st was in the tenor of the explanations given in this document. (See *Divrey Haknesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), Second Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXX, p. 545.)

200. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 December 1960

Coded Tel. RI359; Inc.: 130.09/2314/1

Harman addresses his telegram to Yahil, and reports on his meeting with Secretary Herter,[1] with the participation of Jones and of Farely, the Department of State's adviser on atomic matters.[2]

Harman transmitted Yahil's message.[4] Herter asked about safeguards for disposal of the plutonium, as even a reactor of the size described by Israel produces this element. He reverted to this subject several times in the course of the meeting.

Harman said that Israel did not want to give the matter publicity at this stage as there was no urgency about it, the reactor being due to be completed only in several years' time. However, the Americans having approached Israel about this matter, and in view of the furore of the last few days,[5] the situation has changed and the Prime Minister will reply on the following day to a question in the Knesset on this subject. Herter said it was presumably too late for him to expect an answer to his query about the plutonium in the

Prime Minister's statement. Harman said it was indeed highly doubtful, but the Prime Minister intended to include in his statement several points which should have a calming effect.

The Secretary reverted to the matter of the safeguards, and said that the resolution on this subject adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission in Vienna,[6] which had also been supported by Israel, was connected with the atomic planning of India and other countries. Harman commented that India had opposed the resolution, but it was now building large installations similar to that of Israel's. He said he had requested that the meeting be kept confidential, but as an impression had been created that Israel was withholding information from the Department of State, he would like to issue a statement about the meeting. The Secretary said he regretted the furore created about the affair, and asked to be believed that he had not known anything and had learned about the whole matter from the press during his stay in Paris. They had been obliged to react to what had been said by the chairman of the American Atomic Energy Commission,[7] whose words the Secretary described as "unfortunate". After some discussion of the statement which the Embassy would wish to issue and professional questions on Farely's side, it was agreed that the Embassy would be in contact with Jones on the statement and with Farely on professional matters.

Secretary Herter requested that the information given to him also be supplied in writing, with additional clarifications touching the questions which had been asked, that is, the reactor's capacity, the matter of the power element, and plans for the disposal of the plutonium produced in the reactor.

Harman suggests that a paper be submitted in the spirit of their telegram and requests permission to do so, in order that Israel not be accused of refusing to answer the questions asked.

Notes

1. Secretary of State Christian Herter.
2. Philip J. Farely, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.
3. See Editorial Note, No. 198.
4. No. 199.
5. See *ibid.*, n. 2.
6. The International Agency for Atomic Energy, with its headquarters in Vienna. The Fourth General Conference of the Agency passed a resolution in September 1960, with 43 votes for and 19 against, ratifying the basic principles for a system of guarantees aimed at preventing the member countries from converting to military use materials and installations put under the Agency's supervision.
7. Reference is to a statement of December 18th by John A. McCone, Chairman of

the American Atomic Energy Commission, to the effect that the United States had unofficially checked with Israel information on developments in nuclear science. This information had been received only lately, because Israel's progress in this field had been kept secret. (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram RI339, 18.12.1960, 130.09/2314/1.)

8. See No. 199, paragraph (6).
9. The reply made it clear that reference had been to thermal megawatts (see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in Washington, IR448, 21.12.1960, 130.09/2313/14).

201. A. Harman (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 December 1960

Coded Tel. RI360; 130.09/2314/1

Harman comments on his meeting with the Secretary of State.[1]

(1) In his opinion, the Americans will draw serious conclusions from a refusal to be allowed to visit the site of the reactor.

(2) The subject of the safeguards and the plutonium is a central issue with the Americans and they will continue to press Israel in this matter. Their attitude is influenced by both Middle Eastern and global considerations.

(3) Harman points out that Herter had mentioned the Soviets as having accused America of being a silent partner in Israel's atomic development. That is why it had to be explained that there was no connection between the Nahal Rubin reactor and the one in the Negev. The Americans fear a situation in which pressures will be exerted on the Soviet Union to afford access to nuclear information to countries in its camp.

(4) In Harman's opinion, it is most important to emphasize that Israel's installation is being constructed by Israeli experts. This presents Israel as an independent force to be reckoned with.

(5) Harman does not think that the Department of State's reaction to the Prime Minister's statement will be such as to close the whole affair. The U.S. will continue to regard the issue as open, because they intend to exert more pressure on Israel in the matter of the plutonium and safeguards, and they also have some doubts about Israel's real intentions.[3] Harman thinks Israel's main tactics should lie in stressing the fact that the reactor will be completed only in three or four years' time, so production will not start before that and there will be plenty of time to solve the pertinent issues.

Notes

1. See No. 200.
2. The International Atomic Energy Agency.
3. The Department of State announced on December 22nd, 1960, as follows: "(It was) gratifying (to) note that, as made public, Israeli atomic energy program does not represent cause for special concern." (See Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RI377, 22.12.1960, 130.09/2314/1.) However, the *New York Times* stated on December 23rd that the Americans' apprehensions had not been dissipated, and the Department of State would not confirm that it was satisfied with Israel's assurances. It was feared that the panic which the affair caused in the Arab states might drive them into a defensive pact with the Soviet Union.
   The atomic issue was temporarily shelved owing to the change in the Administration, but it was raised again in President Kennedy's talk with Ben-Gurion on May 30th, 1961.

202. L. Savir (Jerusalem) to M. Fischer. 4 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

The Prime Minister saw Shinnar on January 1st, 1960, and received his report on what had been agreed on between him and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] The Prime Minister accepted what the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said about approaching the Germans again, with no threats and no playing at being offended. There should be no difference between the talks in the past and those planned for now except in the degree of determination. Shinnar should stress that Israel knows all the Germans' arguments against recognition and that it rejects them categorically. Shinnar should also meet important figures who support the establishment of relations. Israel's stand will depend on the results of the talks, but nothing will be done to harm Israel's interests.

Note

1. On the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Federal Republic of Germany — see Introduction, p. XXII.

203. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to M. Fischer. 11 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar met von Eckhardt before the latter's departure for the conference of press attachés of German missions in the Middle East. Von Eckhardt plans to visit the capitals of the countries in the region and also wishes to visit Israel. He asked Shinnar what would be the most suitable dates for the visit. Shinnar promised to obtain the information from Israel.

In connection with the antisemitic incidents,[1] von Eckhardt raised again the matter of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. He said that an extraneous reason must be found for this step, and suggested the fact that the reparations agreement was about to come to an end. Shinnar said he saw no point in looking for such a reason, and Germany must know that its doubts were causing political damage to Israel in that they were encouraging Nasser in his intransigence. Von Eckhardt replied that he understood Israel's position and admitted that Germany was in a quandary and that the time had come to put an end to such an unreasonable state of affairs. The two decided to meet again on von Eckhardt's return and to discuss his impressions.[3]

Notes

1. See Chapter 22.
2. In von Eckhardt's opinion, East Germany might have been involved in these incidents (see the mission in Cologne to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 778, 6.1.1960, 130.09/2355/2).
3. See No. 205 and No. 210, paragraph 5.

204. G. Rafael (Brussels) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 26 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

Rafael reverts to his conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris on the subject of the diplomatic relations with Germany, and wishes to summarize considerations and proposed lines of action. Notwithstanding all the doubts and apprehensions, there is apparently no dispute that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany will strengthen Israel's position. However, with all the importance of the matter, Israel must not humiliate itself by importuning Germany. The line should be to bring the

Germans to initiate the step, and he thinks that conditions have lately been created for the implementation of this aim.

These conditions are the outcome of the wave of antisemitism and neo-Nazism which has considerably weakened Germany's standing.[1] The German government is sensitive to this situation, particularly in view of the approaching summit conference.[2] Israel should exploit this situation, not by direct action, but with the help of the friendly press, friendly personalities who carry weight with Adenauer and also some governments which would recommend to Adenauer the establishment of relations with Israel. To ensure the success of this campaign, it is essential to continue focussing international attention on the neo-Nazi revival, to publicize the fact that ex-Nazis are functionaries of the present establishment, and to point to the asylum that active Nazis have found in the Arab countries.

To this end, Rafael proposes gaining the support of a number of important periodicals in the United States, France, Belgium and Britain, to try and recruit such people as McCloy, who is known to be one of Adenauer's close advisers, and perhaps a number of non-German personalities carrying weight with the Chancellor. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville should be contacted, or perhaps one of de Gaulle's advisers, suggesting that he point out to Adenauer, on his own initiative, the harm that is being done to Germany owing to the lack of relations with Israel. As a matter of course, the intervention should also be asked of all those influential persons in Germany itself, who are interested in the establishment of relations. All the above activity should be done without Israel's direct involvement. Rafael thinks that such a determined campaign could overcome Germany's hesitations and bring about the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.[4]

Notes

1. See Chapter 20.
2. The conference took place in Paris in May 1960, but it broke up with no results owing to the downing by the Soviets of the American reconnaissance plane U-2 on May 1st, 1960.
3. Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. For the Minister's response, see No. 209.

205. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to the Israel Mission in the German Federal Republic (Cologne). 2 February 1960

Coded Tel. 927; Outg.: 130.23/3309/19

Reuters reports that von Eckhardt said the following at a press conference in the Old City of Jerusalem:[1] "Nothing will connect Germany and Israel with the termination of the reparations agreement, except for limited economic relations. I can assure you that Germany will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel — Adenauer and von Brentano have emphasized this to me."

If this report is verified, a strong protest should be lodged by the Israel Representative against this statement which Israel considers of a hostile nature: it will strengthen the Arabs' anti-Israel feelings and cast a new light on Germany's attitude to Israel.

Note

1. See Nos. 203 and 206.

206. L. Savir (Jerusalem) to F.E. Shinnar (Cologne). 5 February 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/19

The news item about von Eckhardt's statement at the press conference originated with Reuters' correspondent in Amman.[1] A reliable source informs us that this man is unreliable and professionally incompetent, moreover his English leaves much to be desired. All this notwithstanding, the fact remains that von Eckhardt himself has not yet reacted to the news item, and must not be absolved of responsibility until he has corrected the impression made by the report. Savir encloses the reports on von Eckhardt's statement that have been available in Israel.[3] He is expecting a full report on the affair and on the official and parliamentary reactions.

Notes

1. See No. 205.
2. The sentence is garbled in the original but is reproduced here as written.
3. See No. 235.

207. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 9 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar reports on his meeting with Adenauer of February 8th.

Shinnar reminded Adenauer of his promise given at their previous meeting to establish diplomatic relations with Israel by the end of the year.[1] He pointed out that, in view of the statements made lately by von Brentano[3] in the Foreign Relations Committee and by von Eckhardt during his visit in Amman,[4] and the debate in the Bundestag scheduled for February 10th, there is a need for Adenauer to clarify the situation.

Adenauer replied that he would raise the question at the cabinet meeting on February 17th, and suggested that they meet again after that date. He added that the possibility existed that some people would object to recognition before the summit conference had taken place because of their fear that this might lead to more countries recognizing East Germany, might weaken Germany's position on that issue at the summit, and increase tension between Israel and the Arab states. He stressed that he himself was not a party to these apprehensions, but he was obliged to consult with his colleagues.

Shinnar made light of the Arab factor, saying that the Arabs would reconcile themselves to Germany's recognition of Israel because they were gaining so much from their relations with Germany. This step could also lead to a relaxation in tension, because it would make clear to Nasser that he could not dictate policies to other countries. He added that postponing recognition could nullify the lengthy process begun with the reparations agreement, and that public opinion the world over, both Jewish and non-Jewish, would not be able to understand such a postponement. He proposed that if the cabinet did indeed decide to postpone recognition till after the summit, an explicit written commitment be given to Israel to establish diplomatic relations not later than July 1st, 1960. Adenauer accepted this proposal on the spot, but said he hoped it would prove unnecessary.

Shinnar's impression was that Adenauer understood that this time he would have to give a concrete unequivocal reply. He estimates that Adenauer will request that the cabinet issue such a letter, and if the phrasing is clear and binding this solution should be accepted. Shinnar awaits the Minister's instructions.[8]

Notes

1. Adenauer said at the same meeting that he would like diplomatic relations to be

established with Israel as soon as possible, and not later than the elections in Israel scheduled for November 1959. (See Shinnar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 685, 22.5.1959, 130.09/2345/8.)

2. See No. 204, n. 2.
3. In the debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag in January 1960, Minister of Foreign Affairs von Brentano referred to the demand for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel and pointed out that Germany's commercial relations with the Arab states required the postponement of such a step. (See the *Jerusalem Post*, January 20th, 1960.)
4. See Nos. 205 and 206.
5. A debate took place in the Knesset, after it had been revealed in June 1959 that mortar shells had been supplied by Israel to the Federal Republic of Germany. During the debate the Prime Minister said that "Germany of Adenauer and of the Social-Democrats is not the Germany of Hitler... today's Germany will never revert to what it was before the Second World War." (See *Divrei Ha-Knesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), Fourth Session of the Third Knesset, Vol. XXVII, July 1st, 1959, p. 2408.) In a further debate in the Knesset on January 20th, 1960, Ben-Gurion said that he stood by what he had said on Germany in the debate of July 1st, 1959 — see *ibid.*, First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, January 20th, 1960, p. 420.
6. Theodor Heuss, the first president of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949–1959), paid a visit to Israel in 1960.
7. Something like the head of the bureau — reference is presumably to Franz Josef Bach (see No. 216).
8. No direct reply by the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been found, but for her position see No. 209. The debate in the Bonn cabinet was ultimately postponed to March 2nd — see No. 210.

208. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 14 February 1960

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar cables on the preparations he has made in anticipation of the German cabinet's meeting on the establishment of relations with Israel.[1] When in Paris he met Goldmann and Blankenhorn. He proposed that Goldmann write to Adenauer stressing the importance of the recognition of Israel to Jews the world over and to the Jewish community in the U.S. in particular. Goldmann agreed to that and Blankenhorn thought it a good idea. Goldmann proposed to approach Harman and Herzog and have them persuade the Department of State to recommend to Germany the establishment of relations with Israel. Shinnar accordingly telephoned the Embassy in Washington, and Goldmann used his own channels for the same purpose. He is informed that Herzog has indeed approached the Department of State. Shinnar requests the Minister

of Foreign Affairs' approval of these steps and of a similar move through France. He will be meeting members of the German government, and other personalities, within the next few days.

Note

1. No. 204.
2. See No. 207.

209. G. Meir to the Israel Ambassador in Brussels.[1] 16 February 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

The Minister of Foreign Affairs thanks the Ambassador for his letter.[2] She has consulted with the Prime Minister and they have both reached the conclusion that no pressure should be exerted in the matter of recognition. Apart from the obvious reasons, there is also the difficult problem of the security of German personnel in Israel. The Ambassador has presumably been informed of Shinnar's meeting with Adenauer,[3] which should be regarded as Israel's final initiative in this matter. Israel will accept a German proposal if and when it is made.

Notes

1. No. 204.
2. See No. 207.

210. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the West European Division.[1] 19 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar reports on talks and meetings he has had on the subject of establishment of relations with Israel.[2]

(1) A secret source in the Chancellor's office informed him that India was about to recognize East Germany but that it had agreed to postpone this step till after the summit conference.

(2) Shinnar met Goldmann and Blankenhorn in Paris.[3] The outcome was Goldmann's letter to Adenauer, a copy of which was given to Shinnar.

(3) Shinnar met Julius Klein who has very close contacts in Germany, and who saw Adenauer, von Brentano and other personalities. Klein is a representative of German figures and companies in the States. He has been active in promoting the establishment of relations with Israel.

(4) Shinnar met Pferdmenges, the well known banker who is Adenauer's close friend and adviser, and who promised to try and persuade Adenauer to decide on recognition of Israel.

(5) Shinnar spoke with von Eckhardt on the subject of his statement in the Old City of Jerusalem,[4] saying that, in spite of his emendations and clarifications, there remained a bad impression which demanded that he make a clear statement on Israel which would be in accord with his former attitude. Von Eckhardt agreed to do that, and, in addition, conveyed to Shinnar some of his impressions from his meetings with Nasser. He thought Nasser had moderated his attitudes and had recognized his main task lay in promoting Egypt's development. He did not find hate for Israel in Nasser, though he met with this phenomenon in the Old City of Jerusalem.

(6) Shinnar met Professor Furler, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee, and found him sympathetic to the issue.

(7) In a talk with Carlo Schmidt, the latter promised to demand the establishment of relations with Israel.

(8) Shinnar met von Merkatz and his impression is that he would support recognition.

If the cabinet debate is postponed, it would enable Shinnar to meet Ministers Strauss, von Brentano and other personalities. The impression he received from all his meetings is that people are apprehensive of the Soviet Union's succeeding in persuading a number of states (the Arab countries and India) to recognize East Germany, even before the summit. Such a development would be catastrophic in that the creation of two Germanies would become an established fact. Shinnar made it clear to his interlocutors that any postponement without naming a concrete date for recognition would be interpreted as a refusal; in his opinion, a decision will be taken in the debate on March 2nd.[7]

Notes

1. See No. 207.
2. See No. 208.
3. See No. 205.
4. A suburb of Berlin, seat of the government offices of East Germany.

5. See Chapter 22.
6. For the results of the discussion, see No. 212.

211. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to J. Herzog. 23 February 1960

Coded Tel. IRA961; Inc.: 130.02/6723/1

Following receipt of a telegram from Bonn, Yahil now knows the agenda of Ben-Gurion's meeting with Adenauer. The Prime Minister will point to Germany's commitment to Israel's security, will demand that Germany supply Israel's needs for defence, that Germany invest extensively in Israel, and that it accord its unequivocal support to Israel's efforts to cement its relations with the European Economic Community. Ben-Gurion will not raise the question of recognition unless Adenauer does so.[1]

Note

1. Refers to a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Adenauer which took place when they were both in the United States. For details of the talk, see No. 215.

212. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to Ch. Yahil and M. Fischer. 4 March 1960

Coded Tel. 845; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar met Minister of Foreign Affairs von Brentano, who informed him of the decision taken in the cabinet on the recognition of Israel.[1] In spite of an agreement in principle that diplomatic relations with Israel should be established, it has been decided not to do so because this could cause the recognition of East Germany by Egypt or other Arab countries, which would in turn force Germany to apply the Hallstein Doctrine.[2] This step must not be taken before the summit conference; moreover it would complicate internal relations, particularly with the SPD,[3] and also external relations. It was agreed, in conclusion, that Adenauer would use his visit to the United States to find out what the attitude of the U.S. was and to coordinate positions. The issue will be debated once more, with Adenauer's return.

Shinnar expressed his disappointment, and the Minister replied that he would recommend to Adenauer to write a personal letter to Ben-Gurion to

explain the situation and state their intention of proposing recognition some time after the summit.

Shinnar also met Adenauer, who did not mention even by implication what von Brentano had said about coordinating positions with the U.S. He referred to von Brentano's presentation of the issue at the cabinet meeting, which made a great impression on the members of the government. He also mentioned that the Department of State had requested them to refrain from any step which could increase tension. Adenauer requested that Shinnar convey to the Prime Minister his personal appeal to understand that at this stage he could not propose relations, and to believe that he sincerely wished to do so after the summit conference, though he could not name a specific date.

Shinnar reminded Adenauer of the previous understanding[4] that a personal letter would be dispatched to the Prime Minister. Adenauer replied that considering the German government's decision it would be preferable not to insist on that understanding. This contradicted von Brentano's promise, but of course the final decision rested with Adenauer.

Shinnar concludes that the Germans' replies are unsatisfactory, but they should not be seen as subterfuges, evasions, or expressions of a change of attitude.

Notes

1. On the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, see No. 210.
2. Called after Walter Hallstein, then secretary of state in the German Foreign Ministry, who, in 1958, established the principle that the Federal Republic of Germany would sever its relations with any country (apart from the Soviet Union) which recognized the German Democratic Republic. The doctrine stayed in force till the end of the 'sixties.
3. The Social-Democratic Party of Germany.
4. See No. 207.

213. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to Ch. Yahil and M. Fischer. 8 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar supplements the information contained in his telegram on his meetings with von Brentano and Adenauer.[1] Most of the talk with von Brentano dealt with global affairs, and here the latter painted a sorry picture.

Khrushchev's threats of signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany and his refusal to make any concessions, bode ill for the future and may perhaps even be the harbingers of war. Von Brentano is not happy with the West's indecisiveness and forbearance. On his visit to India he found out that China's aggressive attitude towards India was definitely influenced from Moscow.

In his talk with Adenauer, the latter commented on the situation in East Germany and on the suffering of the population, and of the farmers in particular. He estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the people opposed the communist regime. Shinnar described the temper of the population in Israel and their fears of Egypt's rearmament. Adenauer agreed that the supply of Soviet arms endangered not only Israel but the entire West. He repeated what he had said about diplomatic relations, namely, that discussions should be resumed after the summit conference and should be brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion.

Shinnar judges that Bonn's stance should be seen not as an evasion or subterfuge, originating in an unwillingness to establish relations with Israel, but as the result of a special political situation connected with the existence of East Germany, and with the problem of unifying Germany and Berlin — all this just before the summit conference at which these issues would be specially discussed. He thinks that Germany's situation will become the more delicate and problematic the nearer the summit approaches, especially in view of the Allies' wish to avoid friction and conflicts. This situation will bring into relief differences of opinion between Germany and its allies, and will continue also into the first stages of the summit. Paradoxically, it could also increase Germany's readiness to establish relations with Israel, because of the moral value of such a step. However, relations established after the summit would not have the same value as those which could have been established before it.

Note

1. No. 212.

214. A. Harman (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 March 1960

Coded Tel. NWT16; Inc.: 130.23/3294/4

Harman reports on the meeting between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion. The latter described the catastrophe of the Holocaust, difficulties in the absorption of the new immigrants, and Israel's problems of defence. He asked for Germany's contribution to Israel's development through investments in industry, shipping and agriculture, or by means of long-term loans. He requested a loan of $50m a year for ten years. When describing the problems of defence, he mentioned the talks which had taken place with Strauss[1] and pointed to two fields in which the Germans could be of help: pocket submarines and anti-aircraft missiles.

Adenauer said they were prepared to help for both moral and political reasons, as they considered Israel a bastion of the West. He said he endorsed what had been agreed on in the talks with Strauss.

Ben-Gurion said he understood that Adenauer accepted Israel's proposal in principle and suggested that two or three experts be sent over to Germany to discuss details of the investments or loans. Adenauer agreed to that. Ben-Gurion then asked whether he could report at home that an agreement had been reached on both economic and security proposals, and Adenauer replied that that was the situation.[2]

Notes

1. Contacts took place towards the end of 1957 between Franz Josef Strauss, the German Defence Minister, and Sh. Peres, the Director-General of the Ministry of Defence, and several of his aides. These resulted in the agreement on German military aid to Israel, which was finally approved by Adenauer in 1962. (See A. Ben-Natan, "The road to the establishment of relations", in *Normal Relations: the Relations Between Israel and Germany* (Hebrew), p. 25; F. Shinnar, *In the Bonds of Constraints and Emotions* (Hebrew), p. 124.)
2. For a complete report on the meeting, see No. 215.

215. Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — K. Adenauer (New York, 14 March 1960)

Notes

1. See No. 214, n. 1.
2. The second part of the conversation, which dealt with international politics and universal problems, has been omitted here.

216. J. Herzog (Washington) to Ch. Yahil. 18 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3294/4

Herzog reports on the negotiations which preceded the statements published following the Ben-Gurion–Adenauer meeting. It was agreed that there would be no joint statement, but that each party would issue its own. The Israelis wished thereby to have the Germans commit themselves publicly, even if by implication, to extensive economic activity in Israel. The two drafts were submitted to Ben-Gurion on the morning of the meeting. The Prime Minister approved the drafts, except for the phrase in the German version: "...will continue its interest in Israel's development...", for which he proposed to substitute "...will continue its support...". This phrasing was not to the German advisers' liking. In the negotiations which followed Minister of Foreign Affairs von Brentano also took part, and he argued that the proposed phrase implied German commitment to support of Israel, and such a commitment would have to be previously endorsed by the government in Bonn. As advisers on both sides could not reach agreement, the matter was put to Adenauer, who approved the wording "support".[2]

Notes

1. See Nos 205, 206.
2. The official version of the announcement has not been found, but see the publications in the press (for instance, in the *Jerusalem Post* of March 15th).
3. See No. 215.

217. F.E. Shinnar (Jerusalem) to the Prime Minister. 22 May 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar raises several points concerning implementation of what had been promised at the Ben-Gurion–Adenauer meeting.[1]

(1) On his return to Bonn he will request a meeting with Adenauer and submit to him the following proposal: (a) The German government's guarantees will be necessary for financing of the development schemes. In contrast to other countries, Israel needs long-term financing, not only for purchase of the necessary equipment but also for outlays in Israel connected directly with the development plans. (b) Such a guarantee would have to be endorsed by the German Ministry of Economy. (c) Adenauer will be informed

that the cost of the present development schemes is estimated at $50m to $100m; in addition, Israel will purchase ships of various categories for the sum of $50m; other schemes, bringing the total to the promised $500m, are now in the planning stages.

(2) If this arrangement is approved by the German government, Israel will propose a line of credit for 12 to 15 years, which should cover both the cost of the equipment (about 30%) and local outlays.

(3) Financing will not be carried out by the ordinary commercial banks, but by public institutions or professional organizations, insurance companies, savings associations or the Bank for Reconstruction (which is headed by Abs).

(4) This plan differs from the ordinary development financing schemes which are planned for a shorter period (5 to 7 years) and are limited to purchase of equipment and may not be used for local outlays.

(5) It is not out of the question that, in view of the possible failure of the summit conference, Adenauer would propose a postponement of the implementation of his promise, arguing that the new situation was against it. In such a case, consideration would need to be given as to whether to accept his proposal or whether it would be better to dispatch a special envoy, preferably of ministerial rank, who would insist on implementation of the original plan in spite of the new situation. In his experience, Adenauer tends to keep to his line notwithstanding changing circumstances, but he will find it more difficult to deny a new envoy than Shinnar.

Notes

1. See No. 215.
2. The Bank of the Trade Unions of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. The Trade Unions of the Federal Republic of Germany.

218. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Ministers of Finance and of Commerce and Industry. 23 June 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

The meeting with Adenauer has been postponed to June 28th.[1] In the meantime Shinnar has met Abs and discussed with him plans for financial aid. Abs was aware of Adenauer's promise and also of the sums of money discussed.[2] Abs said that Adenauer had informed him of his promises in a general way, without going into details, and the same thing occurred with

the minister of the economy and the minister of finance. Abs advises that the aid for Israel be included in the fund for aiding developing countries, whose creation is now being discussed. In this case the Bank for Reconstruction will play a major role in disbursement of these loans, and he suggests that future negotiations be conducted with that bank.

Notes

1. See No. 219.
2. The meeting with Ben-Gurion in New York — see No. 215.
3. Several paragraphs, dealing with financial aid to the "Mekorot" Company and with the hoisting of foreign flags on tankers bought with the reparations money, have been omitted here.

219. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to I. Navon. 29 June 1960

Coded Tel. 935; 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar reports on his meeting with Adenauer, who promised that during the coming week he would talk with Abs, Blessing, the Ministers of Finance and of the Economy, on the possibilities of implementation, and undertook to give a reply following these talks. Shinnar proposed that the Bank for Reconstruction award a $40m to $50m long-term loan without making it conditional on any specific schemes. Shinnar notes that his fears that Adenauer would try to postpone the transaction have not been realized, and there is now a basis for concrete discussion. He suggests that the Prime Minister write to Adenauer, refer to his meeting with de Gaulle, and remind him of the promise given in the course of their conversation of March 14th.[4] Shinnar is certain that the Chancellor is expecting Ben-Gurion to refer to his meeting with de Gaulle. Shinnar requests a response to this telegram.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 218.
2. See No. 220.
3. In June 1960 — see No. 250.
4. See No. 215.
5. Navon replied that he would see the Prime Minister in the afternoon of that day and would then bring his reply. He also commented that it was not advisable to name two figures, $40m and $50m, because the Germans would obviously settle for the lower

figure. (See his telegram to Shinnar, 199, of 30.6.1960, 130.09/2355/1.) No further reaction on Ben-Gurion's part to the talk with Adenauer is on record.

220. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, and of Commerce and Industry. 30 June 1960

Orig.: 130.02/4308/5

Shinnar reports in detail on his meeting with Adenauer, in addition to what he had already reported in his last telegram.[1]

(1) Adenauer showed great concern about the situation arising out of the failure of the summit conference and the suspension of disarmament talks. He stressed that the gravity of the situation was caused by the lack of a leader in the Western world, and this state of affairs would continue until January 1961, when the new American president is sworn in.

(2) Eichmann's capture was discussed.[4] Adenauer said he had never heard of the man until his capture.

The following day Dr. Bach, head of the Chancellor's bureau, telephoned Shinnar and asked him to submit a summary of his proposals in writing.

There was also a regrettable incident when the fact of the meeting was published in the press. Shinnar requests that the press be instructed to keep the negotiations under cover. Their results will be known only the following week, when Adenauer's reply is given in principle.

Notes

1. No. 219.
2. See No. 218, paragraph 2.
3. See No. 204, n. 2.
4. See Chapter 21.
5. On these meetings, see No. 222.
6. See No. 236.

221. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to I. Navon. 30 June 1960

Coded Tel. 943; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar explains that in his talk with Adenauer he specified the amounts mentioned in the meeting between Ben-Gurion and Adenauer of March

14th.[1] He does not share Navon's concern. If this point was the last thing at issue before the agreement is signed then the situation was good indeed. Shinnar cabled today to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Eshkol, and to Sapir, on Adenauer's request to have details of the agreement submitted in writing. He has submitted the memorandum,[2] a copy of which will be dispatched to Israel, in the diplomatic pouch.

Notes

1. Shinnar refers here to Navon's comment on the inadvisability of naming two figures in the talk with Adenauer — \$40m to \$50m, as the Germans could then settle for the lower sum (see No. 219, n. 5).
2. See No. 236 (Appendix B).

222. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, and of Commerce and Industry. 6 July 1960

Copy: 130.23/3309/16

Shinnar reports on his talk with Minister of the Economy Erhardt. Erhardt said that he had met Argentine President Frondizi and had told him that people in Germany did not understand Argentina's inflexible attitude in the Eichmann case.[2] Then they turned to the subject of the loan. Erhardt said he would give his support to that, though many difficulties were involved in the issue. In his opinion, Germany had to find a source of income to cover assistance to developing countries. He proposed to Adenauer to impose a special tax for that purpose, but the Chancellor opposed doing this in an election year. It was agreed that Erhardt would voice his support when discussing the loan with Adenauer.

Shinnar later met von Spindler, the Minister of Finance's special assistant for the reparations agreement and for Israel. Von Spindler dwelt on the difficulties in raising money for the loan and said that in his opinion there would be no escaping a special tax. He promised to relay the gist of the talk to his minister, when the latter returns to Bonn.

Shinnar concludes by saying that since his talk with Adenauer of June 28th[5] he had met all those people whom Adenauer would have wished to consult, and it is necessary now to wait for the Chancellor's reply, which would probably be given within the next few days.[6]

Notes

1. These documents have not been traced.
2. See also No. 220.
3. See No. 218.
4. The Federal Republic of Germany consisted of eleven "Länder" which together formed the "Bund".
5. See No. 219.
6. See No. 223.

223. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 21 July 1960

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar met Abs who told him that he had been instructed by Adenauer to draft a letter describing Israel's proposals in the matter of the loan. The letter should be written in a "positive" vein which would enable it to be given to Ben-Gurion with no further editing. It was agreed to meet again on July 28th in order to check the final draft of the letter before it is dispatched.[3] It was also agreed that Shinnar would request Adenauer for an audience on July 29th, that is, before the letter is delivered, and would then propose that Adenauer enclose with the letter a personal letter of his own to the Prime Minister.

Notes

1. The telegram is filed under 130.09/2355/2.
2. See Nos 224 and 237 (Appendix C).

224. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 29 July 1960

Coded Tel. 962; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar discussed yesterday the draft of Abs's letter to Adenauer[2] with Abs, who agreed to certain changes proposed by Shinnar but objected to others. The letter constitutes an opinion from the Bank's point of view, cautious but generally favourable. The letter will be dispatched to Adenauer whose

planned meeting with Shinnar had to be postponed owing to the Chancellor's urgent engagement elsewhere.[3] When Shinnar does meet Adenauer he will be given a personal letter from the Chancellor to Ben-Gurion, and will immediately leave for Israel.[4] Abs told Shinnar in confidence that a meeting of all the important people in the German economy was scheduled with Adenauer for the following week, to discuss the raising of money for aid to developing countries. Abs thinks that the Chancellor will raise the Israeli case in order to obtain the participants' agreement to the proposed steps, which would afford him a solid basis for the fulfillment of his pledge to Israel.

Notes

1. See Nos 223 and 237 (Appendix C).
2. The meeting eventually took place on August 3rd — see Nos. 225 and 336.
3. See No. 225.

225. K. Adenauer (Bonn) to D. Ben-Gurion. 5 August 1960

Notes

1. See No. 215.
2. No. 237 (Appendix C).
3. On this meeting, which dealt also with Israel's association with the European Economic Community, see No. 336.
4. For Ben-Gurion's reply, see No. 227. Herewith a summary of this letter:
   "One of the things we discussed in New York talk was West German economic assistance, in the form of long-term credit, to promote Israel's development. Mr. Abs' views are expressed in his letter (of July 29, 1960), a copy of which I gave to Ambassador Shinnar and asked him to transmit it to you. After the completion of the current vacation season, namely towards the end of September, I will do my best to obtain German financial assistance for Israeli development projects. I would be pleased to hear your opinion on this matter, and would be grateful for any comments you might have."

226. *Aide-Mémoire* by F.E. Shinnar. (8 September 1960)

Copy: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar reports on the meeting between Eshkol and Erhardt which took place in Brussels. The Minister of Finance described Israel's development

plans, emphasizing the need for absorbing new immigrants, and developing the Negev. Erhardt stressed his support of Adenauer's pledge. He said he was prepared to help in the matter but it was difficult to raise money at the moment, and perhaps the International Bank could help out. Germany, he said, had lately given the Bank a loan of $250m. Eshkol replied that Israel had direct access to the Bank itself and objected to using this Bank for the fulfilment of Adenauer's pledge. It turned out that Erhardt was not briefed on the negotiations, and Shinnar gave him the latest correspondence on the matter which Erhardt read on the spot.[4] Having read the documents, he said they contained a "certain concretization" and said he would discuss the issue with Adenauer and Abs before leaving for Washington. He also suggested that no decision be taken on the final sum and that the plan proceed in stages. Eshkol remarked that he intended to include in Israel's budget for the coming year certain sums connected with the pledge.

Israel's inclusion in the European Economic Community was then discussed.[5] Erhardt said Israel should demand an exemption from duties levied on goods exported to the EEC. He requested not to be quoted during the negotiations with the Community, but promised his Ministry's help in the matter.

The atmosphere was friendly and the meeting was productive.

Notes

1. Finance Minister Levi Eshkol.
2. See No. 215.
3. No. 225.
4. Nos 225 and 237.
5. See Chapter 14.
6. *Ibid.*, No. 336.

227. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to K. Adenauer. 27 September 1960

Notes

1. No. 225.
2. No. 237 (Appendix C).
3. No. 226.
4. This letter has not been traced.

228. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 November 1960

Coded Tel. 59; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar addresses his letter to the Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Trade and Industry, and the Prime Minister's secretary.

At his meeting with Adenauer, the latter confirmed the execution of the loan in stages as proposed in the Prime Minister's[1] and Shinnar's[2] letters to him. He also confirmed that the Prime Minister could include the loan in the long-term planning, starting with the 1961/2 financial year. At the same time, he said he wished to postpone giving a written reply until after he had met Abs, and also requested Shinnar to talk the matter over with Abs. Shinnar's meeting with Abs has been scheduled for the following day.[3] Shinnar will propose that Abs draft a letter from Adenauer to Ben-Gurion confirming that the execution of the loan will commence in the 1961/2 financial year.

Further on Adenauer said that he also intended to raise the subject of American aid to Israel at his approaching meeting with Dillon and Anderson. He said he wanted a stable and strong Israel and he assumed that Dillon and Anderson were of like mind. Shinnar suggests that the Israel Embassy in Washington prepare the ground for this meeting.

In conclusion, Adenauer again promised an early reply. As soon as he receives the answer in writing, Shinnar will come to Israel for consultations and for drafting a comprehensive plan for the coming two or three years.

Notes

1. No. 227.
2. This letter has not been traced.
3. See No. 229.
4. No. 225.
5. See No. 233.

229. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 17 November 1960

Coded Tel. 63; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar has met Abs and relayed to him the gist of his conversation with the Chancellor,[2] as he had been asked to do by the latter. Abs knew of

Adenauer's intention to meet Dillon, which he interprets as the Chancellor's wish to coordinate Germany's moves with the United States. Shinnar told Abs that the Prime Minister was awaiting a letter from Adenauer stating that the implementation of the commitment will commence in the 1961/2 financial year. It was agreed to meet again after Abs's talk with Adenauer, in order to draft the letter which the Chancellor was expected to instruct Abs to prepare. Abs told Shinnar about the talks he had with the Minister of Finance on the subject of the loan and on Goldmann's forthcoming meetings with Erhardt. Abs requested Shinnar to participate in the meetings, but Shinnar said he did not wish to hamper the conversations; he will give his reasons orally on coming to Israel.

Notes

1. See No. 228.
2. See No. 231.

230. Y. Meroz (Jerusalem) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 November 1960

Orig.: 130.02/4316/5

Before the expected Cabinet debate on relations between Israel and Germany, Meroz wishes to submit his personal opinions on the matter, even though he knows they do not conform with what is accepted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The basic assumptions on which his opinions rest were already adopted in the autumn of 1959, when he submitted them in his memorandum to Fischer.[1] These basic assumptions have not changed: on the contrary, they have been strengthened by the latest manifestations of antisemitism in Germany.[2]

From the political aspect, present relations between Israel and Germany can be summed up as follows:

(1) From Germany's point of view:

(a) The German government is not interested in diplomatic relations with Israel because it fears the Arab states will react by recognizing East Germany.

(b) It is not easy to measure accurately the political impact on Germany of non-rational factors (antisemitism, the renascence of racism, etc.). In Meroz's personal opinion, these factors are negligible. Others, including Shinnar, think otherwise. Among the top ranks of the ruling party, and even more so in the Social-Democratic party, the conviction is rife that formal diplomatic relations

would add nothing of consequence to the existing economic, financial and security ties, nor even indirectly to the political ties.

(2) From Israel's point of view:

(a) The main political consideration for initiating diplomatic ties with Germany is connected with the Arab issue: seeing that German non-recognition of Israel results from the Arabs' opposition, such recognition would amount to a political victory for Israel.

(b) The normalization of diplomatic relations with Germany could lead to normalization of relations with some other countries, for example with Iran and Ethiopia, and perhaps also with Turkey and Greece.

(c) On the other hand, normalization of relations could also have undesirable results, in that it would absolve the Germans from the "guilt complex". In Meroz's opinion, this feeling of guilt is Israel's main asset; normalization would mean a gain in prestige, but a loss in everyday relationships: today Israel has direct access to all the departments and public bodies, from the Chancellor down, including the ministers. When diplomatic relations are established, all the contacts will have to be made through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose hostility to Israel is on a par with that of foreign ministries in other countries.

Notes

1. See Meroz's memorandum to Fischer, 607, 26.11.1959, 130.23/3094/24.
2. See Chapter 22.

231. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 21 November 1960

Coded Tel. 67; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar reports on his meeting with Goldmann, who told him about his talks with Adenauer and Erhardt.[2] In his conversation with the Chancellor, Goldmann referred to the loan only by implication, but he received the impression that Adenauer's stand was positive in principle. As to Erhardt, he again proposed that the loan be executed through neutral channels, like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to which the German Government would transfer the money. Shinnar explained to Goldmann why the Government of Israel opposed such an arrangement. During the talk with Goldmann, Shinnar did not go into any details and the correspondence between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion was not mentioned at all.

Notes

1. See No. 229.
2. See No. 226.
3. For the exchange of letters between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion, see Nos 225 and 227.

232. F.E. Shinnar to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Commerce and Industry. 22 November 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3309/13

Shinnar reports on meetings held and planned in order to expedite the grant of the loan to Israel. Some of the delays are due to the holidays and to international and other events. If he does not receive the promised letter from Adenauer before the end of the month, he will leave for Israel for consultations.

The Germans' talks with Dillon and Anderson were unproductive. The Germans had prepared themselves well for the meetings and had pointed to considerable sums which they had hitherto disbursed in the form of reparations or economic aid. The German government has also prepared public opinion in its country for expected American demands and has mobilized some DM3.5m as aid to developing countries. It is obvious that the expected change-over in the American administration[6] made it easier for the Germans to conclude the talks with no results, as they prefer giving the money to the new Administration.

Notes

1. See No. 229.
2. See No. 232.
3. This letter has not been traced.
4. See No. 233.
5. See No. 228, paragraph 3.
6. The presidential elections in the United States took place on November 8th, 1960. Following the Democratic victory, the Administration was to change hands in January 1961.

233. F.E. Shinnar (Cologne) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 25 November 1960

Coded Tel. 73; Inc.: 130.09/2355/2

Shinnar reports on his meeting with Erhardt, who repeated his proposal to transfer the monies through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order not to attract attention and not to irritate the Arabs. Shinnar rejected this proposal, but promised that Israel would keep the transaction secret. He suggested that implementation should commence at the beginning of the 1962 financial year and that specific plans be addressed, even before the approval of the transaction as a whole. This, he thought, was the only way to ensure implementation of the loan.

Notes

1. See No. 226.
2. No. 227.
3. See No. 226.
4. See *ibid.*

234. D. Ben-Gurion: Diary Note. 5 December 1960

Ben-Gurion Archives

Ben-Gurion asked Shinnar over to discuss the situation in Germany and the promised loan. He told Shinnar about his talks with Willy Brandt.[1] Shinnar thinks a coalition headed by the Social-Democrats impracticable, mainly because of their internal divisions of opinion. When the loan was discussed, Shinnar told of his contacts with the German administration and of the internal relationships within the establishment. One of the problems is that in the end everything depends on Adenauer. In any case, the loan will be implemented through the German Bank for Reconstruction. Israel should have plans for the disbursement of $75m ready by February, and a mission would presumably have to be sent to Germany for this purpose.

Notes

1. Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, came to Israel in 1960 to participate in the Conference of the International Union of Local Authorities.
2. See No. 228.
3. See No. 232 and n. 6 there.

4. No. 227.
5. This correspondence has not been found.
6. The Bank for Reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7. Shinnar remained in his post until 1965, when full diplomatic relations were established between Israel and Germany.

238. M. Shneerson (Paris) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 January 1960

Coded Tel. 134; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Shneerson addresses his telegram to Acting Director-General J. Tsur and to Assistant Directors-General, M. Fischer and M. Bartur. He reports on his meeting with Jordan, an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs who told him that Minister Couve de Murville was offended by comments in the Israeli press on the suspension of talks between El Al and Air France.[1] The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not involved in this issue and their officials do not know why Air France decided as it did. In his opinion, the decision was purely economic, or perhaps resulted from difficulties encountered with the Union of European Airlines, "Air Union". Shneerson replied that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in France do not issue directives to the Israeli press, and are glad to hear that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not involved here. He also mentioned sensitivity in Israel concerning the Arab boycott, following the Renault affair.[2] Shneerson also said he was going to meet the Director of Air France, Lesieux.[3]

Notes

1. Negotiations took place in the course of 1959 between Air France and El Al on the extension of cooperation between them on the New York–Paris–Tel Aviv line. An agreement was initialled, but in the middle of December 1959 Air France decided not to finalize it, claiming that it contravened its obligations towards Air Union (the Federation of European Airlines); as a result, the Israeli papers appearing on January 1st, 1960, accused Air France of submitting to the Arab boycott. (See Bartur to the Embassy in Washington, telegram TNW827, 7.1.1960, 130.09/2313/1; daily press summary by the press officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 130.18/2055/6.)
2. The decision taken by "Renault" in 1958 to stop assembling its cars in Israel — see Chapter 4.
3. See No. 239.

239. M. Shneerson (Paris) to M. Fischer and M. Bartur.
4 January 1960

Coded Tel. 141; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Shneerson reports on his meeting with Lesieux, the Director of Air France, who categorically denied that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had intervened in the negotiations with El Al.[1] Suspension of the talks had no political aspect and the only considerations were economic and administrative. "Air Union" decided that an agreement with El Al was undesirable at this stage, and had so informed El Al in a memorandum. Lesieux stressed that the friendly relations and mutual trust existing between Air France and El Al were not affected and will remain close and sincere as in the past.

Note

1. See No. 238.

240. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris.
11 January 1960

Coded Tel. 34; Outg.: 130.09/2350/2

Tsur reports on Ben-Gurion's meeting with Bourdeillette, the French ambassador to Israel, at which he had been present. The Ambassador voiced the hope that the "light clouds"[1] over relations between France and Israel, which have been somewhat exaggerated by public opinion in Israel, would not affect the deep friendship between the two countries. He said that in his leave-taking talk with de Gaulle, the latter stressed his friendship with Israel and his conviction that Israel's security and development were essential to French interests. However, he asked Israel for understanding of France's necessity to renew its ties with the Arab states,[2] which would also be of benefit to Israel. This is still in the far future, but he can now say with assurance that friendship with Israel will not be sacrificed for that purpose. He also requested the Ambassador to convey to Ben-Gurion his congratulations on the results of the elections, which promise a stable government in Israel.[3] The Prime Minister said that Israel was the only country in the region which could be depended on without fear of a sudden upheaval. He enlarged on the assistance extended by Israel to the new states in Asia and Africa,

stressing that Israel was prepared to cooperate with France "as independent and sovereign partners in a great human enterprise". Israel did not object to France's renewing its ties with the Arab world, but relations betweeen Israel and France should not be sacrificed for that purpose. He expressed the hope that de Gaulle would be successful in solving the problem of Algeria.[4] Bourdeillette replied that what Ben-Gurion had said was entirely compatible with de Gaulle's views, attributing, as he did, great importance to the development of backward countries. He explained his country's position on the Algerian issue, and expressed the hope that ties with Israel, especially in the field of culture, would be strengthened.

The Prime Minister concluded, referring to the "light clouds", by saying that at his first meeting with France's Ambassador he did not wish to touch on Israel's concerns, which are very real even though not of the first importance. He also expressed his appreciation of what France had done for Israel since the State's creation.

Notes

1. The case of "Renault"'s submission to the Arab boycott and that of the cancellation of the agreement between El Al and Air France.
2. Following the Franco-British invasion of Egypt in 1956, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia broke off their diplomatic relations with France. These relations were not resumed in the year under review, mainly because of the Algerian issue — see n. 4 below.
3. The elections in Israel took place on November 3, 1959, and they resulted in a victory for Mapai.
4. The conflict in Algeria, in which a nationalist movement clashed with metropolitan France and with French colonists in Algeria, turned into open armed rebellion in November 1954. The revolt was supported with arms and money by the member states of the Arab League, headed by Egypt. The United Nations' resolution of 1955 calling on both sides to enter on negotiations, was rejected by France which, under pressure of the French colonists, opposed the grant of independence. A revolt of the French colonists broke out in 1958; it was supported by the army, and brought France to the brink of civil war and, ultimately, to de Gaulle's return to power. In the Autumn of 1959 de Gaulle proposed self-determination for Algeria to take effect four years after peace had been achieved, when the inhabitants would be able to choose between: (1) independence, with a complete break with France; (2) complete incorporation with France; or (3) a federalist regime with a close partnership with France. Negotiations with representatives of "the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria" commenced in the Summer of 1960, but they failed because of the rebels' demand for immediate independence.

241. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to M. Shneerson. 13 January 1960

Coded Tel. 45; Outg.: 130.09/2350/2

Tsur communicates some ideas with regard to the forthcoming meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir and her opposite number, Couve de Murville.[1] He recommends that a frank discussion be held on relations between the two countries, and that the "caution" which the French have taken to mentioning lately be defined — is it merely a formal phrasing or can it adversely affect real interests? In addition, it is important, Tsur thinks, to submit Israel's ideas on the forthcoming summit conference[2] and to request de Gaulle's support in matters involving Israel's interests. In any case, he should be asked to make the same promise as did the U.S., namely, not to discuss anything affecting Israel without prior consultation. Tsur also suggests that the French be asked to extend their active help in the matter of relations with the European Economic Community, the multilateral agreement and various European institutions. Regarding defence and the acquisition of arms, it should be taken as self-evident that the present state of affairs will continue, while stressing the importance of Israel's security in the region. An effort should also be made to demand of the French a more active and determined stand on the issue of free passage through the Suez Canal.[3] Tsur recommends not to devote too much time to the Renault and Air France affairs.[4]

Notes

1. On her way back from West Africa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs broke her journey in Paris for talks on the bilateral relations between the two countries and on Israel's wish to come to an association agreement with the European Economic Community — see Chapter 14.
2. A meeting between Western and Eastern leaders scheduled to take place in Paris in May 1960, which broke up after the Soviets had downed an American reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory on May 1st.
3. See Chapter 3.
4. See Nos 238 and 239.

242. M. Shneerson (Paris) to J. Tsur and M. Fischer. 21 January 1960

Coded Tel. 233; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Shneerson reports on the meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir and Couve de Murville. Mrs. Meir opened with a description of her tour in Africa.[1] She then turned to the difficulties appearing in negotiations, then being held in Jerusalem between Israel and France, on the extension of their trade agreement.[3] De Murville said he was not conversant with the matter and suggested that Shneerson talk about this with Wormser, head of the Economic Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also on the help to be given to Israel in reaching a multilateral commercial agreement[4] with the Western European countries. As to the summit conference, he did not think that matters touching the Middle East would be raised there, and promised that, if the subject did appear on the agenda, he would hold preliminary talks with Israel.

Mrs. Meir then gave a general outline of the situation in the Middle East. She stressed that Nasser's bogus anti-communist stand had evidently impressed some Western powers, but it seems that Khrushchev has ignored it. Soviet influence over the U.A.R. will grow following the massive supply of Soviet arms to that country, and after the signing of the agreement for constructing the second stage of the Aswan Dam.[5] The wooing of Nasser and the readiness with which he is given loans and grants only give him a bigger appetite and confirm him in his extortion. De Murville did not express his opinion on the picture in general, but agreed that the matter of the Aswan Dam was very serious indeed: Soviet experts and technicians will come in large numbers to Egypt and Soviet penetration of the country will increase accordingly.

De Murville asked what was Israel's assessment of Arab threats to divert two of the River Jordan's sources.[6] Mrs. Meir said that, according to the experts, the project was technically feasible, but it would have no practical significance for the Arabs and would indeed be an act of vandalism as the waters would then flow freely to the sea with no profit to anybody. For Israel this is an existential issue, because the water of the Jordan is essential for its plans of development and it would not wait complacently for a death from thirst.

Mrs. Meir then told de Murville about her talks with Hammarskjöld and Bunche on the Suez Canal issue.[7] Hammarskjöld had not yet received an answer to his letters from the Egyptians. Israel intends to dispatch more ships through the Canal to establish its right of passage. If Nasser is allowed free rein in the Suez Canal, he will next turn to the Tiran Straits.

De Murville mentioned the recent wave of antisemitism,[8] and Mrs. Meir said she was absolutely certain that there was a central body coordinating and organizing these activities and Israel thought one of these centres was in Cairo. As to Germany, it still harboured active Nazi elements.

Notes

1. See Chapter 20, No. 475 and notes there.
2. See No. 308.
3. Negotiations were then taking place in Jerusalem between Israel and France on the prolongation of the trade agreement between them. At one of the points of crisis the members of the French delegation threatened to walk out and return to France, but eventually an agreement was reached and duly signed.
4. See Introduction, pp. XXIX–XXX.
5. The high dam in Aswan; the crisis around its financing eventually resulted in the nationalization of the Suez Canal and later in the Sinai Campaign.
6. The Hasbani in Lebanese territory and the Banias in Syrian territory — see Introduction, p. XIV, and also Chapter 2.
7. See Chapter 3.
8. See Chapter 22.

243. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 28 January 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3340/41

Tsur reports on his meeting with the French Ambassador to Israel, Bourdeillette. The latter told him that he had information from Paris that a meeting of all the Jewish organizations had been held in New York, with the participation of the Israel Ambassador to the U.S., on steps to be taken against the Renault company.[2] The French Ambassador said he knew that there was anger in Jewish circles directed at Renault, but the Israel Ambassador's participation in the meeting seemed to him very strange, and opposed to the spirit in which the two governments had been dealing with the issue.

Tsur said the information the French Ambassador had was entirely baseless. Moreover, when the Presidents' Conference had approached the Israel Embassy on this matter, it was told that the Government of Israel would not intervene. Tsur took this opportunity to say that, according to information received in Israel, the Jewish boycott of Renault is proving effective and the company's sales in the U.S. are falling. At the time he had warned the Director of Renault, Dreyfus, that he would lose more in the U.S. than he would gain in the Arab countries.

Bourdeillette agreed, and said the whole affair was the result of pure stupidity.

Tsur also referred to the Air France affair[4] and said information had reached Israel that the Jewish communities were very angry with Air France.

Israeli representatives have received strict instructions to prevent any reaction against the French company.

Bourdeillette thanked Tsur, and showed him the draft of his reply to Paris written before the meeting, in which he denied the rumours, just as Tsur had done now.

Notes

1. Sent also to M. Fischer, M. Bartur and D. Shaltiel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1. See No. 238.
2. Jacob Tsur, Acting Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1959–1960 (Ambassador to France from 1953 to 1959).
3. See Nos. 238 and 239.

244. M. Shneerson (Paris) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 February 1960

Coded Tel. 367; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Shneerson reports on the ceremony at which the new Israel Ambassador to France, Walter Eytan, presented his credentials to President de Gaulle. In the conversation which took place after the ceremony, the President stressed France's desire that Israel endure and continue to exist, and that it was certain that this goal had been attained. In times of danger France would support Israel and it would always be open to approaches for help. On the other hand, Israel must understand that France has its own problems touching the Arab world, and would therefore not always be able to proclaim publicly its stand.

Notes

1. Walter Eytan, Ambassador to France from 1960 to 1970.
2. A cultural treaty between the two countries was signed on November 30th, 1959; the commercial treaty was prolonged for a year in January 1960.

245. W. Eytan (Paris) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. 435; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Eytan reports on the meetings held in Paris by Deputy Minister of Defence Peres.[1] He had met the French Chief of Staff and the Minister of Finance,[2] and is due to meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[3] He has renewed old contacts and has made new ones. Peres said he felt no change in the atmosphere and he had been received with understanding and sympathy. This confirms Eytan's impressions from his first month in France. The atmosphere here is determined by the attitude of de Gaulle, and everybody knows it is favourable to Israel.

Notes

1. Shimon Peres was elected to the Knesset and appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in December 1959. He then paid a visit to several European countries in order to renew old ties from the period when he was Director-General of the Ministry of Defence.
2. Wilfrid Baumgartner, the French Finance Minister.
3. Maurice Couve de Murville, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the meeting, see No. 246.

246. W. Eytan (Paris) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 February 1960

Coded Tel. 442; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Eytan reports on Sh. Peres's meeting with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville.[1]

Peres described Israel's security situation and its fears in that regard. He linked Nasser's activity against Israel with his ambitions in Africa. He also pointed to Soviet influence and to China's activity in Africa and the Middle East. Peres asked whether Israel could expect French assistance to continue, and what would be the best course of action for Israel in the present situation, from the French point of view.

De Murville answered the first question by quoting de Gaulle's words to Eytan at the presentation of credentials,[2] but he did not answer the second question. He tended to agree that the Soviet Union was trying to create tension,

with the approaching summit conference in mind, from which it expected no results. He asked what decisions Israel would want the conference to make if Middle East problems were raised, and went on to say that the West would propose what it had proposed in the past — maintenance of the status quo, non-intervention, technical assistance and perhaps as a fourth point — freezing of the supply of arms. He asked what Israel's opinion would be of such an embargo.

Peres explained that, in principle, Israel was in favour even of disarmament, because constant arming was a heavy burden on finances and manpower, but an embargo was dangerous in two respects: first, the Soviet Union's agreement would bind itself and its satellites, but not China, which would be free to supply arms to the other party. Secondly, if the embargo is imposed after the U.A.R. has received the MIG-19 planes, but before Israel has received the Mirages, the equilibrium will have been disturbed.

De Murville said he understood the problem. He then asked for information on the clashes in the demilitarized zone, on Iraq, and on the situation in the Gaza Strip and in the Gulf of Aqaba.[3]

At the end of the meeting Peres asked whether he could tell the public in Israel that France will continue with its supply of arms. De Murville replied that this might be desirable from Israel's point of view but was definitely inconvenient for France, considering the situation in North Africa. He said that apparently France had no choice but to speak with two voices.

At a certain point de Murville asked why Israel did not appeal to the Security Council in view of the grave situation on its borders. He did not think the Council could do anything in practice, but it would be a good way to bring the matter to world public notice.

Notes

1. See No. 245.
2. See No. 244.
3. See Chapter 1.

247. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 1 March 1960

Coded Tel. 278; Outg.: 130.09/2350/2

Mrs. Meir instructs Eytan to consult the military attaché in France, Aluf-Mishne Narkiss, whether the time has come to approach the French Government through the regular channels, that is, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the matter of Ben-Gurion's visit to France.[1] She adds that when a special channel was used, the reply was that the approach should be made through the regular channels. The French Embassy in Israel has already approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter. Moreover, Ben-Gurion's planned visit to Britain could leak to the press,[2] and this could be interpreted in France in an undesirable way. Possibly Couve de Murville heard from de Gaulle about Israel's approach through the special channel.

Mrs. Meir requests the opinions of Eytan and Narkiss and, if these are favourable, then the forms of approach in Israel and to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be coordinated.[3]

Notes

1. The Prime Minister's planned visit to France. The preliminary contacts concerning the visit were presumably made through the Ministry of Defence. The visit eventually took place in June — see No. 248.
2. In March 1960 — see Chapter 10.
3. Eytan replied that he and Narkiss both thought that the time had come to announce the visit through the accepted channels. This was approved by G. Meir. (See Eytan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 478, 2.3.1960, 130.09/2350/1; G. Meir to the Embassy in Paris, telegram 288, 2.3.1960, 130.09/2350/2.)

248. W. Eytan (Paris) to Ch. Yahil and I. Navon. 12 May 1960

Coded Tel. 883; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

The Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed Eytan that the French wish to characterize Ben-Gurion's visit as "private", as was his visit to the U.S., and as will be Nehru's approaching visit to France. De Gaulle will host him for lunch and he will meet the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, probably separately. Eytan requests the Ministry to send him as soon as possible suggestions on the people and the institutions the Prime Minister would like to meet.

Notes

1. Yahil's telegram to the Embassy in Paris (11.5.1960, 130.09/2350/2) informing them that Ben-Gurion had decided to commence his visit to France on June 14th.

2. The letter untraced.

249. W. Eytan (Paris) to Ch. Yahil. 14 June 1960

Coded Tel. 156; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Eytan reports on Ben-Gurion's meeting with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ben-Gurion reviewed the situation in the Middle East and dwelt in particular on Nasser's character and aims. He then turned to the Soviet Union, stressing that (a) it can make no concessions in view of its global aims, and (b) the character of the regime there must undergo a change during the coming twenty or thirty years because news from the West keeps infiltrating and the new generation can no longer suffer the narrow horizons of the communist regime.

Most of the talk was devoted by Ben-Gurion to a comprehensive review of the situation in Africa and Asia. The West will be able to save these continents from the communist menace only if it knows how to approach their peoples. This is not only a question of money but also of psychology, namely, of a humane approach. Ben-Gurion asked whether France would view favourably increased activity by Israel in the francophone countries of Africa, and de Murville replied in the affirmative and recalled the beginning of Israel's activity in Mali.[2]

Notes

1. Thus in the original, but reference is most probably to Guinea and Niger, both former French colonies.
2. See No. 493.

250. Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — Ch. de Gaulle (Paris, 14 June 1960)

Report: Ben-Gurion Archives

Ben-Gurion opened by saying that he had wanted to meet de Gaulle before leaving for the U.S. to meet Eisenhower, but this had not been possible because of the French President's prior engagements. He told de Gaulle that he and Eisenhower had discussed the international situation and also the

problems of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and, in general, did not have differences of opinion.[1]

Ben-Gurion then turned to expressing his opinion on the Soviet Union, which believes it has a historic mission to rescue humanity. Capitalism is doomed, and communism will bring salvation to the world. In Ben-Gurion's opinion, this is the reason why the communists cannot make any significant concessions to the West. He has no doubt that the Soviets will wish to occupy new positions of strength, but they will not resort to war for that purpose. The cold war, in his opinion, is a struggle for the souls of the African and Asian peoples. Ben-Gurion then described Israel's activity on these two continents, and said it was essential to reach the hearts of their peoples. Israel's efforts are not sufficient, and the resources of all the free world should be mobilized for that purpose: France, the United States, Germany, Britain, Italy and others should do their share. Success, however, will always depend on achieving the full trust of these peoples. The steps to be taken should not appear as charity. The world's fate depended on this. Ben-Gurion then mentioned several differences between Asia and Africa. The African peoples have no history, while Asia was the cradle of many ancient and well ordered civilizations. The Asian countries are very much afraid of China. In Africa, on the other hand, the fear is of communism.

Ben-Gurion reverted to the subject of the Soviet Union. He said that the people there want a higher standard of living and more freedom. He added that, within 20 or 30 years, when there are 20 or 30 million university graduates in the Soviet Union, they will not acquiesce in living under a dictatorial regime. If the Western world succeeds in keeping the peace, in the end the Soviets will arrive at a democratic regime, will maintain free contacts with the countries of the West, and then the cold war will come to an end. But to make this happen one has to win over the peoples of Asia and Africa. This will have to be done through a humane and egalitarian approach, without domineering or arrogance. If the communists do not succeed in winning over these continents there will be no war, but if they do — then they will risk going to war.

De Gaulle replied that he agreed with Ben-Gurion, but that a humane approach to these peoples was not enough. They have a deeply ingrained feeling of inferiority because of their colour, which cannot be changed. For that reason he thinks that they will prefer the yellow Chinese to the white man.

Ben-Gurion then turned to Middle Eastern affairs. He stressed that the non-Arab countries — Turkey, Iran and Israel — have 46 million inhabitants, as against 36 million for the Arabs. The Arab world is not united and there are conflicts between the various states, like that between Egypt and Iraq. He pointed out that Qassem, the Iraqi ruler, was not a communist and his main

interest lay in preserving Iraq's sovereignty. In Syria there is restlessness and discontent with the union with Egypt. Ben-Gurion added that Iran and Turkey saw the greatest danger, after the Soviet Union, in Nasser, and this is why they maintain friendly relations with Israel. De Gaulle asked why Turkey did not endeavour to come closer to Israel, and Ben-Gurion replied that Israel had very close relations with Turkey, including important economic ties. The same applied to Iran and Ethiopia, though the Ethiopian emperor was afraid of Nasser. This same fear of Nasser existed both in Africa and among the Arab states. Hussein of Jordan would have made peace with Israel long ago, but fear of Nasser forces him to demonstrate hostility to Israel. The same applies to Qassem. But things will change. The Arab states will become a minority in Africa and this will work for strengthening the position of the West in general and of France in particular. To de Gaulle's question, whether Ben-Gurion was afraid of an Arab coalition which would endanger Israel's security, the Prime Minister replied that Egypt by itself already constituted a danger to Israel owing to its rapid rearmament with the aid of the Soviet Union. He had described this situation to Eisenhower, who had said that he would not allow Israel to be destroyed. De Gaulle immediately interjected "La France non plus". When Ben-Gurion told him that Eisenhower had said that the U.S. could not be the main supplier of arms to Israel, de Gaulle asked — Why? Ben-Gurion replied that this was owing to the international situation. He added that when he was in the U.S. he asked for anti-aircraft missiles and radar installations. He had not received a definite answer to that request, and when, on leaving, he asked Secretary of State Herter this question, the latter replied: "It is a fair assumption". Ben-Gurion said he had also asked for aid in his talks with Macmillan[11] and Adenauer.[12]

In conclusion, de Gaulle proposed that they meet again.[14]

Notes

1. See No. 135.
2. See No. 241 and n. 2 there.
3. Moshe Bitan, Ambassador to Ghana from May 1960 to July 1962.
4. One paragraph has been omitted here.
5. One sentence has been omitted here.
6. See Chapter 16.
7. One paragraph has been omitted here.
8. Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia.
9. Ground-to-air missiles.
10. See No. 137 and n. 2 there.
11. See No. 264.
12. See No. 215.

13. The meeting with Debré dealt mainly with matters touching the European Economic Market. For the report on the conversation, see No. 325.
14. On Ben-Gurion's second meeting with de Gaulle, see No. 251.

251. W. Eytan (Paris) to Ch. Yahil. 17 June 1960

Coded Tel. 200; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

Eytan reports on Ben-Gurion's second meeting with de Gaulle.[1] Ben-Gurion described Israel's security problems, and de Gaulle said: "We shall not let you be destroyed. If you are attacked, we shall come to your aid." Then he added: "If Nasser bombs your towns, this would be considered an act of grave international significance and many will come out and attack him, myself first and foremost", and again: "If he tries to destroy your towns from the air this would mean all-out war, this is why I do not believe he will do it."

De Gaulle told the Prime Minister that, after the failure of the summit conference, the U.S., Britain and France decided to analyze the principal strategic problems and to set up a special body for that purpose. He said: "I can promise you that one of the first strategic problems we shall examine will be that of Israel, to decide on what we can do about the threats against you and what we shall do if you are attacked. This would perhaps help you to get what you have been asking for from the U.S."

Other subjects were raised at the meeting, among them the Eichmann case[2] and the Algerian problem. In conclusion de Gaulle said: "I think our talks have been good and productive. I am very glad you came. Now that we know each other personally, I shall be very glad if we could maintain direct contacts with each other. We could meet, and you could write to me directly whenever you wanted to."[3]

Notes

1. On the first meeting, see No. 250.
2. Eytan cabled that Ben-Gurion did not wish to involve de Gaulle in the Argentinian aspect of the Eichmann affair (see his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 150, 14.6.1960 130.09/2350/1).
3. For further details on the conversation, see M. Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion* (Hebrew), Vol. 3, pp. 1383–1384.

252. Israel Embassy in Paris to the Division of Politico-Economic planning and to M. Bartur. 30 June 1960

Coded Tel. 303; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

The Embassy reports that Economic Councellor Boaz was summoned to the Economic Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There he was reminded of their complaint regarding Ambassador Harman's participation in organizing the counter-boycott of Renault, and of the intervention in this matter of their Ambassador in Israel.[1] The official repeated their request that nothing be done by the Government of Israel or its representatives abroad to encourage the counter-boycott of Renault by Jewish and Zionist circles.

Boaz replied that Israel's position had not changed since the exchange of letters between the two Foreign Ministers,[2] and that Israel's representatives were not active in organizing the counter-boycott. He was told the subject came up again in connection with the World Jewish Congress meeting in Paris. Another meeting with the French official has been scheduled, and Boaz intends telling him that (1) no member of the staff of the Israel Embassy in Paris is taking part in the conference, and (2) that Israel has no influence over the resolutions of world Jewish organizations. Boaz requests the comments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if any are thought necessary.

Notes

1. See No. 243.
2. Reference is to the correspondence of October 1959 (130.23/3120/22) between G. Meir and Couve de Murville on the "'Renault" affair.

253. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 11 September 1960

Coded Tel. 369; Inc.: 130.09/2350/4

Yahil explains to Eytan that Israel's position during the debates at the U.N. on the Algerian problem[1] has not been adopted on the merits of the case, but resulted from the Government's decision to go along with France. Clearly this is a grave decision, as it puts Israel in conflict with the African states; however, France must also be aware of the effect the debate will have on France's standing in Africa and on the future of the French Community.[2] Yahil asks whether France has new plans for the expected debate, in view

of the fact that it will be difficult for it to mobilize a one-third blocking majority,[3] the new African states in the U.N. being so numerous. Perhaps France would be interested in a draft resolution by a group of friendly states, which would not be identical with the French one but would be much more moderate than the anti-colonialist proposals; in this way the hostile vote could be split, preventing a two-thirds majority vote against France. Yahil stresses that he is just "thinking aloud", and that the important thing is that Israel should express its concern to France, and show it is sharing in France's problems, in return for France's loyalty to Israel.[5]

Notes

1. Eytan's telegram has not been traced, but his position on the Algeria issue was transmitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the delegation to the U.N., as follows: "First of all, we must adhere to the line of unconditional support of France. Any other attitude will not be understood and will not be forgiven. I assume that France's African friends will propose a formula which we also could support, together with Latin American states and other friends of France, without this hurting France or our standing in Africa." (See Rafael to the delegation to the U.N., NWT476, 29.11.1960, 130.09/2340/7.)
2. The "Communauté Française" was established in 1958 and comprised most of the French colonies in Africa. The member states enjoyed internal autonomy, but foreign and defence matters were under the jurisdiction of the Community as a whole, and in effect under that of France. Several of the member states demanded full independence in 1959, and an amendment to the French constitution was ratified in 1960 which enabled an independent country to be at the same time a member of the French Community. All the member states gained independence during that year, signing treaties of cooperation and aid with France.
3. The blocking third preventing approval by a two-thirds majority of matters of importance in the voting in the U.N. General Assembly.
4. Probably alludes to France's usual line of abstaining from the debates in the U.N. institutions — the Assembly and the committees — on matters touching the Algerian issue, claiming that this was a French internal problem.
5. See Nos. 254 and 260.

254. W. Eytan (Paris) to Ch. Yahil. 12 September 1960

Coded Tel. 848; Inc.: 130.09/2350/3

Eytan reports on his talk on the subject of Algeria with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville. Eytan said that Israel would side with France as in the past, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs was certainly aware

of the effect Israel's stand would have on its relations with Africa; he would therefore be grateful if France could share its ideas with Israel.[1] De Murville said that this was a rather embarrassing question. He could say only one thing with certainty — that France would absent itself from the debate in the Assembly, as it had done in the past. He had no idea of what resolution would be submitted by France's adversaries, and he thought they themselves had not yet decided on it.

Eytan told de Murville that Israel would soon return the Common Market questionnaire,[3] and it now requests France's support in the European Commission to promote the talks with Israel. De Murville had not been briefed on this subject and he promised to inquire.

Notes

1. See No. 253.
2. See No. 104.
3. See No. 340.

255. A. Chelouche (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 28 September 1960

Orig.: 93.02/936/11

Chelouche refers to what had been said in Ben-Gurion's second talk with de Gaulle about the establishment of a joint commission of the three powers for the study of problems of strategy, following the failure of the summit conference.[1] He asks whether the Embassy has any information on whether de Gaulle's promise to discuss the issue of Israel's security in that forum has been kept, or whether it is scheduled to come up. Does Eytan have any suggestions on that subject?

Notes

1. See No. 251.

256. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to Ch. de Gaulle (Paris). 12 October 1960

Notes

1. See No. 251.
2. Fidel Castro seized control of all of Cuba on January 1st, 1959; he later became an ally of the Soviet Union.
3. Nikita Sergeyevitch Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union.

257. Ch. de Gaulle (Paris) to D. Ben-Gurion. 9 November 1960

Notes

1. No. 256.
2. See Nos. 250 and 251.

258. W. Eytan (Paris) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 December 1960

Coded Tel. 548; Inc.: 130.09/2350/3

Eytan reports that in his talk with Maillard, de Gaulle's political adviser, he raised the subject of France's attitude towards Israel's activity in Africa. Maillard said that Israel's readiness to supply arms to Mali has caused concern and resentment, more in the French Community Office in Paris than in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] Eytan said he was not in possession of detailed information on the transaction, but he assumed that France would prefer Israel to Czechoslovakia as Mali's partner in such a transaction. Maillard said, "Not necessarily," and recalled France's resentment towards the U.S. when the latter gave aid to Guinea. Eytan said that this attitude was not reasonable. Maillard agreed, and recalled France's acquiescence in severing its commercial ties with Cuba, under American pressure. Eytan concluded by saying that he would be grateful for more information from the people in charge of the matter, and Maillard promised to find out who they are and to let Eytan know.[2]

Notes

1. M. Fischer, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Mali in September 1960. At his meeting with the Minister of Defence and of the Interior, Madeira Keita, Israel was requested to supply Mali with arms. (See Fischer to G. Meir, 29.9.1960, 130.23/3327/4.)
2. No additional material on this subject up to the end of the year under review has been found, and the assumption is that the matter was shelved owing to the season's holidays. It was raised again in January 1961 — see Shek to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, telegram 910, 20.1.1961, 130.09/2350/5.

259. Editorial Note

The Debate on Algeria at the 15th Session of the U. N. General Assembly

The Algerian problem was put on the agenda of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly of June 1960 at the demand of 25 African and Asian countries. This was the third year running that this problem was debated in the Assembly.

The First Committee debated the issue, and on December 15th it approved, with a majority of 47 against 20 and with 28 abstentions, the draft resolution submitted by Asian and African states, which included four operative clauses:

(1) Recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination and independence.

(2) Recognition of the urgent need of adequate and practicable guarantees to ensure the effective and equitable implementation of the right to self-determination on the basis of recognition of Algeria's unity and territorial integrity.

(3) Recognition of the United Nations' duty to promote the effective and equitable implementation of the above right.

(4) A referendum to be held in Algeria, under U.N. supervision, in which the Algerian people will freely decide on their country's future.

The First Committee's resolution was brought to the plenum for endorsement, where it was debated on December 19th.

11 African states, friendly to France (which itself had taken no part in the debate because it considered the issue an internal problem, Algeria being formally part of metropolitan France), proposed to delete Clause 4, and to replace it by a new clause enjoining the Assembly to summon the parties to the conflict to enter, without any preconditions, negotiations on a cease-fire and on the conditions for conducting the referendum on self-determination, including mutual guarantees by the parties and also international guarantees.

These states also proposed an additional operative clause, enjoining the Assembly to set up an international commission to promote negotiations between the parties. Cyprus, which had not been among the 25 states demanding the debate, submitted an amendment of its own to Clause 4, to have the referendum take place "under the aegis of the U.N.", instead of "under the U.N.'s supervision". The Assembly voted first on the amendments of the 11 African states, which were rejected (the one on the referendum failed by 31 votes for and 39 against, 25 abstaining; the one on the international commission failed by 22 for and 39 against, 35 abstaining).

The Cypriot amendment received 53 votes, 27 were cast against, with 17 abstentions, but it failed because it did not muster the necessary two-thirds majority. Clause 4 was also put to the vote separately, without the amendment, and it too failed to secure the necessary majority.

In the final vote taken on the resolution with Clause 4 deleted, it passed by 63 for and 8 against, 27 abstaining.

For the complete text of this resolution, which was given the number 1573(XV), see Main Volume, p. 411.

260. G. Rafael (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 23 December 1960

Coded Tel. 51; Outg.: 130.09/2350/4

Rafael reports on the way Israel voted on the Algerian issue in the U.N. General Assembly.

The delegation opposed both the Cypriot amendment asking for a referendum under the aegis of the U.N., and also the original Afro-Asian version demanding a referendum under the supervision of the U.N. On the other hand, it supported the two amendments proposing negotiations, submitted by the bloc of the francophone African states.[2] Rafael adds that the French representative at the U.N., Berard, thanked the Israel delegation for its stand. In one case, Israel's vote was decisive.

The debate on the Arab refugees problem has been postponed to a later date, some time in March according to the Arabs.[3]

Notes

1. Eytan asked how had Israel voted in the U.N. General Assembly on the Algerian issue, and what was the date set for the debate on the Arab refugees (telegram, 21.12.1960, 130.09/2350/3).
2. See Editorial Note above.
3. See Chapter 5.

261. A. Lourie (London) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 4 March 1960

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2323/2

Lourie reports on the meeting between Deputy Minister of Defence Shimon Peres and John D. Profumo, Minister of State in the Foreign Office.

Peres referred to the concentration of Egyptian forces on Israel's borders,[1] and said Israel had to be strong so as to deter any possible aggressor. He reviewed Egypt's rearmament with the help of the Soviet Union, and stressed that it woud soon receive MIG-19 jet planes. They are planning to reach their maximum fighting capability in two years' time. Israel has appealed to the U.S. for financial aid, and mainly to France for equipment, but there are items which can be obtained only in Britain. He added that in an emergency the West could do nothing to help Israel because of the time factor and the absence of conventional forces in the area. Israel was now requesting that Britain sell it a further 70 Centurion tanks,[2] in addition to the 60 tanks previously agreed on in principle. In addition, the aerial defence of Tel Aviv was a serious concern, and Israel therefore wishes to acquire ground-to-air missiles.

Profumo said that the question of the missiles raised great difficulties, and it would be bettei if Israel retreated from this idea because the outcome could be that Egypt would obtain similar missiles from their own sources. The British are now debating their global policy on missiles. As to the tanks, it was true that Israel has managed to keep secret the purchase of the first 30 tanks, but it was highly debatable whether the acquisition of 100 tanks could be similarly concealed. He hinted that an answer to Peres's questions could be given during Ben-Gurion's visit to Britain,[4] but stressed that no commitment had been given in the matter.

Notes

1. See Chapter 1.
2. In 1958, when the relations between Britain and Israel were at their best (following Israel's allowing British planes carrying troops to Jordan to pass through its airspace), Britain agreed to sell to Israel 60 Centurion tanks. Thirty tanks were supplied in 1959.
3. South Africa decided to sell 200 tanks acquired from Britain and was looking for buyers. Israel wished to buy some of these tanks, but the deal eventually fell through. (See Lourie to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to Yahil, telegram 187, 8.4.1960, 130.09/2323/2.)
3. Following Peres's meeting with Profumo, the British discussed among themselves the possibility of supplying Israel with additional tanks. The conclusion was that, in view of a number of political setbacks suffered lately by Israel and also of Egypt's rearmament, Israel's request should be approved in part and 60 additional tanks should be sold to it. This recommendation was submitted to Prime Minister Macmillan, who was due to meet Ben-Gurion. A definitive announcement to that effect was delivered to Israel in July. (See summary of conversation in the British Foreign Office, Ben-Gurion's visit, arms for Israel, 15.3.1960, PRO, Prem11/3400/10465; Ofer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 775, 25.7.1960, 130.09/2323/4.)

262. M. Ofer (London) to the British Commonwealth Division. 12 March 1960

Coded Tel. 45; Inc.: 130.09/2323/2

Ofer reports on his meeting with Rothnie of the British Foreign Office, who asked him what subjects was Ben-Gurion was thinking of raising at his planned meeting with Macmillan.[1] Ofer replied that he did not know, but there was concern in Israel about its defence, and the Western powers, in their rivalry with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, were not doing enough to help. He added that the results of Peres's visit[2] did not make for an impression that the British Foreign Office was giving sufficient thought to Israel's needs in the field of defence.

Rothnie replied that their attitude to Israel was based on the principle that a strong Israel was a stabilizing factor in the region. Britain would never woo Nasser and make concessions to him, at Israel's expense. The results of Peres's visit were limited because the necessary studies had not yet been completed. There would be no difficulty in obtaining naval materiel from Britain, but, in the matter of the missiles, U.S. agreement was necessary. As to their policy in the Middle East, Britain's aim was to arrive at a disengagement in whatever touched internal regional issues. This policy has

been adopted because of Lloyd's wish to disembarrass Britain of the legacy of the Suez affair. Britain had no intention of raising Middle Eastern issues at the summit conference, mainly because they did not rely on the Soviets' promises regarding their non-involvement and stoppage of the arms race.

Ofer raised the subject of the purchase of the tanks. He said that when it came to concealing the transaction it mattered little whether it involved 30 or 100 tanks. The U.A.R. had many heavy tanks and the British were supplying Jordan with similar tanks, even though they knew that Jordan's regime was far from stable. If the British were really interested in a strong Israel, they would supply it with arms.

Rothnie replied that the risk of publicity was indeed not critical, especially in view of the fact that Israel had proved it could keep these matters secret. He also agreed that the heavy armour in Jordan was not in particularly safe hands. The British Government was prepared to give serious and sympathetic consideration to Israel's requests, but it still estimated that Israel was stronger than the Arabs. His advice was, that Israel present compelling arguments to prove that the Arabs' military strength was superior.

Notes

1. On the Prime Minister's talks with Macmillan, see No. 264.
2. See No. 261.
3. In reaction to the Franco-British invasion of the Suez Canal area in 1956, Egypt broke off its diplomatic relations with Britain (and with France) in November of that year. The relations with Britain were partially resumed in November 1959, when the embassies headed by chargés d'affaires were opened, but an agreement on the exchange of ambassadors was signed only in January 1961. Apart from the bitter feelings left after the Suez war, the agreement on the exchange of ambassadors was delayed also because of Egypt's demand to open consulates in British possessions in Africa and Asia.
4. See No. 261 and n. 3 there.
5. A conference of the Western leaders (President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer) with Soviet Premier Khrushchev which was scheduled to meet in Paris in May 1960. The conference broke up a few days after its opening following the downing by the Soviets in Soviet territory of the American reconnaissance plane U-2.

263. Statement by the Prime Minister on his arrival in Great Britain. (London, 17 March 1960)

Note

1. See No. 264.

264. Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — H. Macmillan (London, 17 March 1960)

Notes

1. This document is published as declassified by the IMDEA. All deletions are marked. See also the records in the files of the British Prime Minister's Office, Record of a conversation, ...March 17, 1960, PRO, Prem11/3400/10465.
2. See No. 135.
3. General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander of the British Forces in the Middle East, paid a visit to Israel at the beginning of 1951 and had two meetings with Ben-Gurion. At the second meeting, Ben-Gurion said that the relations between Israel and Britain in a state of emergency should be constituted on a basis parallel to that of Britain with Australia and New Zealand. On Robertson's visit, See Vol. 6, Nos. 68 and 72.
4. Reference is presumably to Abd al-Salam Aref, an Iraqi officer who had taken part with Qassem in the coup of July 14th, 1958. He would eventually be one of the organizers of the 1963 coup which put an end to Qassem's rule.
5. Ground-to-air missiles.
6. Following the coup in Iraq, fears arose in Jordan of possible subversive activities by the U.A.R.; Britain was requested to extend its support to Jordan, and British forces were accordingly dispatched there by air. The British planes lifted from Cyprus and passed on their way to Jordan through Israel's airspace.
7. See No. 261.
8. G. Meir paid a visit to Britain in August 1958. The minutes of her talk of 11th August with Selwyn Lloyd are in File 130.23/3098/5.
9. Ilyushin planes.
10. The dispatch of British forces to defend Jordan and of American forces to defend Lebanon.
11. September 20th, 1959.
12. A state in West Africa which gained independence in 1958 but did not join the French Community, in contrast to other former French colonies which attained independence at the same time.
13. A delegation of ten Guineans came to Israel in February 1960 to study cooperative methods in agricultural settlements.

14. Refers to Eden's book *Full Circle*, published in 1960, containing his version of the Franco-British invasion of Egypt in November 1956.
15. See n. 8 above.

265. A. Lourie (London) to Ch. Yahil. 23 March 1960

Coded Tel. 100; Inc.: 130.09/2323/2

Lourie heard from R. Stevens, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Middle Eastern affairs in the Foreign Office, that they were studying Macmillan's talk with Ben-Gurion[2] in detail and were "working hard" to have the necessary information complete. Stevens also said they they would inform the Lebanese Ambassador,[3] when he came to ask for details about Ben-Gurion's visit, that the talk dealt in generalities, without a specific undertaking.

Lourie said it was strange that the Egyptians did not persist in publicizing the matter of the tanks;[4] perhaps they did not want to reveal to the public how much Israel had received in the past, but were concerned about what it would receive in the future. He referred to what he had heard from Stevens on another occasion, implying that the source for the reports in the Egyptian press about Israel buying tanks from Britain was the weekly *Newsweek*, and asked whether they now had more substantial information about the source. Stevens answered in the negative,[5] and noted that what had appeared in the press about Ben-Gurion's visit was most probably based on surmise and not on authentic information.

Notes

1. The submission by Ambassador A. Lourie of his credentials to Queen Elizabeth II.
2. See No. 264.
3. Ibrahim al Ahdab, the Lebanese ambassador to Britain.
4. See No. 261 and n. 2 there.
5. Stevens informed Lourie on March 17th that newspapers appearing in Cairo and Beirut had reported the day before, with screaming headlines, on the sale of Centurion tanks by Britain to Israel, on the matter having been discussed with Peres during his stay in Britain two weeks previously, and on its being still debated by the committee of the three Western powers dealing with the supply of arms to the Middle East. Stevens said that the British Foreign Office thought it possible that the source of the story was the American magazine *Newsweek*. (See Ofer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 67, 17.3.1960, 130.09/2323/2.)

266. Editorial Note

Relations between Israel and Ireland

Catholic Ireland recognized Israel *de facto* on February 12, 1949, but was not prepared to go further and accord Israel *de jure* recognition with full diplomatic relations: the Irish went along with the Vatican in its traditional attitude towards Israel, and also did not want to harm their relations with the Arab states.

The Israel Embassy in London was charged with handling the subject of relations with Ireland, even though it was not accredited to that country. These efforts did not meet with success, but modest commercial relations were established between the two countries.

L. Kohn, the political adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Ireland in the course of the reviewed year. The formal occasion was the delivery of lectures, but he also put forward feelers in the matter of diplomatic relations — again, however, to no avail.

267. M. Ofer (London) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 July 1960

Coded Tel. 773; Inc.: 130.23/3303/26

Ofer reports on L. Kohn's visit to Ireland. He met the President,[1] the Minister of Foreign Affairs,[2] senior officials in the Ministry, and other personalities. The attitude towards Israel was favourable everywhere, but there was no progress towards Ireland's recognizing Israel *de jure* and establishing diplomatic relations.

During Kohn's stay in Ireland, M. Fawzi, the Minister of Foreign of the U.A.R., also visited that country. Kohn was informed that the object of his visit was the establishment of diplomatic relations in exchange for the U.A.R.'s support of Ireland's candidacy for the Presidency of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. The *Irish Times* reported that a decision had been taken to establish diplomatic relations with the U.A.R., but there has been no official confirmation of that report.[5]

Notes

1. Eamon de Valera, the President of the Irish Republic.
2. Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. Such a treaty was not signed in the year under review.
4. See L. Kohn to G. Shomron, 22.7.1960, 130.23/3303/26.
5. A decision in principle was taken on the establishment of diplomatic relations, but it was not implemented in the reviewed year.

268. Meeting: A. Lourie — R. Stevens (London, 15 September 1960)

Notes

1. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol paid a visit to Britain in September 1960, on his way to the United States.
2. The second part of the document has been omitted; it deals with the relations between Israel and Ceylon and with matters on the agenda of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. A paragraph dealing with the Arab boycott has been printed as No. 95.

269. A. Lourie (London) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to A. Liveran. 12 October 1960

Coded Tel. 16a; Inc.: 130.09/2323/4

Lourie reports on a meeting with Stevens on the subject of the forthcoming visit of Chief of the General Staff Laskov to Britain at the invitation of the Military Commentators Circle.[1] Britain is concerned about the visit in the present circumstances, namely the tension along the Syria–Jordan border following the murder of Majali.[3] The Egyptians are worried about possible British intentions, and as King Hussein had been in London recently they could interpret his visit, and that of Laskov, as preparatory steps in some plan of action against them. Stevens said the Foreign Office would probably ask their Ambassador in Israel to suggest that the visit be postponed.[6]

Lourie voiced his surprise at the problem arising at this stage, as the Israeli military attaché[2] had been in continuous contact with the War Office, which had known for a considerable time now about Laskov's planned visit. He suggested that the visit take place with a minimum of publicity. Stevens said

they would think it over and would dispatch appropriate instructions to their Embassy in Israel.

Lourie requests to be informed whether the Chief of Staff prefers to cancel his visit in view of the new circumstances, or whether he intends to carry on with it, giving up, however, official meetings and tours.

Notes

1. Rav-Aluf Chaim Laskov, Chief of Staff of the I.D.F.
2. Aluf-Mishne Binyamin Gibli, Military Attaché in London from April 1960.
3. Hazza' al-Majali, the Jordanian Premier, was assassinated in Amman in August 1960. King Hussein accused the U.A.R. of having planned the murder. On September 16th, the U.A.R. accused Jordan of concentrating its forces on its northern border in preparation for the invasion of Syria. Jordan claimed the movements were part of routine manoeuvres. See also No. 29.
4. King Hussein spoke on October 3rd at the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly and accused the U.A.R. of subversive activities against his country, but the Assembly took no steps against the U.A.R.
5. Macmillan met Nasser twice during the session of the Assembly — on September 29th and on October 3rd. They discussed, *inter alia*, the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries — see No. 262 and n. 3 there. See also No. 270.
6. Patrick Francis Hancock, the British Ambassador to Israel, transmitted to Fischer the suggestion that the visit be postponed — see the latter's telegram to the Embassy in London, 82, 14.10.1960, 139.09/2323/3.
7. In the event, the visit did not take place — see No. 271.

270. A. Lourie (London) to Ch. Yahil. 26 October 1960

Coded Tel. 87; Inc.: 130.09/2323/4

Lourie reports on his meeting with the new Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home,[1] who told him about Britain's efforts to renew diplomatic relations with the U.A.R., promising that this would not affect Britain's relations with Israel. Lourie mentioned the problem of the Chief of Staff's visit, and Home replied that they had been informed of the visit rather late in the day and that the date set was inconvenient to them. Relations between Israel and Britain are an established reality and there is no question of any deviation from this fact.

Home told Lourie that in his talk with Nasser during the session of the U.N. Assembly[5] the subject of the Arab refugees came up. Nasser thinks the time has come to take action in this matter, perhaps with the help of

a neutral personality like Hammarskjöld. Lourie replied that Hammarskjöld had proposed a solution to the problem in 1959, but this was rejected by the Arabs.

Notes

1. Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home was appointed Foreign Secretary in July 1960, in place of Selwyn Lloyd, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer.
2. At the meeting between G. Meir and Douglas-Home, mainly global affairs were discussed, among them Hammarskjöld's opposition to Khrushchev's proposal to appoint a secretariat of three for the U.N., disarmament, and the formation at the U.N. of the bloc of non-aligned nations; matters concerning Israel were discussed only when they touched the Arab refugees and the Palestine Conciliation Commission. (See the delegation to the U.N. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT444, 29.9.1960, 130.09/2339/20.)
3. See No. 264, n. 8.
4. See No. 264.
5. See No. 269 and n. 5 there.
6. General Ne Win, Burmese Prime Minister from October 1958 to April 1960.
7. See No. 269.
8. Reference is to the report submitted by Hammarskjöld on June 15th, 1959, to the 14th Session of the General Assembly (U.N. Document A/4121), containing the recommendation for the integration of the refugees "in the productive communities in the Middle East" — see No. 99.
9. Douglas-Home served as Minister of State for British Commonwealth affairs in the years 1955 to 1960.

271. A. Lourie (London) to Ch. Yahil. 30 October 1960

Coded Tel. 100; Inc.: 130.09/2323/4

Lourie reports on his meeting with Stevens on the subject of the cancellation of the Chief of Staff's visit.[1] Stevens explained that this was caused by the tension between the U.A.R. and Jordan,[2] and should not be construed as a concession to Nasser at Israel's expense. He reviewed the tension between the U.A.R. and Jordan following Majali's murder, and told Lourie about developments in the expected exchange of ambassadors with Egypt, and that they were waiting for the U.A.R.'s decision on a joint communiqué. The Algerian affair was embarrassing to Britain,[5] and they have not yet decided on the stand to be taken at the Assembly. They would even prefer an extreme draft resolution, because then they could afford to abstain. He also mentioned the refugee issue,[6] said that the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires[8] keeps claiming

that Israel is not implementing the 1948 U.N. resolution,[9] while he himself considers this argument invalid as long as the U.A.R. claims to be in a state of war with Israel. Lourie took the opportunity to give Stevens an outline of Israel's position on that issue in general.

Notes

1. See Nos 270 and 271.
2. See No. 269 and n. 3 there.
3. See *ibid.*, n. 4.
4. In response to Hussein's speech at the General Assembly, Nasser attacked him in two venomous speeches interspersed with personal insults — in Cairo on October 5th and in Damascus on October 17th.
5. See Chapter 9.
6. See No. 270.
7. In 1949, Israel announced its willingness to admit 100,000 refugees as its part in solving the problem. This proposal was turned down on the spot by the Arab states.
8. Kamal Khalil, the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires in Britain.
9. See Introduction, pp. XVI–XVII.

272. E. Sasson (Rome) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 28 January 1960

Coded Tel. 159; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reviews the state of relations between Israel and Italy following his recent meetings at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy has reservations about cementing both political and economic relations with Israel. This is similar to the attitudes taken by other Western countries which have political and economic interests in the Middle East, but it is most conspicuous in Italy. This, he explains, is the result "solely of Italy's loyalty towards itself and frankness towards Israel, and not because of any special enmity towards us". He proposes that Israel's representatives in other Western countries also examine the policies towards Israel of the countries to which they are accredited. From his talks in Italy he has drawn the conclusion that the West has acquiesced in the Arab boycott of Israel, no matter how much it is opposed to it in principle, because its political and economic interests demand close relations with the Arab countries. The intention to penetrate new countries in Asia and Africa also acts for cooler relations with Israel, for fear that the Arab states might sabotage these plans.

Note

1. Refers to Israel's attempts, commencing with 1958, to sign a multilateral trade agreement with the O.E.E.C. — the Organization for European Economic Cooperation — see Chapter 14.

273. E. Sasson (Rome) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 February 1960

Coded Tel. 171; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on his talk with Minister of Foreign Affairs Pella.[1] Sasson complained about the reservations Italy had about cementing closer political, economic and cultural ties with Israel, and Pella expressed his surprise and promised to look into the matter. He said that the difficulties in the multilateral agreement proposed by Israel result from technical problems in the Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Trade, and from differences of opinion among the members of the Common Market themselves, and between them and the EFTA countries and other economic organizations, and did not touch Israel at all.[5] He asked Sasson to inform Minister of Foreign Affairs Meir, in his name, that he would fulfil the promises he had given her in their talks.[6]

Notes

1. Giuseppe Pella, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1957 to 1958, and from February 1959 to February 1960.
2. Sasson served in Rome uninterruptedly, from 1953 — as minister, and from 1956 — as ambassador.
3. See No. 272.
4. One paragraph, dealing with matters of a personal nature, has been omitted here.
5. See Chapter 14.
6. The meeting in New York took place in September 1959, when they had come to participate in the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly; the one in Paris was in March 1959, while in Rome they met in October 1957.

274. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 1 March 1960

Coded Tel. 235; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on his talk with Straneo, Head of the Political Division of

the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of delays in approving Israel's requests for the purchase of arms.[1] Straneo said that Italy was concerned about the deterioration of the situation on the Israel–U.A.R. borders.[2] He said that the U.A.R. lived in constant fear of Israel. Sasson replied that this fear was groundless. Straneo promised to look again into the delayed shipments of arms.

Notes

1. Refers to the order for light armaments to the value of some $300,000, placed at the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960 (see No. 277, and Dikan's memorandum to Sasson, 19.5.1960, 130.23/3216/1).
2. See Chapter 1.

275. E. Sasson (Rome) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and M. Fischer. 7 March 1960

Coded Tel. 251; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on the meeting Deputy Defence Minister Peres[1] had with Italian Minister of Defence Andreotti. He thinks the meeting was very productive;[2] among other things discussed was a possible visit by Ben-Gurion, but Sasson thinks this is not an appropriate time for such a visit owing to the present government crisis in Italy.[4]

Notes

1. Deputy Minister of Defence Shimon Peres left in March 1960 for a tour of several countries in the West in order to strengthen the ties of the Ministry of Defence with them.
2. For a report on the conversation, recorded by Shmuel Dror, the Defence Ministry's representative in Italy, see in Sasson's letter to Fischer, 7.3.1960, 130.23/3296/1.
3. On these visits, see Chapters 7 and 10.
4. Segni's government resigned on February 24th. The new government, headed by Fernando Tambroni, took over only on March 25th. It did not last long, and a new cabinet was formed by Fanfani in July 1960.

276. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to E. Sasson. 4 April 1960

Coded Tel. 383; Outg.: 130.09/2359/1

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has seen Italian Ambassador to Israel G. Revedin.[1] She told the Ambassador that she had information to the effect that Italy had promised to sell to the U.A.R. tens of millions of dollars worth of arms.[2] The Ambassador promised to check this information, and added that as far as he knew Italy had nothing to sell to the U.A.R. in this field.

Notes

1. Giovanni Revedin, Italy's Ambassador to Israel.
2. See No. 277.

277. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 17 April 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3296/1

Sasson held meetings with Italian Ambassador to Israel Revedin and with de Regge, who is in charge of the Middle East section in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main subjects in both talks were the supply of arms by Italy to Middle Eastern states and the possibility of a visit by Ben-Gurion to Italy. Sasson's interlocutors promised to find out the truth behind the rumours of a large arms transaction with the U.A.R.,[2] and stressed that if such a deal had taken place they would have known about it. As to the delays in supplying the arms to Israel,[3] they said they had authorized four transactions and hoped that there would be no more delays in the future. De Regge claimed that the delays originated from the office of the Minister and the Director-General and not from his department.

As to Ben-Gurion's visit, they said that the present government crisis prevented any decision being taken in the matter.

Notes

1. A group of relatively young diplomats in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who rebelled against the ministry's ossified hierarchy.
2. See No. 276, and also Sasson to Fischer, 8.4.1960, 130.23/3296/10.
3. See No. 274.

4. See No. 275.

278. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 25 May 1960

Coded Tel. 486; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson describes his efforts in overcoming the "veto" cast by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Israel's requests for arms.[1] In his last meeting he threatened that if Italy's negative attitude did not change,[2] Israel would recall its purchase mission and would inform Italy's Western allies of its action.

Sasson's interlocutors promised to do whatever they could to relieve the situation. Sasson suggests that Fischer summon the Italian Ambassador to Israel and have him cable his government on the situation. When Sasson had talked with the Ambassador during his stay in Rome, the latter promised that efforts would be made to improve matters, with the installation of the new government.

Notes

1. See Nos. 274 and 277.
2. See his memorandum to Sasson, 19.5.1960, 130.23/3291/6.
3. An official announcement was issued in Cairo on April 20th to the effect that a spy network working for Israel had been exposed, two of its members being Italian citizens (see *Davar*, 21.4.1960).
4. See Sasson to Fischer, 8.4.1960, 130.23/3256/10.
5. The talk took place some time later, with G. Meir — see No. 279.
6. See No. 277.

279. A. Chelouche (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Rome. 12 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3296/1

Chelouche reports on the talk Minister of Foreign Affairs Meir had with Italian Ambassador Revedin, in which she said that Italy was perhaps the only state in Western Europe with which Israel encounters difficulties in relations, and which she thinks are avoidable. It appears to her that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to put its money on the Arabs, and that the issues common to Israel and Italy are dealt with in that light. Italy

does not show much interest in Israel's economic potential, which is rather strange, considering that other European countries show great interest in investment in Israel and in its development plans. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also asked what Italy's position would be on Israel's application for an agreement with the European Economic Community.

The Ambassador tried to refute the Minister of Foreign Affairs' accusations. He said that there had been a significant improvement in relations between the two countries during his term of service, and that he was not aware of any anti-Israel line in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The economy in Italy is free and the lack of interest is rooted in economic factors. As to the European Economic Community its position will be decided on purely economic considerations. He is in favour of Bartur's[2] going to Rome in connection with this subject, but the visit should be very thoroughly prepared.

Notes

1. Somalia was granted independence on July 1st, 1960. On Israel's unsuccessful attempts to establish diplomatic relations with this country, see Chapter 20.
2. Moshe Bartur, Assistant Director-General for economic affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bartur actually visited Italy in October 1960 — see Chapter 14.
3. A conference on the role of science in the development of new states took place at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot in August 1960.

280. Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[1] (Jerusalem, 29 August 1960)

Report: 130.23/3296/1

Sasson said that the new Prime Minister, Fanfani,[3] was friendly to Israel. The question, however, is, will he follow a policy of friendship with the Arabs without this affecting relations with Israel, or will he return to the line prevailing in the period between his previous ministry and the new one, namely, friendship with the Arabs and indifference towards Israel?

A discussion took place later on practical steps to promote economic co-operation with Italy, which all the participants thought was the key to changing the situation. The Economic Division, in cooperation with the Western Europe Division, was allotted the task of preparing a review of the possibilities of economic co-operation with Italy. When that has been completed, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will decide in what way to involve

the economic ministries in the proposed plan of action. It was also resolved to examine the possibilities of co-operation with southern Italy.

Notes

1. The discussion took place on the occasion of Sasson's home visit; the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry's staff participated in it.
2. See letter from E. Sasson to G. Meir, 19.8.1960, 130.23/3291/1.
3. See No. 275 and n. 4 there.

281. E. Sasson (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 October 1960

Coded Tel. NWT446; Inc.: 130.09/2339/25

Sasson reports on the meeting between Mrs. Meir and Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni, which took place in New York, when both were present at the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Mrs. Meir laid stress on economic relations between the two countries and proposed that an Italian economic mission be dispatched to Israel to study the possibilities at first hand, and to allay the fears of competition between their countries. She also warned against submission to the Arab boycott pressures. Segni promised to look into these matters on his return to Rome. He stressed that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no objections to expanding economic relations with Israel. Italy's economic relations with the Arab states did not justify coolness towards Israel.

282. H. Dikan (Rome) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 October 1960

Coded Tel. 894; Inc.: 130.23/3296/1

Dikan reports on the meeting between Minister of Agriculture Dayan[1] and his Italian opposite number,[2] Mariano Rumor. Both ministers agreed on the need for co-operation between the European states in the field of aid to developing countries, so as to prevent politicization of the enterprise. Dayan raised the possibility of cooperation with Italy in the field of agriculture and in marketing in particular. Rumor agreed and suggested that experts from

both sides meet to discuss co-ordination in the marketing of citrus. Dayan later proposed that a mission be dispatched from southern Italy to see what was being done in Israel in land development and irrigation, and Rumor agreed that this should be done.[3]

Notes

1. Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan came to Italy to participate in the conference of the FAO — the Food and Agriculture Organization.
2. Mariano Rumor, the Italian Minister of Agriculture.
3. In the event, Israel did not participate in south Italy's development projects. Herewith an excerpt from the report by Y. Anug on his visit to Italy in November 1960: "I have come to the conclusion that there are no grounds for any sort of participation in this important process (the development of south Italy). There is of course the possibility of exchanging visits by experts, and I am for it, but this is a matter of public relations, which of course are important in themselves. I cannot see any practical possibilities. Italy is in no need of experts from Israel... This is a domestic Italian problem of a sensitive and delicate nature. There is nothing there for us." (See report by Anug, November 1960, 130.23/3296/23.)

283. A. Harel (Moscow) to G. Meir. 23 March 1960

Copy: 93.39/544/7

Harel reviews the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel during his first year of service in Moscow.

In his opinion, the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel is a function of its relations with the Arab states, on the one hand, and with its own Jewish minority, on the other. He rejects the opinion prevailing in Israel, as if there was nothing Israel could do to change the policy of the Soviet Union, and argues that there is room for an active Israeli policy with this aim in view. The key to desirable change touches three spheres:

(1) The Middle East.

(2) The Soviet Union itself.

(3) Europe.

In the Middle East, time is on Israel's side, and two processes, seemingly contradictory, may cause a change in Soviet policy. The first, Israel's internal and external growth in strength, giving it more weight as a factor in the Middle East, and the second — a weakening of Israel as a factor contributing to Soviet penetration of the Middle East; the Soviet Union's ties with the U.A.R. and with Iraq are being more and more based on matters of substance and

not, as in the past, on demonstrative propaganda exploiting the Israel–Arab conflict. The U.A.R.'s plans of expansion cause the Soviet Union to distance itself from it gradually, and Israel thus gains manoeuvring space. However, the Soviets are still helping the Arab states with their rearmament.

On the internal front, the Soviets employ contradictory policies towards their Jewish citizens: they refuse to recognize the Jewish people as an independent and creative nation, and promote assimilation and intermingling; on the other hand, the authorities put obstacles in the way of assimilation, and this causes tension within the Jewish community, evident from the growing number of Jewish youth attending the synagogues and identifying with Israel. In the light of this tension, and as a result of pressure by world public opinion, the Soviet Union permitted the publication of two books in Yiddish. At the moment the Soviets are prepared to make artificial moves to try and demonstrate to the world that the situation of its Jews is much better than it is in reality. One can add to this the Soviets' wish to thaw the atmosphere before the forthcoming summit conference. This situation gives Israel more room for manoeuvre.

Assuming that his analysis is correct, Harel proposes the following:

(1) To strengthen the awareness of Jewish identity among the Jews in the Soviet Union, in order to demonstrate that the present Soviet policy does not afford a solution to their problem.

(2) To hold ideological talks with Soviet leaders to have them know the truth about Israel.

(3) To utilize the pressure of world public opinion to gain some improvement in the condition of Soviet Jews and to influence the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel.

(4) To consider steps which would intimate to the Soviets that Israel was prepared to support certain aspects of their policy of creating a more cordial atmosphere if this improved the Soviet Union's attitude towards the Jews and towards Israel.

As regards the third sphere, Europe, Harel points out that Israel's relations with the Federal Republic of Germany carry weight in the context of the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel, as the Soviets attach great importance to the moral help which they think Israel is giving to Adenauer and to Germany whose policy opposes the amelioration of relations between East and West. The Soviet press attacked Israel fiercely after Ben-Gurion's meeting with Adenauer.[3] Harel assumes that at this meeting[4] Israel was promised economic and perhaps also military aid, and he wonders whether it is better to absolve morally the Federal Republic of Germany and to enjoy the benefits promised by Adenauer, or to refrain from doing so in the hope that this would help in improving Israel's relations with the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Initials, in the Russian language, of "the Social-Democratic Workers' Party".
2. A meeting of the leaders of the West (President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer) and of the East (Premier Khrushchev) in Paris in May 1960, which broke up immediately after its opening following the downing by the Soviets, over Soviet territory, of the American reconnaissance plane U-2 on May 1st, 1960.
3. This article states that it was no coincidence that Ben-Gurion and Adenauer were visiting the United States on the eve of the summit conference. Both did their best to prevent the conference from succeeding. During his stay in Washington Ben-Gurion attempted to cast suspicion on the Soviet Union's efforts in the cause of peace, and urged the continuation of the arms race. (On Khrushchev's position in the matter of a meeting between himself and Adenauer, see No. 288 and n. 3 there.)
4. At their meeting which took place in March 1960 — see No. 215.

284. Editorial Note

Efforts Made by the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to Arrange a Meeting with the Soviet Prime Minister, Nikita S. Khrushchev

At a press conference held in London in March 1960, towards the end of his visit to Britain, Ben-Gurion said that he would like to meet Khrushchev and that he had spoken on this subject with Bodrov, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel, even before planning to meet the Western leaders.

Bodrov's answer was late in coming. Ben-Gurion reminded him of the matter before leaving for the U.S. and Britain, and was answered that the suggestion would be discussed after Ben-Gurion's return to Israel (*Ha'aretz*, 20.3.1960). When welcoming the Prime Minister on his return, Bodrov confirmed the reports on Ben-Gurion's wish to meet Khrushchev (*Ha'aretz*, 25.3.1960), while Khrushchev himself, at a press conference during his visit to France, declared that he knew nothing of such a request, and added that if he had received it he would have certainly replied to it (*Davar*, 3.4.1960). When asked on this subject at a cabinet meeting, Ben-Gurion replied that he had told Bodrov about his wish to meet the Soviet leader and repeated that wish at the press conference in London. He explained that it was not the accepted usage to request a meeting in a diplomatic note before the other party had responded to the preliminary overtures (*Davar*, 4.4.1960).

Owing to the ambiguity surrounding this subject, Israel's Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to raise it with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

285. A. Harel (Moscow) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 April 1960

Coded Tel. 768; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel has heard from his Swedish opposite number[1] that he had been asked by a Russian academician close both to Khrushchev and to his deputy Kozlov,[2] whether he thought Ben-Gurion was interested in meeting Khrushchev.[4] The Swedish Ambassador replied in the affirmative, and he assumes that this answer will be conveyed to Kozlov.

In view of this conversation and of Khrushchev's statement at the Paris press conference that he had had no message from Ben-Gurion, Harel suggests that the dispatch of such a letter be considered, to be written by Ben-Gurion and transmitted to Khrushchev through Harel.

Notes

1. R.R. Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
2. Frol Romanovitch Kozlov, First Deputy to the Soviet Premier.
3. This document has not been found.
4. See Editorial Note above.

286. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Moscow. 4 April 1960

Coded Tel. 800; Outg.: 130.09/2327/5

Yahil refers to Harel's suggestion about a letter from Ben-Gurion to Khrushchev.[1] As the Russian Ambassador to Israel is at the moment in Moscow, it would be better to await his return to Israel.

Note

1. No. 285.

287. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Moscow. 5 April 1960

Coded Tel. 801; Outg.: 130.09/2327/5

Mrs. Meir instructs Harel to request an audience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to remind them that Ben-Gurion personally approached Ambassador Bodrov several months ago asking him to arrange for a meeting with Khrushchev, while leaving it to the Soviets to determine the nature of the meeting and other details. Harel has been asked to remind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no answer to that approach has so far been received.

Notes

1. No. 285.
2. No. 286.

288. A. Harel (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 April 1960

Coded Tel. 773; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General. In Gromyko's absence, he met Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik and raised Ben-Gurion's request to meet with Khrushchev. Malik said that the Soviet Government had had the impression that Ben-Gurion's request had been made as an afterthought during an incidental conversation.[2] The political situation being what it was, he thought such a meeting would be premature; however, he would transmit the request to his superiors "in accordance with the issue's importance".

Following that, Harel remarked on the contradictions between the Soviet Union's policy in general and its attitude towards Israel in particular, quoting Khrushchev's words that he was prepared to meet Adenauer,[3] and pointing to the Soviet Union's stand on economic and cultural relations with Israel.[4]

Malik said that he was new in his post and argued that the Soviet Union's attitude could be explained as a reaction to anti-Soviet declarations by Israeli leaders, and in the Israeli press. He concluded by promising an early answer.[5]

Notes

1. No. 287.
2. See Editorial Note, No. 284. The date of the conversation could place it on the occasion of the October Revolution Day reception at the Soviet Embassy.
3. At a press conference held in Paris on April 3rd, Khrushchev said that he was willing to meet Adenauer, as the Soviet Union's opinion was that personal meetings were always useful (see *Ha'aretz*, 4.4.1960).
4. The Soviet Union broke off its economic relations with Israel in November 1956, following the Sinai Campaign. Cultural relations between the two countries hardly existed even prior to the Sinai Campaign.
5. See No. 289.

289. A. Harel (Moscow) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 26 April 1960

Coded Tel. 801; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director-General, and the head of the Eastern Europe Division.

He was summoned that day to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik, and was told that "in view of the hostile and aggressive utterances of Israeli public figures and even of members of the government, the Government of the Soviet Union thought that a visit by the Israeli Prime Minister would be premature. However, it wished to stress that its policy would remain based on a desire for good relations with all the countries of the Near and Middle East without any discrimination".

Harel responded by saying that the statement showed to what extent the Soviet Union's policy was based on erroneous assumptions, and how useful it would have been for the Prime Minister to pay a visit to the Soviet Union; however, in view of the above statement he had nothing more to say. He then rose and terminated the conversation.

Note

1. The telegram was addressed also to the Director-General and to the East European Division.

290. Y.L. Gideon (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Moscow. 9 May 1960

Orig.: 93.39/544/7

Gideon remarks that the officials of the Soviet Embassy in Israel had told the press that there were discrepancies between Harel's report of Malik's statement on Ben-Gurion's proposed meeting with Khrushchev,[1] and the version which had been received at the Soviet embassy. Harel reported that Malik had used the Russian word meaning "premature", while according to the version received at the Embassy, he used the word for "untimely". As to the paragraph on relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East, the version received at the Embassy says that the desire to maintain good relations with these countries "depends on the existence of mutual desire and mutual interests in that respect".[2] Gideon does not attach much importance to the first correction, but if the Soviet Embassy's version of the second part of the statement is correct, then the Soviets could explain that in the absence of desire on Israel's part for good relations with the Soviet Union and the absence of mutual interests in this respect, the statement referred to good relations with the Arab countries only.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 289.
2. Harel replied (his telegram 839, 13.5.1960, 130.09/2327/6) that in the record he had made of the conversation appears one word ("before its time"), but it was not impossible that he had used another word ("untimely"). However, he had no doubt whatsoever that Malik did not add the sentence "...if there exists a mutual will for that and mutual interest".
3. At the Cabinet meeting of May 8th, Minister G. Meir reported on the developments in the efforts being made to arrange for a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Khrushchev. Ben-Gurion commented: "It is not Khrushchev who directs our lives. We can go on living without a meeting with Khrushchev". (See stenographic records of the Cabinet, 8 May 1960.)

291. A. Harel (Moscow) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 May 1960

Coded Tel. 859; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel reports on his meeting with the new President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev. The conversation turned on general problems of immigration and of the economy, and on the role played by the Soviet Union in the establishment of the State of Israel. When the Ambassador voiced his disappointment at the stagnation which had set in during the last few years in the relations between the two countries, manifested *inter alia* by the lack of cultural and economic relations, the President replied in generalities and in expressing the hope that relations would improve.

Note

1. A.V. Burtsev, Director of the Israel desk in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

292. A. Harel (Moscow) to the East European Division. 11 July 1960

Coded Tel. 886; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel refers to Khrushchev's statement at a press conference in Vienna[1] that the Soviet Union has no applications from its citizens for family re-unions with relatives in Israel but has some requests from people living in Israel who want to return to the Soviet Union. Harel proposes official or semi-official reaction to these words, in addition to an appropriate statement to the press. He suggests that the Soviet Ambassador to Israel be summoned to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and given material refuting Khrushchev's charges.[4]

Notes

1. At a press conference held in Vienna on July 9th, Khrushchev said, *inter alia*, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow had no applications for exit permits to Israel within the context of the reunification of families; on the other hand, there were several applications of inhabitants of Israel wishing to return to their Soviet homeland. To the question, what should Israel do to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, he replied that as premier of the Soviet Union he should not advise Ben-Gurion what to do. (*Ha'aretz*, 10.7.1960.)
2. Applications for exit permits.
3. Two refuseniks — one, formerly stateless, now an Israeli citizen, and the other, a woman, a Soviet citizen, whose mother was in Israel. (See comments by Y. Shimoni on Harel's telegram from Moscow, 499, 30.10.1959, 130.23/3115/10.)

4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' reply to the Embassy in Moscow (telegram 945, 12.7.1960) stated that this was being considered and they were thinking of an official response. No further material has been found on this matter.

293. A. Harel (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 December 1960

Coded Tel. 140; Inc.: 130.09/2327/6

Harel addresses his telegram to the Director-General and to the Head of the East European Division.

He reports on a talk with Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko which dealt mainly with the following subjects: (1) the lack of trade relations between the two countries; (2) the lack of cultural relations between the two countries; (3) the delay in replying to Israel's request for documents relating to the Eichmann trial.[1]

Gromyko promised to take a personal interest in the first two points, and advised the Ambassador to contact the Ministry of Trade and the Committee for Cultural Relations in two or three weeks' time, assuring him that by then he would have investigated the problems. As to the Eichmann trial, he said that, to the best of his knowledge, the Soviet Union had no material additional to that submitted at the time to the Nuremberg trials.

The atmosphere was friendly, but, in view of his previous experience with Gromyko, Harel thinks his promises should be taken with a grain of salt. However, he would contact the two governmental bodies mentioned by Gromyko.

Note

1. Israel's request to receive documents touching the Eichmann trial (see telegram 450 of June 27th, 1960, 130.09/2378/3).

294. A. Miron (Lisbon) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 January 1960

Coded Tel. 46; Inc.: 130.09/2324/6

Miron has been informed by a Portuguese businessman visiting Israel[1] that

the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Mathias,[2] is not inclined to recommend to his government any change in relations with Israel[3] in the near future, out of fear of political and economic reactions on the part of the Arabs. The Minister had thought of appointing an honorary consul in Israel, but he considers it preferable to appoint a career diplomat later, after the U.A.R. and Moroccan representations in Lisbon had been raised to the rank of Embassy; perhaps consular relations could develop in the future into full diplomatic relations.[5] The Minister empowered the informant to deliver this message to the Israeli government.

Notes

1. Conde Querida, a Portuguese businessman with close contacts with the administration, paid a visit to Israel on behalf of the Rotary club at the end of December 1959 and the beginning of January 1960. He promised to help in promoting his country's relations with Israel on his return.
2. Marcello Mathias, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. The absence of diplomatic relations — the existence of an Israeli Consulate General in Lisbon, but the absence of a Portuguese consulate in Israel.
4. A Portuguese enclave in India. On attaining independence, India demanded of Portugal to vacate Goa and to return it to India. When Portugal rejected the demand, the Indian army invaded Goa in 1961 and annexed it forcibly to India.
5. Portugal, the U.A.R. and Morocco agreed in January 1960 to raise the rank of their respective Legations to that of Embassies.
6. Gideon Rafael, Israel's Ambassador to Belgium, had maintained contacts with the Portuguese Ambassador in Brussels which ultimately resulted in the opening of Israel's Consulate General in Lisbon. Rafael also came to Lisbon in July 1959 on his way to Africa. (See A. Miron to M. Fischer, 3.11.1958, A. Miron to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21.7.1959, both in File 130.23/3119/38.)

295. J. Prato (Athens) to M. Fischer. 21 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3317/3

In the course of a conversation with D. Bitsios, Director of the Middle East Department in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the issue of the transit of immigrants from Romania,[2] the latter raised the subject of relations between Greece and Israel. He said that the matter of according full recognition to Israel was discussed at the Ministry from time to time, but in his opinion it was desirable to wait for a long period of tranquillity. This was necessary to avoid reproaches on the part of the Arabs, who keep

reminding them that Greece's friendship towards the Arabs demand that Greece demonstrate in practice that its attitude towards Israel differed from that towards the Arabs. Bitsios listed a number of events in mutual relations initiated by Israel which were followed by protests on the part of the Arabs, and claimed that the arguments with the Arabs on marginal issues prevented the Greeks from progressing towards normalization of relations.

Prato expressed his surprise at the readiness of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss these matters with the Arabs. When relations with Israel are the same as those with the Arab states, the Arabs will no longer pester the Greek government with protests and demands for explanations.

Bitsios replied that "there was something" in what Prato had said, but they could not ignore the Arabs' reactions to any moves made by them in Israel's direction. There is no prejudice against Israel, and one should not interpret in that light any steps made out of necessity as a result of a delicate and regrettable situation.

Prato thinks that what Bitsios had said was the best proof of the effectiveness of Israel's line; if the Greeks are shaken out of their repose by Israel's actions, so much the better — they will have to put their mind to the problem. Inaction on Israel's part will leave the Greeks happy with the present situation and will not bring a solution nearer.

Notes

1. D. Bitsios, Director of the Fourth (Middle East) Department in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. See No. 536.
3. Gregorios Cassimatis, member of the Greek parliament, formerly Minister of Public Works, visited Israel in February 1960.
4. Romanian immigrants to Israel using Greece as a transit country on their way to Israel.

296. A. Miron (Lisbon) to Ch. Yahil. 9 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3338/31

Miron lists a number of successes the Consulate General in Lisbon has had, particularly in the field of trade and culture. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs avoids contacts with Israel's representative, top ranking figures ignore invitations to visit Israel, and the issue of mormalizing relations between the two countries has not yet been brought up for favourable consideration.

Miron feels that he is making no progress in this matter, and requests advice from senior officials of the Ministry.[11]

Notes

1. Israel's Consulate General in Lisbon, which opened in January 1959.
2. Luis de Castro Alameida Norton de Mattos, Secretary-General (Director-General) of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. See No. 294.
4. Miron came to Portugal in December 1958.
5. Alberto Marciano Giorjao Franco Nogueira, Director-General of the Political Department in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. Albino Soares Pinto dos Reis, President of the Portuguese National Assembly.
7. Kadish Luz, Speaker of the Fourth Knesset.
8. Manuel Cardinal Gonçalves de Cerejeira, the archbishop of Lisbon, head of the Catholic Church in Portugal.
9. Meir Grossmann, head of the Foreign Relations Department in the Jewish Agency.
10. Monsignor Giovanni Panico, the papal nuncio in Portugal.
11. Yahil replied that one should not despair, and that in Israel's very presence in Portugal one should see important progress.

297. A. Chelouche (Geneva) to M. Fischer.[1] 17 May 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3335/28

On the occasion of his visit to Madrid[2] to participate in the conference of the Olive Oil Council, Chelouche met the head of the Middle East Department in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, J.L. de los Arcos.

Chelouche said he had come to Madrid in the hope that he would be able to have a direct and frank talk with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He quoted Mrs. Meir's words in the Knesset to the effect that there was no reason why Spain and Israel should not establish diplomatic relations.[4] He thought that direct and frank exchanges of opinions could iron out possible misunderstandings which perhaps stood in the way. He refuted the Spaniards' assumption that their interests in the Arab world would be harmed by diplomatic relations with Israel, and described the conflicts in the Arab world. It is a mistake to think that Spain could not have diplomatic relations with the Arab states and with Israel at one and the same time. As to the argument that Israel voted against Spain's admission to the U.N.,[5] Chelouche said that it was not the only one to do so, and holding a grudge for that reason will not serve Spanish interests. Chelouche accepts that diplomatic relations

cannot be established overnight and the groundwork should be laid for that by first establishing cultural and trade relations.

Los Arcos replied that at the end of the Second World War Spain found itself ostracized and excluded from the family of nations. Its fellow outcasts were the Arab states and several Latin American countries. It was natural for these pariahs to club together, and ties were strengthened as time passed. Spain is tied to the Arab states by strong bonds of a common cultural past. In contrast, on its establishment Israel did not think it proper to approach Spain and ask for recognition.[6] Israel's vote against Spain's admission to the U.N. was from sincere ideological motives, but the regime existing in Spain concerns only the Spanish people. With Spain's admission to the U.N. it became bound by the principles and resolutions of that body, and could not ignore the resolutions on Jerusalem and on the refugees. He also said that Spain did not harbour resentment against Israel, but the Israeli press, which doubtless reflects public opinion, publishes only criticism and even lies about Spain, and is emulated by many Jewish organs around the world. All this made for a situation which it is not up to Spain to change as it is not responsible for its creation and has no influence on it. He agreed that the groundwork should be laid for creating a different atmosphere, but he cannot see what Spain can do in this connection. He concluded by saying that he knew of no regulation forbidding trade with Israel.

Chelouche said he could not quite understand why Spain should adhere to U.N. resolutions for which it did not vote, while other states, which did vote for them, have relations both with Israel and with the Arab states. Los Arcos accords to the Israeli press an importance it does not possess; it does not reflect public opinion in what concerns Spain. There is no enmity towards Spain in Israel, but only lack of information. There is in Israel a large community of Sephardic Jews whose sympathy for Spain could be easily aroused, as they have many ties with the Spanish culture and language. No criticism has been levelled lately against Spain by official agents. What the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said in the Knesset was a well-founded reflection of what people in Israel think about Spain. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem is working under difficult conditions which affect the objectivity of his reporting.[9]

Los Arcos replied that the intention had indeed been to send to Jerusalem a consular official who would concentrate on that aspect; he is not expected to furnish political reports. Though he has no official contacts with the authorities, he is very well treated. He added that he was glad the meeting had taken place, as it has helped him to clear up a number of misconceptions.

Notes

1. A copy was given also to Avraham Darom, head of the Latin America Division.
2. A. Chelouche was officially dispatched to Madrid to participate in the conference of the Council for Olive Oil, but he was instructed also to contact the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. Yair Behar, representative of the World Sephardi Federation in Madrid.
4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in the Knesset on February 10th, 1959, that Israel wished to establish regular relations with all the nations of the world, and it saw no reason why such relations could not be established also with Spain. It was not true that "Israel rejected the hand of Spain extended to it in the name of peace and brotherhood". The Minister of Foreign Affairs thus quoted a declaration attributed to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Castiella y Maiz, made following his visit to the U.A.R. at the beginning of 1959, that his country "would never agree to establish diplomatic relations with Israel", and that "the Arab states appreciate the fact that Spain was the only European country which had not yet recognized Israel". (See *Divrey Haknesset* (Knesset Reports, Hebrew), Vol. XXVI, Fourth Session of the Third Knesset, Meeting No. 588, 10.2.1959, pp. 1050–1051.)
5. On this affair, see Vol. 5, No. 348.
6. In April 1949, Israel rejected the overtures by Spain through an official envoy, who proposed that Israel approach his government and request recognition, with the assurance that this would be granted immediately (see Eytan to Sharett, April 24th, 1949, 130.02/2391/28).
7. Reference is to Ovidio Gondi, a local employee at Israel's mission to the U.N.
8. An exhibition of the World Sephardi Federation held lately in Spain, including exhibits from various countries. The Spanish government gave a measure of aid in organizing the exhibition and transporting the exhibits.
9. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem, Jose A. Balenchana, was not accredited to the Government of Israel. This consulate, a survivor from the period of the British mandate, did not recognize Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem nor did it maintain contacts with the authorities but only with the District Commissioner in the Ministry of the Interior.
10. Max Mazin, Vice-President (from 1961 — President) of the Jewish community in Madrid. He mediated unofficially between Spain and Israel.

298. J. Prato (Athens) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 June 1960

Coded Tel. 322; Inc.: 130.23/3317/8

Prato reports on Nasser's visit to Greece.[1] Three main issues were discussed in his talks:

(1) Cyprus. Nasser requested guarantees that the bases[2] retained by the British would not serve for aggression against the Arab states. The Greeks

replied that it was not their intention that the bases should serve for aggression against anybody at all, and, in any case, this was solely a matter for the Cypriots.

(2) The Greek community in Egypt. The Greeks requested guarantees that the cultural and economic rights of that community would be safeguarded; the answer was that special laws could not be passed for that purpose as this would create precedents for other communities in Egypt.[3] However, a specially favourable attitude towards the Greek community was promised.

(3) Israel.[4] The Egyptians voiced their disappointment at the developing cultural and economic ties with Israel, which did not conform with Israel's political standing in Greece. It is not known what the Greeks' reply was.

Notes

1. For a full report on this conversation, see Prato's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15.6.1960, 130.23/3317/8.
2. Akrotiri and Dhekelia, two British bases in Cyprus, designed to remain under British sovereignty after Cyprus had attained its independence.
3. In a further talk with Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff-Tossizza, Prato was told that even though "no definite results had been attained", they depended on Nasser's promise to accord fair treatment to the Greeks (see telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 402, 22.7.1960, 130.09/2293/8).
4. In Fischer's telegram to the Representation in Athens (296, 2.6.1960, 130.09/2293/5) Prato was requested to explain to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Israel was expecting Nasser to be warned against giving vent to remarks insulting to Israel on his visit to Greece. Prato replied (telegram 310, 3.6.1960, 130.23/3317/8) that he had met the Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and that the latter had given him assurances in this matter.
5. Elias Dimitrakopoulos, political correspondent of the English daily *Athens Daily Post*.
6. On the affair of the *Astypalea*, the ship carrying cement from Israel to a buyer in Asmara and detained in Port Said in December 1959, see Chapter 3. The cargo's owner, Antonatos, came to Athens in January 1960 to raise the matter with the Greek authorities. Their response was lukewarm. They in turn raised the matter with Nasser on his visit to Greece and were told that all of the U.N.'s resolutions should be honoured, and not only some of them. (See Prato to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 402, 22.7.1960, 130.09/2293/8.)
7. Eleni Vlakhou, owner of the Athens daily *Kathimerini*, at that time considered the most influential of Greece's newspapers.
8. According to Prato's report (see n. 1 above) Nasser's statements on Israel at the press conference were moderate. On the blockade of the Suez Canal he said that, while passage through the Canal could be considered a luxury for Israel, the refugees' return to their homes was "a most vital matter".

299. A. Miron (Lisbon) to A. Darom. 16 June 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3338/31

Miron reports on his meeting with the Director-General of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matos, who said he was certain that Portugal would exchange diplomatic representatives with Israel in the near future. His own and the Minister of Foreign Affairs' estimate is that Portugal has more to gain from relations with Israel than with other countries, with whom it maintains formal relations at a higher level.

Note

1. Miron was transferred to the Embassy in London and appointed to the post of Minister.

300. Israel Diplomatic Representation in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 August 1960

Clear Tel.; Inc.: 130.09/2293/8

A version of the interview given by Ben-Gurion to the Greek journalist Dimitrakopoulos[1] is transmitted to the Ministry — the full text appears in the Main Volum, pp. 475–476.

Note

1. See No. 298, n. 5. Dimitrakopoulos visited Israel in August and interviewed Ben-Gurion.

301. Israel Diplomatic Representation in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 23 August 1960

Coded Tel. 467; Inc.: 130.09/2293/8

The mission cables a summary of the reaction which appeared in the periodical *Kathimerini*[2] to the interview given by Ben-Gurion to the Greek

journalist Dimitrakopoulos.[1] The mission is of the opinion that this reaction was instigated by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The paper said that Ben-Gurion had contradicted himself in that, on the one hand, he complained that Greece had not recognized Israel *de jure*, and, on the other, he stressed that he understood Greece's motives. If he knows the reasons why Greece is acting as it is, says the paper, then he has no right to complain. The relations between Greece and Israel are the best possible in the context of the prevailing situation in the Middle East. The mission requests instructions on how to react to this reportage, commenting at the same time that a polemic on this subject could adversely affect relations between Israel and Cyprus.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 300.
2. See No. 298 and n. 7 there. Though privately owned, the paper reflected in general the opinions of the Greek Government.
3. Constantine Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister.
4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that, in view of the officially inspired reactions in Greece and in view of the criticism levelled in the Greek press at Cyprus for having an Israeli Embassy opened there, it would seem that the prospects were bleak for the attempts to introduce different interpretations. The Ministry suggested that, after Levin had submitted his credentials to the Cypriot president, the Diplomatic Representation in Athens should try to turn the limelight on the Cypriot attitude as different from that of Greece, which however did not draw on it any sanctions on the part of the Arabs. As to the question at the end of the telegram, the Ministry promised to cable a reply but no such document or any additional material on this subject has been found. (See telegram to the Representation in Athens, 24.8.1960, 130.09/2293/5.)

302. A. Darom (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Guatemala.[1]
25 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3335/28

The Israeli Ambassador to Guatemala had asked whether the arrival there of the new Spanish Ambassador, who is known as a friend of Israel, should be utilized for talks on the subject of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Spain. The view in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that there would be no point in that, because there are no chances of the situation changing in the foreseeable future.

Notes

1. Joshua Nissim Shai, the Israel Ambassador to Guatemala.
2. In his letter to Fischer, Shai wrote that a new Spanish Ambassador had arrived in Guatemala and that he was showing sympathy for Israel. Shai asked whether it was desirable for him to approach the new Ambassador on the matter of Spain's establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

303. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to E. Averoff-Tossizza (Athens). 25 August 1960

Notes

1. See No. 412.
2. At his meeting with Fischer in July 1960, Averoff-Tossizza showed understanding of the issue; it was then agreed that an Israeli jurist would come to Athens to talk the matter over (see the Diplomatic Representation in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 394, 18.7.1960, 130.09/2293/8). Z. Argaman, the Ministry's legal adviser, came accordingly to Athens in August and in his talks with officials of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice a way was found to facilitate and expedite the issue of the necessary documents enabling Jews of Greek origin to claim reparations from Germany. (See report of 22.8.1960 by Argaman, 130.23/3317/3.)
3. Israel had approached a number of countries requesting them to furnish it with documents necessary for the preparation of the case against Eichmann.

304. S.R. Kapel (Athens) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 November 1960

Coded Tel. 633; Inc.: 130.09/2293/8

Kapel reports on his meeting with the Minister of State in the Greek Prime Minister's Office, K. Tsatsos, who explained that the Greek diaspora in Egypt was a hostage there, and it was therefore not possible for Greece to establish normal relations with Israel. However, he said, ways should be cautiously sought for maintaining a profitable cooperation.[1]

Note

1. Words to the same effect had been heard by Prato, Kapel's predecessor, at the farewell visit he had paid to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs (see his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 402, 22.7.1960, 130.09/2293/8).

305. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to A. Harman (Washington).[1] 8 January 1960

Copy: 130.06/3277/18

Bartur transmits to Harman a memorandum on Israel's relations with the European economic unions, commenting that the Arabs would certainly act very vigorously to prevent Israel from effectuating these ties; it was therefore important to recruit the support of the U.S. as a counterwright to the Arabs.

Bartur also reports that he had talked with the officials of the U.S. Embassy in Israel on Israel's endeavours to arrive at a multilateral agreement[2] with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and encloses a memorandum with the Israeli argumentation on this matter. Harman's comments on the memorandum are requested. He adds that he has received clarifications on the meetings scheduled in Paris on January 14th by Dillon, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, with the representatives of the OEEC countries and of Canada. In view of these meetings, Bartur intends to submit to the U.S. Embassy in Israel a memorandum describing Israel's interest in whatever concerns the establishment of economic organizations in Europe and developments in the GATT.[4]

Notes

1. Copies sent also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director-General Ch. Yahil, M. Fischer, J. Herzog and the United States Division.
2. In 1958, Israel attempted to come to an understanding with some of the member states of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, as a preliminary to forming links with the European economic organizations. These attempts, however, came to nothing, mainly because that organization was about to change its character and its members were not enthusiastic about a new bond with Israel.
3. This memorandum has not been found, but it doubtlessly advances arguments identical to those in the Note to the Government of the United States — see No. 306.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — GATT — is an international body set up in Geneva in 1947 with the aim of a gradual abolishment of trade restraints and the introduction of a non-discriminatory regime in the relations between its

members. Israel joined this organization on a provisional basis in 1959 and became a full member in 1962.

5. Harman's reply has not been found, but see No. 313.
6. Only the introduction to the memorandum and its summary have been reprinted here — the complete text is filed under 130.23/3277/18.

306. Note from the Government of Israel (Jerusalem) to the Government of the United States. 11 January 1960

Notes

1. The body governing the European Economic Community, on which every member state is represented by a minister.
2. Douglas Dillon, U.S. Undersecretary of State for economic affairs.
3. See Bartur's letter to the Embassy in Brussels, 7.10.1958, 93.02/211/7.
4. See memorandum by the European Commission, 13.1.1959, *ibid.*

307. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to A. Harman. (Washington)[1] 12 January 1960

Copy: 130.06/3277/18

Further to Bartur's letter to Harman,[2] Tsur quotes the Prime Minister as saying to him that he saw the issue of Israel's economic relations with the European Economic Community as fateful for Israel's entire future, and that all efforts should be directed at that problem.

Notes

1. Copies sent also to Assistant Directors-General M. Fischer and M. Bartur.
2. See No. 305.
3. For the dispute between Air France and El Al, see No. 238.

308. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 14 January 1960

Coded Tel. 56; Outg.: 130.09/2350/12

Bartur suggests issues to be discussed at the meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and her French opposite number. Israel has requested that final negotiations take place which would lead to the signing of a multilateral agreement between Israel and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); the French Minister of Foreign Affairs should also be reminded of Israel's wish to develop relations with the European Economic Community, according to Article 238[4] of the Community treaty. In the scheduled talk with the Secretary-General of NATO, Paul Spaak, Bartur suggests that he be asked for his opinion on Israel's plan to arrive at an agreement with the Community, and what he thought were the prospects and what would the best way to achieve this.[5]

Notes

1. No. 241.
2. On the talk with Couve de Murville, see No. 242.
3. Most probably implies the intention to change the character of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation — see Introduction, p. XXX, and n. 6 there.
4. This article in the Common Market's charter states that non-European countries can also come to be associated with the European Economic Community.
5. At the meeting held on January 21st, Spaak commented that "from the legal aspect and considering the spirit of the charter of the 'Six", he could not see how they could refuse to discuss with Israel's representative the forms of commercial association between Israel and the Community. There are of course political factors which could influence the issue" — see Shneerson to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 234, 21.1.1960, 130.09/2350/1.
6. See No. 305.
7. See No. 306.

309. R. Nirgad (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 January 1960

Coded Tel. 871; Inc.: 130.09/2301/5

Nirgad has been informed that a debate was held at the European Economic Community's Commission on the multilateral agreement proposed by Israel. France was in favour, the Benelux countries saw some technical hitches but tended to approve, Germany voiced some reservations but said it would approve the agreement; Italy was against, and therefore a unanimous opinion could not be drafted and the issue was transferred to the forum of the

permanent representatives to the Community, the discussion there to be held within a week.

Notes

1. Bartur cabled that he had been informed by "a confidential and reliable source" that Israel's proposal for a multilateral agreement had been discussed in Brussels on January 8th, 1960, by a special committee appointed by the European Economic Community. Bartur requested Nirgad to verify this report. (See his telegram of 13.1.1960, 130.09/2301/1.)
2. Nirgad reported that Holland's attitude was favourable, while Italy had reservations owing to the opposition of its farmers and also because of the fiscal regime in Israel, "which subsidizes the Israeli exporter". (See his telegram to the Foreign Ministry, 879, 19.1.1960, 130.09/2301/5.)

310. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Bartur. 21 January 1960

Coded Tel. 130; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson has been informed that the envoys of the Arab states in Rome are exerting heavy pressure on the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prevent the signing of the multilateral agreement with Israel. The most active are the U.A.R. and the Lebanon. The U.A.R. has mobilized the Italian community in Egypt to pressure the Italian government, and has even threatened to repress Italian enterprises in Egypt.

Notes

1. The seat of the headquarters of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
2. The seat of the headquarters of the European Economic Community.

311. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 29 January 1960

Coded Tel. 123; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Bartur transmits to the missions counter-arguments to those opposing the

multilateral agreement with Israel, who say that the agreement will complicate the reorganization of the OEEC. Israel has no intention of joining the OEEC and therefore it is not connected directly with whatever goes on in that organization. The reorganization will take many months and in the meantime the trade regime of the OEEC which is the basis for Israel's proposal is continuing as before. In the talks held in Paris in September 1959[1] extensive groundwork was laid for mutual understanding between Israel and the other parties leading to the preliminary negotiations. This is why Israel is offended by the delays and evasions whose objective validity cannot be understood.

Notes

1. See No. 306.

312. A. Lourie (London) to M. Bartur. 3 February 1960

Coded Tel. 881; Inc.: 130.09/2323/2

Lourie reports to Bartur on his introductory meeting with Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. Sir Roger said that Britain no longer supported Israel's proposal for a multilateral agreement, owing to economic developments in Europe and in the GATT. The trend for liberalization in this organization will make it possible for Israel to achieve its ends within that framework, and that renders the multilateral agreement superfluous. Stevens stressed that their position resulted from purely economic considerations, and Arab pressure had no part in it. Britain's stance was final and irrevocable.

Lourie replied that the multilateral agreement was of importance to Israel. The Middle Eastern markets were closed to Israel, and its principal markets were now in Europe. Britain's proposal to transfer the issue to GATT meant in effect postponing Israel's case indefinitely. Britain should have also taken into account political considerations and supported a move which would have eased Israel's economic isolation and strengthened it against the Arab boycott.

When the matter was discussed at the Embassy, the conclusion was that the Arab factor had indeed not been decisive, and that Britain could not be shifted from its stand. However, it was decided to send a letter to the British government, not in the hope that it would change anything, but in order to express Israel's disappointment.

Notes

1. The telegram, dated February 2nd, 1960, is filed in 130.09/2323/2.
2. See No. 314.

313. M. Erell (Washington) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 5 February 1960

Copy: 93.08/425/3

Erell reports on his meeting with Randolph Williams of the Department of State, at which Israel's proposal for a multilateral agreement was discussed. Williams said that the U.S. looked on Israel's plan with favour but that developments in the economic field in Europe could make for a new situation which could perhaps render Israel's proposal redundant. To Erell's question about the Arabs' efforts to sabotage Israel's plans,[1] Williams replied that as far as the Department of State knew, Arab pressure had no part in Europe's postponing action on Israel's proposals.

Erell comments that it would be pointless to ask the U.S. to exert general pressure on the European countries concerned, but that efforts should be concentrated on a number of selected countries whose positions were known to be favourable. If any difficulty arises with a particular country, then the U.S. would be requested to intervene. If this line makes for progress, well and good; if not, and perhaps in any case, the Americans should be asked to confer with Israel and discuss its problems, seeing that it was at their initiative that new frameworks were created in Europe and they were still active in this sphere.

In conclusion, Erell suggests that perhaps it would be profitable for Bartur to go to Europe and to learn at first hand what were the opportunities and developments, and perhaps then it would be possible to decide on a line of action which would involve Bartur's coming to the U.S. to hold talks there.

Notes

1. See No. 310.

314. A. Lourie (London) to Sir Roger Stevens (London). 23 February 1960

Notes

1. See No. 312.
2. This correspondence is in File 93.04/770/1.
3. See No. 306.
4. See Gilat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 21, 26.6.1959, 130.09/2325/5; and No. 29, 29.6.1959, 93.04/775/2.
5. See Gilat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 115, 21.7.1959, 130.09/2322/7.
6. Moshe Ofer, First Secretary in the Israel Embassy in London.
7. See Ofer's memorandum to Gilat, 17.7.1959, 93.04/770/1.
8. See Bartur's letter to the Embassy in London, 18.10.1959, *ibid.*

315. A. Manor (New York) to M. Bartur. 16 March 1960

Copy: 93.08/425/3

Manor reports on the meeting held by the Prime Minister with Undersecretary of State Dillon, with the participation of Harman and Herzog.[1] The Prime Minister raised the problem of Israel's wish to arrive at some sort of association with the frameworks of economic cooperation in the West, and requested the help of the U.S. to that end. Dillon replied that the policy of the U.S. was to prevent conflicts between the Six and the Seven. America was interested in the European Union not adopting restraints on international trade, and here its interests were identical with Israel's. The U.S. and Canada were working to prevent damage to the interests of non-European countries. When Ben-Gurion asked whether the U.S. was willing to help Israel join the European Economic Community, Dillon said that would be difficult, as many countries had approached them with the same request, including India. The U.S. had begun acting in favour of Japan, but desisted in view of the negative reaction on the part of the Community countries. He also mentioned Turkey and Greece, but stressed that their case was different because they were members of the OEEC. Dillon concluded by saying that the European Economic Community countries did not think the time had come to let Israel join them, as long as the political problems had not been solved; he thought they were apprehensive of the reactions of the Arab states.

Notes

1. Matters touching arms procurement and economic aid to Israel were also discussed at the meeting — see No. 136.
2. A. Harman, the Israel Ambassador to the United States.

316. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan (Paris).[1] 20 March 1960

Copy: 93.26/2713/17

Bartur transmits to Eytan a memorandum addressed to the Committee of Four, which explains Israel's interest in accelerating the negotiations on joining the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He requests that this document be submitted to Burgess[2] or to his deputy. He intends to be in Paris and Brussels at the beginning of April to see Burgess and other members of the Group of Four, also the members of the Commission of the Europan Economic Community, and perhaps other personalities.[3] The memorandum will also be circulated among the twenty countries[4] which are supposed to form the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Their reactions will influence Israel's future steps.

Discussions are taking place between Israel's economic ministers on the appeal to the EEC countries to negotiate on the basis of Article 238 of that organization's treaty.[5] These discussions are still going on, but if an affirmative decision is taken, this would not be inconsistent with the overtures to the group of Twenty. Israel should act on both fronts at the same time; make efforts to join a wider Western body, together with a more practical arrangement with one of the customs unions which are already active, and which are harming Israel's interests. No immediate positive results can be expected, but the new organization of the Western countries makes our efforts imperative.

Bartur concludes by informing Eytan that he is sending a copy of this letter and the memorandum to the other capitals, with a request to pass them on as soon as Eytan acknowledges receipt.[6]

The full text of the memorandum can be found in the Main Volume, pp. 501–504.

Notes

1. On the conversation with Burgess' deputy, America's permanent representative at

NATO and at European regional organizations, see letter of 5.2.1960 from the Embassy in Paris, 93.26/2713/17.

2. See No. 318.
3. The 18 European member states of OEEC, the United States and Canada.
4. For the article in the European Economic Community's charter dealing with association with countries not members of the Community, see also No. 308 and n. 4 there.
5. The memorandum, with an attached letter, was delivered on March 24th by Ambassador Eytan to the acting president of "the Group of Four", X. Zolotas, with the request to circulate it among the other members of the group. The latter acknowledged (in his letter to Eytan of March 25th) receipt of the memorandum and its distribution, but commented that the accepted procedure of distribution of such memoranda was through the channels of the governments concerned (both documents are found in File 93.26/2713/17).
6. See No. 306.
7. Known also as "the World Bank". It grants development loans to governments (or to private bodies with governmental guarantees).
8. See No. 306.
9. See Appendix to Bartur's circular to a number of missions, 28.8.1959, 93.26/2713/17.
10. See Appendix to Bartur's circular to a number of missions, 15.11.1959, 93.08/425/2.
11. See Appendix to Bartur's circular cited in n. 10 above.

317. Sir Roger Stevens (London) to A. Lourie (London). 29 March 1960

Notes

1. See No. 314.
2. This document has not been found. In Britain's reply to Israel's Note of June 1958 (see No. 314 and n. 2 there) there is no reference to a previous reply of June of the same year.
3. See No. 314.
4. See *ibid.*, paragraph 6.

318. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Heads of the Israel Missions Abroad. 25 April 1960

Copy: 93.26/2713/17

Bartur reports on the meetings he held in April in Paris, Brussels and London with the "Four Wise Men" who had been set the task of drafting proposals for

the establishment of the new Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD. He also spoke with officials of the British Foreign Office, and with members of the EEC Commission in Brussels.

Everywhere he found understanding of Israel's interest in cooperation with the new organization, in particular in so far as the coordination of Western economic policy and activity in the under-developed countries was concerned. He also found a readiness, though bound up with political reservations, to accept Israel as an associate of the new organization, but not to be admitted to full membership. All this would become operative as soon as the new organization started functioning. Bartur remarks that attaining the status of associate will not be easy. He has the impression that Israel's efforts to arrive at a multilateral treaty have aroused the awareness, and later the conviction, that Israel should be associated in some way with the new organization of the Western economy. The missions should continue exerting pressure so as also to gain active support from the various countries after the organization has been set up. From his talks in London he found out that EFTA (the Seven) is a closed club and had no intention of expanding, Israel should therefore concentrate its efforts on joining the Six.

In his talks in Brussels with senior officials of the European Economic Community, Bartur found a favourable attitude towards Israel and received the impression that they considered it one of the first candidates for forming links on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC treaty. There is a certain difference in attitude between the EEC Commission and the Council of Ministers of the Six: the Commission sees itself as a sort of federal cabinet of the Community and urges complete unification of the Six, while in the Council of Ministers the national interests of the various countries come to the fore. Bartur thinks that Israel should lay the groundwork for joining the Community by working with the Commission, but that does not contradict the need for recruiting supporters in the European Parliament of the Six,[3] and of diplomatic activity in the various capitals in preparation for the formal step Israel will have to take, application for associateship according to Article 238.

Bartur settled in Brussels that exploratory talks with the Commission would open in May–June. They will involve discussions between experts in agriculture and industry in order to analyse the problems of import and export which will arise with Israel's new status, and to find practical solutions for them. Bartur hopes to receive a final answer from the Commission shortly, and if there is no backing down on anybody's part, then the talks should commence as planned.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 316.
2. Petrilli paid a visit to Israel in March 1960.
3. It includes 142 members from the six countries of the European Economic Community. Its seat is in Strasbourg. It discusses, inter alia, the Community's budget and carries out political supervision of its institutions.
4. See No. 319.
5. See *ibid.*

319. R. Nirgad (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17 May 1960

Coded Tel. 88; Inc.: 130.09/2301/5

Nirgad reports on his meeting with Seeliger of the EEC Commission, who told him that it had been decided to open talks with Israel on the basis of Bartur's proposals.[2] These talks should be conducted, without publicity, with the Israeli mission to the EEC, and there is no reason for a special delegation to come from Israel. Nirgad reminded Seeliger that it had been agreed with Bartur to release a communiqué on negotiations aimed at expanding the commercial relations, and Seeliger promised to check this point again. Ambassador Najar is to meet shortly Rey, who is in charge of the Community's external relations, and further action will depend on the results of this conversation.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 318.
3. See *ibid.*
4. Emile Najar, the Israel Ambassador to Belgium and its representative at the European Economic Community.

320. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Brussels. 19 May 1960

Coded Tel. 257; Outg.: 130.09/2301/1

Bartur reports on the understanding reached with Rey and Hallstein of the EEC on the procedure to be adopted in the talks with Israel:

(1) Before an official application is submitted by Israel to the Council of Ministers of the EEC, exploratory talks will take place between experts of the Commission and Israeli experts in the fields of agriculture and industry, to discuss in detail the problems pertaining to Israel's prospective association with the EEC and to draft the basis of such an agreement. Israel does not wish these talks to be conducted in secret.

(2) It is therefore important to Israel that the talks be given wide publicity, because only thus could interpretations undesirable to both sides be avoided. Bartur's interlocutors agreed to this procedure.

(3) It is essential to set a date for commencement of the talks and to decide on a clearly stated procedure to ensure their continuation. Israel wishes the talks to start at an early date, in conversation with Bartur May–June were mentioned.[2]

Notes

1. No. 319.
2. Najar replied that he had spoken with Rey, who approved of talks being conducted between the European Commission and Israel's representatives, in order to study the possible forms of association. There is no need for a special delegation to come from Israel, as the talks could be held with the Israeli Mission in Brussels which is accredited to the European Economic Community. (See Najar to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegram 97, 20.5.1960, 130.23/3277/19.)

321. E. Najar (Brussels) to M. Bartur. 20 May 1960

Orig.: 130.06/3277/19

Najar reports on a talk with Rey, Nirgad also being present. Rey said he did not think there were at the moment prospects of the Council of Ministers deciding in favour of an association with Israel; however he was prepared to take advantage of the presence of an Israeli mission accredited to the EEC, in order to hold substantive talks on all the practical problems which such an agreement might involve in the future.

Najar remarks that the ceremony of his accreditation to the EEC will be held according to protocol, and he was requested to prepare a speech, a draft of which is enclosed.[2] Hallstein will reply to the speech.

Regarding a statement on the talks with the EEC, Rey is of the opinion

that such a statement could lead to intervention by the Council of Ministers, which would be undesirable at this stage. Najar replied that he was aware of the problem and therefore his statement was formulated in a way which should allay Rey's fears.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 320, n. 2.
2. The text is on File, but has not been printed here.
3. Untraced.

322. R. Nirgad (Brussels) to M. Bartur. 20 May 1960

Copy: 130.06/3277/19

Nirgad reports on his first meeting with Deniau of the EEC's Commission. Deniau pointed to three possible forms of an agreement with the EEC:

(1) Association in the nature of a customs union.

(2) A treaty establishing a "free trade zone" between Israel and the countries of the EEC (according to Article 24 of the GATT agreement).

(3) A trade agreement which would resolve problems of quotas, of a common agricultural policy, and so on. Such an agreement would not solve the problem of customs preferences.

Nirgad replied that it was preferable not to limit the talks to a particular item and it would be more useful to conduct them in a more flexible manner. Deniau said that the first step to be taken was to define Israel's problems, that is, Israel should inform the EEC which problems should be afforded solutions within the framework of an agreement with the European Community. It was this way, he said, that negotiations were started with Greece and with other countries. Israel should specify its aims with regard to tariffs and the products in respect of which it was seeking solutions; which were the most sensitive sectors of commerce; what its plans were in the fields of agricultural policy and industrial development and how these were connected with its relations with the Community; what were its demands of the Community in these and other spheres. Deniau hinted that he thought it would be easier to arrive at a suitable solution with Israel than with Greece and Turkey, which had advanced excessive demands for financial support.

Nirgad asked what would be the following stage in the negotiations and in what way could experts be co-opted to the talks. Deniau replied that the experts, should their participation be considered necessary, would have to

be attached to the mission to the Market. When Israel's requirements have been submitted, the problems will be grouped in appropriate categories, and at their meeting of May 27th he will put concrete questions to the Israelis which would have to be answered in writing.

Nirgad also reports on Najar's meeting with Rey. The subject of the publicity to be given to the talks was discussed, and the ambassador submitted a draft statement. Rey said he was prepared to consider the issue of a statement but repeated his argument that the application should not be addressed directly to the Council of Ministers: this would require a debate at the Council and the adoption of a unanimous resolution, which he thought could not be attained at the moment. Najar again raised the need of co-opting experts to the negotiations, and Rey replied that the Embassy could make up its delegation as it saw fit.

Nirgad asks for instructions for the meeting scheduled for May 27th.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 324.
2. See No. 321.
3. See No. 323.
4. See Najar's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20.5.1960, 130.06/3277/19.
5. Untraced.

323. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Brussels. 24 May 1960

Coded Tel. 265; Outg.: 130.09/2301/1

Bartur thanks Najar and Nirgad for their letters[1] and expresses his agreement with their proposals and actions. He approves the proposal on the issue of a public statement on the talks, and requests that the date be coordinated with him. Bartur stresses that Israel wishes the negotiations to be taken seriously and to that end it will set up the necessary bodies and interdepartmental committees.

As for the talks scheduled for May 27th,[4] Bartur comments that they will be conducted on the basis of the assumption that the association will involve a customs union. A mere trade agreement will not solve Israel's problems, and a free trade zone will only involve Israel with GATT and the EFTA countries. Israel wishes to assure its agricultural exports within the framework of the envisaged agreement, and to protect its newly established industries.

Bartur notes that Israel is waiting to receive the questionnaire from Deniau[5] in order to start working on it. In general the talks should stress that the trend of the Israeli economy is in the direction of industrial development. The direction and rate of development will be decisively affected by the nature of Israel's agreement with the EEC.

Notes

1. See Nos. 321 and 322.
2. See No. 320.
3. The text has not been traced.
4. See No. 324.
5. See No. 326.

324. R. Nirgad (Brussels) to M. Bartur. 3 June 1960

Orig.: 130.06/3277/19

Nirgad reports on the meeting he and Najar had with Seeliger and Deniau of the Common Market on May 27th. The two EEC officials commenced by repeating their proposal that the association with the EEC be "short of a customs union". The Israelis replied that this would not solve the problems of tariffs, and that Israel wished to examine the possibility of an agreement with the Market in the form of a customs union. The Europeans replied that such an association would involve not only the solution of the problems of tariffs but also acceptance of the articles of the Rome Treaty in their entirety. Serious difficulties would arise in connection with agriculture. From their negotiations with Greece they have learned how difficult it was to come to an agreement with a third country on problems dealt with in the Rome Treaty. The Israelis pointed to the differences between the Greek and Israeli economies and stressed that countries newly associated with the Market should not be required to adopt those obligations of the Rome Treaty which the members of the Market themselves had not yet put into operation.

The EEC officials promised to supply the Israelis with the questionnaires on the economy before June 15th. These questionnaires will be printed on blank sheets[2] in order to avoid giving the impression that the EEC was taking the initiative in seeking an association with Israel.

Nirgad reports on a further meeting held on June 2nd with three of Deniau's assistants, whose aim was to clarify certain points in the questionnaires to be submitted to Israel. They interrogated Nirgad on the structure of Israel's

foreign trade, balance of payments, and other subjects. They promised to draft the questionnaires with all dispatch, and in any case not later than June 15th.

Notes

1. See No. 322.
2. See No. 321.

325. Israel Embassy in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 June 1960

Coded Tel. 167; Inc.: 130.09/2350/1

The Embassy reports on Ben-Gurion's meeting with French Prime Minister Debré. Two main subjects were discussed: scientific cooperation and the issue of Israel's association with the European Economic Community. Ben-Gurion expressed his hope that France would support Israel on that issue, and Debré's reply was in the affirmative on both subjects.

326. R. Nirgad (Brussels) to M. Bartur. 17 June 1960

Orig.: 130.06/3278/7

Nirgad transmits to Bartur the questionnaire he received from Seeliger (for text of the questionnaire, see Main Volume, pp. 522–523).

Seeliger said that the Commission could start debating the issue as soon as Israel's answer was received. He thought there were no prospects of substantive negotiations taking place before September, both because of vacations and because the people dealing with the subject were at the moment engaged in talks with Greece. He mentioned the delays in the negotiations with that country and also with Turkey. The main problem facing the Commission in the field of foreign relations was relations with the EFTA countries. The remainder of the meeting was taken up by Seeliger's clarifications of a number of points in the questionnaire.

Notes

1. See No. 324.
2. No. 324.
3. No. 323.
4. These documents are in Files 93.04/769/1 and 93.04/770/1.
5. This is a handwritten annotation in the margin of the letter.

327. H. Cidor (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 June 1960

Coded Tel. 221; Inc.: 130.09/2304/4

Cidor reports on Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's meeting with Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns.[2] Among other subjects, that of Israel's proposed agreements with European economic organizations was also raised. Luns promised his country's support of Israel's efforts, but stressed that the Benelux countries would not, in his opinion, be able to overcome the expected opposition of France and Germany to extending the scope of the EEC.

Notes

1. In his telegram to the Embassy in The Hague (26.6.1960, 130.09/2304/2) Yahil requested a report on Ben-Gurion's visit to Holland between the 22nd and the 27th of June.
2. Joseph Luns, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. Of the member states of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the United States and Canada.
4. See Chapter 21.

328. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 29 June 1960

Copy: 93.26/2713/17

Najar reports on the Prime Minister's meetings in Belgium.

At his meeting with Belgian Prime Minister, G. Eyskens, the main subjects

were Africa, and the Congo in particular, and the steps necessary for preventing the African continent from coming under the influence of the Soviet Union.

Another meeting was with senior officials of the Common Market, Hallstein and Rey, and also with the head of Euratom, E. Hirsch. Ben-Gurion stressed Israel's wish to be associated with the EEC, and he mentioned that the French Prime Minister had promised his support.[6] Hallstein explained that the matter was up to the European Council of Ministers. At this stage, he said, one had to study the data, and the necessary questionnaires had already been supplied to Israel.[7] Ben-Gurion voiced his impression that the process was overlong, and Hallstein said that Israel's reply to the questionnaires was essential in order that the Commission could recommend Israel's association with the EEC to the Council.[8] The meeting terminated before the matters of Euratom could be discussed.

At the meeting with Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Wigny, the subject of Africa was raised, as well as that of Israel's application to the EEC. Here Wigny's answers were rather evasive. He said that the Market was not yet operating smoothly, and when it was consolidated there would be a tremendous leap forward in Europe's economy and the countries trading with it would benefit indirectly. In the meantime countries like Israel would have to suffer, and perhaps certain steps should be taken to reduce the damage done to them. When Ben-Gurion said that the French Prime Minister had promised his support of Israel's application, the Belgian Prime Minister said he was surprised at that, because all the difficulties in consolidating the EEC originated with France.

Ben-Gurion said he was aware of the negotiations being conducted between the EEC and Greece and Turkey, but Israel's situation was different and it should be accorded priority because it was not requesting financial aid like the other two countries. This led to a discussion of the difference between the projected linkage with Greece and Turkey, based as it was on political considerations, and the linkage with Israel, which would be the first case of association with a country undergoing a significant process of development.

Ben-Gurion also met a delegation of the Belgian Socialist Party, the Minister for the Congo, A. de Schrijver, and King Baudouin.

Notes

1. Elisabeth, the Queen Mother.
2. King of the Belgians Baudouin.
3. Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian Prime Minister.
4. Pierre Wigny, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

5. The press conference was devoted to the Eichmann affair. Ben-Gurion declared that Eichmann would remain in Israel for the length of his trial and, if convicted, until he had served his sentence.
6. See No. 325.
7. See No. 326.
8. Israel's reply was given on September 20th, 1960 — see No. 340.
9. Ephraim Eylon was Israel's representative in Congo in the period before its independence, and also during the first following months. The press in Israel reported that a conciliation meeting between Kasavubu and Lumumba was organized on June 20th by him and by the Ghanaian Chargé d'Affaires. (See, for instance, the *Jerusalem Post*, June 21st, 1960.)
10. Ehud Avriel, Israel's Ambassador to Ghana in the years 1957 to 1960, and to Congo in the years 1960 to 1961.

329. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 July 1960

Coded Tel. 152; Inc.: 130.09/2301/5

Najar reports to Fischer and Bartur on his meeting with Lemaignen, EEC Commissioner for Overseas Countries and Territories. The latter expressed his appreciation of what Israel was doing in Africa and said that Africa would have to choose in the future between Russian, Chinese and Israeli models. He said he was prepared to recommend the financing of Israel's activities in Africa which were connected with the EEC, including the financing of a relief mission from Israel and study groups from Africa to Israel, and also the establishment and operation of development enterprises of a social or economic nature. Najar sums up, saying that this meeting opens to Israel new horizons in Africa and will also affect Israel's application to the EEC.

330. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 July 1960

Coded Tel. 156; Inc.: 130.09/2301/5

Najar reports on his meeting with Luxembourg's permanent representative to the EEC. The latter said that he thought the EEC was in no hurry to enter into associations with additional countries. Germany was the main obstacle to Israel's prospects, because of considerations relating to the Arab world. Italy

opposed associations with countries which had not yet reached the European level of development. They had entered into negotiations with Greece and Turkey against their will.

Najar also met the French representative, Gorse, who said he was unaware of Israel's wish to join the EEC. He had also never heard of Ben-Gurion's conversations on that subject in Paris. Najar stresses the importance of having Gorse receive a briefing from Paris.

Notes

1. Umberto Grazzi, Secretary-General (= Director-General) of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. See No. 332.

331. E. Najar (Brussels) to M. Bartur.[1] 8 July 1960

Copy: 43/6385/3667

Najar notes that Ben-Gurion, during his visit to Europe, defined the plan for association with the EEC as Israel's official policy. This had political and economic aspects. Should the EEC approve Israel's application, it would be for political reasons. Economic considerations could also have some effect, and might even supply formal justification for the decision, but they alone would never bring it about because of consideration of the Arab factor.

Najar's opinion is that Israel should not apply formally to the Council of Ministers because of the danger of a rejection. On the other hand, it would be embarrassing to the Six to decide against linkage with Israel because this would be interpreted as submission to the Arab boycott. A start should therefore be made by holding unofficial talks and by sounding out all the governments of the member countries of the EEC. Close relations should be maintained with these countries, but confrontation should be avoided with the Council of Ministers, where Israel could meet with failure. After having submitted the questionnaire,[2] Israel should use the good offices of the Commission to try and obtain an interim decision by the Council of Ministers approving talks with Israel "with the aim of establishing what could be the nature of an agreement with the EEC if this should be decided on". Najar summarizes the steps to be taken by Israel:

(1) The drafting of answers to the questionnaire, which will be submitted on official paper.[3]

(2) Holding background talks with every member of the Commission and

with each of the permanent representatives of the member countries to the EEC.

(3) A preparatory talk with Luns, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose turn it is now to officiate as chairman of the Council of Ministers.[4]

(4) Close contact should be maintained with Hallstein.

(5) Meetings should be arranged with some members of the Parliament of the Six. This should be co-ordinated with the embassies in the various capitals.

Notes

1. See No. 326.
2. See No. 339.
3. Luns officiated as chairman by rotation of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community from July to December 1960, replacing the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Schaus, who had filled that function from January to June of the same year.

332. M. Bartur (Brussels) to the Israel Embassy in Paris.[1] 19 July 1960

Coded Tel. 487; Outg.: 130.09/2378/4

Bartur informs the Embassy in Paris about the meetings held by Najar in Brussels.

(1) Karl Friedrich Ophuls, the German permanent representative to the European Economic Community, said his country was not in favour of an agreement between the EEC and Israel for the same reason that diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel had not yet been established, namely, in consideration of possible Arab reaction. He remarked that this opposition prevailed mainly in the top ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the economic ministries, but he thought it could be overcome by action at a higher political level; this, however, would demand acting "avec fermeté et sans timidité".

(2) The Frenchman, Marjolin, a member of the EEC Commission, did not know of Israel's wish to be associated with the EEC and he had not heard of the Commission's decision to enter on exploratory talks with Israel nor of Ben-Gurion's talks in Paris. He mentioned Italy's known attitude to association in general, and stressed the friendship existing between France and Israel.

(3) Cattani, the Italian permanent representative to the EEC, explained why his country was not interested in agreements with countries whose agriculture would compete with that of Italy. He remarked with regret that the matter of association had become a political instead of an economic issue, and pointed to the case of Greece. He thought it would take a long time until the EEC arrived at an agreement with yet another country. The point at issue, he thought, was a constitutional solution to the problem of relations with overseas territories which were rapidly becoming independent states. In his opinion, if Israel applied now it would be told that its application was premature.

Notes

1. Reference is to the summit conference held in Geneva in October 1955, with the participation of the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union.
2. See No. 334.

333. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to E. Najar. 20 July 1960

Orig.: 93.26/2713/17

Bartur replies to Najar's letter in which he had proposed steps to be taken in the matter of Israel's planned association with the EEC.

In general he agreed with Najar. He attached great importance to concrete exploratory talks with the EEC Commission on the basis of Israel's answers to their questionnaire. Political activity should be simultaneously continued in the capitals of the EEC countries following Ben-Gurion's talks; this would serve to prepare the ground for an application to the Council of Ministers to decide formally, when the time arrives, on negotiations with Israel. Bartur adds that he had discussed the matter with Israel's Ambassador to France, Eytan, and with the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this line had been approved.

Bartur suggests the following steps:

(1) Speeding up exploratory talks between experts following the submission of Israel's answers to the questionnaire to the Commission.

(2) The Israeli Ambassador in Paris should obtain a formal confirmation of Debré's promise to Ben-Gurion to support Israel's application to the European Economic Community.[3] There is no need for special action in Belgium and Holland.[4]

(3) Germany's support was uncertain.[5] Bartur agreed with Eytan that Blankenhorn, the German Ambassador in France, should be approached for help.

(4) Ways should be found to influence Italy, the main opponent; data are now being collected for an economic argument which should convince the Italians that they do not have so much to fear fron Israeli competition, and that they would also benefit from increased cooperation with Israel, following its agreement with the EEC. Bartur accordingly is planning to go to Rome.[6]

(5) Action should be taken according to the steps recommended in Najar's letter.

(6) Progress of negotiations between the EEC and Greece should be followed, and Israel should be on guard against yet another opponent to its agreement with the EEC joining the others.

Bartur concludes by informing Najar that he was transmitting his own and Najar's letters to all the ambassadors in the countries of the EEC — for information, comments, and action.

Notes

1. No. 331.
2. See No. 329.
3. See No. 325.
4. See Nos. 327 and 328.
5. See Nos. 330 and 332.
6. The visit took place in September 1960. Bartur was pleasantly surprised by the atmosphere and by the offered options. The officials of the Embassy in Rome and he himself received the impression that there were good prospects of achieving economic and political results if the necessary efforts were made. (See Bartur to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 836, 17.9.1960, 93.26/2713/17.)

334. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris.[1] 21 July 1960

Coded Tel.: 494; Outg.: 130.09/2378/4

Bartur transmits Najar's report on his meeting with Luns, the Acting Chairman of the European Council of Ministers. Luns thought that Israel could carry on its exploratory talks with the EEC Commission, but the time will come when a formal application to the Council of Ministers will become unavoidable. He did not know what the attitude of his colleagues on this issue would be.

The negotiations with Greece displeased everybody and they would not now wish to hear about a linkage with yet another country. Luns recommends that Israel not submit its application until after the Greek affair is over, and in any case not before September. When the time comes, Israel should approach every government of the member countries and state clearly its intention to apply for an agreement with the EEC. He stressed that it was important to start with Debré's promise to Ben-Gurion. Holland will adopt a pro-Israel stand. Bartur comments that Luns's advice seems reasonable to him.

Notes

1. Was sent also to the embassies in Rome and The Hague, and to the mission in Cologne.
2. See No. 335.
3. No. 337.

335. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 July 1960

Coded Tel. 175; Inc.: 130.09/2301/5

Najar reports on his meeting with Rey, who told him that the EEC Commission had not decided on an association with Israel but has decided to hold exploratory talks on the issue. The meeting with the Prime Minister made clear to them the Israel government's decision to associate with the EEC. He said that all the member countries were convinced that Israel had priority in a linkage with the Community over any other non-European country, but the Germans feared that association with Israel would close to them access to the Arab world. Hallstein and others are fighting this attitude and the case is not yet lost. Rey thought the Arabs would come to terms with reality.

As to Italy, the difficulty was mainly economic and was bound up with internal politics. The new government was weak and dependent on the South, where they feared competition on the part of other Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, Rey thought that Israel should continue its efforts unhesitatingly. He suggests that the first subject for discussion should be the time element and the application to the Council of Ministers.

Najar's complaint about the questionnaire having been typed on blank paper[1] had worked in favour of Israel, and Rey requested that Israel submit its answers on official paper with a letter by Najar addressed to him personally.

Notes

1. See Nos. 324 and 326.
2. See No. 347.

336. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Paris. 7 August 1960

Coded Tel. 205; Outg.: 130.06/3278/7

Bartur transmits Shinnar's report on his meeting with Adenauer.[1] The subject was Israel's planned association with the EEC, and Shinnar complained about Ophuls's attitude in this matter. He said it was inconceivable that the Federal government would not help Israel in its desire to come to an agreement which would enable it to continue its economic relations with the EEC countries without adverse discrimination.

Adenauer replied that Israel could be assured of his government's support, on condition that the other member countries give their approval. However, he stressed that before extending the scope of the EEC its internal conflicts should be addressed and solved. He added that the French attitude was similar, as he had learned from his meetings with de Gaulle.

From this Bartur concludes that it was of the utmost importance to obtain from France a formal confirmation of its positive stand, and to have the French inform the Germans accordingly.

Notes

1. The talk took place on August 3rd — Shinnar's original telegram has not been traced.
2. See No. 332.

337. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Paris.[1] 31 August 1960

Copy: 93.26/2713/17

Bartur informs the Ambassador that the answers to the questionnaire are to be submitted to the EEC Commission in Brussels within the next few days.[2] This

document will be the basis for discussions with experts of the Commission with the aim of framing the conditions of the association agreement and endeavouring to obtain the support of the EEC Commission. This would come after objective economic data had been studied and discussed. Bartur stresses that the opening of formal negotiations, and concrete progress towards an agreement, depend on the Council of Ministers.

Bartur reports that at a meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture and of Commerce and Industry, it was decided as follows:

(1) Efforts should be made to ensure the support of the French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg governments for authorizing the EEC Commission to enter on exploratory talks with Israel on the proposed association agreement. Bartur, accordingly, is planning to go to Rome, Paris, Brussels, and perhaps also to The Hague and Bonn.

(2) The principal object is to gain the support of Germany and Italy. Shinnar thinks that Germany's approval could be obtained.[3] When Israel has the support of five of the member countries, the time would then come to concentrate efforts on Italy.

Bartur requests that Israel's ambassadors in the countries of the EEC prepare for intensive activity in the coming weeks, and that they inform him of their comments and suggestions on what has been said above, and on his planned visit to Europe.

He also encloses a memorandum he had submitted to the Minister of Finance, in which he summarizes Israel's intentions and argumentation in connection with its application to the EEC.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 339.
2. See No. 336.
3. The enclosed memorandum is on file but has not been printed here.

338. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 September 1960

Coded Tel. 216; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar addresses his telegram to Bartur; he points to the fact that the final part of the document containing Israel's answers to the EEC's[1] questionnaire, is phrased in a way which could be interpreted as a formal application for an

agreement with the EEC, while its object for the moment is to bring about extensive exploratory discussions with the Commission prior to submitting such an application. This could embarrass Israel's friends on the Commission *vis-à-vis* the Council of Ministers. In order to obviate the risk of running into snags, and to ensure continuity in contacts with the Commission, Najar proposes to stress in the enclosing letter to Rey that the document does not constitute a formal step aimed at the Commission, nor through it to the Council of Ministers. After this preamble, the remainder of the letter can be framed in the spirit of the document and can expound on the object of the talks.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 340.
2. See *ibid.*

339. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 20 September 1960

Coded Tel. 221; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Najar reports to Yahil and Bartur on his and Nirgad's meeting with Rey, to whom they handed over the memorandum containing Israel's answers to the Market's questionnaire.[1] Rey said he would have his assistants study the document, and that Nirgad could contact them in a week's time. He also said that the Commission was of the opinion the time had come to enter on secret and informal consultations with the Council of Ministers in order to report on the contacts with Israel and to hear the ministers' comments. Najar and Nirgad received the impression that Rey's words about consultations with the Council had been coordinated with the Council in advance.

It was agreed to meet again with Rey when Bartur arrives in October. Najar informed Rey of the planned visit by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, P. Sapir, on October 12th,[2] and Rey said he would try and free himself from other engagements in order to meet Sapir.

Both Najar and Nirgad think that even if the consultation on Israel does not appear on the Council's October agenda but is set for a later date, Israel should concentrate its efforts so that more favourable voices are heard, when the time comes, on the agreement with Israel. Persuading von Brentano and Couve de Murville is of special importance, and the possibility of gaining American support should also be investigated. They suggest that the Minister

of Foreign Affairs also hold talks with her opposite numbers from the EEC countries when she takes part in the coming session of the U.N. General Assembly.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 340.
2. See No. 347.
3. Of the European Parliament — see No. 358.
4. Evidence of only two meetings of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the issue of the European Economic Community has been found in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On Golda Meir's meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister on October 2nd, see No. 281. Mrs. Meir met her Belgian counterpart Wigny on October 12th. Wigny supported Israel's association with the EEC, but warned that it would not be made possible before the negotiations with Greece had been finalized. (See Meroz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12.10.1960, 130.06/3278/7.)

340. E. Najar (Brussels) to J. Rey (Brussels). 20 September 1960

Notes

1. See No. 335.
2. See No. 326.
3. The first part of the memorandum, which comprises detailed answers to the EEC questionnaire, is on file but has not been reproduced here. The summary of the memorandum follows.

341. E. Najar and M. Bartur (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 October 1960

Coded Tel. 231; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar and Bartur address their telegram to Yahil, for transmission to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

They report on their meetings in Brussels with Hallstein, Rey, Mansholt and others, who think that a decision by the Council of Ministers is necessary for entering on formal exploratory talks with Israel. The foreign ministers will perhaps meet on October 19th and perhaps again in November. At this stage the point at issue is the opening of formal exploratory talks with an

Israeli delegation, with the aim of studying possible forms of association; in spite of the practical and political importance of such a decision, it still does not imply a final obligation to effect such an association.

Najar and Bartur summarize the attitudes of the Market's member states as follows:

(1) France. The minutes of the Prime Minister's meeting with Debré show that a favourable attitude was indeed promised,[1] but it appears that Couve de Murville stated his reservations about co-opting additional countries to the EEC, apart from Greece and Turkey. Bartur and Najar received the impression that de Murville would perhaps not oppose Israel's application, but he would certainly not support it.

(2) Germany. The Dutchman Mansholt said that he thought Germany was a weak spot, in spite of Adenauer's and Erhardt's promises.[3] He proposed that, in addition to Israel's direct efforts in Germany, Luns sound out the Germans and try to commit them to support the application. He also proposes that Mrs. Meir talk this over with Luns in New York.[4] Mansholt fears that the Germans could dodge the issue under the pretext of having to come first to an agreement with Turkey — which would mean a considerable delay. He thinks that the attempt to persuade Germany should be made by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and not by the Commission, because of Hallstein's strained relations with his government.

(3) Italy. Mansholt thinks there are good prospects of Italy's not opposing the application. The efforts in Rome should continue, and also those in New York, if possible. Hallstein thinks a preliminary sounding-out is necessary before the debate at the Council of Ministers. At this stage, it would seem that Luns is the only one who could be Israel's sponsor in the Council and in the preparatory talks.

Najar and Bartur think that Israel's efforts to win a positive decision from the Council of Ministers should be made now, otherwise there will be delays and the prospects will worsen. Luns is to be chairman of the Council of Ministers until January 1st, 1961, and this opportunity should be exploited to the full.

Notes

1. See No. 325.
2. See No. 342.
3. See Nos. 226 and 336.
4. The meeting did not take place — see Meroz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 663, 13.10.1960, 130.09/2334/15.

342. M. Bartur (Paris) to Ch. Yahil. 8 October 1960

Coded Tel. 28; Inc.: 130.06/3278/7

Bartur reports on his meeting with Wormser, Director of the Economic Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter said that when Debré gave his promise to Ben-Gurion, he had no idea of the complexity of the issue. There are internal conflicts now among the members of the EEC, he therefore advises Israel to wait until the negotiations with Greece have been concluded. It turned out, he said, that negotiations by the Commission as they have taken place in the case of Greece have not proved effective, and perhaps a different procedure should be adopted in the future.

Bartur's impression was that Wormser wants to persuade Israel not to submit its application to the Council of Ministers because they do not want to support Israel but wish to avoid the embarrassment of direct opposition to its application. In any case, Wormser promised to talk the matter over with Debré and with Couve de Murville.

Notes

1. See No. 341.
2. See No. 339 and n. 4 there.
3. Most probably refers to France's former colonies in Africa, which preserved their connection with France within the framework of the French Community.

343. Y. Anug[1] (Rome) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 October 1960.

Coded Tel.; Inc.: 130.06/3278/7

Anug reports that he was shown telegrams at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from their missions in Belgium and Germany, dealing with the attitudes of these countries to Israel's efforts to enter on agreements with the EEC.

The Secretary-General of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said their policy was one of wait and see, until a joint policy of the EEC on associations was decided on. They thought it preferable to concentrate on the problem of relations with countries of consequence, like Britain, and not to divert their efforts to negotiations with marginal countries. He also mentioned the Arab problem, which demanded circumspection on the EEC part.

The German Ministry of Foreign Trade told the Italians that they would not wish to make things more difficult for Italy, which anyway would be hurt by the association with Turkey and Greece. They thought the case of Israel differed from that of these two countries, because they were members of NATO and were subject to Soviet pressure. Giving preference in the German markets to citrus from Israel would make for difficulties with Spain, and Germany does not wish to cause additional problems with that country which already has an imbalance of trade with Germany.

Notes

1. Yeshayahu Anug, Deputy Director of the West European Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stayed in Italy from the end of September to the beginning of October to survey Israel's standing in Italy and to propose ways of strengthening the ties with that country. (See report of November 1960, 130.23/3296/3.)
2. See No. 344, n. 1.

344. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 October 1960

Coded Tel. 235; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar addresses his telegram to Fischer and sums up the situation following his meeting with Bartur in Paris.

(1) Israel having submitted its answers to the EEC questionnaire,[2] the Commission now considers it necessary to ask for the opinion of the Council of Ministers. This is a result of the growing circumspection Hallstein has been demonstrating in the matter of the political powers of the Council, mainly because of the criticism levelled at the Commission by France.

(2) If Israel considers that it has done all it could by relying solely on Hallstein's sounding out the Council, then the members of the latter will issue evasive statements which could well close all the doors to Israel, including that of the Commission.

(3) On the other hand, if Israel approaches the Council officially, requesting mandatory exploratory talks, it will be difficult for the Council to reject this application. Luns's support will of course carry considerable weight. Countries like Germany and France, which had expressed opposition when interrogated by the Italians,[3] will not be able to do so openly.

It would seem, therefore, that at this stage Israel had good prospects if it showed initiative.

Najar requests comments by the Ministry before the consultations with Bartur scheduled for the latter's return from Germany.[4]

Notes

1. Fischer's telegram No. 399 to the Embassy in Brussels (9.10.1960, 130.09/2301/1) contains information obtained by Anug in Rome, according to which the Italians had found Holland favourable to the association with Israel, while Germany, France and Luxembourg were opposed to it.
2. See No. 340.
3. See No. 343.
4. In a further telegram to Fischer (No. 236, 11.10.1960, 130.23/3328/10), Najar writes that the present telegram assumes that the information obtained by Anug in Rome was reliable. From a conversation he had with the Luxembourg representative on the European Commission, Najar received the impression that the opposition was not so determined as described. In any case, Luxembourg had not been approached by the Italians, and therefore no information on its supposed negative attitude could have been given to them.

345. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations.[1] 12 October 1960

Coded Tel. 651; Outg.: 130.06/3278/4

Fischer addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Bartur and to Najar.[2] He recommends that Israel's approach concerning the EEC should be to avoid a decision in principle or a substantive debate. He suggests that the Minister of Foreign Affairs request Luns, in his capacity as chairman of the Council of Ministers, to see that no final decision is taken in the debate on Israel's application. Instead, in view of Israel's close economic relations with the EEC and the extensive possibilities of fruitful cooperation in Africa, the Council should approve continued study of the issue and empower the European Commission to carry on its exploratory talks with Israel on technical matters, with the understanding that the Council will debate the issue again at a later stage.

Fischer requests that the Minister approve his recommendation,[3] and instructs Bartur and Najar to act in accordance with it, subject to Mrs. Meir's approval.

Notes

1. Was sent also to the missions in Brussels, The Hague, Paris, Cologne and Rome.
2. See Fischer's telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to several missions (No. 662, 12.10.1960, 130.09/2387/4), in which he reviewed the attitudes of the members of the European Community towards Israel's efforts to secure an association agreement in the tenor of Nos. 341, 342 and 343. Fischer summed up, saying that only Luns could second Israel's case in this situation, and that his help was vital. He recommended an overt initiative, limited in its aims, to be aided by Luns, and to be carried out in the preliminary and unofficial stage.
3. Fischer's recommendation was approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs — see Meroz to the Ministry, X663, 130.09/2334/15.

346. M. Bartur and E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 October 1960

Coded Tel. 239; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Bartur and Najar address their telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They report on their meetings in Brussels, some of them with the participation of Sapir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. They were told that Belgium would agree to exploratory talks with Israel. The Secretary of State in the German Ministry of the Economy also showed a favourable attitude. Rey, who is in charge of the EEC economic relations, said he saw no difficulty in overcoming the economic problems, but the issue was basically political. He thought the Benelux countries would agree to talks with Israel and Italy would not object, but reservations could be felt on the part of Germany and France — because of the Arabs. Rey considers that unofficial exploratory talks would not endanger Israel's case, and if the results were positive, the EEC's Commission could enter on talks with Israel immediately and without a formal decision.

Bartur and Najar conclude that it is of the utmost importance that Luns take the initiative in the Council of Ministers, and he has to be urged to do so. Efforts should be made in all the capitals in anticipation of the Council's scheduled meeting on October 19th.

Notes

1. No. 345.
2. See No. 347.

3. See No. 349.

347. P. Sapir (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 October 1960

Coded Tel. 240; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Sapir addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Following his meeting with Rey,[2] he is of the opinion that negotiations with the EEC have progressed to such a stage that "we cannot and should not continue playing tag". It is best, as Rey suggested, that the debate at the Council of Ministers on October 19th be conducted informally. From this debate the attitude of each and every state could be learnt and appropriate conclusions drawn as to further action. This is of particular importance in the case of countries which express sympathy with Israel's case in private conversations, and now their actual attitudes will become known. Rey promised he would report confidentially on the result of the debate.[3]

Notes

1. No. 346.
2. See *ibid.*
3. See No. 349.

348. M. Bartur (Rome) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 October 1960

Coded Tel. 908; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Bartur reports on his meeting with Italian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Russo, and the Director of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. H. Dikan, Counsellor in the Israel Embassy, was also present.

(1) In view of the formidable difficulties in coming to an agreement with Greece and of expected future applications for association with the EEC, for example, on the part of Spain, Italy considers it necessary first to decide on the principles and procedures of dealing with applications. This demand is not aimed at Israel, and there will be no discrimination against Israel in their

attitude to the association requested, recognizing as they do its causes and its importance for Israel.

(2) When the Israelis commented that even a delay in discussions would be considered discrimination, the Deputy Minister replied that that was not their intention.

(3) The Director of the Economic Department stressed Italy's wish to prevent at any price other countries from hiding behind Italy's skirts, as they did in the case of the multilateral treaty. He intends issuing appropriate directives to that end.

(4) So far as bilateral relations are concerned, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will support any concrete plan.

Bartur's impression of the meeting was that only pressure by Israel in the capitals of the Community and in Brussels would promote Israel's case. The worst that could happen would be an answer on their part that they had not yet decided on principles for the future, and thus Israel would at least ensure its place in the queue. France, Germany and Italy are not enthusiastic about an agreement with Israel, but they would also prefer to avoid open opposition. In this situation, support by Holland and perhaps also by Belgium and Luxembourg, and by Israel's friends on the EEC Commission, affords some prospects of success.

Notes

1. See No. 309.
2. See No. 346.
3. See Bartur to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 836, 17.9.1960, 130.09/2359/2.

349. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 20 October 1960

Coded Tel. 251; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Najar transmits to Bartur and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Rey's report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EEC.[1]

Rey and Hallstein opened the meeting by reporting on the contacts with Israel from the very beginning, including talks with the Prime Minister,[2] the questionnaire,[3] and the answers submitted by Israel.[4] The ministers or their deputies reported on contacts with Israel in their capitals. They all expressed their sympathy with Israel but stressed that in view of the on-going negotiations with Turkey and Greece it would be premature to

start on negotiations with Israel. Hardly any economic or political arguments were offered. It was Rey's impression that the Six found it difficult either to say "yes" or "no" to Israel. In the light of the Council's answer, the Commission will be unable to continue its talks with Israel. He would consult Hallstein on whether it would be possible to carry on with the exploratory talks connected with various problems appearing in Israel's memorandum. To Bartur's question Rey answered that the agreement with Greece would probably be signed by the end of the year, while the Turkish delegation is pressing to have negotiations concluded within three months. Rey recommended that Israel wait for a while and then resume its political activity when negotiations with Greece have been concluded.

Najar also met Gorse, who deputized for the French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the session of the Council. Gorse said that, though the results of the debate did not come up to Israel's expectations, there were some positive points to be found. All those present expressed sympathy with Israel's case, Israel's application was discussed, and Israel will be the first candidate among non-European states, except for those which had previous linkages with the EEC countries. Among the ministers, the Italian delegate was the least moderate, while Luns took no initiative beyond discharging his duties as chairman; the German delegate did not voice any opposition beyond the general consensus that negotiations with Israel should be put off until those with Greece and Turkey were finalized. Gorse claimed that he even more than the others, had expressed the view that the talks should not be suspended. What he said at the meeting went beyond the instructions he had received from Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville, and he has now decided to take up the matter with Debré. To Najar he mentioned the possibility of a wide-scope trade agreement, to which Najar replied that Israel was aiming at an association, not at a trade agreement. Gorse said he understood that, but perhaps such a trade treaty would be the first step leading eventually to an association agreement. He also, like Rey, recommended that Israel wait for the signing of the agreement with Greece — but not for the finalization of the Turkish case — before resuming its contacts with the EEC.

Another meeting was that with Borscht, the Luxembourg delegate, who confirmed what Rey and Gorse had said. A meeting with Luns has been set up,[5] and Najar is carrying on with his activity in Brussels.

Notes

1. The meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, at which one of the matters discussed was Israel's application for an associative agreement.

2. See No. 328.
3. See No. 326.
4. See No. 340.
5. See No. 352.

350. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 October 1960

Coded Tel. 258; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar reports to Bartur that Nirgad has seen a document containing details of the debate at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EEC dealing with Israel's application.[1]

(1) Rey, who represented the EEC Commission, explained that the Commission's contacts with Israel had been circumspect and of a technical nature. In view of the seriousness of Israel's application, the Commission thought it should be deliberated on by the Council of Ministers.

(2) The ministers, or their deputies, were of the opinion that the issue demanded very cautious handling. The Belgian, German and Italian thought that negotiations with Israel could endanger those with Greece and Turkey. The Frenchman agreed, but stressed that politically it would be difficult either to approve or reject the application. The Community should avoid adopting a wholly negative attitude. The Dutchman Luns summarized these views and said that, formally speaking, they did not commit the respective governments.

(3) The document summarizes: It would appear from the debate that the Commission can give Israel only a negative answer, which should, however, be done in a diplomatic way.

Nirgad adds that in conversations he had with officials of the Commission he was told that the reservations expressed by the Council of Ministers concerned mainly the association with a non-European country. Luns' statement demonstrates the wish to stress the non-binding character of the negative answer. Israel has been advised to act while Luns was still chairman of the Council[4] and to exploit the presence of many prominent people at the coming session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.[5]

Najar has a scheduled meeting with Luns, together with Cidor, for November 2nd,[6] and with Vigny for December 3rd.[7] He will cable his assessments after these meetings and will coordinate his activity in Strasbourg with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notes

1. See No. 349.
2. See No. 328.
3. No. 340.
4. Luns officiated as chairman by rotation of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community up to the end of December 1960.
5. See Nos 358 and 359.
6. See No. 352.
7. See No. 354.

351. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Brussels.[1] 30 November 1960

Coded Tel. 679; Inc.: 130.09/2378/4

Bartur replies to Najar's telegrams[2,3] on the deliberations of the EEC Council of Ministers. Future steps will be discussed at the Ministry after the reception of Najar's assessments and comments, but in the meantime Bartur puts down some guiding lines for Najar's argumentation in his meetings, which should serve for other capitals as well. (1) Regarding the argument that Israel should await finalization of the agreements with Greece and Turkey, this would mean an unreasonable delay because these negotiations could stretch for a long time.[4] Nor is there a technical or professional reason why the EEC could not conduct exploratory talks with Israel before the agreements with the two countries are signed, and the EEC Commission is ready to do that. Still, Israel would welcome a decision to enter on negotiations after the finalization of the agreement with Greece.

(2) The tendency to suspend additional associations contravenes Article 238[5] of the Rome Treaty and declarations by the leaders of the EEC that it will not be restrictive and that they had no intention of creating a "closed shop".

(3) The argument that Israel is not a European state must be strongly refuted by reiterating that Israel is geographically and economically an integral part of Europe, and this is confirmed by the GATT documents.

(4) The suggestion that Israel settle for a wide-scope or other trade agreement is just a formula for evasion, because in light of the obligations assumed by the EEC countries in the GATT agreements, the problem of discrimination in customs dues can be solved only by entering a customs union, in other words, a form of association. Nor is there a solution for Israel's basic economic problems except by joining a large economic area.

Israel is not demanding a decision at this stage on linkage or on any particular form of agreement, and the aim of the exploratory talks is to determine the nature of the agreement to be decided on in the future; Israel will be prepared to discuss any kind of solution, and the European Council would then finally pronounce on it.

Notes

1. Dispatched also to the missions in Paris, Rome, The Hague and Cologne.
2. No. 350.
3. No. 349.
4. The association agreement between Greece and the EEC came into effect on November 1st, 1962, and the agreement with Turkey — on December 1st, 1964.
5. This article deals with association of countries outside the EEC with EEC countries.

352. H. Cidor (The Hague) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 November 1960

Coded Tel. 73; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Cidor reports on his meeting with Luns, who told him officially that, in his capacity as chairman of the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EEC scheduled for October 31st in Paris, he had been asked by the ministers of the Six to request Israel not to apply formally at this stage for association with the EEC. To Cidor's question on the reason for that request, Luns replied that the ministers had refrained from explaining their reasons, but that everybody thought that an application by Israel would add to the many difficulties in negotiations with Greece.[1]

Luns dictated in Cidor's presence the report on the meeting which he intended sending to the other five ministers, and at Cidor's request he added the following: "The Israel Ambassador said that he would transmit the ministers' request to his government, but stressed explicitly that he did not see anything in the request which could affect the submission of a substantive reply, and the Government of Israel would continue acting on a matter which was to it of the utmost importance." Luns said he understood the importance of the matter to Israel, but he advised urgently against choosing the wrong timing for the application.

Notes

1. Further details on the meeting were told to Eytan by Blankenhorn, who had been present. When Israel's application was put up for discussion, he said, the ministers looked at each other and remained silent, until somebody murmured that the matter was not yet ripe for discussion. The Italian then nodded in the affirmative, and the debate continued on other matters on the agenda. No one said anything touching the issue itself. (See Eytan to Bartur, 4.11.1960, 130.09/2350/3.)
2. See No. 327.

353. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 November 1960

Coded Tel. 263; Inc.: 130.23/3328/10

Najar addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He analyses Luns's request, in the name of the EEC, that Israel not apply formally for an agreement.[1] In his opinion, submission to this request would serve the interests of the EEC, which would prefer unofficial contacts. A formal rejection would have embarrassed them, because it would be contrary to their stated policy of an open door. Najar thinks this situation is to Israel's advantage, but exploiting it would be a delicate matter. From what Luns had said to Cidor, it would seem that the Council of Ministers did not want to appear as finally closing the door to Israel, and it was even faintly implied that, when negotiations with Greece were finalized, Israel's case could come up for discussion. In any case, they avoided adopting a stand in principle committing them to any particular action in the future.

Najar thinks the Council's apprehension of a formal application by Israel can be exploited, and he suggests that in his scheduled talk with Luns[3] he submit to him a memorandum describing the development of Israel's contacts with the EEC Commission, and also the possibilities inherent in Article 238, which had appeared in the reports of the European Parliament, for Middle Eastern countries to enter into association with the EEC. He would stress that both the Commission and Israel had taken into account in their contacts the powers resting with the Council of Ministers. Israel had thought that these explorations could aid in determining the form of an acceptable association and the suitable moment for an official application. Najar would express at that opportunity his regret at the unauthorized publicity given to the closed deliberations of the Council, and say that for that reason it would be to the interests of all concerned that future misunderstandings be avoided by authorizing the Commission to hold extensive exploratory talks with Israel

on the issue of its relations with the European Economic Community. The Commission should be free to examine, together with Israel, all the possible solutions and formulas of association; this would not entail an official resolution by the Council, and an unofficial discussion between Hallstein and Rey and the ministers should be deemed sufficient for that purpose. Following exploratory talks, which would be accompanied by simultaneous contacts in the various capitals, the optimal way of action could be determined. All the above would be said without referring to the deliberations of the last meeting of the Council, and to Luns's request.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 352.
2. No. 344.
3. See No. 356.
4. See E. Najar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7.11.1960, 93.26/2713/17.

354. E. Najar (Brussels) to M. Bartur. 9 November 1960

Coded Tel. 267; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar reports on what Holvoet, an official of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had told him about the deliberations of the Council of Ministers on the issue of Israel's application.[1]

(1) The EEC's decision to apply to the Council of Ministers was caused by Italy adopting the position that the Commission had no authority to hold exploratory talks with Israel without the Council's approval.

(2) The deliberations at the meeting of October 31st were brief.[2] The French Minister of Foreign Affairs summarized the debate of October 19th, and said he understood that all present had been of the opinion that Israel's application was premature. As he found it inconvenient to be himself the bearer of that message to Israel, he had asked Luns to do so.

(3) Following discussions on that matter, the ministers had all agreed that the order of priority in entering on associations with the EEC should be: Greece and Turkey, and then any European country wishing to do so, and then overseas countries which had been connected with the Six.

(4) In their decision, the ministers did not intend to close the door to Israel in perpetuity, but they all thought that its application was at the moment premature.

(5) As to a possible reaction by the Arabs, it was the Italians who had raised

this supposed obstacle, thus enabling the others not to express themselves on that point. It would be difficult to assess the importance of the Arab factor to any one of the Six.

(6) It was understood that there was no opposition to the Commission holding talks with Israel within any framework but that of an association.

(7) The personal relationships between the six ministers have grown so close that Israel should not disclose in one capital what had been said in another. The investigation made by the Italians[4] had caused some agitation in Israel, and Holvoet permits himself to recommend that Israel allow anybody who wishes to extend his support to do so by himself, according to his own methods, without referring to this support in talks with the others.

Notes

1. See No. 352.
2. See *ibid.*
3. Should read "October 19th" — see Nos. 349 and 350.
4. See No. 343.

355. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Brussels. 11 November 1960

Coded Tel. 438; Outg.: 130.09/2301/2

Bartur replies to Najar's recommendations and analysis in No. 353.[1]

Perhaps it would be best to maintain the possibility of an official application by Israel because the Council might agree to empower the Commission to hold talks with Israel, as Najar has suggested; this in order to avoid the embarrassment connected with the submission of an official application now. Bartur instructs Najar to request clarifications in respect of leakages of information, among them by the spokesman of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2] It is well known that Italy is working for a decision to postpone the discussion of Israel's case until after the finalization of agreements with Greece and Turkey and also with African states, which would not happen until 1962. Bartur stresses that Israel would be ready to wait for Greece, but it would be difficult to bring forward cogent arguments for waiting for Turkey and the African states; there is no logical connection between the problems of these countries and exploratory talks with Israel on the basis of Article 238. Bartur adds that Najar should remind Luns of the promise of support given by the Dutch government to Ben-Gurion,[3] and imply that Israel was

disappointed by Holland's passive attitude throughout the deliberations of the European Council.

Bartur concludes by saying that, in view of the favourable attitude of Wigny, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by continuing efforts in Luxembourg, it might be possible to bring about active support by the Benelux countries.

Notes

1. See No. 353.
2. This document has not been traced.
3. See No. 327.
4. See No. 357.

356. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 November 1960

Coded Tel. 273; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar reports to Bartur on his meeting with Luns.

Najar began by telling Luns that the Council's behaviour was undignified. They received from Israel a document prepared in all good faith and earnestness,[2] and the ministers did not relate to it as was proper. Israel, he added, is now showing a way of honourable retreat from this situation, by submitting a memorandum[4] proposing the renewal of talks with the members of the Commission. The political aspects would be discussed directly between Israel and the governments concerned.

Luns read the memorandum on the spot, and then said that the Commission could not now defy the Council by resuming talks with Israel, and that the situation was indeed unsatisfactory. He promised to discuss the matter with his colleagues that very day, but requested that Israel refrain for the time being from approaching the Council of Ministers.

Najar replied that Israel did not consider the talks with the Commission a substitute for an application to the Council of Ministers, and that it reserved for itself freedom of action. Israel would be prepared to wait for the termination of the negotiations with Greece, but not beyond that.

Najar then turned to Luns and said he wished to talk with him not in his capacity as a representative of the Market but as the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. He described the link between Israel and Europe as based not only on present economic ties but also on past events. He stressed that

a linkage between Israel and the EEC would alleviate the tensions in the Middle East and would promote the establishment of peace. He requested that Luns take steps in the Council of Ministers in support of Israel's case. Luns replied that their meeting was worth while if only for what had been said just now. Najar comments that, nevertheless, there was no certainty that Luns would take any practical action.

For the full text of the memorandum, see Main Volume, pp. 563–565.

Notes

1. See No. 352.
2. See No. 340.
3. See No. 326.
4. This memorandum was submitted to the Council of Ministers and was distributed to its members. The decision was that it would be put up for discussion at the meeting of December 7th or during the second half of that month. (See Najar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 275, 130.06/3278/7.)

357. M. Bartur (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 16 November 1960

Stencilled copy: 130.06/3278/7

Bartur reports to the missions on the deliberations held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 14th, with the participation of the Minister, on Israel's efforts to come to an agreement with the EEC.

The discussion commenced with a detailed review of Israel's efforts, with an attempt to analyse the motives of the EEC countries in rejecting Israel's application at that stage. The Minister of Foreign Affairs followed by giving her conclusions on the action to be taken in the future.

(1) The Prime Minister will approach de Gaulle and Adenauer at the appropriate time, as soon as possible but not now when France is undergoing a crisis,[3] and Israel is still trying to have Adenauer implement his promise to Ben-Gurion.[4]

(2) When the new administration in the U.S. has settled down,[5] the Americans should be approached and asked for their support of Israel's application to the Common Market.

(3) Activity should be initiated in all the countries of the EEC, in the European Parliament, and in economic circles trading with, and having interests in, Israel such as suppliers, shipyards, and investors.

(4) A visit by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Paris and perhaps to other capitals should be considered.

(5) The Embassies in all the capitals of the EEC should exert themselves to the utmost in helping in the enterprise.

Bartur requests that the missions comment on all the above points and inform him to what extent they can carry out all the work involved, or, alternatively, what are the conclusions to be drawn in respect of organization and manpower.

Notes

1. See No. 326.
2. See No. 340.
3. For the Algerian issue, see No. 240 and n. 4 there.
4. For the implementation of Adenauer's promises to Ben-Gurion on military and economic aid, see No. 215.
5. Presidential elections were held in the United States at the beginning of November. J.F. Kennedy, the Democratic candidate, came out the victor, and was sworn in on January 20th, 1961.

358. E. Najar (Brussels) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 25 November 1960

Coded Tel. 283; Inc.: 130.09/2301/6

Najar reports to Bartur on his meetings in Strasbourg.[1] His impression is that Israel can find supporters among three of the factions in the European Parliament,[2] but the decision on Israel's association with the EEC lies with the governments, which are not particularly sensitive to pressure by the European Parliament.

Najar adds that the memorandum he had given to Luns[3] will probably come up for discussion on December 6th or 19th at the meetings of the Council of Ministers in Brussels. Minister Schauss, who spoke with Najar, agreed with the conclusions of the memorandum, namely, that one should avoid creating an atmosphere of crisis and stalemate in the EEC's relations with Israel. He explained that Israel's application had only been suspended and not rejected, and that the ministers intended to conclude the negotiations with Greece and Turkey first. Najar replied that it would be most desirable to commence negotiations with Israel as soon as possible, because the Turks will come up with numerous demands, negotiations with them will

be inordinately protracted, and the outcome will be that the agreement with the Turks will constitute a precedent for a linkage based on unfavourable economic stipulations as a result of political pressures. At the very least, negotiations with Israel should be conducted simultaneously with those with Turkey, and it is quite possible that they will facilitate a more balanced approach to the latter. Schauss appeared impressed with this argumentation and said he would lay it before his colleagues. He also advised Israel to be active in all the capitals simultaneously and not rely on any single country, the more so as the ministers continuously consult with each other.

Najar also reports on his meeting with Emile Nöel, the Secretary-General of the EEC Commission. Noël said that the reservations in the Council in respect of Israel's application were due to the Arab factor. He hinted that there was a tendency to build close ties between Europe and the Muslim world, but there was no intention of abandoning Israel, to whom they will extend practical help, but not within the framework of an agreement.

Najar concludes that the memorandum has served Israel well. The EEC people had thought that their negative response and the resulting publicity in the press would put an end to Israel's efforts, and here comes Israel again with a proposition it would be difficult to reject. The atmosphere, previously so full of reservations, has now turned friendly and many recommend that Israel continue with its efforts. Najar stresses that the change in the atmosphere does not necessarily imply a change in the positions taken up by the governments, and more efforts should be exerted to achieve an interim solution, namely, the ministers' approval of the recommendations appearing in the memorandum. When that has been achieved, further steps should be discussed.

Notes

1. See No. 359; also Nirgad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30.11.1960, 130.23/3328/1.
2. The Socialists, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats.
3. See No. 356.
4. Refers to an article published in *Le Monde* of October 31st, according to which the Rome Treaty serving as the EEC charter limits the possibilities of association to countries of Europe and to African countries which had been European possessions — thus preventing an association agreement with Israel. (See the Israel Embassy in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 214, 31.10.1960, 130.09/2350/3.)
5. See No. 352.

359. E. Najar (Brussels) to M. Bartur and A. Chelouche. 30 November 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3328/10

Najar reports on his two meetings with Noël, who painted a gloomy picture of the EEC countries' attitude to Israel's application. Najar's impression was that Noël's words reflected mainly opinions prevailing in the French camp. His mention of Europe's desire for closer relations with the Muslim world agrees with what Najar had heard in Paris. Noël pointed out that during Mollet's premiership both the French and the Government of Israel had come to the conclusion that a formal treaty between the two countries was not necessary; but now Israel's request for an agreement with the EEC, if approved, would constitute a political treaty in the full meaning of the word, something none of the Six desires. Such a treaty, he added, might promote peace in the Middle East, but such an effect is far from certain. What is clear is that it would raise a storm in the Arab world. The countries of Europe have no intention of abandoning Israel and they wish to extend it their help, but for that a ceremonial agreement is not essential.

Najar also met Poher, leader of the Demo-Christian faction in the European Parliament, who said he understood Israel's problems and wished to extend his support. He agreed with what Noël had said about the prevailing opinion in France against the agreement with Israel for the reasons mentioned above.

On his return from Strasbourg, Najar, together with Nirgad, took steps to coordinate their activity with the Israel missions in the EEC's capitals.

Notes

1. See No. 358.
2. To participate in the independence celebrations of the former French Congo.

360. M. Erell (Washington) to M. Bartur. 1 December 1960

Orig.: 130.06/3278/756

Erell reports on his meeting with Fessenden of the Department of State, in charge of The Bureau of European affairs, including the economic, political and military organizations.

(1) America's attitude to the EEC: The Americans are not particularly enthusiastic about the EEC from a purely economic point of view, because

they recognize that it could harm America's trade with Europe, but owing to political considerations the overall attitude is positive.

(2) The Six and the Seven: The Department of State is not in favour of a merger between these two frameworks.

(3) The OECD: Negotiations for the establishment of this body are progressing satisfactorily, and there are prospects of the agreements being signed as early as December. The new organization will not undertake any concrete obligations, and its importance will not go beyond the moral effect of principles and trends. There is a certain conflict between the stand of the U.S., which wishes the OECD to serve as a framework for the participation of the countries of Europe in extending aid to backward countries, and the attitude of the countries of Europe, which wish rather to concentrate on their own economic problems.

(4) The admission of additional countries to the Common Market: The Department of State has not adopted any particular line on that issue. They support the admission of Greece for political reasons, and thus they also have to support the Turkish application. Fessenden agreed that objective data justify and demand the inclusion of Israel in the Market, and confirmed that the obstacles put in its way were the result of political considerations. He was aware of Italian opposition, and he also referred vaguely to the German opposition. When Erell mentioned the possibility of America supporting Israel's case, Fessenden replied that they would be prepared to study the issue.

In his conversation with Fessenden, Erell had no intention of entering on a concrete discussion of the possibility of obtaining U.S. support for Israel's case. Before this issue is raised, further discussions will be necessary in order to comprehend America's attitude more fully.

361. Editorial Note

A Consultation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Further Steps to be Taken in Respect of Israel's Application to the EEC

A consultation was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 28th, 1960, and January 1st, 1961, on further steps to be taken in respect of Israel's application for an agreement with the EEC. The participants were the Director-General of the Ministry, Assistant Directors-General and other senior officials, among them the ambassadors to the U.S. and Belgium, and the head of the Reparations Mission. The conclusions were that contacts should

continue to be maintained in all the capitals of the EEC and also in the U.S., to promote Israel's case. They should be carried out assiduously and with no interruption, and diplomatic action should be accompanied by information activities. Steps should be taken simultaneously to solve immediate problems resulting from discriminatory tariffs, with the aim of neutralizing them by means of special quotas or ad hoc agreements. The possibility was also raised of entering into negotiations on a commercial treaty which should provide a comprehensive solution to the problems of trade and tariffs. The coordination of all these activities was entrusted to the Ambassador in Brussels, who was also accredited to the EEC Market bodies. (See Summary of the Consultation, 2.1.1961, 130.06/3278/7.)

362. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 20 January 1960

Coded Tel. 124; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on a meeting between Monsignor G. Agostini, assistant to Cardinal Ottaviani, the head of the Vatican's Holy Office, and H. Dikan, Counsellor in the Israel Embassy in Rome, together with A. Mayer, the Israel Consul General in Milano. The meeting followed information received by Mayer to the effect that Agostini had said it would be desirable for Cardinal Ottaviani to meet an Israeli personality in order to discuss antisemitic manifestations[1] and 'other matters'. At the meeting Agostini said that that was indeed his intention, and the subjects to be discussed would include matters common to Israel and the Vatican. The meeting should be regarded as having no political character, but political matters would undoubtedly also be discussed. He could promise that the meeting would take place very soon and that the Israeli envoy would be pleased with the outcome of the meeting. Agostini added that it would be preferable, for various reasons, that the initiative for the meeting be taken by Israel. Sasson requests instructions and recommends that Fischer be Israel's envoy to the meeting.

Note

1. See Chapter 22.

363. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Rome. 25 January 1960

Coded Tel. 211; Outg.: 130.09/2359/1

Fischer, who has been instructed to meet Cardinal Ottaviani,[1] requests the Embassy to arrange a meeting for him with Monsignor Testa.[2] The contacts should be kept in strict secrecy, but should not be concealed from Secretary of State Tardini.

Notes

1. No. 362.
2. Monsignor Giacomo Testa, director of the Apostolic Institute offering professional training to the diplomats of the Vatican. Testa was very close to Pope John XXIII, and in the years 1953 to 1959 was the Vatican's Apostolic Delegate in Turkey, where he made the acquaintance of Fischer, who was then Israel's minister to Turkey.

364. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to G. Meir. 25 February 1960

Copy: 130.23/3314/4

Fischer reports on his meetings with Monsignor Testa and with Cardinal Ottaviani, and with other Vatican officials.

Testa told Fischer that the Pope had read the note sent to him by Fischer in October 1959,[1] and had said that he would have given Fischer full satisfaction then and there if he had not been obliged to consult his advisers. The matter was close to his heart, and he would see to it that in due course Israel's wishes were fully satisfied.

At the meeting with Ottaviani, Fischer described the policy of appeasement adopted by the West towards the Arab states, while Ottaviani requested that Israel ameliorate its attitude to married couples of mixed religion. Fischer said that the Catholic Church could help the Jews overcome their tragic memories of the Church's treatment of their people by infusing the Catholic education programmes with a new spirit, and by encouraging the people of goodwill in Israel who now appear as representatives of a hostile Church. The Church should win a standing for itself in Israel, but this could be done only on the basis of full recognition and the establishment of formal relations between the Vatican and the State of Israel.

Ottaviani agreed with Fischer's remarks, and said he would do his best to

advance the desired cause. He pointed to gestures of goodwill made lately by the Pope towards Israel,[5] but he understood that they were not enough and he would accordingly act for the establishment of formal relations. A few days later Ottaviani informed Fischer through a go-between that he had been pleased with the meeting and that he would implement his promises.

At a meeting with Cardinal Tisserant, Fischer was told that Vatican Secretary of State Tardini was seriously ill, and there was doubt whether he could stay on in his post — which made Fischer's meeting with Ottaviani still more important. Fischer also met Cardinal Cicognani, head of the office dealing with the Christian communities in the Middle East, who promised to instruct the Vatican's Apostolic Delegate in Israel, Bishop Chiappero,[6] to maintain close contacts with Fischer.

Fischer left with the Embassy, for transmission to the Vatican, a memorandum dealing with the exploitation of the waters of the Jordan as affecting the holy places.[7]

Notes

1. At his meeting with Testa in October 1959, Fischer gave him a memorandum to be transmitted to Pope John XXIII dealing with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Israel. (See Fischer's report to G. Meir and J. Tsur, 5.11.1959, 130.23/3102/20; the memorandum itself has not been traced.)
2. All the departments and officials assisting the Pope in the fulfilling of his function as head of the Catholic Church.
3. The World Bank approved in December 1959 a $56m loan to the U.A.R. for the widening of the Suez Canal, in spite of the Canal's closure to Israeli shipping — see Chapter 3.
4. The Israeli Committee for the Promotion of Understanding between the Religions of the World, organized in Jerusalem in December 1958 at Fischer's initiative.
5. Pope John XXIII ordered the deletion from the Catholic lithurgy of a number of passages offensive to Jews from the Catholic lithurgy.
6. At his meeting with the Pope in February 1959, Fischer requested that an apostolic vicar be appointed for Israel, whose function would be to oversee Catholic affairs and maintain contacts with the Government of Israel (see Fischer to G. Meir, 10.2.1959, 130.23/3102/20). The Vatican had an apostolic delegate in Jerusalem (in that part of the city which was then under Jordanian rule), a relic of the period of the British mandate, with jurisdiction over Israel, Jordan and Cyprus. At their meeting of February 14th, 1959, Cardinal Tardini informed Fischer that it had been decided to accede to his request, but that the appointment of an apostolic vicar did not mean the establishment of diplomatic relations (see Fischer to G. Meir, 15.2.1959, 130.23/3102/20). P. Chiappero was appointed to the said post in September 1959.
7. The memorandum dated February 1960 (130.23/3314/4) details the methods employed by the Catholic Church in fighting antisemitism, and the Vatican's recognition of Israel is included. The enclosure is on file, but has not been reproduced here.

8. Monsignor Agostini — see No. 362.
9. Cardinal Tardini died in 1961.
10. This memorandum has not been traced.

365. Editorial Note

The Attempts to Set Up a Meeting Between the Pope and an Israeli Envoy

Following Fischer's meetings at the Vatican (see No. 364), Friedmann, a businessman, and Zoccha, a Franciscan abbot from Milano, continued to urge Ambassador Sasson to take the initiative in the matter of contacts with the Vatican — which, in their opinion, could advance the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. (See Sasson's telegrams to Fischer Nos. 224 and 228, February 25th, 130.09/2359/2.) In spite of his doubts, Sasson finally yielded and even received the Minister's approval to carry on with the contacts (see G. Meir to the Israel Embassy in Rome, telegram 317, 15.3.1960, 130.09/2359/1). In the course of the efforts to arrange an audience with the Pope, Sasson was asked to meet Cardinal Ottaviani (see No. 366).

366. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 23 March 1960

Coded Tel. 298; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on efforts to arrange an audience with the Pope.[2] Cardinal Ottaviani advised him to approach the Vatican's Nuncio to Italy,[3] but Sasson was not happy with this suggestion, mainly because he was afraid the Vatican's Secretariat of State would sabotage the arrangements. Ottaviani then suggested that Sasson apply directly to the Pope through the head of the Papal Office,[5] and Sasson agreed to do that.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. Pope John XXIII.
3. Monsignor Carlo Grano, the Vatican's Nuncio in Italy.
4. The official residence of the Italian President.
5. Loris Capovilla, Private Secretary to the Pope. For the letter to the Pope, see No. 367.

6. The further part of this document has not been found.

367. E. Sasson (Rome) to Pope John the 23rd (Rome). 23 March 1960

Note

1. Sasson sent a copy of this letter to Fischer and added a few words: "... The copy of the letter is enclosed. It has been drafted in consultation and agreement with Agostini... As you can see, I am carrying on with this attempt to the very end in the hope that something at last will move...". (See Sasson to Fischer, 23.3.1960, 130.23/3314/4.)

368. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 30 March 1960

Coded Tel. 321; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on differences of opinion between the Holy Office[1] and the Vatican's Secretariat of State[2] about the Vatican's attitude towards Israel. The Vatican is about to cable Sensi,[4] their delegate in Jerusalem, in the matter of Sasson's request for an audience with the Pope, asking whether the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs had approached him on that subject, and whether, in his opinion, the Pope should accede to the request to establish formal relations with Israel. Sasson has been told that, in Agostini's opinion, Sensi should be invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an urgent meeting, to inform him of Sasson's request for an audience with the Pope and of Israel's intention to approach the Vatican, in the name of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking for formal recognition. Sasson recommends that the invitation to Sensi be issued by the Minister herself, to endow the subject with more importance.

Notes

1. The highest tribunal of the Catholic Church, one of whose functions is to determine the doctrinaire position of the Church on political matters.
2. The Vatican's Secretariat of State — analogous to a Prime Minister's Office in other countries.
3. In his telegram (320, 29.3.1960, 130.09/2359/2) Sasson reported that he had been informed by Friedman that in the wake of his letter to the Pope (No. 367) the latter

had instructed Monsignor Samoré to prepare a memorandum on the state of the relations between the Vatican and Israel, in preparation for the audience requested by Sasson.

4. Monsignor Giuseppe Sensi, the apostolic representative in the Old City of Jerusalem.
5. For the post of ambassador to the Vatican. The Vatican will not accept an ambassador accredited also to Italy, therefore M. Fischer was the candidate for this post to the Vatican. (See G. Meir to E. Sasson, telegram 358, 26.3.1960, 130.09/2359/1.)

369. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Rome. 4 April 1960

Coded Tel. 385; Outg.: 130.09/2359/1

Fischer informs Sasson that Sensi had paid him a visit and told him about his stay in Cyprus. When Fischer told him that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would like to meet him, Sensi claimed that he would have to ask for the Secretariat of State's approval for that, because he was empowered to maintain contact solely with Fischer.[2] Following an argument, Fischer told him that the Minister of Foreign Affairs intended asking him to inform the Secretariat of State that Sasson had been instructed to ask for an audience with the Pope in order to lay before him Israel's request for establishing formal relations. Sensi promised to convey this information to the Secretariat of State. He added that ever since Bishop Chiappero's appointment (as Apostolic Vicar in Israel) the Arab ambassadors keep warning the Secretariat of State against establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, and in his opinion the time for that had not yet arrived. He remarked that the German precedent was also an obstacle. Fischer pointed out that the relations between Israel and Germany made for a different situation, and that Israel had not sought Germany's formal recognition. Sensi promised to cable the Minister's request to Rome.

Notes

1. 'Abd al-Khaliq Hassunah, Secretary-General of the Arab League, was planning to go to Cyprus on the eve of the British withdrawal from the island, as part of the efforts of the Arab states to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Cyprus. The visit did not take place owing to opposition by the British, and Hassunah decided to postpone it till after Cyprus had attained independence. In the event the visit was cancelled, "in order to avoid creating the impression of acquiescing in the present state of affairs", that is, the existence of an Israeli embassy in Cyprus. (See Levin to the Foreign Ministry, telegram 265, 7.9.1960, 130.09/2341/2.)
2. An apostolic delegate is not empowered to maintain contacts with the authorities but

only with the local clergy. An exception was made in the case of Sensi, who was permitted to maintain contacts with Fischer.

3. See No. 364.

370. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 26 April 1960

Coded Tel. 394; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports that he was invited for a meeting with the papal Nuncio to Italy in connection with the letter he had written to the Pope.[2] Sasson assumes that the Nuncio had been instructed by the Secretariat of State to invite Sasson in order to arrange for his audience with the Pope and to coach him in matters of protocol.

Sasson also reports that the U.A.R. Ambassador to the Vatican[3] warned against establishing formal relations with Israel. He is further informed that the Secretariat of State has drafted two memoranda for the Pope's perusal: the first on Fischer's talk with Sensi,[4] and the second containing the Secretariat's opinion on the subject of establishment of relations with Israel.

Notes

1. See his telegram to Fischer, 358, 11.4.1960, 130.09/2359/2.
2. No. 367.
3. Galal Ezzat, the U.A.R.'s Ambassador to the Vatican.
4. See No. 369.

371. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 27 April 1960

Coded Tel. 395; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on his meeting with the papal Nuncio to Italy, who told him that in applying directly to the Pope he had not acted according to protocol and that he should have first approached the Nuncio himself and informed him of the purpose of the audience. Touching the matter itself, he said that the Vatican thought the time had not yet arrived for formal recognition of Israel. Among the reasons for this he mentioned the issue of the Holy Places and Israel's unsatisfactory treatment of Christians of Jewish origin, and of mixed couples.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 370.
2. See Nos. 376 and 378.
3. See No. 372.

372. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 28 April 1960

Coded Tel. 403; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson comments on what he had been told by the papal Nuncio to Italy about the Vatican's refusal to establish formal relations with Israel.[1] He thinks that there is rivalry among the various bodies in the Vatican, and the Pope, who is favourably inclined towards Israel, cannot impose his will on the others.

When he reported to the people at the Holy Office on what the Nuncio had said, he was told not to give up hope and to accord them a few days' respite. They said the issue had assumed a personal character and it was up to Ottaviani to use his weight to override the others.

Sasson offers some suggestions for further action: The Holy Office should be given a respite of a week or two; if no satisfactory answer is received by then, the Nuncio will be sent a letter censuring the Vatican's attitude — as it publicly preaches peace and understanding between the nations, while secretly discriminating in this respect against Israel. The issue should also be brought to the attention of various top officials in the Vatican. Sasson also suggests that the Minister of Foreign Affairs invite Sensi over in order to express the Israel government's astonishment at the Vatican's actions.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 371.
2. Several words have been omitted here.
3. See Sasson's telegram to Fischer (397, 27.4.1960, 130.09/2359/2), stating that Sasson had told the Nuncio in Rome that Israel had done a great deal to improve the situation of the Christians, and that the establishment of diplomatic relations would enable Israel and the Vatican to discuss more fruitfully matters of common interest.
4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed Sasson not to take any action until she had the opportunity to consult with Fischer (see her telegram to the Embassy in Rome, No. 446, 4.5.1960, 130.09/2359/1).

373. E. Sasson (Rome) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 5 May 1960

Coded Tel. 422; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson acknowledges the instructions he has received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs not to make any overtures to the Vatican without her approval.[1] However, he cannot prevent Israel's friends from intervening in the matter, though he himself has avoided meeting them. He has asked Fischer to stop over in Rome on his way back from Paris in order to discuss the issue with him.

Notes

1. See No. 372 and n. 4 there.
2. Filed under 130.23/3314/4.

374. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 13 May 1960

Coded Tel. 438; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson is informed that Cardinals Tardini and Ottaviani had met in order to discuss relations between the Vatican and Israel. They decided to meet again in order to analyse the arguments put forward by the Secretariat of State for postponing, for the time being, a decision on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Sasson has instructed his go-betweens to put strongly to officials of the Vatican that Israel had not yet got over the distressing conversation he had had with the Nuncio in Rome, and was not prepared to make any further moves for the time being. However, initiatives taken by the Holy Office would not be rejected.

Note

1. See No. 371.

375. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Rome. 16 May 1960

Coded Tel. 470; Outg.: 130.09/2359/1

The Minister of Foreign Affairs instructs Sasson not to make overtures to the Vatican in the matter of establishing formal relations with Israel, unless a favourable answer was assured in advance.

Note

1. No. 374.
2. See No. 366.

376. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 14 June 1960

Coded Tel. 559; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson reports on his meeting with Ottaviani, who said he had heard Sasson was leaving for Israel, and he was taking the opportunity to request Sasson to persuade the authorities there to be more tolerant towards Christians in general and in particular towards those of Jewish origin.[1] Sasson promised he would do that, but said he was not aware of any discrimination against Christians. He reminded Ottaviani that Israel had evacuated the Franciscan monastery on Mount Zion two weeks previously, and mentioned in contrast the rejection by the Nuncio in Rome of his request for an audience with the Pope.[3] Ottaviani said that the people of the Secretariat of State had been offended because they thought Sasson's intention had been to go to the Pope over their heads; protocol must be followed in future, and everything has to go through the Nuncio. Sasson did not remind Ottaviani that he had in effect followed his advice, but stressed that the Nuncio had referred not only to the protocol but also to the substantive issue of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, which step he said was premature.

Notes

1. See also No. 378.
2. Reference is to the Franciscan monastery on Mt. Zion.
3. See No. 371.
4. See No. 377.

377. E. Sasson (Rome) to M. Fischer. 15 June 1960

Coded Tel. 560; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Sasson continues with his report on the meeting with Ottaviani.[1] To the latter's remark that Israel should arm itself with patience and demonstrate goodwill, Sasson replied that he could not understand why the Vatican, though maintaining diplomatic relations with Arab, Muslim and other non-Christian states, refused to do so in the case of Israel. This attitude was incomprehensible not only to the people of Israel but also to many Catholics the world over. Ottaviani said that was also his argument, and pointed also to the fact that the Vatican had established diplomatic relations with Muslim Turkey several months previously. He promised to raise the issue again with Secretary of State Tardini.

Notes

1. See No. 376.

378. M. Fischer [Jerusalem] to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 26 June 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3314/4

Fischer reports on his meeting with Apostolic Representative to Israel Monsignor Sensi, who was about to leave for Italy. Sensi said he found it his duty to warn against the new definitions issued by the Ministry of the Interior, according to which Israeli law regarded as Jewish a child considered a Catholic according to Catholic canonical law.[1] He warned that this would be a serious obstacle in the process of *rapprochement* between the Vatican and Israel.

Fischer replied that he could not advise the Israeli authorities that this or that act could prevent a *rapprochement* with the Vatican, in the light of the Pope's refusal to grant an audience to the Israel Ambassador in Rome;[2] this proved that the Secretariat of State had adopted an inflexible attitude of opposing any positive step in Israel's direction.

Sensi described what had happened in Rome with regart to the audience with the Pope as a "psychological mistake". Fischer commented that the process in the Secretariat of State of distancing itself from Israel had begun

a long time before that. He himself had obtained from the Pope in 1959 a favourable response to two requests: the appointment of a bishop to Israel and the possibility of maintaining contacts with the Secretariat of State.[3] The bishop appointed to Israel does not maintain any contact with the authorities, while the Secretariat of State has severed its contacts with Fischer.

When Sensi reverted to the issue of Israel's treatment of mixed couples, Fischer said he would not relay his message because the real reason of the Secretariat of State's hostility to Israel was its desire to curry favour with the Arabs. Fischer is prepared, as he always has been, to protect the human rights of the mixed couples, but he is not prepared to enter on a struggle to defend the Catholic canonical law.

Sensi replied that the Vatican thought it sufficient to have recognized Israel, and only the diplomatic relations were lacking. Fischer said that had also been his impression for the first few months of Pope John XXIII's office, but the Vatican's spokesman keeps declaring from time to time that the Vatican had not recognized Israel.

The talk concluded with Sensi saying he would report on it to the Vatican's Secretariat of State.

Notes

1. The Ministry of the Interior published om March 18th, 1960, a circular according to which the children of mixed couples should be registered according to the mother's religion and ethnic affiliation. This caused great anger among Catholic circles. See, for instance, an article in the Catholic weekly *Ave Maria* of October 8th, enclosed with Elizur's letter to Fischer, 21.10.1960, 130.23/3319/21.
2. See No. 371.
3. See No. 364 and n. 6 there.

379. M. Sasson [Jerusalem] to Z. Doriel (Teheran). 21 January 1960

Coded Tel. 9; Outg.: 130.15/3761/20

Sasson reports on the posting of the Iranian diplomat Teymoori[2] to the Swiss Embassy in Israel. Teymoori will handle mainly consular matters but he will also deal with diplomatic affairs. He has requested an audience with the Minister of Foreign affairs, and asked for information about the outbreaks of antisemitism[6] and the situation in Iraq.

Notes

1. The Note, dated January 7th, 1960, is to be found in File 130.15/3761/20. Iran's affairs in Israel were represented since 1958 by the Swiss Embassy.
2. Ibrahim Teymoori, an Iranian diplomat of the rank of second secretary, was posted in January 1960 to the Swiss Embassy in Israel.
3. For details on Teymoori's relations with the staff of the Swiss Embassy, see telegram from the Israel Mission in Teheran to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (20.1.1960, 130.15/3761/20).
4. Amir Khosrow Afshar, the Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
5. Iran recognized Israel *de facto* on March 15th, 1950, and since that month was represented in Israel by a special representative, Reza Safinia. At the same time, the Iranians refused to allow the presence of an Israeli representative of the same rank in Teheran. The Iranians closed their mission to Israel in July 1951, under pressure of the religious circles in their country. On this episode, see Vol. 6, Nos. 222 and 268.
6. See Chapter 22.

380. M. Sasson [Jerusalem] to Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran). 17 May 1960

Coded Tel. 219; Outg.: 130.15/3761/20

Sasson reports that Iran's representative in Israel, Teymoori, is about to leave for Teheran on the instructions of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said he was leaving with mixed feelings. On the one hand, he found that there was much scope in Israel for official methodical work, but on the other hand his standing in the Swiss Embassy was insufficient for such activity. He had been promised that his standing would be regularized, and he was now leaving for Teheran to have the promise implemented.

Sasson described to Teymoori the situation following Doriel and Ezri's latest talks in Teheran with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Afshar. Teymoori was sceptical, and said he was afraid that Teheran would prefer a gradual advance towards the establishment of diplomatic relations to doing that at one go.[2] It was important that he hear from Ezri on that point before meeting Afshar. He intended to stay in Teheran until the minister's return and to come back to Israel if the outcome of his talks is favourable.

Notes

1. Abbas Aram, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. Of the establishment of relations.

381. D. Sattath (Prague) to the East European Division. 27 May 1960

Coded Tel. 242; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Sattath reports on a talk with the Iranian ambassador to Czechoslovakia,[1] who told him that three Arab ambassadors in Teheran — the U.A.R., the Moroccan, and an unnamed third one — submitted to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes protesting at the flooding of the Iranian market with Israeli goods. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that Iran had always demonstrated goodwill towards the Arab states, but they had disappointed Iran and they had no right to put to it any demands. The attempt to Arabize the Persian Gulf destroyed the basis for further cooperation. Iran had recognized Israel *de facto* and the origin of the goods in Iran's markets was Iran's internal affair.

Note

1. Apparently the Iranian Ambassador in Prague.

382. Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran) to M. Sasson. 6 June 1960

Coded Tel. 318; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Doriel and Ezri report on a meeting with the head of the Middle East Division in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who told them that the scheduled meeting for a discussion on establishing diplomatic relations with Israel had been put off because of more urgent affairs. He was anxious lest the new regime in Turkey[1] embark on a policy of *rapprochement* with the Arabs and coolness towards Israel. He said that Iran's ambassadors to Egypt and Switzerland opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

Doriel and Ezri point out that the rumours about a pro-Arab and anti-Israeli Turkish line could discourage the elements in Iran handling the subject of Israel, and request more information so that they can refute these rumours.

Notes

1. A military coup took place in Turkey on May 27th — see No. 394 and n. 1 there.
2. A conference of Iranian diplomats took place in Geneva in May 1960. The issue of

the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel was among other items on the agenda.

3. Untraced.

383. M. Sasson [Jerusalem] to Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran). 7 June 1960

Coded Tel. 248; Outg.: 130.15/3761/20

Sasson suggests that Doriel and Ezri meet Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Afshar and advise him that there was no basis for the rumours of cooling relations between Israel and Turkey,[1] on the contrary, there were good prospects for their improvement. The Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara, Moshe Alon,[2] has been instructed to meet the Iranian Ambassador in Ankara[3] and Batmanglidj,[4] the Iranian representative in CENTO, and infuse them with optimism about the prospects of good relations between Israel and Turkey.

Notes

1. See No. 382.
2. Moshe Alon, Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey in the years 1956 to 1960.
3. Hassan Arafa (spelling uncertain), the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey.
4. Nadir Batmanglidj, the Iranian representative at the CENTO headquarters in Ankara.
5. See No. 382, paragraph 3.

384. Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 July 1960

Coded Tel. 335; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Doriel and Ezri transmit a report appearing in the newspaper *Keyhan*,[1] according to which Iran was about to set up a mission in Israel. A well-known source quoted in the paper says that this is a perfectly normal process, seeing that Iran had already recognized Israel but was forced to close down its mission there because of lack of funds — but that did not mean that the recognition had been retracted. When the necessary funds are available, the mission will open its doors again. The source pointed out that an Iranian diplomat was handling consular matters from the Swiss Embassy in Israel. He also remarked that there was no reason for the Arab states to be indignant

about it because all the governments having normal relations with the Arabs also have friendly relations with Israel; moreover, the Arabs sit at the same table with Israel on international bodies. Doriel and Ezri point out that the report was published at the Foreign Minister's initiative; this is the first time that a report on Israel is given such prominence, and this is also the first public statement claiming that the relations with Israel had never been suspended and that the mission in Israel had closed down owing to lack of funds. This is also the first disclosure of the presence of an Iranian diplomat in Israel. The mission mentioned in the report is described as being of Embassy rank. The report also refutes in advance possible arguments on the part of the Arabs and rejects in advance their assumed protests. The Israel mission sees in this report a step by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to prepare public opinion in Iran and also the Arabs for the planned resumption of the relations with Israel.

Notes

1. A daily newspaper appearing in Teheran.
2. The conference took place in July, and the Iranians rejected the Arabs' protests against Israel's participation — see the Mission in Teheran to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 266, 15.6.1960, 130.15/3761/20.
3. See No. 381.
4. An article in the Egyptian weekly *Ruz al-Yusuf* of June 13th, 1960, stated that Iran was about to recognize Israel and to establish diplomatic relations with it at the level of embassies, but retreated after intervention by the Pakistani president, Ayyub Khan. Abbas Aram, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in response that Iran's recognition of Israel was firm and valid, and that the article in the Egyptian weekly revealed nothing that was new. (See the Mission in Teheran to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 1937, of 30.6.1960 and 232, of 14.7.1960, both in File 130.15/3761/20.)
5. An officer from the Medical Corps of the I.D.F. participated in an international conference on military medicine which took place in Teheran in April 1960. In protest against his appearance, the representatives of the Arab states, except for Morocco, walked out of the conference. (See untitled document, 5.5.1960, *ibid.*)
6. The flag was hoisted owing to Israel's participation in the conference on military medicine.
7. Reference is to the statement made by the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Ezri, the deputy head of the Israel Mission in Teheran, to the effect that the Shah agreed to the resumption of the relations with Israel and to the exchange of representatives at the ministerial level. (See the Mission in Teheran to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 140, of 2.5.1960 and 334, of 16.7.1960, both in File 130.15/3761/20.)
8. Parliamentary elections took place in Iran in July–August 1960.

385. Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran) to the Middle East Division. 24 July 1960

Coded Tel. 346; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Doriel and Ezri transmit the Shah of Iran's reply given at a press conference to a question by a journalist about the rumours that Iran was about to recognize Israel. The Shah replied that Iran had already recognized Israel and had opened a mission there, but the mission later closed down owing to lack of funds and because of circumstances then prevailing. Iran's recognition of Israel was never retracted and it is firm and established.

Doriel and Ezri report that the French Ambassador in Teheran[1] asked the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs what was the degree of truth in the rumours about the resumption of the relations between Iran and Israel. The Minister replied that the decision about that had not yet been taken but that it could be made any time now.

Note

1. Henri Roux, the French Ambassador to Iran.

386. Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran) to the Middle East Division. 27 July 1960

Coded Tel. 350; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Doriel and Ezri transmit the text of an interview with the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs appearing in the periodical *Al-Tala'at*[1] touching the Arab states' reaction to the Shah's statement on the resumption of the relations with Israel.[2] The Minister repeated what the Shah had said, and stressed that nothing new had occurred to justify all the repc rts and numerous statements in the Arab states. It is a matter for surprise that friendly countries should give so much unjustified publicity to the subject in question. The Government of Iran reserves to itself the right to complain against the Arab states which exploit a subject of long standing for the sake of unseemly publicity.

A further item of information is that the Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs[3] said that Iran's decision to recognize Israel would have no influence on his country's policy.

Notes

1. A daily evening paper in Teheran.
2. See No. 385.
3. Manzur Qadir, the Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs.

387. Z. Doriel and M. Ezri (Teheran) to the Middle East Division. 27 July 1960

Coded Tel. 353; Inc.: 130.15/3761/20

Doriel and Ezri report that Iranian circles are of the opinion that the Shah's words on Israel[1] were not a slip of the tongue but the culmination of the gradual instilling of the idea of resuming the diplomatic relations with Israel begun by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it rejected the Arabs' protests touching various episodes in the relations between Iran and Israel. The Arab representatives held a consultation at the U.A.R. Embassy in Teheran, and discussed the U.A.R. Ambassador's proposal to sever the relations with Iran.[5]

Pakistan's intervention is to be feared, should it decide to use its influence in support of the Arabs. Britain would most probably urge the Pakistanis on, with the Americans' knowledge. The Shah has good relations with Pakistan's president.

Another weak spot is Iran's wish to improve its relations with Iraq, from which it had not succeeded in obtaining any concession on Shatt-al-Arab,[10] but had agreed to the exchange of ambassadors. Iran hopes also that Iraq will restrain the regime's opponents who had found refuge there, and would prevent Soviet infiltration through Iran's back door.

The attitude of the powers and of Turkey to the renewal of diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel is unclear. The B.B.C. commented on it in a negative vein.[11]

In conclusion, Doriel and Ezri recommend that Israel remain passive in the matter and leave the activity to Israel's friends.

Notes

1. See No. 385.
2. One sentence has been omitted here.
3. See No. 384 and n. 4 there.
4. See No. 392 (Appendix A).

5. See No. 393 (Appendix B). As a result of these developments, the U.A.R. ambassador left Iran and then the Iranian ambassador left the U.A.R. The relations between Iran and Egypt were resumed only in 1970.
6. See No. 386, paragraph 2.
7. Nasser paid a visit to Pakistan in April 1960.
8. See No. 384 and n. 4 there.
9. The Pakistani president instructed his country's delegation to the scouts' jamboree in Teheran to return home, owing to Israel's participation in the gathering. In the event, the Pakistani delegation did not leave but it did not participate in the jamboree's official events.
10. The agreement signed in 1937 between Iraq and Iran left this river, which constitutes the boundary between the two states, under Iraqi sovereignty, except for three sections adjacent to three Iranian towns. Iran attempted to emend the agreement, demanding that the boundary line be drawn in the middle of the river, as is the case with other rivers constituting boundaries between states.
11. The Arabic language programme of the B.B.C. broadcast on July 25th a talk hostile to Iran, following the Shah's declaration of Iran's recognition of Israel. (See memorandum by Divon to G. Meir, 26.7.1960, 130.15/3761/20.)
12. The last paragraph has been omitted.

388. Z. Doriel (Teheran) to A. Aram (Teheran). 30 July 1960

Note

1. See No. 382 (Appendix A).

389. Israel Mission in Teheran to the Middle East Division. 21 August 1960

Coded Tel. 417; Inc.: 130.15/3761/25

Doriel was summoned to the head of the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was handed the text of the Shah's reply to President Ben-Zvi's message.[1] He was also told that what the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs had said at the press conference of August 20th[2] was at the explicit request of an Iranian representative to one of the Arab states, and was timed to coincide with the conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League.[3]

The statement by the Minister of Foreign Affair was in accord with the messages sent by the Shah to King Hussein[6] and to the rector of the

Al-Azhar University.[5] Their text had been drafted to enable the Arab states to defend themselves against the Nasserist propaganda, and the formula proved effective. The Shah thinks that this is a flexible formula which will accord to Iran freedom of action in the future.

Notes

1. See Nos. 388 and 390.
2. At a press conference held on August 20th, 1960, Aram said that Israel and Iran had not exchanged ambassadors and that Iran had not recognized Israel *de jure*. Aram referred to Iran's *de facto* recognition of Israel in 1950, and stressed that the Mossadegh regime, which had recalled the Iranian representative to Israel in 1951, did not abrogate the *de facto* recognition. (See publication by the Iranian Department of Information, "Facts About Iran", No. 77, 30.8.1960, 130.15/3761/25.)
3. At the conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League held in Chtourrah in Lebanon in August 1960, a resolution was adopted calling on the members of the League to continue their efforts to enable Iran to base its relations with the Arab states on firm foundations.
4. Ali Ardalan, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1955 to 1958.
5. For the text of the Notes exchanged between Mahmud Shaltut, President of the Al-Azhar Univerity, and the Shah of Iran, see publication of the Iranian Department of Information, No. 76, 130.15/361/25.
6. King Hussein sent a message to the Shah on July 27th, asking him to postpone the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel 'until the Arab nation finds a solution to this stalemate, and until justice is done'. The Shah replied that there was no change in the relations between Iran and Israel, which had been based from the beginning on de facto recognition. (See *Al-Jihad* [a daily paper appearing in east Jerusalem and regarded as the voice of the Hashemite court] of 2.8.1960.)

390. Sh. Divon (Jerusalem) to the Prime Minister's Bureau.[1] 24 August 1960

Copy: 130.15/3761/25

Divon transmits the Shah's message to President Ben-Zvi.[2] The Shah thanks the President for his message, and says that the megalomaniac dictators who do all they can to sow conflict between the nations will not succeed in their evil designs. The Shah wishes with all his heart to contribute to his utmost to understanding between the peoples of the region and to fruitful cooperation which will achieve flourishing progress in the Middle East.

Notes

1. Copies were sent also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Director-General and to the Assistant Director-General of the Ministry.
2. See Nos. 388 and 389.

391. Sh. Divon (Jerusalem) to the Israel Mission in Teheran. 15 December 1960

Copy: 130.15/3761/15

Divon brings to the Mission's notice a number of decisions taken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on matters connected with the relations with Iran. The most important of them are: (1) The Mission should not raise the issue of diplomatic relations with [Iranian] government officials. (2) The subject can be raised in unofficial circles, but no campaign on that issue should be organized.

Other decisions: A commercial attaché will be dispatched to Iran; permission is given to take on a local employee to deal with the press, and another whose task will be to maintain contacts with the Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of fuel. The entire issue of fuel is being dealt with in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and other concerned bodies.

Notes

1. Ezra Danin, adviser on Middle Eastern affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Iran on several occasions, the last time being in October 1960.
2. Avraham Cohen, Deputy Director of the Middle East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

394. M. Fischer (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Ankara. 29 May 1960

Coded Tel. 692; Outg.: 130.15/3764/2

Fischer informs the Chargé d'Affaires, Moshe Alon, that he will be coming to Ankara to meet the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selim Sarper, and other officials to discuss matters of common interest.[1] Israel is not

interested in giving publicity to this mission. When Alon receives a note on the establishment of a new government in Turkey, he should respond by announcing Israel's recognition of the new regime. Israel must be one of the first countries to recognize the new regime.[3]

Notes

1. A bloodless military coup took place in Turkey on May 27th, which put an end to the ten-year rule of the Democratic Party. The military junta called "The Committee for National Unity" ruled Turkey until October 1961. It was headed by General Gürsel, who took over the functions of head of state, prime minister and minister of defence.
2. The Israeli vessel *Snunit* was seized in September 1959 for illegal fishing in Turkish territorial waters. The crew were released in November 1960 when a general amnesty was proclaimed in Turkey — see No. 409.
3. And, indeed, Israel was the third country to recognize the new regime in Turkey.

395. M. Fischer (Ankara) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 June 1960

Coded Tel. 185; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Fischer reports to the Director-General, Ch. Yahil, on his meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sarper. Fischer promised political, economic and technological support of the new regime. He raised the issue of the level of diplomatic relations between the two countries and said that the time had come to put an end to the existing undignified state of affairs. Sarper replied that he personally was in favour of exchanging ambassadors, but the general policy touching the region had not yet been put on the agenda. Turkey should take into account its relations with the Arab states and with Pakistan; Sarper suggested that the issue be discussed again in two or three months' time.

Notes

1. Kamuran Acet, Director of the Middle East Division in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. See No. 379, n. 2.
3. Abdullah Gözübüyük, Turkish Minister of Justice, May–August 1960.
4. A number of paragraphs have been omitted here.
5. Adnan Menderes, Turkish Prime Minister in the years 1950 to 1960.
6. Following the Sinai Campaign, the Arab states exerted pressure on Turkey to break

off its diplomatic relations with Israel. These efforts were led by Iraq, which was then Turkey's ally in the Baghdad Pact. Menderes at first submitted to the pressure, and promised Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id to do as he requested, but ultimately he settled for reducing the level of representation with Israel: the ministers heading the legations in the two countries were replaced by chargés d'affaires. See also No. 400.

7. The People's Republican Party — the main opposition party in Turkey in the years 1950 to 1960.
8. The Democratic Party — the ruling party in Turkey in the years 1950 to 1960.
9. Ismet Inönü, leader of the People's Republican Party, President of Turkey from 1938 to 1950.
10. Cihat Iren, the Turkish Minister of Trade, May–August 1960.
11. See No. 396.
12. At his second meeting with Sarper — see No. 397.

396. M. Fischer (Ankara) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] 15 June 1960

Copy: 130.23/3348/26

Fischer reports on his meeting with Inönü, in the company of the Chargé d'Affaires in the Israel Legation in Ankara and with the participation of a member of parliament of the Republican Party, B. Ecevit.

Fischer reviewed the situation in the Middle East, emphasizing the importance of preserving a balance of power, which he thought was also in Turkey's interest. He described Israel's relations with Iran and with Ethiopia, and in reply to Inönü's question said that Israel had no contacts with Pakistan. He replied in the negative to the question whether Israel had any contacts with Iraq. Fischer then reviewed the prospects of achieving peace with the Arab states and the refugee problem. He raised the issue of the relations with Turkey, which he said were less than satisfactory ever since Turkey had decided in 1956 to reduce the status of the missions. Inönü replied that in his opinion that was not the time for a change because the new regime was concentrating on internal affairs and did not wish to change the status quo in the field of foreign policy. He also explained that the Republican Party's ties with the new regime were rather loose.

Opinions were then exchanged about the situation in the Middle East, and Inönü said that if he became head of the regime he would strive for peace in the region. Fischer said that Israel expected Turkey to show the way to other states in the Middle East which have excellent relations with Israel but are afraid to make the fact public. (Iran was hinted at here.) Inönü did not react to that.

Fischer told Inönü about his meeting with Sarper, whom he informed

of Israel's readiness to aid the new regime in the political, economic and technological fields.

Fischer concludes by commenting on Inönü's cautiousness during the conversation, which shows that Inönü thinks his prospects of becoming head of the regime are good.

Notes

1. Copies sent to the Director-General, G. Rafael, M. Bartur, Sh. Bentsur, E. Sasson and M. Sasson.
2. Inönü was president of Turkey when it recognized Israel in 1949.
3. See No. 395 and n. 6 there.
4. In his speech, Inönü expressed his support of the principles of the Menderes government's foreign policy in all that concerned the Middle East formulated as following: "We are interested in strengthening our relations with the Arab countries, but they must understand that Turkey has its own specific interests, just as the Arab [states] have their own special interests". (See the Legation in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 167, 5.5.1960, 130.15/3764/2.)

397. M. Fischer (Ankara) to Ch. Yahil. 16 June 1960

Coded Tel. 190; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Fischer reports on his second meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sarper, who informed him that General Gürsel agreed in principle to rectify the formal flaw in the relations between Turkey and Israel, but the subject had to be debated in the cabinet — whose agenda was full. Sarper also said that he saw no reason for Turkey to change its relations with the U.A.R.

Fischer told Sarper about Israel's activity in Africa. Sarper said that in his opinion Nehru should be recruited to stop the Soviet infiltration, to which Fischer replied that the infiltration of Nehru's or Nasser's neutralism would pave the way for the Soviets; Turkey's presence in the new African states would however be welcome. One of its tasks would be to demonstrate that Nasser is not the sole representative of the Islam. These words seemingly made an impression on Sarper.

After Sarper had inquired about Israel's relations with Pakistan, Fischer reverted to the subject of the relations with Turkey, and asked whether General Gürsel indeed approved rectifying these relations. Sarper replied that that was the case in principle, but that he would prefer to give the matter more thought and consider its possible effect on Iraq and Syria in particular. He

promised to report to Gürsel on this conversation and to see to it that the issue is put up for discussion at the next meeting of the government. He replied in the affirmative to Fischer's question whether another visit to Ankara on his part would be desirable.[2] When Fischer mentioned the possibility that Alon, the Chargé d'Affaires, would be recalled to Israel, Sarper requested that Alon be enabled to stay on in the hope that in due course he would be replaced by an ambassador.

Notes

1. General Gürsel — see No. 395.
2. Fischer did come to Turkey again in August 1960 — see No. 402.
3. Fuat Köprülü, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in the years 1950 to 1956.

398. M. Fischer (Ankara) to Ch. Yahil. 17 June 1960

Coded Tel. 192; Inc.; 130.09/2290/4

Fischer sums up the results of his visit to Turkey, following a meeting with Küneralp, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fischer's visit undoubtedly brought about a discussion in depth among the top-ranking officials on the relations between Turkey and Israel. However, as long as the present interim regime headed by the army is in power, there are no prospects of Israel's desire to exchange ambassadors to be fulfilled. However, he received assurances that Turkey would continue with its policy of sincere friendship towards Israel, will intervene if Israel is attacked, and the existing relations and cooperation in all fields will continue.

Note

1. Cihat Iren — see No. 399.

399. M. Fischer (Ankara) to Ch. Yahil. 18 June 1960

Coded Tel. 193; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Fischer reports on his meeting with Turkish Minister of Trade Iren, at which the latter told him that the subject of the relations between Turkey and

Israel was put on the agenda of the next government meeting. Gürsel is apprehensive of the possible effect of gestures towards Israel on the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Fischer dismissed the possibility that an exchange of ambassadors with Israel would cause Iraq to incite its Kurds against Turkey. A second obstacle — according to Iren — was the unwillingness of the young officers to appear as anti-Muslims, influenced as they were by the inciting propaganda to that effect conducted by the political parties. Iren is in favour of Fischer's coming again to Ankara, when he will help in arranging for him a meeting with Gürsel.

Note

1. Cihat Iren — see No. 398.

400. M. Fischer (Athens) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19 June 1960

Copy: 130.23/3348/25

Fischer reports on his meeting with A. Kural, Turkey's Ambassador to Greece.[1] Kural told him that, in 1956, the then Turkish Prime Minister Menderes was prepared to "loosen" the ties with Israel,[2] but in view of the opposition to that by Nuri Birgi, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he settled for the recall of the heads of the missions. Kural also said that the former administration had intended to return the relations to their former level, but they refrained from doing so solely on account of the possible effect on their relations with Iraq.

Kural said that during his last visit to Ankara he had heard from the heads of the new regime favourable comments on the continuation of the cooperation with Israel. He also said that Gürsel and the army officers showed constant sensitiveness to the Kurdish problem. Fischer then repeated what he had said to the Minister of Trade[4] about the Kurds, and Kural agreed with him and said he was convinced that Qassem, Iraq's ruler, would try to raise the Kurds only in the case of a serious conflict with Turkey which could endanger his regime.

Regarding the recall of the heads of the missions, Kural said that the new regime would also have to consider the effects on public opinion in countries in which Turkey still had some standing, for instance, Jordan. Fischer then

explained to him why serious negative reactions on the part of Jordan's regime could not be expected.

To Fischer's question whether the possibility existed of the new regime's changing the attitude the former regime had towards the U.A.R., Kural replied in the negative, because the objective conditions had not changed. According to him, Nasser's visit to Greece had been a failure.[6] He had often heard from Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff-Tossizza that he regretted that Greece had not established full diplomatic relations with Israel immediately on its creation. Fischer said that in his opinion Averoff-Tossizza was sincere when he had talked with him about the relations between Israel and Cyprus, but it was doubtful whether his ideas would be translated into deeds.[7]

Fischer's impression was that Kural still saw the *rapprochement* between Turkey and Israel as one of his tasks, but he did not think that this would result in his recommending the exchange of ambassadors in the near future.

Notes

1. Adnan Kural, the Turkish Ambassador to Greece. Kural was Minister to Syria in the years 1955 to 1958, and when the diplomatic mission in Syria closed in 1958 owing to Syria's union with Egypt and the formation of the U.A.R., he returned to Ankara and was entrusted with handling Turkey's relations with Israel. In 1960 he was appointed Ambassador to Greece.
2. That is: to break off.
3. The second part of the sentence has been omitted.
4. See No. 399.
5. A. Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs.
6. On Nasser's visit to Greece, see No. 298.
7. Fischer met Averoff-Tossizza in January in an attempt to persuade him to convince President Makarios to establish diplomatic relations with Israel at the level of embassies, immediately after attaining independence, and not to imitate Greece, which settled for *de facto* recognition and for relations at the level of diplomatic representation. (See M. Fischer to G. Meir, 6.1.1960, 130.23/3317/3.)
8. See Nos 394 and 395.
9. See No. 394, n. 2.

401. M. Alon (Ankara) to M. Fischer and the Middle East Division. 13 July 1960

Coded Tel. 228; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Alon reports on his meeting with Colonel A. Türkes, the Director-General of

the Turkish Prime Minister's Office, who plays a central role in the ruling military junta.

Alon repeated Israel's offer to cooperate with the new regime and to contribute to it its experience. Türkes stressed the identity of interests between the two countries, and Turkey's desire for a strong Israel. He criticized the Middle Eastern policy of the former regime, and said the unification of the Arab states was not in Turkey's interest, and therefore the efforts of every state to remain independent will have to be supported. Türkes claimed that former Prime Minister Menderes had thrown Syria into Egypt's arms in 1957, by concentrating forces on the Syrian border.[1] He added that a strong Turkey was in Israel's interest, just as a strong Israel was in Turkey's interest, and therefore Turkey will have no hand in attacking Israel or in weakening it. Alon replied that Israel would always be a faithful ally of Turkey's and will contribute to fruitful and effective cooperation. He reminded Türkes of Israel's aid to Turkey in the Cyprus issue and that of the regional atomic centre,[3] the location of which was a bone of contention between Egypt and Turkey. With all this, he stressed that the present flaw in the relations between the two countries was a hampering factor; a policy of capitulation to pressure is ineffective because it calls up yet more demands. The reparations agreement with Germany, for instance, was finalized in spite of Arab pressure. Türkes expressed his agreement with what Alon had said. The subject was being debated and he hoped ambassadors would be exchanged shortly.

Notes

1. In September–October 1957, after the arms deal between Syria and the Soviet Union had been signed, both countries accused Turkey of concentrating its forces on its border with Syria, with aggressive intentions. Turkey replied that it had no such intentions, and that the movements of its troops were only in the context of manoeuvres. It appears that Syria's fears of a Turkish attack tipped the balance towards its union with Egypt.
2. One sentence has been omitted here.
3. Israel supported Turkey's demand to host the regional centre for the Middle East of the International Agency for Atomic Energy. Turkey's competitor for the seat of the regional centre was Egypt.

402. M. Fischer (Ankara) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 August 1960

Coded Tel. 282; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Fischer reports to the Foreign Minister on his meeting with Sarper, on his second visit to Ankara. Sarper told him about Turkey's intention to help Israel in establishing diplomatic relations with Cyprus. The Cypriot Vice-President, who is a Turk, has the power of veto in all matters touching foreign relations and security, and also in the appointment of foreign representatives. He will veto the appointment of the U.A.R. Ambassador if there are any difficulties in appointing the Israeli Ambassador. To Fischer's question whether the Vice-President would indeed use his power of veto, Sarper at first replied in the affirmative, but then he corrected himself and said this would be done if necessary. Fischer commented that the aid extended in the U.N. by Israel to Turkey in the Cyprus affair was conditional on their reciprocity in aiding Israel to the full, including the use of the veto.[4] Sarper replied that he would raise the matter with the government if necessary, but he thought that the present instructions would already assure Israel's rights. He added that President-elect Makarios accepted the principle of joint decisions with Vice-President-elect Kutchuk in the appointment of foreign representatives.

Sarper asked how did Israel interpret the resolution adopted on Hatay (Alexandretta) at the congress of the National Unity Party of the U.A.R. When Fischer gave him a suitable reply, Sarper said that Nasser wanted hegemony in the Middle East and he saw in Turkey a competitor, thus the aim of the statement at the congress was to mobilize the Arab nationalism on the Hatay issue. Sarper also asked about Israel's assessment of the situation in Syria.

Fischer then raised the problem of the formal relations between the two countries. Sarper replied that the case of Iran — the U.A.R. having severed its relations with Iran when the latter announced it was renewing its relations with Israel — increased the Turkish government's hesitations. The subject was discussed in the cabinet, but only two ministers were in favour of exchanging ambassadors with Israel. Therefore, in order to avoid an answer in the negative, Sarper decided to keep the matter pending and to further it in the course of his ministerial activities. His first step would be to recall the present Turkish chargé d'affaires[8] in Israel and to replace him by a diplomat with the personal rank of a minister.[9] He suggested that Israel take a similar step in due course. Fischer said he could not comment on that without instructions from his Ministry.[10] Sarper promised to arrange a meeting for Fischer with General Gürsel, and also to be present there in the role of interpreter.[11] He reminded Fischer of Gürsel's words to the Arab representatives in Ankara, which were definitely in Israel's favour.[12]

Notes

1. Emin Dirvana, Turkey's Ambassador-Designate to Cyprus.
2. Vecdi Türel, the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia.
3. The constitution of Cyprus accorded to the (Greek) president and to the (Turkish) deputy president the right of veto on government decisions touching foreign affairs, defence and security.
4. See No. 401.
5. The sanjak of Hatay (Alexandretta, Iskanderun in Turkish) was annexed to Turkey in 1939. Syria had never officially renounced its sovereignty over this region. On July 16th, the National Union Party (the only party existing in Egypt) resolved that "the U.A.R. must take all official and popular steps for the return of the Alexandretta region and all other occupied areas of the Arab homeland". (*Al-Ahram*, 17.7.1960.)
6. One paragraph has been omitted here.
7. For the breaking off of relations between the U.A.R. and Iran following the Shah's declaration on the recognition of Israel, see Chapter 16.
8. Nejat Uçtum, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Israel in the years 1957 to 1960.
9. Rifat Ayanlar, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires (with the personal rank of minister) in Israel from December 1960 — see No. 408.
10. See No. 404, paragraph (b).
11. See No. 405.
12. At a meeting on July 27th, the representatives of the Arab states thanked Gürsel for the statement he had made on the Algerian issue, and requested that Turkey support their position in the Israeli–Arab conflict. Gürsel replied that Israel's existence was a fact, and that Turkey's realistic policy took into account existing facts. If the Arab representatives had any proposals for the solution of the issue, he would be happy to discuss them with the (Turkish) government. As to the refugee problem, he could not see how Israel could absorb a million Arabs. (See Alon's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2.8.1968, 130.15/3764/4; also his telegram 275, 4.8.1960, *ibid.*)
13. See No. 403.

403. M. Fischer (Ankara) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 August 1960

Coded Tel. 284; Inc.: 130.09/2290/4

Fischer reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on his meeting with Minister of Trade Iren, who told him that the developments in the case of the relations between Iran and Israel were causing hesitation in Turkey,[1] but this was a passing situation. In the meantime Sarper was making efforts to promote Israel's case, and most of the government ministers were now favourably inclined — excepting Minister of Communications S. Ulay, who had served as military attaché in Cairo and had become friendly with Nasser. Iren supports Sarper's decision to leave the issue pending. Iren again suggests

that Fischer meet Gürsel, and Sarper is also in favour of that. Gürsel did not voice an opinion on the issue during the debate in the cabinet.

Note

1. See No. 402, n. 7.
2. See *ibid.*, n. 5.

404. Ch. Yahil (Ankara) to the Israel Legation in Ankara. 10 August 1960

Coded Tel. 772; Outg.: 130.09/2290/3

Yahil instructs Fischer to tell Sarper that Israel was intending to open an embassy in Cyprus, and that when the island achieves independence the present Consul-General, Levin, will be recommended as ambassador.[1] Cyprus will not be required to reciprocate, but Israel will not acquiesce in having a lower status than the Arab states. Turkey's support is requested in the matter.

As to Sarper's proposal to raise the personal rank of the representatives,[2] this would not satisfy Israel's demands. The Turks are of course free to act as they see fit, and the same goes for Israel, but as long as there has been no exchange of ambassadors Israel will not consider the mutual relations as regular and proper.

Note

1. Zev Levin, Israel's Consul General in Nicosia from 1959 to 1960, and Israel's first Ambassador to Cyprus.
2. See No. 402.

405. Meeting: M. Fischer — General Gürsel (Ankara, 15 August 1960, document dated 16 August)

Report: 130.23/3348/24

Fischer reports on his meeting with General Gürsel, Minister of Foreign

Affaires Sarper also present and acting as interpreter, with the participation of Chargé d'Affaires Moshe Alon.

Fischer began by promising cooperation with Turkey in all the spheres, both in the Middle East and on the international arena. He reviewed Israel's standing in the Middle East and its activities in Africa. He said Israel did not require of its friends to be enemies to the Arabs, but expected of the head of the Turkish state to help it convince the Arabs that their struggle against Israel was in vain and that Israel's existence was an unshakeable reality.

Here Gürsel interrupted Fischer and reminded him of his words to the Arab representatives in Ankara.[4] Fischer commented on this that it appeared he was trying to convince somebody who was already convinced.

Fischer went on and described the recall of the heads of the missions by the former regime as a grave error, which increased the tension and the arms race in the region. It encouraged the Arabs to believe that Israel can be isolated from its friends. He mentioned the declaration addressed by the new regime to the United States and to the Soviet Union saying that Turkey would decide on its policy in complete freedom while standing by its commitments and treaties, and expressed the hope that the same principle of an independent and vigorous policy would be introduced by Turkey to the Middle East.

Gürsel replied to that that the Arabs were not capable of acting as mature nations. They were divorced from reality and lived in a land of illusions. This attitude will last for a long time yet, but the Arabs will not be able to destroy Israel. Israel can be assured of Turkey's help when the time comes, but open and public relations with Israel would only irritate the Arabs and would bring Israel no benefit.

Fischer pointed in reply to the dangers confronting Israel from the U.A.R.'s rearmament being carried out with the help of the Soviet Union. Gürsel said that Israel had nothing to fear from the Egyptian army. He asked why Israel did not ask the U.S., Britain and France to say to the Arabs what he himself had told them. Fischer replied that they were using a style different from Gürsel's, which was the right one, as he knew the Arabs very well.

Gürsel added that he wanted to make friends with the Arabs and explained that this would be also to Israel's benefit, as it would make it easier for Turkey to explain to the Arabs the reality of Israel's existence. He referred to the statement on Israel by the Shah of Iran and its undesirable results. He added that the relations between Turkey and Israel "could not be better than they are today".

Fischer reverted to the subject of the relations. He said Israel had expected of the new regime that it see as its duty to let the world know that the error committed by the previous regime was a thing of the past. He mentioned the attacks made by the U.A.R. on the Iranian Shah and said that the Shah could not conceal the fact that Nasser's "pinpricks" irritated and worried

him. In contrast he referred to Gürsel's speech in Iskenderun,[6] in which he proved to Nasser that his unpleasant remarks meant nothing to him, and thus caused him to desist. A policy leading to the exchange of ambassadors would demonstrate to the Arabs that they would do best to rid themselves of their illusions and would help them in progressing towards a realistic and healthy perception of the situation. Turkey's standing and influence could only gain from such a policy. Turkey together with Israel were an impregnable fortress.

Gürsel limited himself to saying that the existence of this fortress was one of the important — perhaps the most important — realities in the region, and that everything should be done to fortify it still further. As to the exchange of ambassadors, he said: have patience.

Notes

1. In reaction to the National Union Party's declaration on Hatay (see No. 402 and n. 5 there), Gürsel stated that "If Nasser wanted Hatay, let him come and take it". (See Alon to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 257, 25.7.1960, 130.09/2290/4.) See also n. 6 below.
2. See Editorial Note, No. 259, and No. 260.
3. One sentence has been omitted here.
4. See No. 402 and n. 12 there.
5. See *ibid.*, n. 7.
6. On July 29th, Gürsel declared in Iskanderun that "Hatay is an inalienable part of the Turkish homeland. The hand that is lifted against it shall be severed". (See *Cumhuriyet*, an independent daily appearing in Istanbul, 30.7.1960.)
7. One paragraph has been omitted here.

406. M. Alon (Ankara) to M. Fischer. 14 September 1960

Coded Tel. 379; Inc.: 130.09/2290/5

Alon reports on his leave-taking visit to Colonel Türkes. They reviewed the situation in the Middle East and certain recent events (the conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League[1] and the murder of Majali,[2] Jordan's Prime Minister). Alon pointed to the interest shared by Turkey and Israel in keeping stability and peace in the region. Türkes replied that his country had had in its history a great deal of experience with the Arabs and therefore it could never trust them. He saw in Israel a stabilizing factor in the region, which made for close cooperation between it and Turkey. He wished to extend the cooperation to the economic, scientific, cultural and social spheres. Alon mentioned the proposals for cooperation in the field of

development which had been submitted to the Turkish Minister of Trade,[3] and Turkes requested a copy of the proposal so that he could see personally to the satisfactory progress in the matter. He expressed the hope that the exchange of ambassadors would be effected soon, and said he himself was doing his utmost to advance it. He promised to Alon that he would maintain friendly relations with his successor[4] and cooperate with him for the common good.

Notes

1. The conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League which took place in Chtourrah in Lebanon in August 1960.
2. Hazza' al-Majali, the Jordanian premier, was assassinated in August 1960. King Hussein accused the U.A.R. of responsibility for the murder. See No. 29.
3. This matter remains obscure.
4. Moshe Sasson, Acting Director of the Middle East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replaced Moshe Alon in September 1960 as Israel's Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey.

407. M. Alon (Ankara) to M. Fischer. 14 September 1960

Coded Tel. 380; Inc.: 130.09/2290/5

Alon reports on his leave-taking visit to General Gürsel, in the presence of Sarper.

He reviewed the situation in the Middle East and stressed the identity of interests between the two countries in keeping peace and stability in the region, which are in danger from Nasser's subversive activities. Gürsel replied that he was interested in cooperation with Israel and would see to this cooperation being maintained. Israel must not fear its neighbours. He will see to it that while he was in office nothing would impair the cementing of the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Notes

1. See No. 406.

408. Israel Legation in Ankara to the West European Division. 3 December 1960

Coded Tel. 541; Inc.: 130.23/3348/26

Sasson transmits a report by the Turkish news agency "Anatolia" that the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Israel has been promoted to the rank of Minister. The report mentions the recall of the Turkish Minister to Israel during the Suez crisis of 1956. When asked whether this signified the regularization of the relations, the spokesman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs said "no comment". The spokesman also referred unofficially [off the record] to Colonel Sarraj's words in connection with Hatay[1] and stressed Turkey's wish to have closer ties with Israel. When this information reached Sasson and he was asked about it, he replied "no comment". Sasson suggests that the same answer be given by the ministry people if asked about the report.

Sarraj's statement and the official strong reaction in the Turkish press, which quoted Gürsel's past words,[2] were given prominent place in the newspapers. In contrast, the report on the promotion of the Turkish representative in Israel has so far been printed only in a French paper appearing in Istanbul and in the bulletin of the news agency.

Notes

1. On November 29th, the anniversary of the Hatay region's annexation by Turkey and of the U.N. resolution on the partition of Palestine, Colonel Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Syrian part of the U.A.R., declared that: "We must thank fate and the Almighty for that we have accepted the burden ... of recovering the occupied region and of liberating Palestine ... we swear to our children and the coming generations that we shall not spare our blood in our war to regain the right of which we have been robbed." (*Al-Ayyam*, a Damascus daily, 30.11.1960.)
2. See No. 405 and nn. 1 and 6 there.

409. A. Chelouche to the Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara. 5 December 1960

Copy: 130.23/3348/26

Chelouche reports on the meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the new Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Israel, R. Ayanlar. Mrs. Meir thanked the Turkish representative for the release of the Israeli fishermen

who had been detained in September 1959[2] and expressed her apppreciation of the efforts made in this matter by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. She then raised the issue of rectifying the flaw in the formal relations between the two countries. The Chargé d'Affaires replied that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was certainly aware of the difficulties facing Turkey, which had ties of religion, tradition and history with the U.A.R., and expressed the hope that the issue would find its solution in time.

The Minister replied that religious ties were indeed very important, but she thought the democratic regime in Turkey and the base on which it is grounded make for Turkey's having a more solid common denominator with Israel than with the U.A.R. It would be a sad day when governments based their policies on religious concepts. She described Israel's good relations with certain Muslim countries in Africa, and added that the states which withstood the pressure and the threats emanating from the U.A.R. had lost nothing, and the U.A.R. had not severed its relations with them. She mentioned as an example the reparations agreement with Germany, which transferred to Israel hundreds of millions of dollars but whose relations with the Arab states had not been impaired. Mrs. Meir mentioned also that the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, had visited Israel and this did no harm to Burma's relations with Egypt.

The Chargé d'Affaires replied that Turkish foreign policy was based on the principle of good relations first of all with its neighbours and only then with the rest of the world. Turkey and Israel had common interests and this was a solid basis for the relations between them. One had therefore to wait and see how things developed.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed and said that the formal flaw in the relations had not harmed the cooperation so beneficial to the two parties. She had raised the issue because she had had no previous opportunity to talk the matter over with him. Israel, she said, was armed with patience. The Chargé d'Affaires remarked that the Minister of Foreign Affairs could rest assured that Turkey would not agree to interference by others in this matter. The two then exchanged views on the recent events on the internal scene in Turkey and on the arrangements the Chargé d'Affaire had to make for his sojourn in Israel.

Notes

1. Rifat Ayanlar, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Israel.
2. See No. 394, n. 3.
3. General Gürsel dismissed the Council for National Unity on November 13th, and set up in its place a new council, which did not include Colonel Türkes and 13

other officers; Gürsel claimed that these officers were conspiring to set up a military dictatorship and to prevent the elections from taking place.

410. M. Sasson (Ankara) to A. Chelouche. 8 December 1960

Coded Tel. 560; Inc.: 130.09/2290/5

Sasson reports on his meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sarper, to whom he transmitted the Israel government's wishes for Prime Minister Gürsel's speedy recovery, and also offered to send over to him a physician from Israel, if need be.

Sarper expressed his appreciation of the letter he had received from Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs[2] on the release of the crew of the fishing vessel *Snunit*, and asked what did Israel know about Sarraj's motives in making his statement on Hatay.[3] Sasson promised to cable Israel and to let Sarper know when the answer arrived. His personal view was that there was a connection between the statement and the trial of Majali's murderers,[4] at which an accusing finger had been pointed at Sarraj personally. Nasser was worried about the propaganda emanating from Jordan, which caused the Syrians to fear that they had fallen into the trap of the "Arab unity" while most of the other Arabs believed that the union between Syria and Egypt has been a failure. Sasson pointed to Nasser's statement of support of Sudan's independence, which makes the Syrians wonder at the logic behind Nasser's acts, when he offers independence to one state while subordinating another, Syria, to Egypt. Sasson added that the insidious propaganda aimed by the U.A.R. at Israel had apparently exhausted itself, and thus the subject of Hatay had to be raised to draw attention away from the Majali murder trial.

Sarper told Sasson that he had instructed their Ambassador to the U.A.R., Esin,[5] to protest to Nasser personally on what Sarraj had said, but Esin could not obtain an interview with Nasser and requested Sarper's permission to see Minister of Foreign Affairs Fawzi instead. Sarper did not allow him to do that; he added that he hoped Nasser would refuse to see Esin, and then he (Sarper) would have another reason to be tough with the U.A.R.

Sasson transmitted Israel's appreciation of the promotion of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires,[6] and said that Israel was intending to act likewise in respect of its Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara. Sarper said this would be best done within a week or a fortnight.[7] He said he was progressing consistently towards normalization of the relations, and would exploit every mistake by the Egyptians, as he did in the Hatay case. Israel should rely on his sincerity and goodwill, seeing that he had already implemented two of his promises —

release of the fishermen and promotion of the representatives. He had been asked at the cabinet session and at the meeting of the Committee for National Unification for an explanation of the promotion of the Chargé d'Affaires in Tel Aviv. Those who criticized his step did not oppose the *rapprochement* with Israel but feared that the move would cause the Arabs to unify, while Turkey was interested in their being estranged from one another. Sarper explained his position and allayed their fears. He should be relied on to bring about normalization through a cautious and delicate process.

Sasson again requests information on the Hatay affair which he could transmit to Sarper.

Notes

1. See No. 409 and n. 3 there.
2. See No. 394, n. 1.
3. See No. 408 and n. 1 there.
4. See No. 406, n. 2.
5. Seyfullah Esin, the Turkish Ambassador to the U.A.R.
6. See No. 408, paragraph (a).
7. Moshe Sasson was given the personal rank of Minister in January 1961.

411. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the British Commonwealth Division. 13 January 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3354/58

Levin reports on his meeting with Archbishop Makarios. They conversed first on various subjects (Makarios's condemnation of antisemitic manifestations,[1] Israel's willingness to sign an air traffic agreement with Cyprus, and its agreement for the establishment of regional centers for international bodies in Cyprus, on condition that Cyprus stay neutral in the conflicts between the countries of the region), and then turned to the main subject: the nature of the relations between the two countries when Cyprus attains independence.

Makarios said that he was planning on opening only four embassies during the first two years: in Athens, Ankara, London and Washington. Consular offices will be opened in a number of countries, including the U.A.R., Lebanon and Israel. Levin stressed Israel's wish to have close relations with Cyprus and to have them given formal expression. Makarios made some friendly remarks regarding Israel, and said the policy of Cyprus was to

maintain relations with Israel in spite of pressure on the part of any country whatsoever.

When Makarios enquired what were Israel's relations with Turkey, Levin replied that they were excellent.

Notes

1. See Chapter 22.
2. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

412. J. Prato (Athens) to Ch. Yahil. 22 July 1960

Coded Tel. 402; Inc.; 130.09/2293/8

Prato reports on his meeting with Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff-Tossizza, who told him that he had instructed their representative in Cyprus[1] to request Archbishop Makarios not to agree to discrimination against Israel in determining the character of its representation in Cyprus, while taking into consideration Cyprus's interests.[2] Greece's attitude was that of friendly neutrality, but it will not exert any pressure in the fear that it could be later accused of causing harm to the Cypriot diaspora in Egypt or to Cyprus's economy. He warned Israel about the activity of certain commercial circles in Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, in whose interests it lay to prevent the establishment of relations with Israel. Averoff suggested that Israeli tourism to Cyprus be encouraged and that a tourism agreement be signed between the two countries. Cypriot circles estimate that tourism from Israel would balance the possible loss of revenues should the Arabs restrict their trade with Cyprus in the event of the establishment of relations with Israel.

Notes

1. G. Christopoulos, the Greek Consul-General in Cyprus.
2. Prato's talk with Averoff-Tossizza was preceded by the latter's conversation with M. Fischer, the Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fischer told Averoff-Tossizza of Levin's talk with Christopoulos, in which the latter advised Israel to settle for a lower level of representation than that of the U.A.R. Averoff-Tossizza said that this opinion did not reflect his instructions, and promised to remind his representative that the relations should exist on equal terms — a lesson learnt from the bitter experience of Greece's relations with Israel. He also said that he had expressed this opinion in the presence of Cypriot ministers visiting Athens. Fischer

warned against the illusion that it would be possible to open a consulate first and to turn it gradually into an embassy. Averoff replied that this line of thought was in accordance with Makarios's attitude, but in any case he would see that a friendly note of warning is transmitted to Makarios in his name. An immediate rush of Arab anger is better than a chronic disease. (See Fischer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram from Athens No. 394, 18.7.1960, 130.09/2293/8.)

3. The further part of the document, dealing with the relations between Greece and Israel and Nasser's visit to Athens, has been omitted here.

413. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24 July 1960

Coded Tel. 243; Inc.: 130.23/3394/58

Levin addresses his telegram to the Director-General and to the heads of the divisions of the British Commonwealth, Western Europe, the Middle East, the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

He reports that Archbishop Makarios told the Consul-General of the U.S. that the U.A.R. was threatening to sever its relations with Cyprus should the latter open a mission in Israel. Makarios also said that notwithstanding his ardent wish to have relations with Israel, he could not ignore the U.A.R.'s threats. He also said he did not know what was the attitude of his deputy, Kutchuk, on this issue. The Consul replied that the U.S. kept to the principle of equality in the relations with all the countries in the region.

Later Kutchuk told Makarios that he was for equality in the representation between Israel and the Arab states. It has been resolved to open embassies in Greece, Turkey, Britain and the U.S., and consulates in a number of other countries, including Israel, the U.A.R and Lebanon, but this decision is not final.

Levin has been informed that Holland intends to accredit its minister to the Lebanon also to Cyprus. He recommends that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs use its influence in Holland to prevent such a step, and to prevent similar appointments on the part of other friends of Israel.[1]

Note

1. G. Meir annotated this document in the margin: "One must act through Holland. Do they already have an ambassador here? If not, one should talk with the Chargé d'Affaires."

414. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 August 1960

Coded Tel. 249; Inc.: 130.09/2341/2

Levin reports to the Director-General and to the head of the British Commonwealth Division that he had heard from Deputy President Kutchuk and from the Turkish consul[1] that Archbishop Makarios had requested Kutchuk to agree to the opening of a U.A.R. Embassy, and to postpone by six months the opening of Israel's Embassy. Kutchuk was opposed to that and, as instructed by Ankara, demanded equal treatment for Israel and the Arabs.

Levin saw Makarios and told him that Israel intended to open an Embassy in Cyprus. Makarios requested that the Arab pressure be taken into consideration and that the opening be postponed for six months. The discussion concluded with Makarios saying that he would not refuse Israel's request if it insisted on it strongly, but that he was apprehensive of the Arabs' reaction.

Levin suggests that, when Makarios's announcement about the granting of independence to Cyprus is received in Israel, an answer be sent also to Deputy President Kutchuk.

Notes

1. Vecdi Türel, the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia.
2. See Nos. 423, 424 and 426 (Appendices A, B and D).

415. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 August 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3344/58

Levin reports that he had several meetings with the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs[1] on the subject of the proposed date of his accreditation,[3] and was told that the matter rested with Archbishop Makarios, who requested not to be pressed and to rely on him to set as early a date as possible.

Deputy President Kutchuk and the Turkish Consul-General, Türel, told Levin that there was no cause for worry. They advised Levin not to pressure Makarios overmuch.

The Greek-Cypriot community in Egypt has mounted a campaign against the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cyprus and Israel, for fear

this would adversely affect their well-being. The press in Cyprus went along with them, but they changed their attitude following a meeting between Levin and the owners and editors of the various papers, which later published more balanced editorials. The Trade and Industry Federation of Cyprus joined Israel's opponents.

Several Cypriot ministers stressed before Levin the necessity of following a neutral foreign policy, expressed their anxiety for the fate of the Cypriot diaspora in Egypt, and said they were certain Makarios would find a solution to the problem.

Makarios, when asked by an Egyptian journalist on the possibility of an Israeli Embassy opening in Cyprus, said that the Arabs had to understand that he was not completely free in determining the nature of the relations between the two countries because the opinion of the Turkish Deputy President must also be taken into account. Levin comments that this statement by Makarios proves his assumption that Makarios will attempt to hide behind Turkish pressure in justifying himself to the Arabs.

However, on another occasion Makarios declared that the Arab states had known beforehand of Cyprus's intention to establish normal relations with Israel, and they should not therefore act surprised. Cyprus, he said, would not take sides in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Arab states could open embassies in Cyprus, but they could not prevent the opening of an Israeli Embassy there. He hoped that the Arab states would not employ sanctions against his country, and requested that his statement be kept off the record.

Levin assumes that the Arab pressure will continue, but he hopes that his efforts will bring about his accreditation in the near future.

Notes

1. Spyros Kyprianou was appointed the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 22nd, replacing N. Kranidiotis, who had been appointed to this post with the attainment of independence but preferred the post of Ambassador to Greece instead.
2. Untraced.
3. G. Meir's letter to Kranidiotis of August 16th, 1960, preceded this approach; it contained a request for Cyprus's *agrément* for Levin's appointment (see No. 425, Appendix C). The *agrément* was given on August 17th. (See Levin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 251, 17.8.1960, 130.09/2341/2.)
4. The conference of the foreign ministers of the Arab League which took place in Chtourrah in Lebanon in August 1960, adopted a resolution calling for united Arab action against Israel in Cyprus (see Levin's telegram 266, 8.9.1960, 130.09/2341/2).
5. Hazza' al-Majali, the Jordanian premier, was assassinated in August 1960. King Hussein accused the U.A.R. of responsibility for the murder.
6. Polykarpos Yiorkadjis, the Cypriot Minister of the Interior.
7. Tassos Papadopoulos, the Cypriot Minister of Labour and National Insurance.

8. Stella Souliotou, the Cypriot Minister of Justice.

416. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 September 1960

Coded Tel. 262; Inc.: 130.09/2341/2

Levin addresses his telegram to the Director-General and to the British Commonwealth Division.

The Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted a message from Archbishop Makarios in which he requested that Israel not pressure him in the matter of Levin's accreditation. The U.A.R. is threatening to sever relations with Cyprus and to retaliate against the Cypriot community in Egypt, but the principal pressure comes not from the U.A.R. but from the leaders of the Cypriot diaspora there and their families on the island. Makarios hopes to find a solution to the problem very soon.

The Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Cyprus told Levin about the threats by the U.A.R. representatives to wreak their vengeance on the Cypriot minority in Egypt. The press in Cyprus has published reports from their correspondents in Greece on the anger prevalent there at Makarios because of his agreement to the opening of an Israeli Embassy. Levin assumes that a similar attitude has been adopted by the Greek Embassy in Cyprus.[1]

Britain stands against Cyprus's submission to Cairo. The longer Makarios puts off Levin's accreditation, the more will he be open to extortion and his position will be accordingly weakened. The British Chargé d'Affaires intends to transmit this position to Makarios at their next meeting.

Note

1. In his telegram 265 of September 7th, 1960 (130.09/2341/2) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Levin reports that he had indeed heard from the Director-General of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Greek Government had expressed to Makarios its disappointment at his willingness to establish full relations with Israel, and that the Greek Embassy in Cyprus argues that the relations between Cyprus and Israel should be like Greece's relations with Israel.

417. M. Alon (Ankara) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 September 1960

Coded Tel. 383; Inc.: 130.09/2290/5

Alon reports to the Middle East Division that he was informed by the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs[1] that the Arab ambassadors in Ankara had demanded of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sarper to intervene with the Turkish Deputy President of Cyprus in order to have the Cypriot government's agreement for the opening of an Israeli Embassy revoked. Sarper replied that the Arab states were exaggerating in their estimate of Turkey's influence over Kutchuk and over the Turks in Cyprus. It would be preferable if Cyprus did not take sides in a conflict which did not touch it directly, and this was probably the consideration which made Cyprus agree to have normal relations also with Israel.

The Secretary-General told Alon that the Arab pressure would not change Turkey's attitude nor that of the Turkish community in Cyprus, headed by Kutchuk. Notwithstanding the delays caused by Makarios's vacillations and by his Greek advisers, the Ambassador-Designate of Israel will soon present his letters of credence.

Note

1. Zeki Küneralp, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

418. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 September 1960

Copy: 130.23/3344/58

Levin reports that there has been some progress in the matter of his accreditation. Archbishop Makarios and his Minister of Foreign Affairs have restrained the local press, which has now started to report favourably on the establishment of full relations both with Israel and with the U.A.R. The Cypriots have become convinced that the U.A.R. was not intending to sever its relations with them, especially in the light of a message from Cairo on the appointment of an Ambassador to Cyprus. Cyprus was inclined to have the U.A.R. Ambassador-Designate present his credentials before Levin, and to open an embassy in Cairo as another sop to the U.A.R.

Levin spoke with the Turkish Ambassador, who told him that his country's position was that an Israeli Embassy must open in Cyprus, even if this brought about the severance of relations by the U.A.R. Levin explains that there is a difference in approach between the Turkish Ambassador and the Turkish Consul-General: the former considers Turkey's aim to bring about cooperation between the two communities in Cyprus, and therefore he would be more inclined to make concessions in order to achieve this cooperation, while the latter sees the situation in Cyprus as a clash of interests between the two communities, and he therefore actively supports Israel's interests against those of the Cypriot Greeks.

The Turkish Ambassador[4] told Levin that he could not prevent the opening of a Cypriot Embassy in Cairo. Kutchuk could of course use his power of veto here, but this would exacerbate the friction between the two communities because Makarios would not hesitate in this case to blame the Turkish community should the U.A.R. indeed sever its relations with Cyprus. Makarios's decision to appoint a Turk as Ambassador in Bonn will also make it more difficult for Kutchuk to impose a veto.

The Turkish Ambassador also told Levin that the Greek Ambassador had told him that in his opinion Cyprus should prefer the interests of its diaspora in Egypt, and to accord to Israel limited relations only, just as Athens and Ankara have done.

At Levin's meeting with the Greek Ambassador, he was told that the latter had been requested by the Lebanese Ambassador[5] to intervene with Archbishop Makarios to prevent the establishment of full relations with Israel, but he refused to do so, giving as his reason Greece's reluctance to intervene in an internal Cypriot matter. He also said that Cyprus was inclined to have the Egyptian Ambassador-Designate present his credentials before Levin did so.

Levin also reports that the nephew of an American businessman named Skouras,[6] of Greek extraction, met Makarios without previous briefing by Levin. The result was that he did not know exactly what to demand of Makarios and he ended by accusing Cyprus of not having recognized Israel, to which Makarios retorted that Israel had indeed been recognized and that an Israeli Embassy was open and active on the island.

Levin finally reports on the arrival of two delegations in Cyprus: a commercial delegation of seven members from the U.A.R., headed by the deputy minister of the economy, active mainly in establishing ties with Cypriot commercial circles, and a delegation from the Cypriot community in Egypt — presumably their last effort to persuade Makarios to go back on his decision to have an Israeli Embassy open in Cyprus. Another visit was that of a Palestinian representative, who met Makarios and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in an attempt to obtain their support for the preservation of the rights

of the Arabs of Palestine. Makarios confined himself to generalities about the friendship existing between Cyprus and the Arab countries, while Deputy President Kutchuk said the Turkish community had no particular interest in the issue.

Levin concludes by saying there is no cause for worry, and the arrival shortly of the U.A.R.'s Ambassador-Designate will also solve the problem of his own accreditation. He suggests that Mrs. Meir also meet the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of their presence in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.[8] A meeting with the Cypriot (Greek) representative to the U.N.[9] and his deputy (Turkish)[10] would also be desirable.

Notes

1. The first paragraph, dealing with administrative arrangements at the Israel Embassy in Cyprus, has been omitted here.
2. Mustafa Lutfi was appointed to the post.
3. Gamal Bardlosi, the U.A.R. Deputy Minister of the Economy.
4. Emin Dirvana, the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus.
5. Chehade Gussein, the Lebanese Ambassador to Cyprus.
6. Wishing to help Israel, Spyros Skouras, an American businessman of Greek extraction, sent his nephew of the same name on a mission to President Makarios (see Harman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 92, 13.8.1960, 130.09/2334/1).
7. Haj Amin al-Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Arab Higher Committee.
8. No material has been found on G. Meir's meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sarper in New York, and apparently this meeting never took place.
9. Rossides was the Cypriot permanent representative at the United Nations, and also Aambassador to the United States. On his meeting with G. Meir, see No. 421.
10. Ahmed Akyamaç, the Cypriot deputy permanent representative at the United Nations. No information on his putative meeting with G. Meir has been found.

419. Ch. Yahil [Jerusalem] to Z. Levin. 4 October 1960

Copy: 130.23/3344/58

Yahil replies to Levin's letter[1] and agrees with his assumption that Cyprus will not renege on its promises to Israel. He thinks the solution will be found in having the U.A.R. Ambassador-Designate present his credentials before Levin, and in Cyprus opening an Embassy in Cairo. Israel must come to terms with being discriminated against in comparison with the U.A.R., and make the best of a bad bargain. He suggests that the Embassy in Cyprus carry on with

its day-to-day work and not postpone things until after the accreditation. The Government of Israel is prepared to make special concessions to Israeli tourist traffic to Cyprus, and if the Cypriot reaction to that is favourable a delegation could be dispatched to talk the matter over even before the submission of the credentials. Yahil requests that Levin report on developments as frequently as possible.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 418.
2. See No. 420.

420. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17 October 1960

Copy: 130.23/3344/62

Levin sums up the situation in Cyprus with the passage of two months from its independence.

The position of the U.A.R. has grown stronger owing to Cyprus's decision to have full diplomatic relations with Israel, as the government is stressing in compensation its close relations with the U.A.R. on every occasion. Levin reviews the efforts made by the U.A.R. to prevent the opening of Israel's Embassy in Cyprus, and assesses that also in the future a large measure of the activity of the U.A.R. Embassy will be directed against Israel.

Owing to the threats made by the U.A.R., Israel is met by a certain coolness on the part of the Cypriot public, which is anxious about the fate of the Cypriot minority in Egypt. The press has been criticizing Makarios for having made a mistake in agreeing to the opening of Israel's Embassy. However, the arrival of the U.A.R.'s Ambassador has contributed to restoring tranquillity to the atmosphere. The tourist traffic from Israel and some activity in the field of culture relations have strengthened Israel's standing. Levin criticizes the fact that nothing has been done to increase exports from Cyprus to Israel, which could affect the granting of licences for imports from Israel. The staff of the Embassy must be increased to be able to deal with these matters.

Notes

1. The first part of the letter, containing a review of the internal and economic situation in Cyprus, has not been reproduced here.
2. See No. 418.

421. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 October 1960

Coded Tel. NWT503; Inc.: 130.09/2339/25

Comay reports to G. Rafael on the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Cypriot permanent representative to the U.N., Rossides, with Comay's participation.

Mrs. Meir stressed Israel's wish to have good relations with Cyprus, and expressed the hope that there would be no submission to the Arab attempts at extortion. Israel had not demanded of other countries to choose between it and the Arabs, and there was no justification for the Arab states to dictate to others in matters touching their sovereignty. She pointed to Israel's wish for closer economic relations with Cyprus, and, among other things, its intention to reduce the travel tax and to increase the import of carobs from the island.

Rossides replied that the Cypriots also desired good relations with Israel in view of their history, their geographical proximity and common interests. The Egyptians had pressured Makarios, claiming that they had been the leaders in the U.N. in the campaign for Cyprus's independence, while Israel had joined its enemies. Nevertheless, Cyprus insisted on having normal relations with Israel and the Arabs had to come to terms with that. He had personally explained Cyprus's position to Nasser. He added that if they had not postponed the Israel Ambassador's accreditation until an arrangement had been arrived at with the Arabs, unnecessary complications would have resulted. He had been present when Nasser ordered that the dispatch of the U.A.R.'s Ambassador-Designate to Cyprus be expedited. As far as he knew, the Ambassador was due in Cyprus any day now, and immediately after he had presented his credentials the Israeli Ambassador would do likewise.

The Minister denied Rossides's claim and said that Israel had never opposed the granting of independence to Cyprus.

Comay's impression was that Rossides had not been overly sincere, and that he had tried to avoid meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs but had in the end to carry out his superiors' instructions.

422. Z. Levin (Nicosia) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 December 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3344/58

Levin reports on the talks which took place in Paris between the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, details of which were revealed to him by his Turkish colleague. Sarper had told the Cypriot Kypriano that the accreditation of the Israeli Ambassador must no longer be delayed. Kypriano replied that Archbishop Makarios preferred waiting for the arrival of the U.A.R. Ambassador-Designate, when both representatives would submit their credentials. As the U.A.R. Ambassador has been delayed, Makarios wishes to appoint an Ambassador in Cairo and then accept the credentials of the Israeli Ambassador. Sarper rejected this idea and said the accreditation of the Israeli Ambassador should take place immediately. Kypriano did not reply to that, nor did the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Averoff-Tossizza.

According to Levin, the candidate for the Cypriot ambassadorship in Cairo is Hajioanu. However, he heard from the Cypriot Minister of Defence[1] (a Cypriot Turk) that the Turkish ministers would oppose the appointment of an Ambassador in Cairo as long as Turkish councillors had not been appointed to the Cypriot Embassies in Washington and London. They do not oppose in principle the opening of an Embassy in Cairo, seeing that Makarios had agreed to the opening of an Embassy in Bonn headed by a Turk.

The Turkish Ambassador promised Levin that he would speak with Deputy President Kutchuk to have Makarios pressured to accept Levin's credentials even before the Cypriot Government approves the appointment of an Ambassador in Cairo.[2]

Notes

1. Osman Örek, the Cypriot Minister of Defence.
2. The Cypriot Embassy in Cairo opened in February 1961.

427. M. Kidron (Bangkok) to Ch. Yahil. 15 January 1960

Notes

1. Sir Arthur Ransingha, the Ceylonese Ambassador to Italy and non-resident Minister to Israel.

2. Prince Souvana Phouma, the Laotian Ambassador to France, submitted his credentials as non-resident Minister to Israel on January 11th.
3. Nai Phairot Jayanama, the Thai Ambassador to Italy and non-resident Minister (later Ambassador) to Israel.
4. On the occasion of raising the level of representation between Thailand and Israel from ministerial to ambassadorial.
5. See No. 453.
6. See No. 442.
7. Thailand never opened an embassy in Israel and continued to be represented by its Ambassador to Italy, who submitted his credentials as Ambassador to Israel in March 1960.

428. M. Michael (Bombay) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 February 1960

Coded Tel. 40; Inc.: 130.23/3312/7

Michael reports to the Asia and Africa Division on his visit to New Delhi.[1] He found out that the ambassadors of the Arab states were exerting strong pressure on the Indian Government and its Ministry of External Affairs in order to harm the relations with Israel. Nasser being due in India soon,[2] the Indian Ministry of External Affairs is looking for ways to hurt Israel, such as restricting Jewish emigration to Israel, limiting the number of Indian tourists going to Israel, and supporting Arab positions in all international forums. Michael is informed that this policy is strongly supported by the Soviet Union, and supported with reservations by Britain. He has been doing his utmost to fight this manifestation, but cannot so far point to any success.[4]

Notes

1. The Israel consulate was in Bombay, and the consul travelled occasionally on business to New Delhi.
2. Nasser's visit to India took place in April 1960.
3. See Chapter 1.
4. See No. 429.

429. M. Michael (Bombay) to the Asia and Africa Division. 19 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3311/48

Michael gives more details on his meetings in New Delhi, the gist of which he had reported in his telegram.[1]

Coelho, head of the Department for the Middle East, Europe and America in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, described to Michael the attitude of the Arab states to the relations between India and Israel, as follows: The Arabs regard India as their territory, in contrast to the U.S., for example. This attitude is being strengthened owing to India's international importance as leader of the non-aligned nations. The Arab states are prepared to pay any price in order to safeguard their standing in India. They believe that if they succeed keeping India in their camp, they could gather around themselves a large bloc of nations and have Israel finally isolated. It is difficult to describe the pressure exerted by the Arab ambassadors on the Indian Government. This pressure has increased lately, presumably as a reaction to the activity of the Israeli Consulate in Bombay which has succeeded in gaining the support of the Indian press. Coelho advised Michael to be satisfied with being on Indian soil, to keep a low profile and to refrain from attempting to win over public opinion. He also said that if Michael wanted to achieve anything he should go only through Nehru, who, however, cannot withstand the Arab pressure. He might request Nehru to authorize the transfer of the Consulate from Bombay to New Delhi. If Nehru asks for the opinion of the Ministry of External Affairs he will be given a favourable reply, while the Arabs will be told that international usage allows Israel to situate its Consulate where it sees fit. He concluded by warning Israel against distributing political material in India (material originating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem was meant here, and not the bulletin of the Consulate Bombay). Baig, Head of Protocol in the Ministry of External Affairs, advised Michael to visit New Delhi as seldom as possible, and not to maintain contacts with heads of missions, apart from consulates.

Bajpai, head of the Middle East Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, said he was certain Michael knew the limits of what he could do to gain support for his country without arousing enmity among those in power.

Michael thanked all his interlocutors for their good intentions and explained the basic error in their submission to extortion; the Arabs would court India much more vigorously if it established full relations with Israel.

Notes

1. These references are apparently erroneous and perhaps No. 428 was meant, and Michael's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 42, 15.2.1960 (file 130.23/3312/7), reporting on the U.A.R.'s activity against the immigration from India. It also said that the officials of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs

were complaining about problems which arose owing to applications submitted by immigrants from India, now in Israel, who wanted to return to their country.

2. Colho, Director of the Middle East, Europe and America department in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
3. K.S. Bajpai, in charge of the Middle East desk in the Indian Ministry od External Affairs.
4. Baig, Chief of Prótocol in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
5. Michael Michael was appointed Consul in India in October 1959. He was raised to the personal rank of Consul General in March 1960.
6. See Chapter 1.
7. In the absence of Indian representation in Israel, India's consular affairs were dealt with by the British Embassy in Tel Aviv.
8. See No. 431.

430. M. Michael (Bombay) to the Asia and Africa Division. 19 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3311/48

Michael reports on his meeting in New Delhi with Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs Mrs. Lakshmi Menon. Mrs. Menon said, of her own initiative, that the issue of the diplomatic relations with Israel was one of the unfinished affairs weighing on India. She advised Michael to meet Nehru, because he must be made aware of the problem again and again. Michael replied that as a Consul he had no right to talk even with her, the more so with Nehru. She agreed, but said that "one must find ways to work in the given conditions".[1] When Michael asked her why she did not speak with Nehru herself, she said: "We are technical people, we do not advise — we implement".

Note

1. E. Ben-Horin annotated this paragraph in the margin: "Not under any circumstances", namely, that he should not request an audience with Nehru.

431. M. Michael (Bombay) to the Director of the Asia and Africa Division. 4 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3311/48

Michael adds some comments regarding the meetings he had in New Delhi in February.[1]

He fears that there is more behind the Arab effort in India than could be concluded from his meetings. The growth in importance of the Afro-Asian countries, on the one hand, and the indications of more extensive and more vigorous participation of this bloc in global decisions, within the framework of the summit conferences[2] and within other frameworks, on the other hand, apparently bring the U.A.R. to the conclusion that the fate of the Middle East can be decided by gaining the sympathy of these states. True, Israel's achievements in the African and Asian countries are being praised by statesmen the world over, but the larger countries of Asia are not friendly to Israel, and one can even describe them as hostile to it.

Nasser is prepared to do anything to win Nehru over, and India is to him a key position in his political efforts, the importance of which is steadily growing.

One could have assumed that with the improvement of the relations between India and Pakistan Nehru would have less need of the support of the Arab bloc, but this is not the case, among other reasons, because the Kashmir issue has not been settled yet. But even if the Kashmir problem is solved, Nehru would still wish for Arab support because he wants India to attain a major standing in the international community, and he needs the Arab states for that.

The hope that other countries would pressure India to improve its relations with Israel, has been dispelled. It turns out that Nehru's attitude enjoys wholehearted support of the Soviet Union, and apparently also the tacit approval of the British. Nothing is known of approaches to Nehru in Israel's favour on the part of the U.S. or of Israel's friends in Asia and Africa.

Michael expects the Arab pressure on India to increase steadily in two directions: pressure on Nehru and on the External Ministry officials, and pressure on the public opinion in India to deter it from opposing Nehru on this subject. He fears that India's attitude towards emigration and tourism to Israel will change for the worse.

Israel cannot do much to change the situation. Michael recommends that efforts continue to be made to influence public opinion and the officials of the Indian External Ministry. The idea of meeting Nehru is impractical: there are no new arguments or explanations he hasn't heard yet, and such a meeting could be useful only if it is initiated by the Indians themselves.

Finally, Michael firmly rejects the advice given to him by his Indian interlocutors to stay passive and do nothing.[7] Efforts should continue, but care should be taken not to bring Nehru and his government to a stance of open hostility towards Israel.

Notes

1. No. 429.
2. See Michael's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 25.2.1960, 93.42/309/11, in which he warned that Nehru's participation in summit conferences would be harmful to Israel's interests.
3. A.K. Brohi, Pakistan's High Commissioner (= ambassador) in India.
4. Has not been found.
5. A popular movement calling for agricultural cooperation and voluntary agrarian reform, also by having large landowners give away their land to landless peasants. Several members of this movement took part in a seminar on cooperation which took place in Israel in March–May 1960.
6. Vinoba Bhave, a disciple of Gandhi, founder of the Buddhan movement.
7. See Nos. 429 and 430.

432. A. Dagan (Rangoon) to E. Ben-Horin. 9 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3331/12

Dagan reports on his two meetings with the Prime Minister of Nepal, B.P. Koirala, who visited Burma at the beginning of March.

Acting on instructions received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem,[1] Dagan invited Koirala to come to Israel and to take part in the Congress of the Socialist International due to open in April.[2] Koirala replied that he could not come to Israel owing to previous commitments, but that he would send one of his senior ministers, probably the Minister of the Interior (who had been present during part of the meeting). Dagan expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would be able to visit Israel on some other occasion, and mentioned the International Conference on the Role of Science in the Advancement of New States, which was scheduled to open at the Weizmann Institute in August.[3] Koirala replied that he would be happy to come if this would be at all possible.

Dagan then raised the subject of the establishment of diplomatic relations bweteen the two states. Koirala said he would prefer to deal with this subject in two stages: first, the development of cultural and trade relations, and some months later, the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Dagan replied that Israel wished to commence by appointing a Minister or a non-resident Ambassador to Nepal, and hoped that Nepal would do likewise. Koirala said he was not afraid of possible Arab reaction but of that of India, to which Dagan replied that one should consider not only the example of India but also that of other countries, for instance Burma, and other Asian states. He added that India's inimical attitude towards Israel was based on reasons

which did not apply to Nepal. Koirala said that he would try and convince his government to take a favourable decision, and the matter can then be settled by the Nepalese delegate to the Congress of the Socialist International.

At a second meeting, the Nepalese Prime Minister told Dagan that the delay in establishing relations with Israel was caused by internal difficulties. He requested that the Minister of Foreign Affairs send him an unofficial letter, which could help him persuade his ministers. He asked Dagan to keep this a secret, and requested him to give Mrs. Meir's letter to him personally, so as to make certain it would reach him.[4]

Dagan remarks that Koirala did not describe the 'internal difficulties' nor did he explain the reason behind his request, but he thinks it would be advisable to go along with him.

Notes

1. Ben-Horin's telegram to the Embassy in Rangoon, containing guidelines for Dagan for his forthcoming meeting with the Nepalese Prime Minister on the occasion of the latter's visit to Burma (6.3.1960, 130.09/2361/3).
2. Koirala's first visit to Israel took place in 1958 — see No. 464.
3. An international conference on the role of science in the advancement of new countries took place at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot in August 1960. Some 50 scientists from 20 countries participated, including several winners of the Nobel prize. Personages from 15 Asian and African new states also participated, including the President of the former French Congo and the Nepalese Prime Minister.
4. See No. 436.

433. E. Ben-Horin (Jerusalem) to M. Michael. 21 March 1960

Copy: 130.23/3311/48

Ben-Horin comments on several of Michael's letters.

He suggests that Michael refrain from interfering in the matter of Nehru's participation or non-participation in the summit conference. He knows that various countries are not happy with the leadership role assumed by India in these conferences, but Israel has no possibility whatsoever of influencing the matter.

Michael's reports are distributed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are read with great interest. There is a great deal of curiosity about India in Israel, much goodwill, and also great disappointment. Everybody agrees that continuous effort should be invested in this country, even if this should prove very expensive. Ben-Horin proposes that Michael continue with his

activities in India, but this should not be done at a rate quicker than the other party could agree to. He agrees that a meeting with Nehru would be useless, because, as Michael has said, Nehru has aleady heard all of Israel's arguments, but perhaps the coming conference of the heads of the British Commonwealth countries could serve to establish indirect contacts with him.

Ben-Horin informs Michael that he is about to be moved to another post, following which the Division will be split into an African part and an Asian part; the latter will be headed by Ya'acov Shimoni, the most expert of all in whatever touches the Asian continent.

Notes

1. See No. 431, n. 2.
2. See Michael to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2.3.1960, 93.42/309/11, requesting Ben-Horin's opinion on his reports from India.
3. No. 431.
4. See No. 429 and n. 5 there.

434. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Rangoon.[1] 14 April 1960

Copy: 130.23/3304/23

Shimoni transmits to the Ambassador a personal letter from President Ben-Zvi to Burmese Prime Minister U Nu.[2] For text see Main Volume, p. 671.

Notes

1. Daniel Lewin, the Israel Ambassador to Burma.
2. Izhak Ben-Zvi, President of Israel from 1953 to 1963.
3. U Nu paid a visit to Israel in June 1955.
4. In 1959.
5. Lewin confirmed that the letter had been delivered as instructed, and remarked that an early reply could not be expected owing to U Nu's numerous obligations (and, indeed, no such reply has been found). (See his letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4.5.1960, 130.23/3304/13.)

435. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Bangkok. 15 April 1960

Copy: 130.23/3343/57

Shimoni informs Ambassador Kidron that, while trying to find out what was the situation regarding Kidron's apppointment as non-resident Ambassador to Cambodia, he came across material showing that he himself had visited Cambodia in 1956 when he was Minister to Burma. He had met the then Cambodian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs[3] and the conclusion was that diplomatic relations would be established, and that the Cambodians would give their *agrément* as soon as Israel submitted the name of the candidate. A similar promise was made to former Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett when he paid a visit to Cambodia in December 1956.[4] An official application was submitted to Cambodia shortly afterwards, but since then the Cambodians have been using delaying tactics.[5]

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. Shimoni was then Israel's Minister to Burma.
3. Khim Tit was then Prime Minister and Prince Sirik Matak was Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. Sharett came to Cambodia in December 1956 when touring south-eastern Asia, and talked with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of the state, on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. Sihanouk promised to expedite his government's handling of the matter. (See Moshe Sharett, *Touring Asia* (Hebrew), p. 334.)
5. On the Cambodia government's *agrément* to Kidron's appointment, see No. 440. Cambodia also agreed to have the level of representation raised from the ministerial to the ambassadorial.

436. A. Dagan (Rangoon) to Y. Shimoni. 17 April 1960

Copy: 130.23/3331/19

Dagan reports on his visit to Kathmandu, where he went in order to hand to Prime Minister Koirala Mrs. Meir's letter on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[2]

At their first meeting he gave to Koirala Mrs. Meir's letter, and also a letter from the Minister of Education, Abba Eban, inviting him to participate in the Weizmann Institute conference in Rehovot. Koirala advised Dagan to

meet some ministers and other personages in order to help him advance the cause of the relations. Dagan came out of these meetings with a favourable impression. The meeting with the Minister of the Interior, who is apparently the leading figure in the government, was particularly useful: the minister told him that "nobody can stand between us and Israel", and that they would hurry matters up.

Dagan then met Koirala again, and the latter told him that the issue would come up for a final decision in the cabinet, and would Dagan please remain in Kathmandu until the matter is settled. The decision was taken on April 14th, and on the same day the Prime Minister answered a question in Parliament, saying that Nepal and Israel were about to establish diplomatic relations. Dagan was invited that evening to dinner and was told that the government's decision was favourable; it would have to be endorsed by the King,[4] but that was strictly a formality. On the following day Koirala sent to Dagan his reply to Mrs. Meir's letter.

Dagan adds that he was asked what sort of technical aid could Israel give to Nepal. He said he could not promise anything, but described what Israel was doing in Burma and in other countries. Koirala said they wished to concentrate on problems of irrigation, electric power, and roads.

Notes

1. See Dagan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17.4.1960, 130.23/3331/19, reporting on his visit to Nepal.
2. See No. 432. The letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 30.3.1960 is in File 130.23/3331/19.
3. From a visit to China.
4. Mahendra Bir Bikram, king of Nepal.
5. Harishwar Dayal, the Indian Ambassador to Nepal.
6. Elyashiv Ben-Horin, the Israel Ambassador to Burma from 1960 to 1963.
7. The letter, dated 15.4.1960, is filed under 130.23/3331/19.
8. Krishna Prasad Bhatarai, speaker of the Nepalese parliament.

437. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in London. 3 May 1960

Copy: 130.23/3331/19

Shimoni describes the steps taken in the matter of establishing formal relations with Nepal. He adds that the Nepalese minister Giri was just then staying in

Israel to participate in the Conference of the Socialist International, and the opportunity was taken to give him an official note on the establishment of relations, and also a personal letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Nepalese Premier requesting his *agrément* to the appointment of Ben-Horin as a non-resident Ambassador to Nepal.[2] Shimoni requests that Lourie meet his Nepalese colleague[3] and give him this exchange of letters. Lourie can tell the Nepalese that the exchange of notes has a purely formal significance, and that the matter had been settled in talks held in Nepal.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 436.
2. The personal letter, dated 28.4.1960, is filed under 130.23/3331/19; the official Note has not been traced.
3. Rama Prasad Manandhar, the Nepalese Ambassador to Britain.
4. Lourie acted as instructed, and in his telegram 527 of May 30th (130.23/3331/19) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he reported that his Nepalese counterpart had informed him of his government's *agrément* to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel at the ambassadorial level.

438. M.R. Kidron (Bangkok) to Y. Shimoni. 19 May 1960

Copy: 130.23/3325/60

Kidron reports on his visit to Malaya,[2] during which a motion was submitted in Parliament by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party[3] proposing to revoke Malaya's recognition of Israel.[4] He left the country before the matter had been resolved,[5] but he was informed at the Prime Minister's Office that the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman,[6] would reply in a manner similar to a previous statement of his, namely, that Malaya's recognition of Israel was a matter of routine and that there was no intention of developing this routine situation into the exchange of diplomatic representatives. His informer told Kidron that he doubted whether the Tunku could give the same reply if the matter were raised for the third time, and he thought the Prime Minister would have to make some concession or other. From this Kidron concludes that this is the reason for the gradual dissipation of the hopes for a normalization of the relations which had been aroused following the conversations held by various Israelis with the Tunku during the last few years, starting with Sharett's visit in 1956.[7] The relations with Israel are a function of the increase in strength

of the fanatical Muslim party, and one can say for certain that if there ever were hopes for normal relations, they have now disappeared.

On the other hand, the relations with the Malayan workers movement are still good, and the best way of improving the ties between the two countries is through the Histadruth and this movement. Mutual visits should be encouraged, but they should not be given too much publicity in order not to harm those going back to Malaya.

Kidron stresses that the present regression in Malaya's attitude towards Israel does not, for the time being, derive from its relations with the Arab states. There are very close cultural relations between Malaya and the U.A.R., because Malaya draws its religious Muslim inspiration from Cairo and hundreds of students are sent to the Al-Azhar University. However, the Tunku despises Nasser, and there is anger in the Malayan Government at the U.A.R. Embassy's activity among the oppositionary Muslim circles. Kidron also mentions that Malaya's permanent representative to the U.N. appears at the receptions given by the Israel mission in spite of the Arab representatives' protests.

In the course of his visit Kidron met the leaders of the labour movement and of the Socialist Party. He was not afforded the opportunity of meeting the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but he spoke with the latter on the telephone.

Notes

1. The first part of the document, which does not deal directly with Israel's relations with Malaya, has been omitted here.
2. In March–April 1960.
3. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
4. As a matter of fact, it was Israel which recognized Malaya on August 31st, 1957, shortly after that country had attained independence; protocol demands that the older state extend recognition to the younger one.
5. The debate was postponed till December 1st, 1960, when, as reported, the Malayan Prime Minister rejected the opposition's demand to abrogate the recognition of Israel. (See Yegar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15.12.1960, 130.23/3325/60.)
6. The Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.
7. Sharett paid a visit to Malaya in October 1956, after he had resigned his post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. See M. Sharett, *Touring Asia* (Hebrew), pp. 99–111.
8. P.P. Narayanan, secretary-general of the National Union of Plantation Workers in Malaya.
9. Several paragraphs, containing a list of the meetings held by Kidron, have been omitted here.

439. E.E. Simke (Manila) to the Asia Division. 20 May 1960

Notes

1. The treaty of friendship between the Philippines and Israel was signed in February 1958, but was ratified by the Philippine congress only in December 1963, owing to delays caused by the opposition to the treaty of the Muslim minority in that country.
2. Some time later Simke recommended that the arrival of Israel's minister-resident be utilized for expediting the ratification of the treaty (see his letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2.6.1960, 130.23/3337/4).

440. Penn Nouth (Paris) to W. Eytan (Paris). 15 June 1960

Notes

1. The letter, undated but probably from the end of April or the beginning of May 1960, is filed under 130.23/3343/57. It was sent following a reminder by Eytan.
2. Kidron submitted his credentials as ambassador (non-resident) to Cambodia in August 1960.

441. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to the Asia Division. 28 June 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3304/23

Ben-Horin reports on his meeting with the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sao Hkun Hkio, on the occasion of submitting to him copies of his credentials.

Ben-Horin described to the minister Israel's activity in Burma and said he would like to start his tour of Burma by visiting the Shan States (the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also Minister for the Shan States,[3] and he himself is a Shan prince) and the agricultural project initiated by Israel.[4] He said that the Israeli experts wanted to do "a good agricultural job". The Minister only nodded and said nothing about the project. Ben-Horin comments that the Shan inhabitants' attitude to the project is unclear: it is an exemplary project from the economic and social aspects, but the locals could also be seeing it as an incursion by force by the Burmese into land which does not belong to them. The Minister of Foreign Affairs told Ben-Horin that his ministry was at his service and he hoped that he "will make use of it". Ben-Horin

comments that this hint is an indication of the internal state of affairs and of the conflicts between the various ministries, the army, and the opposition. He recommends that Israel act with great caution and thinks the dangers of overstepping in one direction or another can be avoided.

Notes

1. Soo Hkun Hkio, the Burmese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for the Shan states.
2. U Win Maung, the President of Burma.
3. A minority group in northern Burma, linguistically and ethnically kin to the Thai, was accorded limited autonomy, like the other minorities; some of its members, demanding a larger measure of autonomy, were in a state of revolt against the government.
4. Reference is to an Israeli project in Namsang, which had been planned both as a concatenation of cooperative villages for ex-servicemen and as a regional agricultural centre.
5. See Chapter 21.

442. Y. Ilsar (Manila) to the Asia Division. 7 July 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3337/4

Ilsar reports on his meetings with Philippine Deputy President Macapagal, President of the Senate Rodriguez, and the Political Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Singhian [spelling uncertain] The central topic in these talks was the delay in opening the Philippine Legation in Israel. It was explained to Ilsar that the reason for the delay was caused by the Senate not having yet approved the necessary budget, because of the opposition of Senator Alonto, representative of the Muslim community. Macapagal and Rodriguez told Ilsar that the chances were this Senator would not be reelected in 1961, and then the problem would be solved.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 439.
2. Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines.
3. Felixbarto M. Serrano, the Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. The Philippine legation in Israel opened only in 1962; until that time, the Philippine ambassador to Italy continued to act also as non-resident minister to Israel.

443. D. Lewin (Tokyo) to Y. Shimoni. 8 July 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3317/31

Lewin reports on his meeting with the Japanese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shima, on the eve of the latter's leaving for Istanbul for the conference of the heads of the Japanese missions in the Middle East. Shima said he saw no reason why Israel's Legation in Tokyo should not be raised to the rank of Embassy. They agreed to discuss the matter further on Shima's return from Istanbul.

Lewin informs Shimoni that he had at one time talked with Minister of Foreign Affairs Meir about the possibility of her visiting Asia when the U.N. General Assembly closes.[2] She had said she would like to do that, but she could not visit the smaller Asian states without visiting the larger ones, like India, China and Japan, as this could be construed as weakness. As there was no possibility of her being invited to India or China, the tour would become possible only if she were invited to Japan. She agreed to have Lewin sound the Japanese out, but she thought the chances were slim. Now Lewin raised the matter with Shima, who suggested that the invitation be handed to Mrs. Meir by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs when they meet at the U.N. He added that this would not be a "state visit", such as that of a head of state or a Prime Minister; the invitation would be by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to his colleague. Lewin requests Shimoni to find out whether the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be interested in such an invitation, and whether she could find the time for the Asian tour after the U.N. General Assembly.

Notes

1. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. G. Meir's prospective visit to Japan was raised also in a talk with Kanayama on August 24th, 1960. Kanayama said he did not think his government could host an official guest in November 1960; however, should Mrs. Meir happen to visit Japan, she would be more than welcome. (See Zippori to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1.9.1960, 130.23/3317/31.)
3. Aichiro Fujiyama, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. After the elections which took place in November 1960, Zentaro Kosaka was appointed Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
5. For a report on this conversation, which however has nothing to add to what is said in the present document, see Lewin's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11.7.1960, 130.23/3317/1.

444. D. Ben-Gurion (Jerusalem) to J. Nehru (Delhi). 28 July 1960

Note

1. For Nehru's reply, see No. 447.

445. D. Lewin (Tokyo) to Y. Shimoni. 29 July 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3317/31

Lewin reports on his talk with Shima on the latter's return from the conference of the Japanese diplomats in the Middle East in Istanbul.[1]

Shima said that the feeling at the conference was that the time was not right for raising Israel's Legation in Tokyo to the rank of Embassy. This was not a matter of principle, but the right time for such a step should be sought in order to avoid adverse reactions on the part of the Arabs. He added that a change in the attitude of the region's states towards Israel would make things easier for them too, and in that connection he asked what was the significance of Iran's statement in the press on its relations with Israel and whether there was a chance of Lebanon's following in Iran's steps. Lewin said that there were no prospects of Lebanon's following Iran, and that he did not know more about the Iranian statement than what had appeared in the press.

Notes

1. See No. 443.
2. Zenji Motomura, the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Israel.
3. For the announcement on the exchange of representatives between Israel and Iran, see No. 384.
4. Tatsami Kono, the Japanese Ambassador to Lebanon.

446. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 August 1960

Coded Tel. 820; Inc.: 130.23/3304/23

Ben-Horin reports on his meeting with Burmese Premier U Nu. Ben-Horin

stressed the importance attached by Israel, and by its Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, to the relations with Burma. Israel hoped that these ties would become still stronger and more extensive. U Nu approved of Ben-Horin's proposal for the exchange of parliamentary delegations. He received from Ben-Horin a list of Israeli experts staying in Burma and a list of Burmese students undergoing training in Israel.[3]

Notes

1. A delegation of members of the Knesset came to Burma in September 1960, on their way to Japan to participate in the Ninth Interparliamentary Conference in Tokyo.
2. Of the parliament.
3. For an additional report, see Ben-Horin's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (817, 1.8.1960, 130.09/2361/7), quoting U Nu, who said he was waiting for Ben-Gurion in order to practice meditation with him. Ben-Gurion did visit Burma in 1961.

447. J. Nehru (New Delhi) to D. Ben-Gurion. 9 August 1960

Note

1. See No. 444.

448. M. Yegar (Rangoon) to the Asian Division. 15 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3325/60

Yegar visited Malaya in the first half of August 1960, when he was Second Secretary in the Israel Embassy in Rangoon. The official reason for his visit was to participate in the conference of the Asian Football Confederation,[2] but he used the opportunity to investigate the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Malaya.

His most important meeting was with the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Yegar said that on the occasion of his stay in Kuala Lumpur he wished to transmit the Israeli Government's reply to what the Tunku had said to the Israeli Minister to Australia when he was visiting that country. The Israeli Government, said Yegar, appreciated the Prime Minister's difficulties which were caused, as far as they knew, by two factors.

The first factor was pressure by the Arabs. Here it could be said that Israel had missions at various levels in several Muslim countries. Many Muslim personages pay official visits to Israel. This state of affairs not only does not harm these countries' relations with the Arabs, but, on the contrary, endows them with more importance. Israel considers the generalization "the Arab states" a term inconsistent with reality. In practice, the pressure originates only with the U.A.R. or is inspired by this state.

The second and more weighty factor is the Muslims of Malaya, and in practice the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.[8] This is an internal Malayan affair, and Israel cannot express an authoritative opinion on it. However, Israel considers the Tunku's personality and power of leadership to be such that he could overcome the opposition of a fanatic minority.

Yegar added some details on the developments in the matter of the relations between Israel and Iran, and said that Israel was prepared to establish non-reciprocal relations with Malaya for the time being, namely, that Israel dispatch a representative to Kuala Lumpur while Malaya be represented in Israel by the British Embassy. If such an arrangement does not meet with Malaya's approval, Israel would settle for any honourable form of unofficial representation according to Malaya's needs and convenience. Israel has no doubts that the establishment of relations would benefit both countries, the more so as the Malayan Government was embarking on rural development projects, on the organization of a health service, and perhaps also on the development of shipping. In all these spheres Israel could be of help to Malaya. The relations between the two countries would serve as an example to other Muslim states, and thus advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister replied that the main problem confronting them was the ignorance of the population, which was being exploited by fanatic Muslim preachers who are in opposition to his government. During the elections, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party employed as ammunition the Tunku's sympathy towards Israel, and most of his election campaign was directed against that party. His government has to devote much energy to fight that party even after the elections. He himself, the members of his government and the educated circles in his country are distant from religious fanaticism and they are very much interested in establishing relations with Israel, but when they do that they will be giving more ammunition to their Islamic opponents. His government must not hazard its strength, at least not until it has more support among the masses. All this apart, the Tunku would like Israel to know that Israeli visitors will always be welcome in Malaya, but they should keep a low profile. He also spoke about the Arab activities in Malaya, and mentioned that he had managed, with great difficulty, to close down a newspaper founded by the Saudis.

The Tunku showed Yegar a file with material on the forthcoming debate in Parliament on the revocation of the recognition of Israel. He said this showed how the opposition attacked him on evry occasion connected with Israel. He said he would reply to the motion in a sarcastic manner, and will say that, instead of expending their energy on matters of low interest to Malaya, they should devote their efforts to the development of their country. The motion would of course be defeated by the votes of the coalition.

At another meeting Yegar raised the possibility of Malaya's participation in a conference scheduled at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot on the role of science in the advancement of new states. After the Tunku had consulted with his deputy, Yegar was told that the invitation had come too late, but that Malaya wished to be notified of similar events in the future, and would be glad to receive the summaries of the debates at Rehovot.

Yegar says that he is convinced the Tunku was sincere in his saying that he and his government were interested in relations with Israel. The problem was not only the Islamic fanatics but also fanatic Muslim elements within his own party. There are no prospects at the moment of establishing diplomatic relations, but the goodwill shown to Israel should be exploited to foster ties with Malayan personages travelling abroad and with Malayan diplomats, and to investigate the possibilities of developing ties in the fields of culture, sports, development and trade.[13]

Notes

1. The first six chapters of the report deal with various meetings held by Yegar in Malaya, and in particular his participation in the conference of the Asian Football Federation.
2. Merdeka — "independence" in Malayan. The games took place on the occasion of Malaya's Independence Day.
3. Who visited Malaya in the course of his Asian tour during October–November 1956.
4. E. Ben-Horin escorted Sharett on his Asian tour (he was then Deputy Director of the Asia Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
5. See No. 438 and nn there.
6. Hussein bin Dato, the Malayan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
7. During his visit to Australia, the Tunku met Yuval on November 9th, 1959, and said to him: "I remember my conversation with Mr. Sharett. Malaya's leadership is well cognizant of Israel's character, but the Muslim masses are inimical to you therefore we cannot establish relations with you." (See Yuval to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10.11.1959, 130.23/3111/14.)
8. See No. 438 and n. 3 there.
9. See Chapter 17.
10. Yaacov Shimoni annotated this paragraph in the margin: "This is a misunderstanding, PMIP was not established by him."

11. See No. 432, n. 3.
12. The United Malay National Organization — the dominant party in Malaya's ruling coalition.
13. M. Kidron, the Ambassador to Thailand, who had also paid a visit to Malaya during that year (see No. 438), reacted to this letter and said that he agreed with Yegar's conclusions and recommendations but that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should decide which embassy was to deal with Malaya — the one in Thailand or the one in Burma. Shimoni replied that Malayan affairs should remain with the embassy in Bangkok, unless an Israeli consulate opened in Singapore. (See Kidron to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15.9.1960; Shimoni to the embassy in Thailand, 11.10.1960, both filed under 93.13/232/21.)
    Moshe Yegar arrived in Malaya in October 1964, posing as an unofficial commercial representative but with the secret knowledge and approval of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in the attempt to gain a permanent Israeli foothold in Malaya which could later turn into a diplomatic mission. The attempt proved unsuccessful, and Yegar had to leave Malaya in January 1966.

449. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Ambassador in Washington. 19 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3345/17

Ambassador Harman is informed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has decided to recommend to the government the extension of full recognition to South Korea, on condition that the Koreans inform Israel beforehand of their willingness and appreciation of this step, and willingness to establish regular diplomatic relations with Israel. Shimoni explains that this decision was taken after it became clear that South Korea was a stable state and a welcome member among the nations, while Israel, in refraining from recognizing South Korea, had become almost totally isolated, together with the Soviet bloc and a number of non-aligned states, like India. Neutral European states, however, like Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, have already recognized South Korea, and so have some Western countries which had recognized Communist China, like Holland and Britain. Shimoni comments that the revolution which resulted in the overthrow of Rhee[1] has put South Korea on the road to parliamentary democracy, and this should help Israel in deciding for recognition. However, it should be made clear that this decision does not involve recognition of South Korea's claim to the whole of Korea.

Harman is requested to sound out unofficially the South Korean ambassador in Washington.[2] He should explain to him the background to Israel's decision and obtain from him an official commitment in principle that the recognition would be accepted with willingness and appreciation and would pave the

way for the establishment of relations. Harman should also explain that, for the time being, Israel cannot dispatch to Seoul an ambassador or a resident minister, the intention being to accredit to South Korea the minister in Tokyo. South Korea would be expected to reciprocate, but Israel would be only too happy if South Korea decided to dispatch to Israel an ambassador or a resident minister.

Shimoni also reports that a similar decision has been taken in respect of South Vietnam, and that Ben-Horin, the ambassador to Burma, has been instructed to go to Saigon[4] and sound out the Vietnamese. Harman is requested to transmit this information to his South Vietnamese colleague after he has received confirmation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Ben-Horin had indeed left for Saigon.

Harman is requested to report fully as soon as possible.[5]

Notes

1. Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea from 1948 to 1960, resigned on April 27th, 1960, following demonstrations against him which were supported by the Korean army.
2. Il Kwan Chung, the South Korean Ambassador to the United States.
3. Harman's letter of 8.8.1960, reporting on his meeting with his Korean counterpart, is filed under 130.23/3345/17.
4. See No. 463.
5. Harman replied on 29.8.1960 (File 130.23/3343/17) that he had met his Korean counterpart who welcomed the proposal. He suggested that Israel accredit to his country its minister to Japan, and mentioned that they had an embassy in Turkey.

450. Editorial Note

The Relations Between Israel and Ceylon

Diplomatic relations between Israel and Ceylon were established in September 1957, but the Ceylonese remained cool and reserved owing to heavy Arab pressure accompanied by threats of a boycott (the Arab states were an important customer for Ceylon tea, Ceylon's main export item).

The Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, announced in August 1960 that the government of her predecessor, W. Dahanayake, had accredited a minister to Israel without considering the significance and possible effects of such a step in the context of the complicated situation in the Middle East, and its repercussions on Ceylon's relations with the Arab states. Dahanayake had thus acted contrary to the policy adopted by

his predecessor, Solomon Bandaranaike (Mrs. Bandaranaike's late husband), and the Government of Ceylon has decided on immediate steps to cement their relations with the Arab states. (See No. 474 — Appendix A.)

451. Y. Barnea (Colombo) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 August 1960

Coded Tel. 420; Inc.: 130.09/2352/8

Barnea was summoned to the Minister of Finance,[1] (who was also a parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister) who informed him that the government of Ceylon was about to announce the appointment of a committee to investigate the circumstances leading to the accreditation of Ceylon's minister to Israel.[2] The Minister said this did not mean that the accreditation would of necessity be revoked, but Barnea received the impression that a decision on this had already been taken. The Minister added a few conciliatory words and promised that relations between Ceylon and Israel would not be affected, and also said that a new minister would be sent out to Israel in due course, but Barnea is certain that this promise should not be taken seriously. He requested the Minister to delay the announcement for a while to enable further consultations, but his request was rejected. He is due to meet the Prime Minister[4] in several days' time.

Notes

1. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, the Ceylonese Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister's parliamentary secretary. The title of Deputy Prime Minister was ascribed to him in error.
2. Sir Arthur Ransingha, the Ceylonese Ambassador to Italy and non-resident Minister to Israel.
3. W. Dahanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon from the assassination of his predecessor Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike in September 1959 till the elections which took place in March 1960.
4. Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (widow of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike), the Ceylonese Prime Minister from July 1960.

452. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Rangoon. 20 August 1960

Coded Tel. 386; Outg.: 130.23/3331/14

Ambassador Ben-Horin is informed that the Nepalese Prime Minister, now visiting Israel, asked him to come to Kathmandu at the end of August.[1] Shimoni also reports on a number of agreements of which they were notified during the visit, among them the establishment of a joint contracting enterprise, the dispatch from Nepal of a delegation to survey the problems of water supply, agriculture and cooperatives, and the admission of student trainees, including discharged soldiers, wishing to study agricultural subjects. In the matter of relations, a promise has been made that Nepal would open an embassy accredited to Israel and to several countries in southern Europe. If this embassy is not situated in Israel, a secretary from the embassy will reside in Israel as a permanent representative.[2] Israel has similar plans regarding Nepal.

Notes

1. The Nepalese Prime Minister was visiting Israel at that time. Ben-Horin's first visit to Nepal as non-resident Ambassador was in September 1960 — see No. 464.
2. This promise of Koirala's was never implemented, while Israel dispatched a chargé d'affaires to Nepal in 1961 — see No. 472.

453. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 21 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3339/18

Shimoni presents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a review of relations between Israel and Ceylon in preparation for the debate to be conducted in the cabinet on this subject.[1]

(1) Ceylon has never publicly announced its recognition of Israel, but as they used to reply to congratulations and to congratulate Israel themselves, and even approached Israel officially on several occasions — Israel interpreted this as recognition.

(2) In the autumn of 1956 Israel and Ceylon decided to establish diplomatic relations and the Ceylonense gave their *agrément* to the appointment of the Israel minister in Burma as a non-resident minister to Ceylon. The presentation

of the minister's credentials was delayed owing to the Sinai campaign, but it eventually took place in September 1957 during the premiership of the late S. Bandaranaike; thus the claim that the step had been taken by "another" government is pure hypocrisy. It is true that the Ceylonese minister presented his credentials — as a non-resident minister — when Dahanayake's government was in power, but the diplomatic relations themselves had been instituted by the government headed by the present premier's late husband. During that period Israel appointed several non-resident ministers to Ceylon and also dispatched chargés d'affaires. Ceylon, as said above, was satisfied with dispatching a non-resident minister who never visited Israel, after having presented his credentials.

(3) Protests and threats on the part of the Arabs were already being heard in 1956, and they grew in strength in 1960, after the Ceylonese minister had submitted his credentials. The Arabs resorted to threats of boycott, and especially threatened that the Arab states would stop buying Ceylon tea. The Ceylonese reaction to the threats was feeble. Shimoni's impression is that the timing of Ceylon's announcement on the minister's recall was connected with the visit of a Ceylonese delegation to Iraq for the festivities of Iraq's Revolution Day.

(4) It has not yet been made clear whether the government of Ceylon has already revoked the minister's accreditation or whether it is still considering this move.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, No. 450.
2. See No. 474.
3. See No. 451.
4. See memorandum from Shimoni to G. Meir, 21.8.1960, 130.23/3339/18.

454. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Legation in Tokyo. 22 August 1960

Coded Tel. 647; Outg.: 130.09/2315/11

Shimoni instructs Minister Daniel Lewin to leave immediately for Colombo,[1] to ask for a meeting with the Prime Minister, and to transmit to her a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mrs. Meir (for full text of the message see Main Volume, pp. 702–703). Conversations with other ministers who can be reached should be conducted in the spirit of the message.

The Ceylonese announcement was released in several versions, and it is not clear what final decision has been taken. In Israel's opinion, there are three possibilities: (1) That Ceylon would limit itself to the public announcement of a review of relations with Israel, without taking substantive steps. (2) That their present minister to Israel would be transferred to another post, and that their new ambassador in Rome would not be accredited also to Israel. (3) That they would formally revoke the present minister's accreditation. Israel would naturally prefer the first possibility, but should this not be the case then the second possibility is preferable to the third. Israel should also strive for a public announcement of what the Israeli chargé d'affaires had been told in private, namely, that Ceylon would stay neutral in the Middle East conflict and that friendly relations with Israel would continue.

Shimoni informs Lewin that the Israel ambassadors in London, Washington, New York, Moscow and Rangoon have been requested to speak with their Ceylonese colleagues in the same spirit as that requested of Lewin, and also to persuade their opposite numbers from other states likewise to approach the Ceylonese ambassadors.[5]

Notes

1. Daniel Lewin, the Israeli Minister to Japan, who also was accredited to Ceylon as non-resident Minister.
2. See No. 451.
3. See No. 453.
4. Sir Oliver Goonetillke, the Governor-General of Ceylon.
5. This telegram brought in numerous reports on talks between Israeli diplomats and their Ceylonese counterparts, from which it became clear that the Ceylon Government's decision was adopted partly because of the Arab boycott and partly because of the wish to besmirch the outgoing government of Dahanayake. (See, for instance, Lourie's telegram from London, 877, 25.8.1960, 130.09/2334/4; Harman's telegram from Washington, NWT131, 23.8.1960, 130.09/2313/2; Eshel's telegram from the permanent mission to the U.N. in New York, X434, 25.8.1960, 130.09/2334/14; Harel's telegram from Moscow, 988, 25.8.1960, 130.09/2327/6.)

455. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 26 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3334/6

Shimoni suggests to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that a consulate be opened in Singapore to be headed by a high-ranking official of the Ministry.

The reasons are not only Singapore's economic importance and its steadily strengthening ties with Israel, manifested by the visit paid to Israel by three ministers from Singapore;[1] but also its role as a bridge to Malaya, which is a key country and whose relations with Israel are problematic. As Singapore's foreign relations are at the moment conducted by Britain, Shimoni assumes that there will be no problem in opening the consulate.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 459.
2. See Nos 438 and 448.
3. G. Meir's reply has not been found, but an Israeli consulate was not opened in Singapore for several years to come. The embassy was opened in 1969, and a resident ambassador was accredited to that country.
4. See Ben-Horin's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18.8.1960, 93.13/232/21.

456. D. Lewin (Colombo) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 August 1960

Coded Tel. 486; Inc.: 130.09/2352/8

Lewin reports on his meeting with the Ceylonese Prime Minister, with the participation of the Minister of Finance and the Director-General of the Ministry of External Affairs.[1] He handed to the Prime Minister the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister requested him to assure Mrs. Meir that she had no anti-Israeli intentions or feelings — she only had an account to settle with former Prime Minister Dahanayake. The Minister of Finance, Felix Diaz, argued in the same vein that the reason for revoking the accreditation of their minister to Israel was not submission to pressure by the Arabs but a desire to nullify the acts of the former Prime Minister. He said there was a tentative proposal for settling the issue: the present minister would be handed a letter of recall, without revoking his accreditation, and at the same time they will ask for an *agrément* for a new minister, who would temporarily remain minister-designate, so that the present government could deliberate and decide on the date on which he would submit his credentials. In their opinion, the immediate recall of their minister is unavoidable, owing to the internal situation in their country. In case no suitable candidate is found for Rome and for Israel, the recalled minister will be given an additional letter saying that they intended to accredit their new ambassador to Italy also as minister to Israel. They will agree to

the release of this letter to the press, and would also be willing to issue a joint statement with Israel. They also said they were planning to dispatch to Israel a high-ranking delegation, which would perhaps also include Diaz. Lewin's impression is that the Ceylonese are intending to have the new minister remain minister-designate for a long time, and he asks for instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in preparation for his next meeting.[3]

Notes

1. See Nos 451 and 454.
2. See No. 474.
3. See No. 457.
4. See Lewin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21.9.1960, 130.23/3339/17.

457. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Colombo. 30 August 1960

Coded Tel. 460; Outg.: 130.09/2352/8

Shimoni replies to Lewin's report on his meetings in Ceylon,[1] and instructs him to inform the Ceylonese in the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that she was glad that the reasons for their step were internal and were not connected with their relations with Israel and the Arabs. Their proposal for the solution of the crisis seems to Israel feasible, on condition that the recall would affect also their ambassador in Rome and not only their minister to Israel, and that his letter of recall is transmitted to Israel only after he has left Rome. It would be best if the letter of recall is accompanied by a request for the *agrément* for the new minister. The foreign ministry would be very glad if this decision is released to the press, whether in the form of a letter to Israel or as an announcement. However, Israel thinks there is no need for a joint communiqué. Shimoni requests to be cabled on further developments.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 456.
2. See No. 458.

458. D. Lewin (Colombo) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 September 1960

Coded Tel. 447; Inc.: 130.09/2352/8

Lewin reports on another meeting with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. The latter explained that they could not recall their ambassador in Rome nor could they let him remain as minister to Israel. He rejected Lewin's proposal to appoint their ambassador in Paris as non-resident minister to Israel even without the submission of letters of accreditation, blaming the internal situation and their inability to hold the budgetary debate before the Israeli issue is settled. After the budgetary debate is over and the committee investigating Dahanayake's regime has finished its deliberations, the appointment of a new minister will perhaps be considered. Lewin's proposal to postpone all the practical steps until the committee's investigation is over was also rejected, as was his proposal for the appointment of an Israeli minister resident in Ceylon.

The Prime Minister promised to give Lewin her reply to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[2]

As to the letter of recall, two possibilities were mentioned: that the minister would come to Israel to deliver the letter, or that the letter would be given to the Israel legation in Colombo. Lewin requests instructions as to which of the two is preferable.[3]

Lewin's conclusion is that the decision of the Ceylonese is final, notwithstanding the equivocations which keep changing in step with the Israeli arguments.

Notes

1. See No. 457.
2. See No. 460.
3. In its reply, the Ministry instructed Lewin to inform his interlocutors that Ceylon's step was unilateral and that Israel had no part in it. Israel cannot be expected to offer advice on how to carry this step out, and they should act as they please. (See Shimoni to the Legation in Colombo, telegram 471, 12.9.1960, 130.09/2352/8.)
4. See No. 460.

459. Yong Nyuk Lin (Singapore) to G. Meir. 13 September 1960

Notes

1. Yong Nyuk Lin, the Singaporean Minister of Education, headed his country's delegation to the conference which took place at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot on the subject of "The role of science in the advancement of new countries".
2. Abba Eban, the Minister of Education and Culture, did not visit Singapore in the year under review.
3. The Minister of Foreign Affairs annotated this paragraph in the margin: "For the Prime Minister's attention". Such a conference did not take place.

460. D. Lewin (Colombo) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Coded Tel. 449; Inc.: 130.09/2352/8

Lewin reports that the Ceylonese Prime Minister's reply to the message of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given to him in the form of a letter from the Ministry of External Affairs.[1] (For the English text, see Main Volume, pp. 710–711.) The most important difference between what was said at the last meeting and the letter is that in the end they decided not to recall their ambassador in Rome.[2]

Note

1. See No. 458.
2. However, the Ambassador did ultimately remain in Rome.
3. The full text is found in File 130.23/3339/18. For Israel's reply, see No. 461.

461. Israel Legation in Colombo to the Ministry of External Affairs of Ceylon. 18 September 1960

1. See No. 460.

462. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to Y. Shimoni. 18 September 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3304/24

Ben-Horin reports on his meeting with General Ne Win, Chief of Staff of the Burmese army, and Prime Minister until April 1960. After the General reviewed Burma's foreign relations and also dwelt on the internal situation and the relations between the various political parties, Ben-Horin inquired about the possibility of the Foreign Minister's paying a vist to Burma on her way back from the U.N. General Assembly. The General approved of the idea. They then discussed various topics relating to cooperation between the two countries, including the shipping line, the settlement of discharged soldiers, Israeli aid to a certain hospital, and so on. Ben-Horin concludes that the General's friendship towards and reliance on Israel are firm and unshakeable, and this is an invaluable asset to the embassy's activities.

Notes

1. Sgan-Aluf Alexander Gidron, the military attaché in Burma.
2. Ne Win paid a visit to Israel in June 1959, during his premiership.
3. A civilian government took over from Ne Win's military regime in April 1960. U Nu was reelected to the premiership and Ne Win returned to his former post of Chief of Staff.
4. U Nu's ruling National Alliance Party, and the opposition Socialist Party.
5. The Defence Services Institute — the body dealing with economic organizations owned by the army.
6. U Thwin, the Burmese Minister of Commercial Development and Supply.
7. Untraced.
8. Brigadier Maung Maung, Director-General of the Burmese Ministry of Defence.
9. The 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, due to convene from September to December 1960.
10. See No. 446, n. 1.
11. A Burmese shipping company, administered by ZIM.
12. See No. 441 and n. 4 there.
13. Brigadier Aung Gyi, the Burmese Deputy Chief of Staff.
14. Ben-Horin proposed that Israeli doctors be dispatched to the hospital at Taunggyi, the capital of the states of Shan.
15. See No. 470.

463. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 October 1960

Coded Tel. 950; Inc.: 130.09/2361/7

Ben-Horin reports on his visit to South Vietnam made in order to inform them of Israel's readiness to recognize this country and to establish diplomatic relations with it.[1] He raised the subject in two talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,[2] and the impression was that they were hesitating for fear that the U.A.R. would react by coming closer to North Vietnam. Many months could pass until a reply is received, and in the meantime it would be best to establish diversified trade relations.

Notes

1. Ben-Horin came to Saigon at Shimoni's instructions, who said that the government had decided to accord full recognition to South Vietnam, on condition that that country respond affirmatively and establish full relations with Israel. Ben-Horin was instructed to contact the highest levels of the authorities in Saigon. (See Shimoni to Ben-Horin, 367, 15.8.1960, 130.09/2361/4.)
2. Vu-Van-Mau, South Vietnam's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam.
4. Ben-Horin's letter of October 21st, which however adds nothing new to what is said in the present document, is in File 130.23/3313/49.

464. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to Y. Shimoni. 25 October 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3331/21

Ben-Horin, who is accredited to Nepal as a non-resident ambassador, reports on his visit there in September 1960.

The following understandings were reached in the course of the visit: (1) A delegation from "Solel Boneh" will be dispatched to negotiate on the establishment of a joint contracting enterprise (the delegation arrived while Ben-Horin was still in Nepal, and an agreement was signed by them with the Nepalese).

(2) A date was set for the visit of a survey delegation of water experts from Israel and representatives of the cooperative sector, dealing both with marketing and with agricultural settlement. [The visit took place in November 1960.]

(3) Nepal intends to send to Israel trainees for current courses and for courses to be specially organized for the Nepalese. They are planning to send over engineers, other professionals, agricultural instructors, administrators, and other experts.

(4) The question of sending Israeli technicians to Nepal had best be settled with the two delegations scheduled to come to Nepal, as their members are experienced in the fields of interest to the Nepalese.

(5) Delegations to be dispatched from Nepal to Israel will be of two sorts: those whose task would be to observe and to gather general impressions (like a parliamentary delegation) and practical survey missions. An understanding was reached on the dispatch of an official agricultural delegation, the date of whose visit will be set on Ben-Horin's next arrival in Nepal. A delegation of engineers will also be coming to Israel for a short study tour.

Ben-Horin discussed with the Nepalese Prime Minister and the U.S. ambassador to Nepal[6] the possibility of using American aid moneys for joint enterprises with Israel, and met with favourable responses. The U.N. representative to Nepal also expressed his readiness to cooperate in referring U.N. trainees to Israel, and perhaps also in financing an Israeli expert from time to time.

As to diplomatic representation, Ben-Horin was told that Nepal wished to open an embassy to serve Israel and some countries in southern Europe, but had not yet decided on its location. Ben-Horin informed them of Israel's intention to dispatch to Kathmandu a resident chargé d'affaires. Summing up, Ben-Horin says that there is in Nepal goodwill towards Israel and a wide field for activity for both Israel and other countries. With regard to development plans, it is not quite clear how long Nepal will have financial resources at its disposal for ambitious enterprises. He assumes that, as the cold war has also reached Nepal, many parties will be interested in strengthening their positions through extending aid to the country. At the same time, an important factor is the element of uncertainty resulting from Nepal's complex geopolitical situation. Ben-Horin warns that every credit can be exhausted, including the credit of trust and goodwill. Israel has made a good and vigorous beginning, and a wise and consistent continuation is necessary to justify the trust invested in it.

Notes

1. See Ben-Horin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26.9.1960, 130.23/3331/21.
2. The conference actually took place in January 1953.
3. See No. 452.
4. The visit took place in November 1960.

5. Water Resources Development — a daughter company of TAHAL.
6. Henry A. Stebbins, the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal.
7. Kulanath Lohani, Secretary (= Director-General) of the Nepalese Ministry of Planning.
8. Several paragraphs, dealing with military aid extended to Nepal by Israel, have been omitted here.

465. M. Michael (Bombay) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 25 October 1960

Copy: 93.42/309/12

Michael reports on the activities of the consulate in Bombay during the first year of his service in India. He lists in detail the factors to be taken into account by Israel when operating in India: the Indians' conviction that Israel identified with the "Western-capitalist" world (this is measured in India by statements and manner of voting, and not by practical acts); that Israel is swimming against the current of history in the Middle East; and that maintaining the status quo in relations with Israel is the only way to prevent conflagrations. Therefore, whether Israel is in the right or not, nothing should be done to change the so-called equilibrium in relations. Additional, less important factors are the antisemitic feelings of certain Indian personages, India's relations with Pakistan (including the Kashmir issue), and the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel.

All this dictates caution in Israel's moves, so as not to arouse strong adverse reactions. An assessment of Israel's success can be based on three considerations: to what extent Israel has succeeded in changing and extending the sphere of the status quo; what the Arabs think of Israel's actions and how they react to them; and whether Israel has succeeded in rallying circles of friends and public opinion to its cause.

As far as is known to Michael, the Arabs are well aware of Israel's efforts to escape from the confines of its consulate and of its success in making friends and winning over public opinion. As India is considered by the Arabs to be "the apple of their eye", it is no wonder that they exert themselves to the utmost to put obstacles in Israel's way. However, they cannot register any success, except for the cancellation of one single lecture.

Because of Arab pressure and their own considerations, the Indians interpret the "status quo" in relations as limiting the Israeli consulate to activity in the narrow consular field. In contrast, Michael has asserted that the consulate is Israel's representative mission in the full meaning of the word, and its duty is to behave like any embassy in India. Accordingly, during the past year

Michael has managed to hold meetings and talks with various ambassadors in New Delhi, to maintain contacts with government offices, to make official approaches to the Indian Foreign Ministry on subjects outside the consular sphere, to hold meetings with officials of the Ministry of External Affairs, to deliver public lectures, to hold meetings with journalists, and to move the centre of activity to the capital. However, a retreat from this or other position may be imposed in the course of time.

When it comes to establishing situations which would go beyond the status quo in relations, it turns out that the argument 'but you have permitted this to all the other countries' does not hold in Israel's case, and the Indians keep putting obstacles in the way of visits by delegations, concerts, sports events, and exhibitions. In spite of all the difficulties and of Arab pressure, some success can be noted in these fields, as well as in making friends and winning over the press. Information activities include lectures, the consulate's bulletin, and films. The consulate has also been regularly reporting on developments and events in India. In summing up, Michael says that Israel has not utilized to the full the many opportunities to be found in India. Extending the consulate's activities is bound up with obtaining more resources, including manpower, which have already been promised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notes

1. See No. 385.
2. *The Blitz*, a pro-Arab anti-Western Bombay weekly.
3. See Nos. 428 and 429.
4. Nehru was present at the concert, which took place in November 1960.
5. In the second half of 1960, ZIM inaugurated a shipping line to the ports of south-east Asia, among them Bombay, in spite of protests by the representatives of the Arab states in New Delhi.
6. A city in Indonesia which in 1955 hosted a conference of the independent countries in Asia and Africa. Israel was not invited owing to opposition by the Arab states, and the conference expressed support of "the Rights of the Arab People of Palestine".
7. The U.N. General Assembly adopted on October 17th, 1960, a resolution submitted by 28 non-aligned countries, calling on all the member states to refrain from acts which could exacerbate tension throughout the world. Israel supported this resolution and even wished to be counted among its sponsors, but its advances were rejected.
8. A right-wing opposition party in India. One of its leaders, R. Hutheesing, visited Israel in April 1960.
9. The document was annotated in the margin by G. Meir: "How many staff do we have in India?"

466. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to A. Harman (Washington). 13 November 1960

Copy: 130.23/3348/17

Further to his letter to Harman on the subject of South Korea, Shimoni informs him that E. Zippori, of the Israel legation in Tokyo,[2] visited South Korea to attend football games there. He took the opportunity to talk with an official of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who told him that the processing of Israel's proposal on the establishment of relations had been somewhat delayed owing to the replacement of their ambassador in Washington. He also asked whether Israel's recognition of South Korea involved recognition of the South Korean government's sovereignty over the whole of Korea. Zippori evaded answering this question; his impression was that such recognition was a precondition for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Shimoni comments that this is exactly what Israel had been afraid of. He finds it hard to believe that countries like Sweden or Holland, which have full relations with South Korea, recognize its claim over the entire peninsula. He assumes that this demand has only lately come into usage. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has therefore requested the ambassadors in Sweden, Holland, Britain and Norway to find out discreetly how these countries have acted in this matter.[3] Until the answers are received, Harman is requested not to take any initiative in respect of his Korean colleague. There is no objection to Harman's finding out what America's position is on this issue.

Notes

1. See No. 449.
2. See Zippori's letter to the director of the Asian Division, 25.10.1960, 130.23/3345/17.
3. In his letter of 14.12.1960 to the Embassy in Washington (130.23/3345/17) Shimoni says that inquiries made it clear that Britain, Sweden, Norway and Holland did not recognize South Korea's claim to sovereignty over the entire peninsula.

467. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to M. Bartur.[1] 1 December 1960

Copy: 130.23/3337/4

Shimoni transmits to the addressees passages from the report by Israel's minister in Manila[2] on the possibilities of developing economic, commercial and

technical aid relations with the Philippines. His conclusion is that economic relations can be developed if Israel adopts the principle of dispatching an expert if requested to do so, possibly by a private body, even if an immediate economic deal is not in the offing; the door would then be open to future commercial deals. His recommendations are:

(1) To lay the groundwork in the Philippines for a demand for Israeli experts.

(2) To create a suitable climate in Israel for dispatching experts even if an immediate deal is not envisaged, whether the potential employer is a public or a private body.

Passages from Shimoni's reply to the minister are also enclosed: He hopes that the organizations and institutions in Israel will be able to penetrate the Philippine market with those items of equipment and merchandise which they are in a position to supply, in particular agricultural equipment. However, Shimoni is rather more pessimistic about the chances of success. He recalls that Simke, the Israeli honorary consul in the Philippines, broke off relations with Sheeba,[4] without whom an increase in trade with the Philippines is problematic. Shimoni agrees with the minister in Manila that experts should be dispatched there, also private bodies, but that should be done only if the proposals are serious and promising. Shimoni comments that the minister's letter does not sufficiently stress the possible dispatch of student trainees and the tourist traffic from the Philippines to Israel. He thinks the dispatch of trainees from the Philippines preferable to the dispatch of experts from Israel.

Notes

1. Was sent also to A. Remez, director of the Department for International Co-operation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to M. Alon, director of the Economic Division there.
2. Yehiel Ilsar, the Minister to the Philippines.
3. An American Jewish businessman domiciled in the Philippines, who, in 1959, signed an agreement with an Israeli company for the establishment of a cotton plantation. The deal fell through.
4. Benjamin Sheba, representative of an Israeli firm for trade with the Far East, "Transasiatic".

468. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to B.P. Koirala (Kathmandu). 6 December 1960

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See No. 452.
3. Seventeen nations joined the U.N. during the 15th Session of the General Assembly: Cyprus, and 16 African states.
4. See No. 464.
5. Golda Meir did not visit Nepal.

469. D. Lewin (Tokyo) to Y. Shimoni. 8 December 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3345/17

Lewin acknowledges receipt of two letters on the subject of South Korea, one from Shimoni[1] and the other from Gazit.[2] Lewin suspects that the Korean minister in Washington is avoiding Gazit because he understood the latter's hints that Israel was not prepared to recognize South Korea's sovereignty over the whole of Korea. Lewin comments that the impressions he received from incidental conversations, for instance, with the Swedish and Norwegian ambassadors, was that this issue had never been actually discussed, but that their relations with South Korea were based on the U.N.'s resolution which recognized the Seoul government's sovereignty over the entire peninsula. The truth of the matter cannot be ascertained without direct questions being asked, and this was not what Lewin and Shimoni had intended. Lewin thinks that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must decide in this matter. If South Korea's sovereignty over the whole of Korea is recognized, then efforts should continue to establish formal relations; otherwise the efforts should be terminated.

Lewin also reports that the businessman Shaul Eisenberg told him that he had been asked by the Korean Minister for Reconstruction whether Israel was prepared to assist them in the fields of agriculture and afforestation. Lewin requests an answer in principle whether Israel was prepared to do so even if the issue of relations was not yet settled, and he would also like to be advised on the extent of Israel's possible involvement in "this adventure".[4]

Notes

1. Shimoni wrote that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had instructed him to shelve for the time being the Korean subject. He also appended a copy of his letter to the Embassy in Washington — No. 466. (See Shimoni to the Legation in Tokyo, 13.11.1960, 130.23/3343/17.)
2. In his letter to Shimoni (16.11.1960, 130.23/3343/17) Gazit reported that, basing himself on Shimoni's guidelines to Harman (No. 449), he explained to the Korean Minister in Washington that Israel's recognition of Korea did not involve recognition of any of its Government's claims outside its borders. The Minister later cancelled, one after the other, two meetings he had set up with Gazit.
3. Shaul Nehemiah Eisenberg, a businessman.
4. Shimoni replied that, if he is approached by the South Korean Minister for Reconstruction, he should tell him that Israel was prepared to cooperate with countries with which it had no diplomatic relations, but not with countries to which Israel had proposed mutual recognition and which had not yet replied to the proposal. Israel hoped that scientific and technological relations, the dispatch of experts and the admission of students would constitute part of the official relations which Israel expected to be established soon. (See Shimoni to the Israel Legation in Tokyo, 16.12.1960, 130.23/3345/17.) No material has been found on Lewin's meetings with the South Korean minister.

470. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to the Director of the Asia Division. 22 December 1960

Copy: 130.23/3304/23

Ben-Horin sets down in detail the factors affecting the nature and content of relations between Israel and Burma:

(1) The strength of the affinity Burma's leaders have for Israel, either personally or ideologically.

(2) The intensity of economic activity in Burma itself.

(3) The effective benefit derived by Burma from its relations with Israel.

(4) The image of the Israeli colony — with all its components — in Burmese eyes.

(5) The importance Burma attaches to outside factors hostile to Israel.

Ben-Horin estimates that a change for the worse in most of the above factors has been taking place since the new regime took over in April 1960.[2] The closest to Israel among the cabinet members is the Prime Minister, U Nu. The junior ministers can be won over, but this is not the case with the senior members of the government, and in particular with the second most influential minister, Thakin Tin, the Minister of Finance and Planning, and his coterie. This group's hostility to Israel, however, is a secondary effect

of their hostility to socialism in general. As long as the socialists had a decisive say in the government, they did not swim against the current in regard to Israel. Now they have more freedom of action and they will not lift a finger to decide in favour of Israel in the debates in the cabinet; and in practical matters, for example in the movement of experts, and trainees and economic activities, they will not accord to Israel preferential treatment. The Minister of Finance and his like are almost solely interested in China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. The Minister of Industry and Labour, U Rashid,[7] demonstratively stresses his Muslim affiliation, as his base of power is his role as president of the most important Muslim association in the country.

Ben-Horin explains that changes in the rate of economic activity in Burma have always resulted in changes in the extent of its practical relations with Israel. The stagnation in 1958, when the army took over, caused a significant decrease in movements of all sorts between the two countries. There is no danger of that stagnation returning, and the economic activity in which Israel has integrated, controlled by the army, has not stopped. The situation is more difficult in the purely civilian sector. The search for foreign money free of interest for the financing of development projects and the severe restrictions on foreign exchange in connection with the dispatch of Burmese delegations abroad, significantly limit the possibilities of an increase in these activities.

Notwithstanding all that has been said above, Israel's general situation in Burma is satisfactory, and it has a good reputation both in government circles and among the general public. The hundreds of Burmese who visited Israel came back as appreciative and affectionate friends. Twenty-five Israeli experts are now serving in Burma in various capacities (the shipping line,[8] a contracting enterprise,[9] a medical drug manufacturing company, a military bank, and others).

In the political sphere, Burma has never been totally committed to Israel. U Nu fought ably for Israel's case at the Bandung conference,[11] but he did not take matters to their logicl conclusion, and said plainly that he would not be able to do more in a similar situation in the future either. U Kyan Nyein, who is ideologically closer to Israel than any other Burmese, during his term in office as deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for economic matters thwarted any attempt to enter into a shipping partnership with Israel, owing to his fear of possible reaction on the part of the U.A.R. The Burmese delegation to the United Nations has expressed itself only once during all these years on the subject of the refugees in terms which roused the Arabs' ire. Burma's reaction to the Sinai Campaign was significantly more restrained than that of the other Asian states, but this was the result of a desperate struggle with the Burmese delegation behind the scenes of the Asian Socialist Conference held in Bombay in November 1956.

Following his visit to Israel, General Ne Win immediately went to Egypt,

in order to even things up, as he said. He informed Nasser that he was neutral in the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, but that Nasser had no right to interfere in direct relations between Israel and Burma. However, during his term in office, the Burmese delegation to the U.N. refused Israel's request to make a statement on freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal.

There are other reasons for the need to keep a balance between Israel and the Arab states. There is the proximity to India, and the general political philosophy of the Burmese not to raise their voices in matters which do not concern them directly. It is therefore not to be expected that Burma will adopt a position favourable to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs, and there is also the danger that this policy might lead to the conclusion that, in the context of direct relations with Israel, it would perhaps be better to avoid acts which might be construed by the Arabs, and the U.A.R. in particular, as inimical to their legitimate interests. A danger signal is the explicit wish to appease the U.A.R. in the matter of having Israel share administrative functions in the Burmese army's shipping line. There is also some sensitivity to Arab pressure also within the army.

To the adverse factors, from Israel's point of view, such as the *rapprochement* with China and the renewed affinity witho India, can be added the special relationship with the "Bandung nations" and the strengthening of economic relations with Pakistan. Significant importance should be attached to the generally prevailing impression in Burma that the U.A.R. is growing in power both internally and in the Arab world, and that it is becoming a factor in international politics much sought after by the other neutralist countries. The U.A.R.'s propaganda is exploiting this vein with some degree of success, and its mission's diplomatic activity is much more intensive than previously.

Nevertheless, sums up Ben-Horin, Israel has still much room for manoeuver and for its various activities, and the outlook should not be described by such a trite expression as "pessimistic".[14]

Notes

1. Several paragraphs, dealing with the internal situation in Burma and with its foreign relations, have been omitted here.
2. The army took over the reins of government in Burma in 1958, and this regime lasted until the beginning of 1960.
3. In 1958. See Y. Shimoni, *Contemporary Asia* [Hebrew], p. 248.
4. U Kyaw Nyein, a Socialist leader, Burmese Deputy Prime Minister from 1957 to 1958.
5. General Ne Win, the Burmese Prime Minister from 1958 to 1960.
6. Thakin Tin, the Burmese Minister of Finance and Planning.
7. U Rashid, the Burmese Minister of Industry, Mining and Labour.

8. See No. 462 and n. 11 there.
9. A contracting construction company, owned jointly by the Burmese government and "Solel Boneh", which operated from 1959 to 1963.
10. See No. 441, n. 4.
11. See No. 465, n. 6.
12. It took place in Bombay in November 1956.
13. U Ba Swe, a Socialist leader, Burmese Prime Minister from 1956 to 1957.
14. Shimoni commented on Ben-Horin's report, saying that he agreed with his summary, analysis and conclusions (see his letter to the Embassy, 6.1.1961, 130.23/3304/23).

471. Israel Consulate in Bombay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 December 1960

Note

1. The upper house of the Indian parliament.

472. E. Ben-Horin (Rangoon) to N.P. Thapa (Kathmandu). 27 December 1960

Notes

1. The king of Nepal dismissed Prime Minister Koirala on December 15th and put him under arrest.
2. See No. 464.
3. See *ibid.*, and also No. 468.

473. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legations in Colombo and Tokyo. 27 December 1960

Coded Tel. 506; Outg.: 130.09/2352/8

Shimoni reports that the Ceylonese ambassador in Rome approached the Israel ambassador there[1] and requested that he accept from him a letter of recall from his post as non-resident minister to Israel. He explained that this way was preferable to his going to Jerusalem and handing the letter to

the President, which would cause publicity undesirable both to Ceylon and Israel. The ambassador said he had no objection to accepting the letter, but intimated that this did not constitute an agreement to the act itself or to the manner of its execution — this was a Ceylonese matter and Israel was not a party to it. This reservation is important in view of the ambassador's basing himself on a draft supposedly agreed upon between Minister Lewin and the Ceylonese Ministry of External Affairs.[2]

Notes

1. Eliahu Sasson, the Ambassador to Italy.
2. In spite of the revocation of the Ceylonese Minister's accreditation to Israel, the Israel Legation in Colombo continued operating until the severance of relations between the two countries in 1970.

475. Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem, 24 February 1960)

Report: 130.23/3301/5

The Minister of Foreign Affairs described her visit to Africa in January 1960.[1] After taking part in the independence celebrations in Cameroun, she left for Liberia for President Tubman's fifth-term swearing-in ceremony. After that she visited Ghana and Guinea, and also used short touch-downs of her plane in the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Togo for talks with the leaders there. Her general impression was that Israel's tasks there were many and the manpower inadequate. The people to be sent there should undergo stringent selection, because conditions of service were very difficult.

Yahil then raised the subject of the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference scheduled for April in Conakry;[10] it was decided to reinforce the embassy there in preparation for the conference.

Notes

1. Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Meir made her second tour of Africa in January 1960 (the first tour was in March 1958). After participating in the independence celebrations of Cameroun (1.1.1960), she left for Liberia to be present at President Tubman's swearing-in for his fifth four-year term (Jan. 1960), and then she visited Ghana and Guinea. She also utilized her plane's touchdowns in the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Togo for talks with the local leaders.

2. On G. Meir's meeting with Nkrumah, see Avriel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 488, 22.1.1960, 130.09/2292/1.
3. France exploded a nuclear device in the Sahara desert on February 13th, 1960, despite the resolution adopted at the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly on December 12th, 1959, at the initiative of Asian and African states, calling on France to refrain from that act. (Israel voted with France against that resolution.)
4. On G. Meir's meeting with Sékou Touré, see her telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 72, 15.1.1960, 130.09/2353/3, and Hillel's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 75, 17.1.1960, *ibid.*; on President Ben-Zvi's invitation to Sékou Touré to visit Israel, see Tsur's telegram to the Embassy in Conakry, 1.2.1960, 130.09/2353/1.
5. On G. Meir's meeting with Tubman, see Yavor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 231, 5.1.1960, 130.09/2324/15. Tubman came to Israel in July 1962.
6. President Ahidjo did not come to Israel in the year under review, but a delegation from Cameroun, led by Pierre Kandem Niniym, the Minister of Health, participated in the conference held at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot in August 1960, on the role of science in the advancement of new states.
7. During G. Meir's visit to Sierra Leone, she was invited to be present at a cabinet meeting, when it was resolved to set up a joint company to operate in the fields of water drilling and construction. It was also decided to send to Israel a group of students for agricultural training. Britain, which at that time still ruled over Sierra Leone (which attained its independence in April 1961), approved this understanding. (See Yavor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 234, 15.1.1960, 130.09/2324/15.)
8. Sylvanus Olympio, the Togolese Prime Minister. On G. Meir's visit to Togo and on Togo's relations with Israel, see review No. 9 of the Israel Embassy in Accra, 7.11.1960, 130.23/3307/35.
9. On some of Israel's activities in Ghana, see No. 492.
10. The Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference took place in Conakry between the 11th and 15th of April 1960. See No. 479 (Editorial Note).

476. Editorial Note

The Relations Between Israel and Ethiopia

Relations between Israel and Ethiopia differed from those with other African states. Ethiopia extended to Israel *de facto* recognition only, and formal relations were limited to the consular level. Ethiopia was not prepared to go farther than that for fear of possible Arab reaction, and especially that of the U.A.R.

Ethiopia, which then also included Eritrea, is situated in an area of vital strategic importance to Israel: at Egypt's rear, on the Red Sea, and in proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Straits. Emperor Haile Selassie was of like mind with Israel in fearing the danger in Nasser's expansionist ambitions. When Israel made efforts during the years 1957–1958 to strengthen its ties with Iran and

Turkey, it made the same overtures to Ethiopia. Thus the formal low-level relations did not reflect the true state of ties between the two countries, which had significant practical content.

477. Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jerusalem, 29 February)

Report: 93.75/2124/33

H. Bar-On, the consul general in Addis Ababa, reviewed relations between Israel and Ethiopia, Israel's activities in the economic and educational fields, the internal situation in that country, and its relations with Somalia and Sudan. He mentioned Ethiopia's having lately appointed a consul general in Israel[6] with the personal rank of minister, who had been Ethiopia's minister of education and was of good standing in his country.

Notes

1. TAHAL — a state-owned company for water works planning.
2. A joint Israeli-Ethiopian company operating mainly in fishing and manufacturing tinned meat.
3. A body subordinate to ECOSOC — the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
4. A number of paragraphs, dealing with American aid to Ethiopia, Ethiopian agriculture and Ethiopia's foreign affairs, have been omitted here.
5. See No. 253, n. 2.
6. Tekle Sadik Mecouria, the Ethiopian Consul General in Jerusalem.

478. Z. Loker [Jerusalem] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 March 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3300/34

Loker reviews the situation in Israel's relations with the East African states. The leaders of Kenya and Tanganyika have been invited to Israel, and the dates of their visits depend on their agendas. No contacts have been made so far with Uganda. Consulates in Nairobi and in Dar es-Salaam are in the course of being established. So far there have been only two trainees in

Israel from Tanganyika, and one from Kenya. Efforts are being made now to obtain a scholarship for an Israeli student in Kampala, Uganda, to study anthropology or sociology. The establishment of the higher studies institute of the Histadruth[4] will strengthen educational ties with these countries. Loker recommends that more visits by East African personages in Israel be organized and that the number of scholarships for trainees from that region be increased.

Notes

1. Ben-Horin's report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and others on the visit, dated July 19th, 1959, and a supplementary report of July 20th, 1959, are filed under 130.23/3094/25. Among the recommendations: the appointment of a commercial attaché to the consulate in Nairobi, extending invitations for a visit to Israel to "leaders with bright prospects", maintaining continuous contacts between the Histadruth and trade unions in the region, "a certain generosity" in allotting scholarships to students from the region.
2. The enclosure has not been traced.
3. These were not established in the year under review.
4. The Afro-Asian Institute for Labour and Cooperation Studies of the Histadruth, which opened in October 1960.

479. Editorial Note

An Incident at the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization is a non-official body whose founding assembly took place in Cairo in 1957, its council and permanent secretariat also being located there. The second conference of this organization was held in Conakry between April 11th and 15th, 1960. Although Israel's ambassador to Guinea, Shlomo Hillel, received an invitation to participate in the conference as an observer — as did his colleagues in the diplomatic corps — he was requested to leave the chamber of the assembly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the ambassador to request a meeting with the President of Guinea in order to transmit to him a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing the hope that, in view of the normal relations between the two countries and of international usage, the President will see fit to take steps which would demonstrate his government's repudiation of the grave insult inflicted on the Israel ambassador.

A resolution was passed at the conference without a vote being held,

condemning Israel as "an imperialist base". and demanding the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees.

480. Sh. Hillel (Conakry) to E. Ben-Horin and E. Elath. 13 April 1960

Coded Tel. 137; Inc.: 130.09/2353/3

Hillel reports that he had been requested to leave the assembly hall of the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The request had been made by the member of the Guinean Bureau Politique who was responsible for the organization of the conference, and was seconded by Ismail Touré, the chairman of the conference and brother to Guinea's President, Sékou Touré. Hillel's argument that he had been invited by the organizers of the conference was rejected. He assumes that the reason for his expulsion was because a Palestinian delegation was scheduled to make a speech on that day.

Hillel later complained to the secretary-general of the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who claimed that Guinea was not responsible for what happened at the conference which was of an international nature, and that this step might have been necessary to assure Hillel's personal safety. Following an argument, he requested Hillel to write him a note on the subject. Hillel refused and said he was looking for explanations and not for a run-around in the form of an exchange of correspondence. Hillel requests instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on whether to submit a note, whether to give publicity to the incident, or whether to take any other suitable step. In his opinion, a sharp reaction on Israel's part towards the Guinean government was in order here.[6]

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. The heads of the diplomatic missions in Conakry were invited to attend the conference in the status of observers.
3. A Palestinian delegation from Gaza, organized with the initiative of the U.A.R., participated in the conference.
4. Alpha Diallo, the Secretary-General (= Director-General) of the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. Hillel did not go back to attend the conference.

6. Hillel raised the issue before Guinea's president, Sékou Touré, who asked him to put the matter in writing. The Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to Hillel's Note, arguing that the incident concerned not Guinea but the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. (See Hillel's telegrams to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1, 14826, 15.4.1960, 22.4.1960, 130.09/2353/3.)

481. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 April 1960

Coded Tel. NWT214; Inc.: 130.23/3301/22

Comay reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to Yahil that he was told by Ghana's permanent representative to the United Nations that, at the meeting of the African Group, he had demanded that Israel be invited to the celebrations of Africa Day at the U.N.[1] This met with strong opposition on the part of the Arab countries, the only supporter of Ghana's initiative being Ethiopia. The question was raised why only Israel and South Africa be refused invitations and not other countries, like France, Portugal, and perhaps also Britain. It was finally resolved to leave matters as they were and to bring up the problem for debate on the principle of the issue at the African states conference due to be held in Addis Ababa in June. Comay fears that the decision there will go against Israel, and he thinks attempts should be made to prevent this initiative.[5]

Notes

1. The representatives of the African states at the United Nations held an annual reception on the occasion of Africa Day; Israel was not invited to attend following pressure by the Arab states.
2. See No. 253.
3. Ato Tesfaye Gebre Egzy, Ethiopia's permanent representative at the U.N.
4. See No. 483.
5. Instructions to act to prevent this issue from being raised at the conference in Addis Ababa were sent to Israel's missions in Africa, and, indeed, the matter did not appear on the agenda. (See quote in Yahil's telegram to the Embassy in Paris, 724, 26.5.1960, 130.23/3301/22.)

482. K. Salmon (Capetown) to Ch. Yahil. 17 April 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3300/15

Salmon reviews relations between Israel and South Africa. Israel's main interest in that country is bound up with the existence of a large Jewish community there. As a result, Israel is not free to express its opinion of apartheid as would have been done if only its own interests were at stake, that is, the relations with the African countries and the conflict with the Arabs. South Africa itself does not cooperate with Israel, for instance in the matter of the Arab boycott, for fear of its shaky international standing being weakened still further. Salmon is surprised at the Arab states not having exploited Israel's ties with South Africa for more taunting at the conferences of African and Asian states. In his opinion, in all that concerns cooperation in international political matters, relations between the two countries should be kept to a low profile.

Salmon surveys the internal situation in South Africa and the situation of the Jewish community there. He proposes the establishment in Israel of a joint body of the government and the Jewish Agency to plan the absorption of immigrants from South Africa. He complains of the dearth of manpower in the mission in South Africa preventing the execution of the tasks set to it, and suggests the opening of consulates in Capetown, and perhaps also in Durban, in addition to the one in Johannesburg.

Notes

1. This correspondence has not been traced.
2. At the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, on November 17th, 1959, a resolution was adopted (No. 1375(XIV)) referring to a previous resolution of October 30th, 1958 (No. 1248(XII)) concerning the policy of apartheid, and expressing regret and concern at the fact that the government of South Africa had ignored the appeal of the Assembly to reconsider its policy which violated the right of all the ethnic minorities to enjoy the basic rights and liberties, and calling on the member states to make the necessary efforts to implement this resolution. Sixty-two states, including Israel, voted for the resolution, 3 opposed it and 7 states abstained.
3. No reply to this letter has been found.

483. H. Bar-On (Addis Ababa) to the Africa Division. 25 June 1960

Coded Tel. 905; Inc.: 130.09/2286/2

Bar-On reports on the second conference of the independent countries of

Africa, which took place in Addis Ababa between the 14th and the 16th of June.

In spite of all the efforts and the promises,[2] Egypt succeeded at the last moment in introducing into the last paragraph of the resolution dealing with preserving international peace, the words: "expresses concern for the non-implementation of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the Bandung declaration[3] and Accra resolution[4] pertaining to the solution of the problem of Palestine, which is a disturbing factor to world peace and security in the north-east of the African Continent".

Bar-On is informed that this passage was inserted in return for the U.A.R.'s agreeing to the paragraphs calling on the African states to sever their relations with South Africa and to impose various sanctions on it. Bar-On considers this a serious development, which opens new possibilities to the U.A.R. in Africa. He recommends that Israel's ambassadors in Africa try to meet the foreign ministers in their countries to find out which way the wind is blowing.

Notes

1. The conference of the independent African states, which was held in Addis Ababa from the 14th to the 16th of June 1960.
2. On the debate which preceded the adoption of the resolution, see Bar-On to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 897, 23.6.1960, 130.23/3301/22.
3. The Bandung conference, in which some of the independent Asian and African states participated, was held in April 1955. Among its other resolutions was the expression of support for "the rights of the Arab People of Palestine".
4. An Afro-Asian conference was held in Accra in 1958, and among its other resolutions it called for "a just solution to the problem of Palestine".
5. Concerning the issue of free passage through the Suez Canal — resolutions adopted in September 1951 and October 1956.
6. The U.A.R. was the only state participating in the conference which maintained diplomatic relations with South Afica.
7. See Bar-On to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 910, 27.6.1960, 130.09/2286/2.

484. Meeting of the Economic Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Jerusalem, 25 July 1960)

Copy: 130.23/3301/5

On the agenda were the three main problems arising out of the maintenance of aid activities in Africa: order of priorities, financing, and manpower. Finance

Minister Eshkol described his impressions from his visit to Africa, and said that the main problem was financing. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that France had to be sounded out as to whether it was prepared to help Israel in financing either from its own resources, or from those of the European Economic Community. She requested a report on the sums expended so far in Africa for training, development enterprises, surveys, and so on.

Notes

1. A survey of the possibilities of developing Mali's agriculture (Mali was the former French Sudan) was prepared by Zvi Gat, an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture (see memorandum from Lorch to Fischer, 19.9.1960, 130.23/3327/4).
2. N. Azikiwe, President of the Nigerian senate and Nigeria's Governor General from November 1960, was planning the establishment of a university at Nsuku, capital of Eastern Nigeria, and asked for Israeli aid for that purpose. (See letter from the Embassy in Lagos to the Foreign Ministry, 20.1.1960, 130.23/3330/14, and Yavor's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28.11.1960, *ibid.*)
3. See n. 8 *ibid.*
4. These were countries independent for generations and, unlike the former European colonies, were not afraid of a foothold to be gained by a foreign country.
5. A first talk on this subject took place in Brussels on July 6th, 1960, between the Israel Ambassador to Belgium and to the European Economic Community and the official of the Community in charge of the affairs of overseas territories — see No. 329.
6. See Chapter 6.
7. Eshkol represented Israel in Congo's independence celebrations on June 30th, 1960, and delivered to its Government a gift from Israel — one hundred scholarships. He left for the Ivory Coast on July 4th, and in his talk with its Premier, Houphouet-Boigny, discussed the expansion of the economic ties between the two countries and the opening of an Israeli embassy in Abidjan. Eshkol visited Dakar between the 5th and the 7th of July, and discussed cooperation with Israel. From there he went to Ghana, met President Nkrumah, and toured various institutions employing Israeli experts. His next stop was Nigeria, where he toured its eastern and western provinces, but refrained from visiting its mainly Muslim north; he discussed the granting of credit by Israel to Nigeria. From there he went to Liberia, where he discussed various projects, including the building of a luxury hotel.
8. A delegation from Sierra Leone headed by Rogers Wright, its Minister of Construction and Development, visited Israel in August 1960 and signed a memorandum on the construction of a building for its parliament by the company in joint ownership of the two countries, using Israeli credit. (See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the consulate in Freetown, telegram No. 4, 16.8.1960, 130.09/2344/11.)

485. Israel Consulate General in Addis Ababa to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16 September 1960

Coded Tel. 216; Inc.: 130.15/3758/1

The Consulate reports on Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan's first meeting with Emperor Haile Selassie.

The Emperor stressed the close cooperation between the two countries in matters touching security. When he had visited the U.A.R., Nasser had criticized this cooperation, but the Emperor ignored his objections. Ethiopia has refrained from recognizing Israel out of consideration for the Arab states, but he had told Nasser that his intention was eventually to recognize Israel, and he would let Nasser know about it beforehand.

Dayan replied that Israel considered that normal friendly relations should be based on full diplomatic relations. Israel was willing to aid Ethiopia in instruction and training, but not in armament. Israel saw the need of a strong Ethiopia not only in the arena of the Middle East, but also as an important factor in Africa.

After Dayan had reviewed the political situation and pointed to Nasser's expansionist ambitions, the Emperor said that, on his visit to Cairo the previous year, Nasser had promised to stop his anti-Ethiopian propaganda but did not keep his promise.

As regards economic matters, the Emperor said he was hoping for cooperation with Israel, and that agreements in this sphere could be reached in the course of Dayan's visit. Dayan said Israel was about to start operating five fishing vessels in Ethiopian waters, sailing under the Ethiopian flag. Israel was prepared to extend aid by sending experts and in training in other spheres also.

Notes

1. Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia.
2. Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture.
3. See Editorial Note, No. 476.
4. There was a border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan at that time, and Sudan accused Ethiopia of aiding the rebellious tribes of southern Sudan. Ethiopia, on its part, accused Sudan (and other Arab countries) of encouraging the separatist movement in Eritrea.
5. In 1959.
6. This was an idea entertained by the British towards the end of World War II, to unite the three parts of Somalia — Italian, British and French — with the region of

Ogaden in Ethiopia, with its rich water resources. Egypt also supported this plan, while Ethiopia opposed it vehemently.

7. In 1952, in a federative union. Ethiopia abrogated Eritrea's autonomy in 1962, and its Muslim inhabitants reacted by forming "the Front for the Liberation of Eritrea", which entered on guerrilla warfare to achieve independence, with the support of the Arab states.
8. A conversation on general matters took place between the Emperor and Dayan during the meal. The Emperor said, *inter alia*, that he thought Soviet influence in Africa would increase, while "the Americans do not comprehend the situation". (See the Consulate General in Addis Ababa to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 127, 19.9.1960, 130.15/3758/1.)

486. Israel Consulate General in Addis Ababa to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 24 September 1960

Coded Tel. 217; Inc.: 130.15/3758/1

The Consulate reports on the concluding meeting of Minister of Agriculture Dayan and Emperor Haile Selassie. Dayan expressed his opinions on matters touching security, economic and social problems, and relations between Israel and Ethiopia, of which he had learned something in the course of his visit. He said Israel could not finance Ethiopia's development, and the United States had to be approached in this matter. Israel could help with experts and administration, and perhaps the two forms of aid could be combined: financial aid from the United States and experts and administrators from Israel. He stressed that though Israel was willing to do all it could to help in Ethiopia's development, the absence of diplomatic recognition by Ethiopia prevented the normalization of relations and put obstacles in the way of the desired aid.

The Emperor said he recognized the handicaps under which the two countries laboured in the absence of diplomatic relations, but he had to emphasize that relations between Ethiopia and Israel were closer, and cooperation more fruitful, than in the case of other states with which Ethiopia had full relations. The Emperor said that Ethiopia was in need of continuous economic advice from Israel, and Dayan answered that Israel will consider appointing a highly qualified economic attaché in the consulate, who could act as adviser to the Ethiopian government.

Notes

1. See No. 485 and n. 6 there.
2. This document has not been traced.

487. Editorial Note

Relations Between Israel and Nigeria

Israel devoted special attention to its relations with Nigeria, the most populous African country — some 40 million inhabitants at that time, about half of them Muslim. Contacts had begun even before Nigeria became independent. Joint companies were set up in Eastern and Western Nigeria, the majority of whose shares were owned by the regional governments, and the minority by Solel Boneh (in the case of building enterprises) and Tahal/W.R.D. (in the case of water development companies). Nigerian personages visited Israel, and Nigerian trainees came to participate in various courses.

The situation was different in the case of overwhelmingly Muslim Northern Nigeria. Coolness towards Israel was expressed, *inter alia*, when it became known that the federal government of Nigeria was planning to obtain from Israel credit to the amount of £3m. The Prime Minister of Northern Nigeria showed determined opposition to the deal (see letter from S. Argov to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10.7.1960, File No. 130.23/3330/14). The agreement was nevertheless ratified.

This was the reason why Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan, on his visit to Nigeria, paid special attention to leaders from the Muslim north when he represented Israel at Nigeria's independence celebrations in October 1960.

488. Israel Embassy in Nigeria to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1 October 1960

Coded Tel. 83; Inc.: 130.09/2316/6

The Embassy reports on Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan's visit to Northern Nigeria, most of whose inhabitants are Muslims. Dayan met the Prime Minister of Northern Nigeria,[1] who explained that his Government feared a *rapprochement* with Israel would result in obstacles being put

in the way of pilgrims to Mecca. He also accused Israel of meddling in Nigeria's internal affairs. Dayan replied that Israel had no intention of harming Northern Nigeria's interests. He pointed to Israel's experience in agriculture and irrigation, and proposed to put Israel's know-how at Nigeria disposal. His interlocutor said that there was a possibility of developing relations with Israel, but it would have to be done very discreetly and at a slow pace.

Notes

1. The Sardauna (prince) of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria and president of the ruling party in Nigeria, the Northern People's Congress Party. In the elections to the federal parliament held in December 1959, this party won 145 seats and formed a coalition with two other parties.
2. M. Ribadu, Minister for the Affairs of Lagos in the federal government of Nigeria.
3. See Editorial Note above.
4. The Action Group, the sole opposition party in Nigeria.
5. Aminu Kano, a Muslim, member of the federal parliament of Nigeria for the Progressive Union of Northern Elements, which was then part of the ruling coalition. (He paid a visit to Israel in 1960.)
6. On Northern Nigeria's sensitivity concerning the possible effects of the relations with Israel on the Hajj to Mecca, see letter from Sh. Argov to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2.8.1960, 130.23/3330/14.
7. See Argov's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12.10.1960, *ibid.*

489. Editorial Note

Relations Between Israel and Somalia

Israel attached special weight to Somalia, a Muslim country in the Horn of Africa, at Egypt's back yard, a region of great strategic importance for Israel.

R. Timor, a special envoy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Somalia in June 1960 on the eve of its attaining independence, and met its leaders. Two main subjects were discussed: Israel's delegation to the independence celebrations to be held on July 1st, 1960, an invitation having been sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Meir, in May 1960; and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Israel was urged to "understand Somalia's sensitivity" and not to dispatch a delegation, for fear that the U.A.R. would incite the masses to rebel against their government. Somalia evaded a discussion on the establishment of relations. (See Timor [from

Addis Ababa] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 147, 13 June 1960, in File No. 130.15/3760/21.)

490. R. Timor (Rome) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 November 1960

Coded Tel. 991; Inc.: 130.09/2359/2

Timor reports on his meeting with Somalia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Issa. Timor raised the subject of diplomatic relations, and was answered that this should be left to the workings of time and that a more auspicious political atmosphere should be awaited. In the meantime Israelis were issued visas to Somalia and they were very welcome. Somalia has been explaining to the U.A.R. that they accepted Israel as a *fait accompli* and they were expecting economic and political advantages from cooperation with a country whose ships called in ports in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. However, the Somali Government could not afford at this stage to host overt Israeli diplomatic activity. Timor proposed the opening of a consulate or a trading mission, and was answered that the Somalis were not cognizant of such diplomatic niceties. In the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia, more frequent contacts were desirable, whether in Mogadishu or in meetings between Israelis and Somalis abroad. He mentioned relations between Israel and Iran which culminated in the Shah's declaration of Iran's recognition of Israel,[5] and said this was most probably the result of patience on both sides and the nurturing of relations for many years. He also mentioned that the votes of the Arab states were essential to Somalia. At this stage the Somali leadership should be won over to the idea of establishing relations with Israel. He thought the preservation of the present state of affairs, without supplying religious preachers and the opposition with ammunition against the government, was preferable to Israel's representation in Mogadishu which could have adverse repercussions unwanted by both governments.

Notes

1. Abdallah Issa, the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. Issa was Prime Minister of Somalia's interim government on the eve of its attaining independence. Timor met him when he visited Somalia in June 1960 — see Editorial Note above.

3. Was formed on July 22nd, 1960, and included 11 ministers from former Italian Somalia and four ministers from former British Somaliland.
4. Somalia joined the Arab League only in 1974.
5. The Iranian Shah's declaration of July 1960 on his country's relations with Israel — see No. 385.

491. Memorandum by N. Lorch (Jerusalem, 20 November 1960)

Copy: 130.23/3301/5

Lorch surveys the decolonization process through which Africa is passing. Israel's efforts to win over the new African states have three principal aims: (1) To neutralize them in relation to the Israel–Arab conflict. (2) To build up Israel's importance in the eyes of the great powers by its successes in Africa and its influence on the African states' positions in the struggle between the Eastern and Western blocs. (3) To aid Israel's economy in finding markets for its products and in creating revenues through the export of know-how and joint cultural activities.

Lorch lists a number of advantages Israel has, mainly in being a small country which could not be suspected of imperialistic ambitions; in not being identified with any concept of a superior race; in its population containing a relatively large professionally trained element. The disadvantages are the presence of the U.A.R., who are coreligionists of a large portion of Africa's population; Nasser's role as one of the leaders of the non-aligned bloc of countries, the recipients of aid from both West and East, and whose example a number of African states would wish to emulate; the presence of communities of Lebanese expatriates in Africa; the activities of the Soviet Union; the activities of the former colonial powers and their citizens in the African states which had attained independence — these, though approving in general of Israel's activities, do not hesitate to act against it when they think their own interests could suffer.

Lorch then surveys Israel's activities in Africa, and concludes that Israel is facing unique opportunities now that old patterns are disappearing and new ones have not yet materialized.

Notes

1. The Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger.
2. The Federation of Mali split into two states: Senegal and Mali (the former French Sudan).

3. Was established in 1960, after a survey by Prof. Michaelson, expert Israeli ophthalmologist.
4. In 1958, with Israel's increasing activity in the peripheral countries (Turkey and Iran), the affairs of the countries in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia) were transferred from the Africa Division to the Middle East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed by the British in 1953, and it lasted for some ten years. It comprised Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
6. Nyasaland became independent in 1964, and it changed its name to Malawi.
7. Northern Rhodesia became independent in 1964, and it changed its name to Zambia.
8. Two states in Central Africa, which were then under Belgian trusteeship. They both became independent in 1965, when Urundi changed its name to Burundi.
9. Father Fulbert Youlou, President of the Republic of the Congo (the former French Congo) headed his country's delegation to the conference on the role of science in the development of new states, which took place at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot in August 1960. He became the first head of an African country to visit Israel.
10. Alexander Tsur, consul in Freetown from June 1960 until Sierra Leone attained its independence in 1961.
11. Water Resources Development — a daughter company of TAHAL.
12. The capital of Northern Nigeria.
13. The Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, with its headquarters in Lagos. Its members at that time included Britain, South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France, Portugal, Belgium, Ghana, Cameroun, Nigeria and Liberia.
14. The Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara.
15. The Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara.
16. The International Labour Organization.
17. A French language daily published at that time in Israel.
18. Modibo Keita, Prime Minister of Mali, visited Israel in 1958, before his country became independent.
19. Yehuda Horam, First Secretary in the Israel Embassy in Paris, was put in charge also of African affairs.

492. N. Lorch (Jerusalem) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 21 November 1960

Copy: 130.23/3301/5

Lorch surveys Israel's activities in Ghana, Togo, Liberia and Senegal, and submits proposals for their continuation in the future.

Notes

1. See No. 475. An agreement was signed on October 19th between the ZIM company and the government of Ghana, in accordance with which the latter bought ZIM's share in the joint company. Another agreement was signed on the same day, empowering ZIM to administer the company until 1967.
2. See *ibid.* The government of Ghana informed the Israeli Ambassador in October 1960 that the contract for training the Ghanaian air force, which was to expire on April 30th, 1961, would not be renewed, and that the air force would be trained by the Royal Air Force. It was understood that the Israeli team would continue with the training till the beginning of March 1961. (See Bitan's telegrams to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, 700,688, 11.10.1960, 13.10.1960, 130.09/2292/4.)
3. A settlement north of Safed, which was established in 1945 and whose members were evicted by the British in 1946 after a cache of arms was discovered there. Jews settled there again, were again evicted by the British, and this sequence was repeated until the British gave up and let the settlers be.
4. The Builders' Brigade, a unit on the model of the NAHAL set up in Ghana with Israel's assistance.
5. The Ghana National Construction Company, a building and contracting firm, jointly owned by "Solel Boneh" and the government of Ghana.
6. Moshe Bitan, the Ambassador to Ghana from 1960 to 1962.
7. For a summary of Israel's relations with Liberia see the briefing prepared for Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol prior to his visit to Liberia, 28.6.1960, 130.23/3325/4.
8. Chanan Yavor, the Ambassador to Liberia from 1957 to 1960.
9. Amadou Karim Gaye, the Senegalese Minister of Development, Planning and the Economy.

493. Z. Loker (Jerusalem) to Y. Tekoah (Rio de Janeiro). 30 November 1960

Copy: 130.23/3301/5

Loker transmits a memorandum by Eliashiv Ben-Horin on Israel's activities in Africa (for full text, see Main Volume, pp. 788–797).

Notes

1. Is missing in the original.
2. See Nos. 491 and 492.
3. The Afro-Asian Institute for Labour and Cooperation Studies of the Histadruth, began functioning on October 10th, 1960.

4. The Secretary (= minister) of Public Works, Thomas Buchanan, came to Israel in April 1960. No details have been found of any other of his visits.
5. The Mayer Bros. Company.
6. The eye clinic, under the direction of the Israeli expert Eliahu Neumann, opened in 1960, following a survey made in Liberia by Prof. Michaelson, an expert Israeli ophthalmologist. (See also No. 491, n. 3.)
7. Chaim Gvati, former Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture.
8. David Armon of the Technion in Haifa set up a department of engineering at the University of Monrovia.
9. K.A. Gbedemah, the Finance Minister of Ghana, visited Israel in July 1959 and September 1960.
10. Krobo Edusei, the Ghanaian Minister of Transport and Communications.
11. Francisco Ribeiro Aye, the Director-General of the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence. He visited Israel in October 1960.
12. See No. 492 and n. 1 there.
13. See *ibid.*, n. 2.
14. See Nos 475 and 492.
15. See Editorial Note, No. 487.
16. Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria's federal government.
17. F.S. Okotie Eboh, the Minister of Finance in Nigeria's federal government. He visited Israel in July 1959 and June 1960. During his second visit negotiations began on the granting of Israeli credit to Nigeria.
18. See No. 477 and n. 6 there.
19. See Nos 485 and 486.
20. The establishment of the company was authorized during Mrs. Meir's visit in January 1960 — see No. 475, n. 7.
21. Rogers Wright, the Housing and Development Minister of Sierra Leone.
22. See No. 484.
23. Mamadou Dia, the Senegalese Prime Minister.
24. François Tombalbaye, President and Prime Minister of Chad (the visit took place in 1959, before Chad became independent).
25. The Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger.

494. H. Bar-On [Addis Ababa] to the Middle East Division. 19 December 1960

Coded Tel. 245; Inc.: 130.15/3758/1

Bar-On submits his assessments of Israel's position following the unsuccessful coup of December 1960 against the Ethiopian Emperor.[1] A significant number of Israel's friends were killed. Some survived, but their standing is unclear. There will most probably be significant changes in the composition of the government and in internal and foreign policies. Some of Israel's friends, who did not occupy important posts before the coup, could do so

now, in the light of their behaviour during the coup. On the other hand, some of Israel's friends were among the conspirators, and this could adversely affect Israel's standing. It is not yet possible to assess the situation regarding Israel's activities in Ethiopia, in particular in what touches the economic sphere. Bar-On thinks that all the experts should continue with their work, but no new ones should arrive until the situation clears up.

Notes

1. An unsuccessful coup took place in Ethiopia on December 14th, 1960, during Emperor Haile Selassie's visit to Brazil.
2. Makonen Habta Wald, the Ethiopian Minister of Trade, Industry and Planning.
3. Mikel Amde Dessalguen, the Ethiopian Minister of Information.
4. Ababa Aragay, the Ethiopian Head of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defence.
5. Andargatchew Messai, the Ethiopian Minister of the Interior.
6. The relations between Israel and Ethiopia did not suffer, and they returned to normal. Ethiopia recognized Israel *de jure* on October 24th, 1961, and agreed to raise the consulate in Addis Ababa to the level of an embassy. Ethiopia continued to be represented in Israel by a consul general.
7. The Israeli firm W.R.D. was drilling for water in that region.

495. Editorial Note

Relations Between Israel and Mauritania

Moktar Ould Daddah, the Prime Minister of Islamic Mauritania, declared several months before his country attained independence that its attitude towards Israel would be the same as that of the Arab and other Muslim countries, in other words, refusal to establish any sort of relations (*Ha'aretz*, 8.6.1960). Israel's efforts to change this attitude were unsuccessful, in spite of a number of meetings, some of them promising, with Mauritanian representatives.

496. Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 20 December 1960

Coded Tel. X923; Inc.: 130.09/2334/15

The Mission reports on a meeting with Mauritania's representative to the U.N. who announced in the name of his Prime Minister[2] that Mauritania appreciates Israel's position on their issue.[3] They are interested in regular relations with Israel but have to postpone their establishment until after their admission to the U.N. When asked by the Arab League on their attitude to Israel, they replied that there was nothing in Islam against having relations with Israel, while from the political point of view they did not think it was incumbent on them to adopt the doctrine of the League.[4] It was agreed to maintain contacts between the two countries both in New York and in Dakar.

Mauritania intends resubmitting its candidacy to the U.N. when the General Assembly reconvenes in March 1961. They do not expect a change in the position of Morocco[5] and the other Arab states,[6] but they do hope for a change in the position of the Soviet Union[7] as the result of pressure by the new African states which — according to the Mauritanian representative — will make their establishing relations with the Soviet bloc countries conditional on the Soviets removing their veto on Mauritania'a admission to the U.N.

Notes

1. Has not been found.
2. Mokhtar Ould Daddah, the Prime Minister of Mauritania.
3. Israel supported Mauritania's admission to the United Nations.
4. Mauritania joined the Arab League only in 1973.
5. Morocco opposed Mauritania's admission to the U.N., claiming that it was part of its territory.
6. The Arab states, except for Tunisia, supported Morocco's stand.
7. The Soviet Union vetoed Mauritania's admission to the United Nations, in retaliation for the West's opposition to the admission of Mongolia to the organization.
8. A conference of the bloc of 12 French speaking countries in West Africa.

497. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Statement in the Knesset on the Capture of Adolf Eichmann

D. Ben-Gurion announced in the Knesset on 23rd May 1960 that "a short time ago one of the greatest of the Nazi war criminals, Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible together with the Nazi leaders for what they called 'the final solution of the Jewish question'", namely the extermination of six million of the Jews of Europe, was found by the Israel Security Services. Adolf Eichmann is already under arrest in Israel, and will shortly be placed

on trial in Israel under the terms of the Law for the Trial of Nazis and their Collaborators, 1950. (*Divrei Ha-Knesset* [Knesset Reports, Hebrew], the 98th Session of the Fourth Knesset, 23.5.1960, p. 22.)

498. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 June 1960

Coded Tel. 278; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi reports to Yahil on his talk with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs,[1] in the presence of the Deputy Foreign Minister[2] and the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Minister said that the news reports, an investigation carried out by the police, and questions in Congress oblige the Government of Argentina to enquire of the Government of Israel whether Eichmann had been captured in Argentina. If this turns out to be the case, it would constitute a violation of international usage and Argentina would have to submit the strongest protest, the results of which could not be foreseen. This should not be construed as a threat, but Levavi must understand that the situation was very grave indeed.

Levavi promised to convey the Minister's words to his government, while stressing that he did not know where Eichmann had been captured, whether force had been used, or whether he had been persuaded by some means or other to deliver himself up. He added that an item in the Israeli press refuted the version of the *Time*[3] weekly claiming that Eichmann had been captured in Argentina.

Levavi points out that the Argentine government, which is in a weak position and under attack from a strong opposition, would have to sever its relations with Israel unless the fact of Eichmann's having been captured in Argentina is denied. The severance of relations will be a heavy blow to local Jewry and to Israel's standing in Latin America. He therefore suggests that he be empowered to state that Eichmann's capture by Israeli agents did not take place in Argentina. He requests Yahil to persuade Ben-Gurion, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, to approve his suggestion.

Notes

1. Diogenes Tabaoda, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. Miguel Angel Santano, the Argentinian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

3. Refers to a report in the *Time* magazine of June 1st, 1960, saying that "Israeli agents" had kidnapped Eichmann in Argentina.
4. El Al maintained no regular line to Buenos Aires, and a special flight brought the Israel delegation to the May 1960 celebrations of the 150th anniversary of Argentina's independence.

499. Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 June 1960

Coded Tel. 280; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

As requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[1] the Embassy transmits the text of the Argentine Foreign Minister's statement that he had summoned the Israel Ambassador to request an unequivocal statement from his Government on the Eichmann affair, and informed him that the Government of Argentina would take appropriate steps if it turned out that an act violating international and local law had been committed on Argentina's territory.

The Embassy also reports on the coverage by the local press, which gives various versions of the kidnapping, including that of the *Time* weekly;[2] it has also transpired that Eichmann's photograph, as appearing in the papers, is identical to that of a man by the name of Ricardo Clemens. Further, official sources have announced that an Israeli airplane had landed on May 19th, bringing the Israeli delegation to the 150th anniversary celebrations of Argentina's independence. The visitors' passports had been given a routine check and their names had not been noted down.[3] The plane's destination was unknown, as it was not common procedure to record the destination of departing aircraft.

Notes

1. Yahil's telegram to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, in which he requests them to cable the full text of the Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina.
2. See No. 498. n. 3.
3. See *ibid.*, n. 4.

500. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires. 3 June 1960

Coded Tel. 681; Outg.: 130.09/2295/1

Yahil instructs Levavi to meet the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and to transmit to him a *Note Verbale*, the gist of which is as follows:

The Government of Israel was unaware that Eichmann had come from Argentina. It only became clear following Levavi's report of his talk with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] It appears that Jewish volunteers, among them a number of Israelis, had been trying, from the end of the world war, to track down Eichmann, the principal agent in the mass murder of Europe's Jewry. Several months ago one of these groups had received information to the effect that Eichmann was hiding in Argentina under an alias, without the knowledge of the authorities, and that he was being aided by other Nazis living in this country. The searchers could not find out whether this was in fact true, but they did manage to establish that many Nazis were living in Argentina.

After having found Eichmann's address, where he was living under an assumed name, the searchers contacted him and asked him whether he was prepared to come to Israel and to stand trial. When he became convinced that his hideaway had been discovered, he requested 24 hours' delay, at the end of which period he expressed his willingness to stand trial in Israel and even wrote down his decision in German. The volunteers then escorted Eichmann out of Argentina and delivered him to the Israeli intelligence services. These informed the authorities on May 23rd that they had Eichmann in their hands, and the government then instructed the police and the legal adviser to take the necessary steps in preparation for the trial. It was only later that the government was informed that Eichmann had been brought from Argentina.

Yahil concludes with a personal message to Levavi, saying that it was a fact that the government had not known that Eichmann had been brought from Argentina until Levavi's meeting with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs. The intelligence services explained that Eichmann had been brought over from Argentina by a group of volunteers who had handed him over to the intelligence services.[4]

Notes

1. No. 498.
2. Gideon Hausner, the Attorney-General.
3. For the full text of the message, in Spanish, see File 93.32/2150/1. For the English translation, see U.N. Document S/4342, of 21.6.1960.
4. Levavi cabled that he had delivered the message to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with some oral clarifications. The Minister said he would reply only after he had perused the documents which, at first sight, did not seem to him satisfactory. The conversation was conducted in a calm atmosphere. (See Levavi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 284, 3.6.1960, 130/09/2245/2.

501. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 June 1960

Coded Tel. 295; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi suggests to Yahil that the Argentine ambassador to Israel, Garcia Arias, be summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked for his opinion on Ben-Gurion's sending a personal message to Argentine President Frondizi. The message would not add to the information already in hand, but it would be less official in tone and written in a more literary style. The Argentine Ambassador would be requested to transmit this question to his Government with the utmost urgency. Levavi explains that his proposal comes as a result of information he has received on the Argentine Government's reaction to the Israeli note.

Notes

1. See No. 500.
2. See No. 502.

502. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires. 8 June 1960

Coded Tel. 693; Outg.: 130.09/2295/1

Yahil informs Levavi that he had summoned the Argentine Ambassador in order to deliver to him a message from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to President Frondizi.[1] The Ambassador said he was afraid the fact of the message would leak to the press and thus the whole purpose of the message would be missed. He therefore requested that the message be transmitted through Levavi.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 501.
2. The full text of the message, in Spanish, is filed under 93.32/2150/1. For the English translation, see U.N. Document S/4342, 21.6.1960.

503. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 June 1960

Coded Tel. 299; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi reports to Yahil on his meeting with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, who gave him Argentina's reply to Israel's message of June 3rd dealing with the Eichmann affair.[1] Levavi comments that the contents of reply bear poor witness to the effectiveness of the Jewish and democratic pressure. It is known for a fact that a certain group demanded the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and another demanded Levavi's expulsion. Argentina has apparently given up the idea of imposing sanctions on Israel, but there is no guarantee that it would not revert to it. The Argentine President has hinted to a Jewish friend[2] that the tone of the press has to be moderated and that relations should be gradually returned to their normal state. Levavi remarks that he finds it difficult to estimate how far President Frondizi was sincere in what he said. Bringing the case to the International Court at the Hague is perhaps an easy way out, but the recall of the Argentine ambassador to Israel[3] signals the intention of maintaining tension simultaneously with legal proceedings.

The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs told Levavi that his government wished to stay on friendly terms with Israel, but that depended on Israel. Levavi adds that rumour has it that the Argentinians are working for his expulsion, and asks whether, in view of the Argentine ambassador's recall from Israel, it would not be appropriate for him also to leave Argentina, even if for a limited period of time.[5]

Notes

1. In its Note of June 8th, Argentina protested against the violation of its sovereignty and demanded Eichmann's return — after which Israel could request his extradition by legal means. Argentina declared that if Israel did not accede to its demands, the issue would be submitted to the United Nations. (The full text of the Note, in Spanish, is in File 93.32/2150/1. For the English translation, see No. 522 — Appendix A.)
2. Mariamo Weinfeld, political adviser to the President of Argentina.
3. Argentina recalled its ambassador from Israel — see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, telegram 707, 13.6.1960, 130.09/2295/1.
4. See No. 500, n. 4.
5. Yahil said that the top officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought Levavi should "remain on the bridge till the very end", and as to the reply to Argentina's Note — consultations were under way with the Prime Minister and others. (See his telegram to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, No. 695, 9.6.1960, 130.09/2295/1.)

504. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 June 1960

Coded Tel. 312; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi informs Yahil that he heard from President Frondizi's Jewish adviser[1] that the President had decided to terminate the dispute over the Eichmann affair. He wants the case to be brought to the U.N. and to be buried there in the archives. Nobody intends bringing Eichmann back to Argentina. Israel should reply in detail and with the utmost courtesy to Argentina's Note. The ambassador to Israel will most probably return there soon. The President would very much like to meet Mr Ben-Gurion in Paris. Levavi comments that the President has not yet been entirely convinced that he had been told the whole truth, but there are indications that he is coming around to that opinion. He therefore suggests that a courteous reply be drafted to the Argentine note,[2] that the meeting in Europe be set up, and that the campaign in the Israeli press against Argentina be put an end to.

Levavi comments that there are various versions about the Argentinian *volte-face*. It now appears that there had not been any public support of the anti-Israel campaign, except for a nationalist clique in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by the legal adviser, de Pablo Pardo. The President, who was facing a military coup, may have knuckled under to that group. Levavi concludes by saying, "Time will tell".

Notes

1. Mariamo Weinfeld — see No. 503.
2. See No. 506.

505. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 June 1960

Coded Tel. 315; 130.09/2295/2

Levavi reports to Yahil on his meeting with A. Scilingo, the President's diplomatic adviser.[1] The latter advised Israel not to employ delaying tactics, otherwise the nationalist clique in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could cause problems. He suggests that Ben-Gurion request de Gaulle to talk to Frondizi about the affair; it would be desirable for the French to propose a formula

based on Eichmann's remaining in Israel. Ben-Gurion will meet Frondizi in Belgium to agree on the formula or at least on possible ways of settling the problem, such as "good offices" of the French or any other method. The adviser said he could let Levavi know the President's reaction to these proposals within a few days.[3]

Levavi stresses that it would be for the best if Ben-Gurion raises the matter at his meeting with de Gaulle. There is also the question whether this move would have any effect on Israel's reply to the Argentine Note, on the date of its submission, and on its circulation at the United Nations. Perhaps it would be preferable not to circulate the Note among the members of the Security Council for the time being.

Notes

1. Adolfo Scilingo, diplomatic adviser to the President of Argentina.
2. In his telegram to Levavi, 703, 11.6.1960 (130.09/2295/1), Yahil says that Ben-Gurion would be happy to meet Frondizi in Europe, and supplies details of Ben-Gurion's schedules.
3. See No. 508.

506. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires and to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 12 June 1960

Coded Tel. 56-57; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Yahil addresses his telegram to Levavi and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in New York.

Yahil quotes from the telegram he had sent to Levavi, namely, that at the cabinet meeting of June 12th doubts were raised whether to reply at all to Argentina's Note of June 8th,[1] seeing that Ben-Gurion's message to President Frondizi[2] contained in effect Israel's main arguments. The opinion was voiced that perhaps Argentina would prefer the affair to be handled quietly, and a meeting between Frondizi and Ben-Gurion rather than a formal reply. Levavi is requested to cable his opinion, perhaps after consulting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs[3] or whoever he sees fit.

In order to make the decision easier for Levavi, Yahil transmits to him the draft of the reply [see Main Volume, pp. 811–813] and requests his comments.[4] The Minister of Foreign Affairs is informed that the draft was

decided on at the cabinet meeting, and that it will not be dispatched before Levavi's opinion is heard.[5]

Notes

1. See No. 503.
2. See No. 502.
3. Diogenes Tabaoda, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. In an interim reply, Levavi suggested waiting with the Note (see No. 507) and later expressed his opposition to the Note's submission (see his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 323, 13.6.1960, 130.09/2295/2). In the event, this Note was not submitted, and following the developments in the affair another Note was submitted in its place, its text appearing in No. 517.
5. Untraced.
6. See No. 503.
7. See No. 500.

507. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 June 1960

Coded Tel. 319; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi replies to Yahil's telegram[1] and expresses his satisfaction at having been consulted in the matter of Israel's reply. He remarks that the effect of the first Note was not entirely what had been expected, and he recommends waiting with the dispatch of the present reply. In his opinion, mediation by the French should not be insisted on, and the meeting between Frondizi and Ben-Gurion will not take place unless the matter is raised at the meeting between Frondizi and de Gaulle. In a lengthy conversation with the diplomatic adviser of the President Levavi did not succeed in dissuading him from abandoning the idea of mediation, but this obstacle can be circumvented, and the main thing is to avoid a crisis. He is informed that the President praised Ben-Gurion's letter. The affair should be terminated before the President returns home, otherwise the chances of coming to an agreement will be much less. He foresees danger in the activities of the Nazi officials among the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who will attempt to exploit the President's absence to sabotage any fair settlement.

Notes

1. No. 506.
2. No. 505.
3. A number of words have been omitted here.

508. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 June 1960

Coded Tel. 324; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi reports to Yahil that Frondizi's diplomatic adviser[1] told him the President agreed to the arrangement detailed in No. 505.[2] Frondizi and his entourage are leaving for Rome, and Levavi requests that the Israel ambassador there arrange the meeting in Brussels. He also requests that Ben-Gurion sound out de Gaulle as to whether the latter is prepared to persuade Frondizi to show understanding and moderation, and that Ambassador Eytan contact the Argentine ambassador in Paris[3] to attempt to draft an agreement to be signed in Brussels by Frondizi and Ben-Gurion. Levavi also suggests that Eytan sound out the French whether they would be willing to serve as the final arbiter in case no understanding is reached in Brussels. He stresses that Frondizi is not a free agent and that he has to take into consideration public opinion and the pressure of nationalist circles in his country.[4]

Notes

1. Adolfo Scilingo, diplomatic adviser to the President of Argentina.
2. No. 505.
3. Alejandro Ceballos, the Argentine Ambassador to France.

509. G. Meir (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 June 1960

Coded tel. NWT330; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Mrs. Meir addresses her telegram to Yahil in Jerusalem and Harman in Washington.

She reports on her talk with the Argentine representative to the U.N.,[1] who said that his instructions were to approach the Security Council unless Israel

agreed to make good the violation of their sovereignty. He also said that it may be possible to deliver Eichmann to their embassy in Israel, which is considered Argentine territory, where he would remain until an international body decided into whose hands he should be delivered.

Mrs. Meir said that Israel distinguished between the affront to Argentina, for which it has already apologized[2] and was ready to do so again, and the venue of Eichmann's trial. No compromise would be possible on the latter issue, the only appropriate place for the trial being Israel. She added that Israel would be prepared to take Eichmann to the Argentine embassy for a few minutes under the strict understanding that he would then be returned to Israel. The Argentine representative objected to that, and the meeting thereupon concluded.

Mrs. Meir adds that Cabot Lodge, the U.S. representative to the U.N., told Comay that if the issue is laid before the Security Council Israel would find itself isolated and the U.S. would have no choice but to side with Argentina. Mrs. Meir instructs Harman to take up this matter in Washington.

Notes

1. Mario Amadeo, Argentina's Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
2. In the first message sent by the government of Israel to Argentina — see No. 500.
3. Telegram 328 has not been found, while telegram 432 from Yahil to G. Meir and Comay says that paragraph 11 in Comay's telegram verges on the absurd, and that foreign representatives and pressmen would be allowed to attend the Eichmann trial as observers. (The telegram, dated 14.6.1960, is in File 130.09/2334/9.)
4. Untraced.

510. M. Comay (New York) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 June 1960

Coded Tel. NWT334; Inc.: 130.09/2339/23

Comay addresses his telegram to Yahil, to Harman in Washington, to Levavi in Buenos Aires, and to Eytan in Paris. He reports that Argentina's Permanent Representative to the U.N. has approached the Alternate President of the Security Council[1] with an official request to convene the Council for an urgent meeting, enclosing a detailed résumé of developments.[2] The subject on the agenda will be the violation of Argentina's sovereignty with the simultaneous infringement of international law and creation of an atmosphere of mistrust

and insecurity incompatible with keeping international peace. The Argentine representative also saw the Secretary-General of the U.N.

Comay has requested a meeting with the Secretary-General in order to request that Israel be invited to attend the sessions of the Security Council and to stress the urgency in convening the Council.

Notes

1. Tingfu Tsiang, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the United Nations.
2. See U.N. Document S/4336 of 15.6.1960.
3. Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion was at that time on a visit to France.

511. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations.[1] 16 June 1960

Coded Tel. 871; Outg.: 130.09/2295/1

Yahil today received Frondizi's reply to Ben-Gurion's letter,[2] the gist of which is as follows:

Frondizi understands the feelings of the Jewish people with regard to crimes ascribed to Adolf Eichmann. The Argentine Republic has demonstrated time and again its detestation of the crime of genocide and joined in its condemnation in international forums. At the same time, his government protests against an act constituting an infringement on its sovereignty. The very fundamentals of international co-existence will be in danger if they are not based on legal principles as accepted the world over. He points out that, in its letter of June 8th,[3] the government of Argentina proposed to give consideration to Israel's request in regard of Eichmann in the context of existing legal instruments, as soon as the latter is returned to Argentina. He hopes that the settlement of differences of opinion will assist in maintaining the friendly relations which should exist between the two peoples.[4]

Notes

1. Was cabled also to Buenos Aires and Paris.
2. See No. 502.
3. See No. 503 and n. 1 there.

4. The full text of President Frondizi's reply is found in File 93.03/3059/1; the English translation is found in File 130.23/3352/1.

512. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Mission in New York and the Embassy in Buenos Aires. 16 June 1960

Coded Tel. 452; Outg.: 130.09/2295/1

Yahil addresses his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Comay in New York and to Levavi in Buenos Aires.

Yahil quotes from a report by Darom,[1] head of the Latin America Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had been sent to Rome to arrange the meeting between Frondizi and Ben-Gurion. Darom met Weinfeld, Frondizi's Jewish adviser, and asked him whether there was any point in arranging the meeting after Frondizi had told journalists that he had heard about the planned meeting only from the press, and after Argentina had asked for an urgent debate at the Security Council.[2] Weinfeld repeated what he had said to Levavi, namely, that Frondizi was well aware of the impossibility of having Eichmann returned to Argentina, and that the President's purpose in approaching the Security Council was to have the affair shelved.[3] He also complained at not having received Israel's reply in the matter of the meeting for five whole days. Darom refuted these claims.

Weinfeld further claimed that the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in New York on the Eichmann affair had annoyed them, the Argentines, greatly, and that was the reason for their approaching the Security Council. Darom replied that he did not remember such a statement. He added that Ben-Gurion could not possibly go to meet Frondizi under the threat of the debate at the Security Council. However, if Argentina requests a postponement of the debate of its own initiative and does not insist on Eichmann's being returned to them, the idea of the meeting could still be discussed. Weinfeld said he understood Darom's explanations and assumptions, and promised to report on the talk with Frondizi and to contact Darom later on. Darom comments that there was no point in his meeting the Argentine Foreign Minister before Frondizi's position had been made clear; his impression is that the Minister of Foreign Affair opposes the idea of the meeting.

Yahil agrees with Darom's conclusions and recommendations. He told him that the possible advantages of giving the idea of the meeting full publicity were being discussed, and instructed him to enquire whether a secret meeting between Frondizi and Darom would not be advisable under the circumstances[6].

Notes

1. Seeing that both President Frondizi and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion were in Europe in June 1960, the idea came up to have them meet in order to solve the crisis in the relations between the two countries. Frondizi's first stop in Europe was Rome, and Avraham Darom, Director of the Latin America Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was accordingly sent there. He contacted there M. Weinfeld, President Frondizi's adviser. (Darom from Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12.6.1960, 130.09/2359/2.)
2. See No. 510.
3. See No. 504.
4. See No. 505.
5. See Yahil to the Embassy in Rome, telegram 574, 16.6.1960, 130.09/2359/1.
6. President Frondizi did not meet Darom, but at Darom's meeting with Weinfeld the latter told him, in Frondizi's name, the following: (1) Frondizi was willing to meet Ben-Gurion at any time and at any venue, but the initiative had to come from a third party — de Gaulle or the prime ministers of Belgium or Holland. (2) Owing to public opinion and the stance of the nationalist opposition, Argentina finds it difficult to request a postponement of the debate at the Security Council; however, if any member of the Security Council requests such a postponement, Argentina will not object. (3) Frondizi begs Israel to understand that Amadeo's uncompromising stand is aimed at satisfying the public opinion in Argentina, and Israel should not take it amiss. (4) Israel's defence at the Security Council must agree with the lines of Ben-Gurion's Note to Frondizi. (5) Israel is requested to put an end to the anti-Argentine propaganda in the press, especially in Argentina itself. (See Darom to Yahil and Eytan, telegram of 18.6.1960, 130.09/2359/2.)

513. I. Navon (The Hague) to Ch. Yahil. 22 June 1960

Coded Tel. HIA8; Inc.: 130.09/2304/3

Navon requests Yahil, in the Prime Minister's name, to instruct Levavi to deliver the reply Note immediately to the government of Argentina and to circulate it among the members of the Security Council.[2] The Prime Minister has instructed him to inform the press, when asked, that the idea of the meeting with Frondizi had not originated with him, but that he would be glad if it took place and was ready to meet the Argentine President.

Navon further adds: (1) At Ben-Gurion's press conference in Brussels[3] on June 21st, he repeated what he had told the reporter of *Le Monde*,[4] namely, that he would be glad to meet Frondizi, and that the trial of Eichmann would take place in Israel.

(2) The Argentine Ambassador in Brussels explained to Najar that the meeting was being put off because of Israel's Note to the Security Council.[5]

(3) Information has been received from Paris that there are differences of opinion in Frondizi's entourage, and that he has yielded to the pressure of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is clear that the Argentinians are disseminating various conflicting versions.

Notes

1. The meeting between Ben-Gurion and Frondizi was set for June 26th, but it was cancelled by the Argentinians after Israel had submitted its reply to the Security Council — see below, n. 5. (See Najar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram of 22.6.1960, 130.09/2301/5.)
2. See No. 506 and nn there. G. Meir opposed the Note's submission, and this was accordingly not sent to the Argentine government and not distributed to the members of the Security Council. (See Yahil to Navon, No. 110, 23.6.1960, 130.09/2304/2.)
3. Ben-Gurion said at the press conference that Eichmann would remain in Israel for the duration of his trial and, if found guilty — until he has served his sentence. (See the *Jerusalem Post*, 22.6.1960.)
4. Ben-Gurion told the correspondent of *Le Monde* that Israel would not release Eichmann but would guarantee that he had a fair trial. He would be able to hire foreign lawyers, even Germans, for his defence, on condition that they were not Nazis. Argentina's complaint to the Security Council, said Ben-Gurion, was groundless, and he expressed the hope of meeting Frondizi soon. (*Ha'aretz*, 21.6.1960.)
5. See No. 523 — Appendix B.

514. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 24 June 1960

Coded Tel. 446; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

Yahil sums up the debate at the Security Council on the Eichmann affair.[1] The speeches made by the Minister of Foreign Affair and others gave eloquent expression to the background of the affair — the destruction of European Jewry — and to the obligation to bring to trial Nazi criminals like Adolf Eichmann. The resolution adopted gave Argentina full satisfaction on the issue not contested by Israel — that the sovereignty of all countries should be respected. The interpretation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Israel's apology constituted the "appropriate reparation" required of it, was supported by several representatives, including the American one, and thus deprived the demand for Eichmann's repatriation and the punishment of his captors of international endorsement. There are grounds for hoping that this was the end of the affair in so far as it concerned Argentina, and that the way was

clear for implementing the final paragraph of the resolution — the promotion of good relations between Argentina and Israel.

Yahil suggests that no additional interpretations be given beyond what has been stated above, as further developments may be expected within a matter of days.

Note

1. The debate on the Eichmann case opened at the Security Council on June 22nd, 1960. The issue before the Council was Argentina's complaint that Israel had violated its sovereignty (see U.N. Document S/4336, dated October 15th). The Argentine representative said in the course of the debate that his country denounced the crimes committed by Eichmann, but these did not justify Israel's violation of the law. He asked the Council to declare that his country's sovereignty had been violated and that compensation for this act should be demanded, and requested the adoption of his draft resolution — No. 524 (Appendix C).
   Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Meir replied that Israel had not violated Argentina's sovereignty, but admitted that the Israeli citizens who had brought Eichmann to Israel had transgressed against Argentina's laws. Israel had already apologized for that act twice, and now it is extending its apologies yet again. Meir added that these transgressions should be seen in the context of the unique crimes of which Eichmann stands accused. In her opinion, Israel's apologies constitute adequate compensation as demanded by Argentina.
   The U.S. representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, came out in support of Argentina's draft resolution but said that the debate on this subject could not be separated from Eichmann's "monstrous" deeds. He proposed two amendments to the draft resolution, and said that, in America's opinion, the debate itself at the Security Council, the adoption of Argentina's proposal and the apologies tendered by Israel constituted adequate compensation to Argentina.
   The resolution ultimately adopted censured Israel for having kidnapped Eichmann and spirited him away from Argentina, and imposed on it the award of compensation to Argentina in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law — see No. 525 (Appendix D).

515. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 June 1960

Coded Tel. 361; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi reports to Yahil on his meeting with the Argentine acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. MacKay,[1] the Deputy Minister, and the Legal Adviser of the Ministry. He was asked about Israel's reply to Argentina's last Note[2] in

the light of the debate at the Security Council,[3] and when it could be expected. Levavi replied that he would transmit the questions to his government, and he thought Israel's reply would be available soon. At the same time he permitted himself to repeat the explanation given by Israel's and Argentina's friends at the Security Council, namely, that the appropriate reparation was already implicit in the resolution itself and in the apology tendered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the debate at the Council. The Argentine officials did not argue with Levavi. Further on Levavi said that he had an idea of his own, and that was the appointment of a committee of two or three from each side which could quietly solve all remaining issues, if any. The Argentinians agreed to that, but at the same time said that the proposed committee would not be a substitute for a reply by Israel.

Levavi recommends that Israel submit a courteous Note without indulging in argument with the Argentinian Note, stressing Israel's wish to maintain friendly relations with Argentina and to submit to the Security Council's resolution. The last paragraph of the Note should raise the proposal of the joint committee or, alternatively, this proposal could be submitted orally. Levavi concludes that in this way Israel could enable Argentina to save its face, and this would put an end to the Eichmann affair — the Nazi criminal remaining in Israel's hands and good relations with Argentina being restored.

Notes

1. Luis R. MacKay, the Argentinian Minister of Education, who deputized for the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was then accompanying President Frondizi on his tour in Europe.
2. See No. 503.
3. See No. 514.
4. See Levavi's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15.6.1960, 130.09/2295/2.

516. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 July 1960

Coded Tel. 372; Inc.: 130.09/2295/2

Levavi addresses his telegram to Yahil and refers to the announcement by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs[1] repeating Argentina's demand for the return of Eichmann. This announcement, which is said to have originated with Frondizi, caused a spate of rumours in various circles, including those

which had not been hitherto involved in the affair, but Levavi thought it had no practical significance.

The President's diplomatic adviser, who had been offended by the cancellation of the meeting between Frondizi and Ben-Gurion,[3] made some suggestions about the wording of Israel's reply to Argentina's Note in a similar vein to that which Israel was planning to adopt;[4] he also proposed that, simultaneously with the submission of the Note, the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs publish a declaration based om Israel's argumentation at the Security Council, namely, that Israel had the uncontestable right to refuse at that time to divulge the circumstances surrounding Eichmann's capture. Nevertheless, Israel did reply in detail to Argentina's query, owing to its friendship towards, and trust in, Argentina, and it expects the Argentine Government to take this attitude into account.

Notes

1. Refers to the statement by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs denying "rumours from foreign sources" as if Argentina considered Israel's apologies the "adequate compensation" mentioned in the Security Council's resolution. (See *Ha'aretz*, 26.6.1960.)
2. Monsignor Umberto Mozzoni, the Vatican's Nuncio in Argentina.
3. See No. 505.
4. See No. 506.

517. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires and to the Israel Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 3 July 1960

Coded Tel. 23–24; Outg.: 130.23/3352/2

Yahil addresses his telegram to Levavi, with a copy to the Foreign Minister in New York.

Levavi is cabling in clear the draft of the reply to Argentina's Note.[1] The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs should be informed simultaneously with its submission that the Note reflected the Israel Government's sentiments, in the hope that it would be accepted in a spirit of goodwill and this would put an end to the whole affair. If the Argentine Government should wish to give the understanding and the mutual wish for good relations a more demonstrative character, Israel would be happy to cooperate. The possibilities would be: a special visit by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Buenos Aires,

a meeting in a neutral locality, a joint communiqué, or any other form to be agreed upon. Should the Argentine government have any reservations touching the content of the Israeli Note, they are requested to make clear their position; an informal channel for that would also be acceptable. Further discussions could take place at any level or in any locality if Israel is informed of the subject to be discussed.[2]

Notes

1. For the final version in Spanish, as it was drafted in Buenos Aires and submitted to the Argentine government, see below. The English translation is found in File 130.23/3351/3.
2. Levavi delivered the Note to MacKay, who was then deputizing for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and supplemented the message orally as instructed by Yahil. The Ministry's reply was that they would have to study the Note and they would perhaps invite him to come again and receive their official or unofficial reply, as he would then prefer. Levavi said that Israel intended publishing the text of the Note. (See Levavi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5.7.1960, 130.23/3352/2.)

518. Editorial Note

The Argentine Government's Note to Israel of July 20th, 1960

A Note replying to Israel's Note of July 4th (see No. 517) was delivered by the Argentine Government on July 20th, the gist of which is as follows:

Following a review of the exchange of Notes and other contacts between the two governments on the Eichmann affair, the Note refers to the Security Council's resolution stating that Argentina's sovereignty had been violated and demanding that Israel extend to Argentina appropriate reparation in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law. The Note disputes the claim included in Israel's Note of July 4th referring to the interpretation given by Minister Meir in her speech at the Security Council, to which the representatives of the U.S., Britain and France also adhered, that Israel's apology tendered to Argentina constituted an "appropriate reparation". In refuting this claim, the Note quotes from the speeches of other representatives on the same occasion. The Note concludes by stating that Argentina does not consider Israel's apologies and proposed solutions as satisfactory, and therefore reserves to itself the right to take appropriate steps as it should think fit.

The Note also implies that Eichmann was transported from Argentina on

board the El Al plane which had brought Israel's delegation to the 150th anniversary celebrations of Argentina's independence.

(Full text of the Argentine Note is in File No. 93.32/2150/4; the accusations levelled at El Al were denied by the Israel Embassy in a communiqué to the local press — see Levavi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram of 20.7.1960, 130.09/2295/2. See also No. 520.)

519. A. Levavi (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 22 July 1960

Coded Tel. 404; Inc.: 130.23/3352/2

Levavi reports that he was very courteously informed that his presence was not welcome any more, and that he had to leave Argentina. Sh. Rosenne arrived immediately afterwards, to meet various personages, including Frondizi, and to hear from them that the controversy between the two countries was in effect over. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs also hinted that by making Levavi a scapegoat his government saw an improvement in relations possible in short time. He suggests that Rosenne meet everybody possible, that he listen to them, but that he himself not make any statements.

520. G. Rafael (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 23 July 1960.

Coded Tel. 499; Outg.: 130.09/2378/4

Rafael transmits the text of an announcement by the Government of Israel following Argentina's declaring Levavi *persona non grata*.[1] Israel expressed regret at this step by the Argentinians, as neither Levavi nor the embassy staff in Buenos Aires were guilty of any deed contrary to accepted diplomatic usage. Israel also denied any connection between its request to carry several medical and humanitarian cases on board the plane which was returning after having brought over the Israeli delegation to Argentina's anniversary of independence celebrations, and the Eichmann affair.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 519.
2. See Editorial Note, No. 518.
3. See *ibid.*

521. Sh. Rosenne (New York) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 8 August 1960

Copy: 130.23/3352/2

Rosenne reports on his mission to Argentina, the purpose of which was to come to an agreement with the authorities there on the termination of the tension between the two countries in the wake of the Eichmann affair.

When he arrived in Buenos Aires, he learned that Argentina had already declared Ambassador Levavi *persona non grata*. Rosenne thinks the Argentine government was so quick to act because it wanted to confront him and the Israel Government with a *fait accompli*. Following consultations with the staff of the Embassy, it was decided that no change would be made in Rosenne's original plans to meet L.M. de Pablo Pardo, the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to hear what he had to say and to report back home. This decision was based, *inter alia*, on various rumours and hints that the Argentine Government considered Levavi's recall as an "appropriate reparation" and that it regarded the affair as closed.

Rosenne's first meeting with Pardo took place on July 23rd, when Pardo indeed said that Levavi's recall was the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries. Argentina was worried about the complicated international situation and the spread of the cold war and preferred to avert avoidable conflicts. It would be possible to discuss the appointment of new ambassadors no later than in two months' time, the interval being necessary to calm down public opinion in Argentina. Pardo further asked whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs to pay a visit to Argentina later in the year, not for the purpose of offering more apologies but as a symbol of normalization of relations. He also suggested that the two countries issue a joint statement, to be drafted by himself and Rosenne. He also thought it best for Rosenne to meet President Frondizi, to hear from him at first hand about the termination of the conflict.

At his second meeting with Pardo, Rosenne said that Israel was prepared to regard the incident as closed on the lines suggested by Pardo, even though there was anger in Israel about Levavi's expulsion. The draft of the proposed

announcement was discussed, as was the visit of an official Israeli personage to Argentina. Pardo said they had had Ben-Gurion in mind, and Rosenne replied that the Prime Minister's agenda was full and that he did not often go abroad. Views were also exchanged on Rosenne's proposed courtesy visit to President Frondizi.

At the third meeting with Pardo, several versions of the proposed joint statement were discussed but none of them were to Rosenne's satisfaction; a rather noncommittal version was finally agreed upon (for the final version, see Main Volume, p. 836).

At the meeting with President Frondizi, the latter was full of complaints about Israel's actions, against the phrasing of its first Note, and against Levavi, who, he claimed, did not fulfil his role as ambassador as required. He said that he now saw the affair as closed and steps could at once be taken to renew the regular relations between Israel and Argentina. He then approved the joint statement by the two countries.

A number of other meetings later took place with Pardo, to deal, *inter alia*, with the drafting of the letter on the exchange of ambassadors. Following protracted discussions, Rosenne succeeded in persuading the Argentinians not to insist on a visit by Ben-Gurion as part of the settlement between the two countries.

Rosenne also met the leaders of the Jewish community there and thanked them for their dignified stance during the crisis between the two countries.

Notes

1. The first paragraph, dealing with Rosenne's travel arrangements, has been omitted here.
2. See Rosenne to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 761, 22.7.1960, 130.09/2323/4.
3. In Rafael's reports on his meetings with Colombo, Argentina's Chargé d'Affaires in Israel, Rosenne's mission to Buenos Aires is not mentioned. (See telegrams 809 and 813, 22.7.1960, 130.09/2295/1.)
4. See Rafael to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, telegram 824, 25.7.1960, 130.09/2295/1.
5. See No. 525 (Appendix D).
6. In 1959.
7. See Rafael to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, telegram 823, 25.7.1960, 130.09/2295/1.
8. See No. 500.
9. See No. 502.
10. Yosef Avidar, Israel's new Ambassador to Argentina, submitted his credentials on December 14th, 1960; Argentina's ambassador to Israel, Rogelio Rafael Tristany, submitted his credentials on December 21st, 1960.
11. See Rafael to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, telegram 839, 31.7.1960, 130.09/2295/1.
12. The 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (September–December 1960).

526. Ch. Yahil (Jerusalem) to Israel Missions Abroad. 6 January 1960

Coded Tel. 84; Outg.: 130.23/3356/2

Yahil instructs the missions in countries where antisemitic incidents had taken place to report immediately and in detail on the facts, the background, and the reactions of the authorities, the press, the population in general and the Jewish communities. The missions should not depend on press reports but should investigate the events themselves, and also find out whether prevailing opinions were that the incidents were organized and coordinated by an international centre.

At meetings with the authorities and with public figures the conversation should be directed to that subject and Israel's interest in all that happened in the Jewish diaspora should be stressed. The intention here is not to approach the authorities specially with these incidents in mind but to express Israel's interest within the framework of the usual contacts.

Close contacts should be maintained with the Jewish organizations, desecrated synagogues should be visited and prayed in and these visits should be given full publicity. In countries where antisemitic incidents did not take place, the mission should report on their impact on the local public. A special telegram is being sent on the debate held in the Knesset on that subject.

Note

1. See No. 527.

527. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to Israel Missions Abroad. 7 January 1960

Coded Tel. 85; Outg.: 130.23/3356/2

Tsur instructs the missions abroad to deliver to the local governments *Notes Verbales* stressing the deep shock caused to the public in Israel by the manifestations of antisemitism and by Nazi symbols appearing as graffiti in various countries. The note should include quotations from the speech delivered by the Minister of Justice in the Knesset on January 5th,[1] and should conclude with an expression of the mission's conviction that the government in question will devote appropriate attention to this problem.

Tsur requests that the missions report on execution as instructed.[2]

Notes

1. See *Divrei Ha-Knesset* [Knesset Reports, Hebrew], First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 247–248.
2. See Nos 531 and 532.

528. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to Israel Missions Abroad. 8 January 1960

Coded Tel.; Outg.: 130.23/2378/3

Further to the instructions dispatched in No. 527, Tsur wishes to make it clear that the *Notes Verbales* should not be considered expressions of protest, nor are they directed at any particular country, but are intended to convey to the respective governments information on Israel's reaction to the events. Thus they do not constitute intervention in the respective states' internal affairs (this is to allay in advance any misgivings local Jews might have on that point). However, the note should clearly state that Israel cannot remain indifferent to the lot of Jews wherever they may be.

Note

1. No. 527.

529. Press Release by the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. 11 January 1960

Note

1. The matter was debated at the Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in January 1960, whose recommendations were approved in the plenum of the Commission on Human Rights on March 16th, 1960 — see No. 533 (Appendix A.)

530. J. Tsur (Jerusalem) to A. Harel. 24 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3356/2

In reply to Harel's letter,[1] Tsur informs him that Israel's circular dealing with manifestations of antisemitism was accepted with understanding and the countries concerned gave satisfactory replies[3] (except for South Africa, which regarded the circular as interference in its internal affairs).

Israel has no reliable information on the originators of these incidents, but from reasonable assumptions[4] the following picture emerges: there are the remains of a Nazi antisemitic organization in Germany, and there are elements, especially among the youth who had not experienced the Hitler era, which have absorbed the Hitlerite ideology. These elements could be responsible for the first incidents in Cologne and in other cities. Latent antisemitism exists in most countries the world over, but within isolated groups only. This, however, added to the propensity for imitation, is enough for swastikas to be scrawled on walls, for synagogues to be desecrated, and for other similar manifestations. There is no confirmation of the report that the Nazi centre in Cairo, headed by van Leers, had a hand in these happenings, nor of the claim that these incidents had been instigated by the Arabs. Nor does the responsibility lie with the communists and the East Germans, as claimed by several of West Germany's leaders; but there is no doubt that these agents exploited the incidents after they had taken place.

The conclusion is that the present wave of antisemitic incidents, though limited in extent, can prove a real threat in the future, because its manifestations the world over prove that antisemitism is alive and only waiting for the right moment to raise its head again.

This concern for the future should be given expression in diplomatic conversations, and interlocutors should be warned against false tranquillity.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See, for instance, the circular by the acting Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Antisemitism and the Arabs" (13.1.1960, 130.23/3356/2), and "Information for Israel Missions Abroad" No. 10, "On the Antisemitic Manifestations in Germany" (31.1.1960, 130.23/3356/1).
3. See Nos. 531 and 532.
4. Ben-Gurion also spoke on this matter when he said in the Knesset on January 20th, 1960: "...We have instructed one of our services which has the means to do it, to investigate in various countries in Europe and in America... whether there is any international organization responsible for this... I cannot guarantee success, but efforts are being made to uncover this body". See *Divrei Ha-Knesset* [Knesset Reports, Hebrew], First Session of the Fourth Knesset, Vol. XXVIII, 20.1.1960, p. 421.

   And these are the results of this investigation: there is no international antisemitic or neo-Nazi organization; there are old-established Nazi and neo-Nazi groups and

local antisemitic organizations operating openly or clandestinely. These await every opportunity for action. There is sporadic cooperation between these groups and their counterparts in other countries. The centre of the neo-Nazi activity is in Europe, but dangerous activity also takes place in South America. (See I. Harel, *Security and Democracy* [Hebrew], p. 299.)

5. A suburb of East Berlin, the seat of the government offices of the German Democratic Republic — East Germany.

531. A. Gefen (Jerusalem) to Israel Missions Abroad. 25 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3356/2

The missions are informed of the replies received to Israel's circular on antisemitic incidents. The reply from Bolivia should be singled out, as it did not originate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but from the Interior Ministry; information in Israel's possession makes it the only country where the Arab communities and the Arab states' missions have been openly accused of lending a guiding hand to antisemitic manifestations.

Notes

1. See No. 527.
2. For countries whose response is not mentioned — it either was never received or was received later — see No. 532.
3. Rodolfo Garcia Arias, the Argentine Ambassador to Israel.
4. E.H. Louw, the South African Minister of External Affairs.
5. Katriel Salmon, the Israeli Minister to South Africa.
6. German D. Vergera, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs.
7. Eric de Carbonnel, Secretary-General (= Director-General) of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8. Joel Bar-Romi, the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in Havana.
9. Ra'anan Sivan, the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires in Canada.
10. John George Diefenbaker, the Canadian Prime Minister.

532. A. Gefen (Jerusalem) to Israel Missions Abroad. 31 January 1960

Copy: 130.23/3356/2

Additional replies to Israel's circular on antisemitic incidents are transmitted.

Notes

1. No. 531.
2. Raul Porras Barenechea, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. José Ricardo Cordova, the Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4. Arie Aroch, the Israel Ambassador to Sweden.

534. Résumé of a Meeting at the Jewish Agency[1] (Jerusalem, 6 January 1960)

130.23/3329/27

J. Herzog opened by pointing to the lack of clarity in assessments of the situation and in the resulting guidelines, which adversely affected activities in the United States. There was lack of coordination between the various Jewish organizations.[2] He recommended a meeting with the King of Morocco[3] for clarification, and the exertion of pressure on the political instead of on the bureaucratic level, as had been the usage hitherto.

J. Tsur, the acting Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed with the demand for a consensual assessment of the situation, but added that this would become available within two or three months, and would be based on surveys being conducted at that very time. He described the process of the deterioration in the situation of Morocco's Jews, and demanded that a member of the staff of the Consulate General in New York be entrusted with coordinating relevant activities in the United States.[4]

M. Gazit, the Director of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' bureau, denied that there were differences of opinion in assessing the situation, and argued that there was unanimity in regarding immigration to Israel as essential to the Jews of Morocco. In his opinion, a clear demarcation should be made between the functions of the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency, on the one hand, and other Jewish organizations,[5] on the other hand. He added that the embassies in Paris and London should have more tasks entrusted to them.[6]

After other participants had had their say, Shragai summed up the debate as follows:

(1) The most urgent issue is that of coordination between the various Jewish organizations.

(2) The importance of the meeting with the King of Morocco should not

be overestimated, but he agreed that it should be set up. Attempts in that direction have not yet met with success, owing to the fact that there was no Jewish personage adequately qualified for that except for Dr Goldmann, and the King apparently did not wish to meet him at all. One must keep looking for another person.[7]

(3) It would be best if the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency, and no other Jewish bodies, dealt with the situation of the Moroccan Jews — as long as coordination in that field, and a clear-cut division of functions, has not been agreed on.

Regarding a consensual assessment of the situation, this can be achieved when all the agents have sat down together at the joint institution. Three trends can be already identified:

(1) The Moroccan authorities oppose emigration of Moroccan Jews to Israel.

(2) They are acting to cut off Moroccan Jewry from the rest of world Jewry.

(3) There are no prospects of Moroccan Jews being able to advance up the social ladder.

Notes

1. The meeting on the immigration from Morocco took place in the office of Sh.Z. Shragai, head of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency; J. Herzog, Minister in the Embassy in Washington, was then on home leave. Those participating were officials of the Jewish Agency and civil servants dealing with the issue.
2. Nahum Goldmann, President of the Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress, favoured a conciliatory attitude towards the Moroccan authorities in all that concerned their treatment of the Jews, and minimized the importance of the steps intended to deliver the Moroccan Jewry. Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir and Sh.Z. Shragai, on the other hand, were for organizing large-scale emigration from Morocco, involving as it might an open confrontation with the authorities. They also favoured a liberal policy in all that concerned selection of the immigrants. (See A. Harel, *Security and Democracy* [Hebrew], p. 309.)
3. Muhammad V, King of Morocco from 1957 to 1961; he previously bore the title of "sultan".
4. Shimshon Arad, Consul in Israel's Consulate General in New York, was entrusted with this task.
5. In 1955, an Israeli state agency established branches in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, which were called "the framework". Their function was to train the Jewish communities in self-defence. After emigration from Morocco was banned in 1956, the Moroccan branch was instructed to organize also the (illegal) emigration. (See A. Harel, *Security and Democracy* [Hebrew], pp. 304 and 306.)
6. The Ambassadors to France (Jacob Tsur) and to Britain (Eliahu Elath) vacated their

posts in 1959. Their replacements (Walter Eytan to France and Arthur Lourie to Britain) were appointed only in 1960.

7. No meeting between King Muhammad V and any Jewish personality took place before the former's death at the beginning of 1961.

535. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni and M. Carmil. 6 January 1960

Coded Tel. 545; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1

Bendor reports that the Rumanian authorities have begun to issue emigration permits to Jews for various countries, but not for Israel. Those who apply for a permit to another country can expect a positive answer within a month, the permit being valid for six months from the date of issue. A number of Jews have already applied for emigration permits to countries like France, Switzerland, Austria, Britain and West Germany. In all the cases investigated by the Legation, these people said that their final destination was Israel. Several Jews have requested the Legation to help them in obtaining visas for the countries named, and foreign diplomats have been asking the Legation staff for guidelines. Most of the applicants will not be granted visas without the Legation's help.

Bendor is wondering about the authorities' possible objective in taking this step, and mentions a number of possibilities: (1) To facilitate emigration without angering the Arabs. (2) To ensnare the Jews and expose them to possible accusations of attempting to flee the country and to sabotage the unification of families. Bendor has no satisfactory answer to these questions.

Bendor also guesses at possible future scenarios, as follows:

(1) A reasonable number of Jews will be enabled to leave the country in this way, thus making up the hundreds mentioned by Deputy Prime Minister Bodnaras.[4] (2) A growing number would be permitted to leave for other countries, and the number of permits for Israel will be accordingly reduced. (3) When the Jews have recognized the possibility of a short cut, hundreds and perhaps thousands of applications will be submitted. (4) Many of the putative immigrants to Israel will fall out by the way, and many Jews will remain in Europe.

Bendor comments here that in cases (2) and (3) the unification of families will become pointless; as to case (4), this does not worry him because as soon as this phenomenon assumes serious dimensions the countries of Europe will stop issuing transit visas.

Bendor wishes to raise some questions touching foreign governments and Rumanian Jews:

(1) Should foreign governments be approached in their capitals and asked to grant visas to Rumanian Jews? Should visas be granted to whoever expresses his wish to emigrate or undertakes to do so, or only to those who have already submitted their applications? Should the Legation deal with this problem locally, that is, negotiate on every single case and ascertain whether the applicant is serious in stating his wish to go to Israel?

(2) Can the Legation avoid answering questions put to it by Jews on this subject?

(3) Can the Legation refuse help to Jews wishing to obtain visas to other countries?

(4) Can financial aid be extended to Jews who plan to reach Israel by way of another country?

Bendor remarks that if the Legation helps even five Jews to obtain visas to other countries, the number of applicants demanding the same aid will grow steadily.

Notes

1. In his telegram (dated 5.1.1960, 130.09/2297/9) Shimoni asked the Legation in Bucharest whether and in what way Israel should approach friendly states with the request to be liberal with issuing visas to Rumania's Jews should they decide to emigrate. He quoted Shaul Avigur, head of the state agency handling immigration from Eastern Europe, who had said that the Jews should not be encouraged to approach these countries, but neither should they be impeded or dissuaded from doing so.
2. In their telegram of 4.1.1960 (130.09/2298/1) Bendor and Carmil say that they do not understand the Rumanians' objective in authorizing indirect immigration, and that this raises a number of queries, the principal one being: should Israel request other countries to grant immigrant or residential visas to the Jews with the assumption that Israel is their final goal and that the state of Israel will arrange for their transport there? The worry is that if the Jews know that applying to other countries can "bring salvation nearer" then the number applying for visas to Israel will fall off. On the other hand, discouraging them from such a step could prevent their leaving when allowed to do so. According to Shimoni's telegram to the Minister in Bucharest (621, 6.1.1960, 130.09/2297/9), the issue was brought before Ben-Gurion (who deputized for the Minister of Foreign Affairs during her trip to Africa) who decided that a number of countries should be approached and requested to facilitate the issue of visas — this in opposition to Avigur, who thought doing nothing was best.
3. In this telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6.1.1960, 130.09/2298/1) Bendor disagreed with Avigur (see nn 1 and 2 above). Bendor's view ultimately prevailed.
4. At a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest on November 7th, 1959, Bodnaras told Bendor that "several hundred" Jews would shortly be allowed to leave Romania. (See Bendor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 352, 8.11.1959, 130.09/2297/13.)

536. J. Prato (Athens) to M. Fischer. 19 February 1960

Orig.: 130.23/3346/1

Prato reports on his meeting with Bitsios, head of the Middle East Division in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom he had approached on the possibiity of planes carrying Rumanian Jews being permitted to stop over on the way to Israel. Prato said that the previous year the authorities had facilitated the transit of immigrants from Rumania, who numbered a few dozen; however, should their number increase and the Rumanian authorities request permission for their landing in unscheduled flights, Israel would request Greece to give this matter favourable consideration.

Bitsios replied that he had not heard of such a request so far, and promised to find out and inform Prato accordingly.

Three days later Prato was informed that the Greeks had agreed to allow additional daily flights from Rumania up to February 24th.[2] He thought this was in answer to his request, but when he telephoned Bitsios to thank him, the latter said he had some bad news for him: the Greek Government had decided to limit the number of visas to Jews from Rumania. He did not mention the flights at all. At a second meeting which took place at Prato's request, Bitsios said that the Arabs had approached the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protested strongly against the granting of the transit visas. The Ministry then instructed the Greek Ambassador in Bucharest to limit the number of transit visas and not to have them exceed the number granted the previous year. Prato comments here that he had the impression Bitsios was less than sincere. Bitsios also said that the Ministry's decision was not the result of Arab pressure but part of a policy designed to win over the Arabs to the side of the West in the bid for supremacy against the Soviets in the Middle East. Bitsios also stressed that the route through Greece had not been entirely closed, and that there were alternative ways out of Rumania. In any case, he promised to raise the matter again with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Averoff-Tossizza, and to transmit to him Israel's arguments. Bitsios did not refer to the additional flights at all, and Prato did not press him on that point because a temporary arrangement had in the meantime been worked out and planes from Rumania kept arriving with no hindrance.

Notes

1. The telegram summarizing the subject matter of the present document is in File 130.09/2293/7.
2. For the telegram, see *ibid.*

3. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prato met him unltimately — see No. 538.

537. G. Meir (Jerusalem) to the Israel Missions Abroad. 22 February 1960

Coded Tel. 189; Outg.: 130.09/2378/3

The Minister of Foreign Affairs draws the attention of the heads of missions to the reports in the press on the immigration from Rumania and hopes for its increase.[1] She stresses that it is incumbent on them to prevent the publication of such reports, and instructs them to meet the press and tell them about the agreement for the unification of families, pointing to the need to avoid publicity about this process. The manner of implementing this instruction is left to the heads of the missions.

Notes

1. The immigration from Rumania, which was on the increase from August–September 1958, was temporarily stopped in February 1959. This came about because of pressure by the Arabs exerted following statements made by Israeli leaders on the benefits Israel was deriving from the immigration. The Rumanian authorities resumed issuing emigrant visas at the beginning of 1960, but they represented this step as a process of the unification of families for humanitarian reasons, and demanded that Israel refrain from giving publicity to this arrangement.

538. J. Prato (Athens) to Y. Shimoni. 28 February 1960

Coded Tel. 121; Inc.: 130.09/2293/7

Prato reports on his meeting with Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff-Tossizza,[1] following his previous meeting with Bitsios on the subject of the transit of immigrants to Israel from Rumania through Greece.[2]

Prato reviewed the subject, and mentioned, *inter alia*, that in 1956–57 Nasser expelled many Jews from Egypt and encouraged them to go to Greece, knowing full well that they would find their way to Israel. The Minister confirmed that there had been approaches by the Arabs on this subject, and asked about the present number of immigrants and estimates for the future. Prato replied that he could not answer the second question, but

requested that the Greek Government not curtail the present flow of traffic, either by rail or by daily flights. The minister replied that he well understood the humanitarian aspect of the issue and promised to give the matter further consideration in order to find an acceptable solution.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 536.
2. See No. 537.
3. The Rumanian national airline.
4. Prato met Averoff-Tossizza again on March 7th, 1960, and again came out empty-handed (see his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 136, 7.3.1960, 130.09/2293/7). Nor was G. Meir's talk with the Greek diplomatic representative in Israel more successful (see Shimoni's telegram to the missions in Athens and Bucharest, 202, 1.3.1960, 130.09/2378/3). It was only in May 1961 that the Greek Embassy in Bucharest was instructed to issue an unlimited number of visas (see the Legation in Bucharest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 896, 22.5.1961, 130.23/3346/3).

539. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni. 3 March 1960

Coded Tel. 714; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1

A meeting has been arranged for Bendor with the Rumanian Prime Minister.[1] He fears the meeting will be confined to matters of protocol, yet he wishes to be able to raise the subject of immigration and the local employees in the Legation.[2] He suggests that he be empowered to transmit a message from Ben-Gurion expressing appreciation of the Rumanian government's understanding of the problem of the reunification of families. A special request should be added, if possible, touching the local Jews now in prison.

Notes

1. Chivu Stoica, Head of the Council of Ministers (= Prime Minister) of Rumania.
2. Local Jews employed at Israel's Legation who had been arrested by the Rumanian authorities. See also No. 548.
3. See No. 540.

540. Y. Shimoni (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest. 4 March 1960

Coded Tel. 18; Outg.: 130.09/2297/10

Shimoni refers to Bendor's request to furnish him with a message from Ben-Gurion to the Rumanian Prime Minister.[1] The message will express appreciation of the humanitarian attitude evinced by the Rumanian Government and of the renewal and increased rate of unification of families, and also the hope that it will go on growing. He leaves it to Bendor to decide whether to add in his own name that Israel was making every effort to prevent undue publicity, and that cooperation on that point, especially touching the means of transport, would be helpful. The matter of the local employees[2] must not be included in the message, but Bendor could raise it orally if the conversation takes an appropriate turn.

Notes

1. No. 539.
2. See *ibid.*, n. 2.

541. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni. 6 March 1960

Coded Tel. 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: The situation of Rumanian Jews is good, as confirmed by Orbach[2] when visiting Rumania. There is however a humanitarian problem, and the Rumanian Government's policy is to facilitate the unification of families. There is no agreement between Israel and Rumania, and thus no room for cooperation between them with regard to emigration. The local employees have broken the law and have confessed to their crimes. He was prepared to review the various cases and to see what could be done about them. Staff of the Israel Legation distribute money and gather information, perhaps to pass it on to foreign services. The distribution of money by the Legation and chauvinist propaganda have brought most of the Jews to sell off their movables and stop working. Just as the government has not tolerated antisemitism in its country, so it will not tolerate chauvinist Zionist propaganda. "Let the people return to their work and resume their

regular lives." The émigrés from Rumania are members of the bourgeoisie and the World Jewish Congress exploits them for imperialistic ends and for propaganda against Rumania. The Israeli press has also raised the Arab world against Rumania. When Bendor handed Ben-Gurion's message to him, he said "Thank you", and nothing else.

Notes

1. See No. 540.
2. Maurice Orbach, former Member of Parliament (Labour) and member of the Executive Committee of the British Branch of the World Jewish Congress.
3. Stoica also argued that there was no Jewish problem in Rumania and there was no reason for Jews to leave the country (see Bendor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to M. Carmil, telegram 723, 6.3.1960, 130.09/2298/1).

542. M. Erell (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 April 1960

Coded Tel. 738; Inc.: 130.09/2313/12

Erell reports on his meeting with Hamilton of the Department of State on the subject of the passage of immigrants from Rumania through Greece.[1] Hamilton said that his department has decided not to intervene in this matter.[2] According to Hamilton, the Greeks are anxious about the well-being of the Greek community in Egypt, and therefore the Department of State has decided that their intervention would be "inappropriate".

Notes

1. See No. 538.
2. Erell had talked with Hamilton on two previous occasions, with no results (see his telegrams to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NWT46, NWT49, 1.4.1960, 5.4.1960, both filed under 130.09/2313/2.

543. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon. 9 May 1960

Coded Tel. 999; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2

Bendor comments that the last six months' developments tend to show that the Rumanian authorities have decided to allow emigration in numbers and in methods which would not attract too much attention. This can be concluded from a series of steps and events which enable emigration to proceed in small numbers, by air through Greece and Austria and by rail to Austria and Yugoslavia. In April, for example, 425 people left Rumania, half of them by air. The situation as regards indirect emigration[3] is not better than that of direct emigration, and most of the applications are rejected. Many Jews, about a hundred a day, come to the Legation unhindered; there is no logical explanation for this liberality, seeing that the Legation's staff are under continuous observation.

Notes

1. When emigration from Rumania was temporarily stopped — see No. 537, n. 1.
2. The Bucharest airport.
3. See No. 535.
4. Urged by Israel, people of international standing often approached the Rumanian representatives and also Rumanian personalities visiting abroad and pressured them to act for the resumption of Jewish emigration from their country — see No. 544.

544. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon. 11 May 1960

Coded Tel. 8; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2

Bendor remarks that at the present rate of emigration the exodus of Rumania's Jews will take some fifty years. Efforts should be made to increase the rate and to rescue the maximum number of Jews as long as the present liberal policy lasts. The ban on publicity should be re-examined. Pressure must not be relaxed at any possible point. "Pressure groups" of well known artists and scientists should be organized to persuade the Rumanian authorities to issue emigration permits to all who have applied. These groups should be supplied with instances of people whose applications had been rejected, but no names should be mentioned for obvious reasons. Israel, says Bendor, will be sinning against thousands of Jews if it does not exploit all possible ways to help them emigrate.[2]

Notes

1. Rumania's National Day.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that publicity could put an end to the emigration, and therefore they opposed Bendor's suggestion about publicizing it in the press. His other recommendations were approved. (See Gideon to the Legation in Bucharest, telegram 162, 15.5.1960, 130.09/2297/10.)

545. Y. Vered (Paris) to Y. Meroz. 11 July 1960

Copy: 93.02/941/6

Vered comments that, though most of the attention is now directed at the Jews of Morocco, the time has come to put on the agenda the problem of Algeria's Jews. There are some 150,000 Jews in Algeria enjoying full rights, in accordance with the Crémieux decree.[1] Algeria will most probably attain independence in a year's time, and then the Jews' special status will be abolished. They will also suffer because they had helped the French against the Algerian nationalists.

Algeria's Jews are still free to come and go, therefore Vered proposes to shock them out of their complacency and motivate them to save themselves and their property. Representatives of Israeli economic firms should therefore be dispatched to Algeria to propose investments in Israel to the well-off sectors, and plans should be made for absorption of the others because successful absorption will encourage further emigration.[2]

Notes

1. The decree, issued in 1870, bestowed French citizenship on Algeria's Jews.
2. Meroz replied that the issue should be clarified at a high level with the French government. At this stage, no action wss necessary by Vered or by the Embassy in Paris. (See Meroz's letter to Vered, 5.9.1960, 93.02/941/6.)

546. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon. 19 July 1960

Coded Tel. 196; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2

Bendor reports on his meeting with E. Majincescu (spelling uncertain),[1] one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The latter protested

against the activities of the Legation's staff who create the impression among the hundreds of applicants that the Legation played a role in the implementation of Rumania's policy of the reunification of families. He requests that this activity be stopped, as it goes beyond accepted diplomatic usage. He also protested against the staff's visits to synagogues being exploited for propaganda for emigration, against the distribution of money among inimical circles, and against other activities contrary to diplomatic usage. The administrative body of the Jewish community has received complaints from Jewish citizens about these actions, and has therefore decided to designate one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff, who are requested to refrain from visiting other synagogues.

Bendor replied that the Legation is open to all, and the applicants are advised that the decision in their case rests with the Rumanian government. As to visits to synagogues, Bendor rejected the accusations and stressed that the bounds imposed on the Legation's staff contravened diplomatic usage. Following further discussion, it was agreed that the designation of one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff should be considered as a wish expressed by the directive body of the Jewish communities in Rumania, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends that the Legation's staff honour that request.

Notes

1. E. Majincescu, one of the deputies of the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. On a former meeting with Majincescu on the same subject, see Bendor to Gideon, telegram 161, 7.7.1960, 130.09/2298/2.

547. Y.L. Gideon (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest. 18 August 1960

Coded Tel. 247; Outg.: 130.09/2297/10

Gideon reports on the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with Manu, Rumania's Minister to Israel. Mrs. Meir expressed her appreciation of the continuing process of reunification of families, and stressed Israel's desire to have good relations with Rumania, and to develop and improve them further. She said she had viewed with the utmost seriousness the limitation imposed on the Legation staff's visits to synagogues,[1] but she understood the issue had now been resolved.[2] She also expressed regret at the expulsion of Israeli diplomats, and declared that there was not a particle of truth in the

accusations levelled at them.[3] As to so-called propaganda for immigration, it was entirely superfluous; those who do not wish to immigrate to Israel will not be influenced by any propaganda. She also declared that it was only natural that Jews should have ties with Israel and show interest in that country.

Manu replied that he was happy to hear of Israel's desire for good relations with Rumania. He also received with satisfaction the Minister's declaration that Israel's representatives do not indulge in prohibited activities, however his government was presumably in possession of reliable information when it acted as it did. He did not deny the Minister's statement that the synagogue crisis had ended. He said he had no complaints and had not transmitted any to Bucharest.

Notes

1. See No. 546.
2. Bendor's talk with Rumanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dumitrescu (spelling uncertain) took place on August 17th. Bendor's impression was that his interlocutor had no clear idea of what Bendor had been told by Majincescu (see No. 546 above). Bendor suggested that the Minister of Foreign Affairs inform Manu that she had been gratified by hearing also from Dumitrescu that there was no ban on visiting the synagogues, and that she declare that Israel's representatives could pray wherever they wished. (See Bendor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegrams 277–278, 17.8.1960, 130.09/2298/3.)
3. Two of the Legation's staff had been lately declared *personae non gratae* and had been expelled from Romania.
4. An international conference on the role of science in the advancement of new states was held at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot in August 1960.

548. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon. 28 September 1960

Coded Tel. 389; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3

Bendor reports on his meeting with Bodnaras, one of the Rumanian Deputy Prime Ministers. The latter stated as follows:

Eighty-eight Zionist activists have been released from jail and permitted to emigrate to Israel. The rate of emigration, which is now some 200 a week, may increase shortly. The authorities are now considering the possibility of transporting the emigrants by way of Turkey. Further to Bendor's talk with Prime Minister Chivu Stoica, Bodnaras accused some of the staff of the

Legation of posing as representatives of Rumanian Jewry, and of offering aid in exchange for information on Rumania. Bendor rejected these accusations.

Bodnaras advised Bendor to follow the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the visits to synagogues. When Bendor protested, he said that that was only his recommendation, and that the visits encourage those who oppose emigration to Israel. "What do you want", he asked, "to pray or to exhibit yourselves?" Bendor replied that if the Legation's staff absent themselves from synagogues where they used to pray, it would only cause a scandal in Rumania and in other countries the world over, and the present routine should be kept to in order to maintain the present tranquillity. Bodnaras then advised the Legation staff not to make themselves overly conspicuous in the synagogues.

Notes

1. E. Bodnaras, one of the Rumanian deputy prime ministers.
2. See No. 539 and n. 2 there.
3. At a reception on the Rumanian National Festival Day, Bodnaras said that emigration would continue in spite of the pressure exerted by the Arabs. (See Bendor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram 298, 24.8.1960, 130.09/2298/3.)
4. See No. 541.
5. See No. 546.
6. The largest and most important synagogue in Bucharest.
7. The second synagogue in importance in Bucharest, called after Rabbi Leib ben Yehiel Michal, a rabbi and writer who officiated in Bucharest from 1866 to 1871.
8. Presumably those arrested because of their Zionist activities.

549. A. Dagan[1] (Jerusalem) to the Israel Envoys Abroad. 14 December 1960

Stencilled circular: 130.23/3346/3

Guidelines are transmitted to the envoys for meetings with their Rumanian opposite numbers or with Rumanian personages visiting the envoys' countries of residence. These guidelines are also intended for any other Israelis meeting Rumanian persons.

Some 100,000 Jews are estimated to have registered for emigration to Israel during 1958, but a sudden stoppage in emigration occurred in February 1959, and as a result some 15,000 applicants, who had sold their apartments and all their effects in preparation for leaving the country, were left with no means of subsistence. Israel made every effort to have the emigration

resumed, and thus in November 1959 emigrants began arriving, at first in their dozens, and then in their hundreds. The Rumanians describe this process as "unification of families".

When meeting Rumanians, their humanitarian approach should be praised, but at the same time the slow rate of emigration should be commented on. Censure should also be levelled at the mass dismissals from work, the expulsion of students from their schools and universities, and other mistreatment of the applicants for emigration. Many families have been split as the result of the sudden stoppage of emigration; some have already been reunited, but many others are still waiting for their emigration permits. There are also new similar cases, each of which is a personal tragedy. Attention should also be drawn to the arrests of Zionist activists, some of whom have been released, but others are still in jail.

Note

1. A. Dagan, from September 1960 Acting Director of the Eastern Europe Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

550. W. Eytan (Paris) to the West European Division. 15 December 1960

Coded Tel. 601; Inc.: 130.09/2350/3

Eytan reports that in the pogroms against Algeria's Jews there was damage to property and to institutions, but there were no casualties. If Israel plans to send emissaries to Algeria, it should inform the French authorities that their aim is to study, to report and to allay tension. If anything is said about their planning to defend the Jews, the French will deny them entry and reply that that is their duty.

Not one Jew has so far approached the Jewish Agency offices to enquire about emigrating to Israel. Eytan informed the board of the Alliance association which is about to convene to discuss the situation, that Israel will take in any Jew wishing to come there. The board expressed its satisfaction at this statement, but one of the members commented that the well-off will prefer to emigrate to France.

551. Israel Legation in Bucharest to A. Dagan and Sh. Avigur. 29 December 1960

Coded Tel. 594; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3

Bendor reports on his leave-taking meeting with Dumitrescu, one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Deputy Minister utilized the meeting for accusing the Legation's staff of espionage, of Zionist propaganda, of illicit trading in currency and jewelry, and of using their trips and visits to the synagogues for these purposes. He based himself on Prime Minister Stoica warning[4] and pointed to possible grave results if these acts were not stopped. He also repeated the recommendation about visits to synagogues. Bendor categorically rejected these accusations.

Notes

1. Bendor transmitted in this telegram (28.12.1960, 130.09/2298/3) a preliminary summary of his talk with Dumitrescu which is set out in full in the present document.
2. Bendor cabled that he feared the Rumanians were about to expel a member of the Legation's staff, and therefore it was of importance that his replacement arrive as soon as possible. He did not think he would be admitted for a farewell visit by the Rumanian Prime Minister or his deputy. (28.12.1960, *ibid.*)
3. See No. 547.
4. See No. 541.
5. See No. 552.

552. Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to A. Dagan. 29 December 1960

Coded Tel. 597; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3

Bendor remarks that Dumitrescu's outburst[1] was puzzling on several points: Why did he deliver such a grave warning on the eve of Bendor's termination of service in Bucharest? What is the reason for such anger at Israel? What exactly are they angry about — is it about the refusal to follow their recommendation about visits to synagogues? Why do they hurl baseless accusations at the Legation's staff? Are they preparing the ground for renewed restrictions on the Legation (travelling, visits, blockading the Legation)? Are they about to expel some official? Will they renew their attempts to prevent contacts between the Jews and the Legation staff?

Bendor recommends as follows: His replacement should be dispatched to Bucharest as soon as possible.[4] The possibility should be considered that someone from the Legation would be expelled even before Bendor left the country. Plans should be made for helping the Jews in case their contacts with the Legation are severed. The policy of visits to the synagogues and travel outside Bucharest should be reviewed. Bendor concludes with saying that his impression is that the Rumanians' manifestations of anger will not stop the emigration.

Notes

1. No. 551.
2. The matter remains obscure.
3. Moshe David Rosen, the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in Rumania.
4. Katriel Salmon was appointed to replace Bendor; he arrived in Bucharest in April 1961.
5. The immigration from Rumania did increase in 1961, when 20,778 people immigrated as against 9,247 in 1960.

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Abbreviations:

I.D.F. — Israel Defence Forces.

n — note

INDEX OF TOPICS AND PLACES

References are to document number. See Companion Volume for summaries of Hebrew documents and Main Volume for English and French documents.